{ "id": 4160577, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PATRICIA DAWN ABSHIRE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Abshire", "decision_date": "2008-09-16", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1185", "first_page": "594", "last_page": "608", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 N.C. App. 594" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639659 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633572 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638286 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635999 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 S.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640710 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36-37", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted; alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/659/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Cal. App. 4th 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 40885 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/112/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743463 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "\"Domicile denotes one's permanent, established home as distinguished from a temporary, although actual, place of residence. When absent therefrom, it is the place to which he intends to return (animus revertendi" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573011 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793573 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3737474 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9380301 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "noting that the defendant notified the sheriff's office by telephone \"when he moved from Fifth Street to East Raleigh Avenue on 18 August 1998,\" but failed to fill out a change of address form until 6 November 1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9130206 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "noting that the defendant notified the sheriff's office by telephone \"when he moved from Fifth Street to East Raleigh Avenue on 18 August 1998,\" but failed to fill out a change of address form until 6 November 1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "noting that when a sheriff's deputy visited the defendant's registered address in March 2002, the \"occupant informed the deputy that she had been residing in the house since May 2001 and did not know defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8997424 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "noting that when a sheriff's deputy visited the defendant's registered address in March 2002, the \"occupant informed the deputy that she had been residing in the house since May 2001 and did not know defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376497 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156150 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted; alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "570" }, { "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135812 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)(1)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(al)" }, { "page": "(b)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.79", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "659 S.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640710 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "36-37", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/659/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14.208.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8998116 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573011 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156150 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1174, "char_count": 35038, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.2983395943161165 }, "sha256": "cc2b9105d6ce4f649558451b74168625e660934b010d3567ed21b0428f283d36", "simhash": "1:a82f7120502f8472", "word_count": 5734 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:54:33.452279+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STROUD concurs.", "Judge HUNTER dissents by separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PATRICIA DAWN ABSHIRE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nOn 28 February 2007, Patricia Dawn Abshire (defendant) was convicted by a jury of failing to comply with sex offender registration in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11. Defendant received a sentence of thirteen to sixteen months\u2019 imprisonment. Her sentence was suspended for eighteen months and she was placed on supervised probation. Defendant now appeals. For the reasons stated below, we vacate her conviction.\nI. Background\nDefendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child in 1995. As a result, she must comply with the requirements of the North Carolina Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs (the Registration Program). Under the Registration Program, she must \u201cmaintain registration with the sheriff of the county where [she] resides.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.79(a) (2005). Each sheriff has \u201cforms for registering person as required . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(b) (2005). These forms require a registering person to provide, among other things, her \u201chome address.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(b)(1) (2005). \u201cIf a person required to register changes address, the person shall provide written notice of the new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a) (2005).\nOn 19 July 2006, defendant submitted a change of address form to the Caldwell County Sheriffs Office. She listed her old address as 2155 White Pine Dr. #9, Granite Falls, NC, in Caldwell County. She listed her new address as 3410 Gragg Price Lane, Hudson, NC, also in Caldwell County. This was the thirteenth change of address form that defendant had submitted since becoming subject to the Registration Program requirements.\nRoss Lee Price, the father of defendant\u2019s then-boyfriend, owned and lived in the house at 3410 Gragg Price Lane. Defendant\u2019s then-boyfriend was incarcerated at the time. On or about 19 August 2006, someone broke into the house at Gragg Price Lane and stole defendant\u2019s daughter\u2019s computer. Approximately ten days later, defendant and her two children began spending the night at defendant\u2019s parents\u2019 house, located on Poovey Drive in Granite Falls, also in Caldwell County. She slept at Gragg Price Lane on 9 September and 14 September 2006 and received her mail there. According to defendant\u2019s testimony, she also maintained a personal telephone number at Gragg Price Lane and returned \u201calmost everyday\u201d to do laundry, pick up fresh clothes, \u201chang out,\u201d and to feed her dog, fish, and three cats. She and her father both testified that she never brought a suitcase to Poovey Drive. Defendant also testified that she \u201cnever planned on moving [to Poovey Drive], living there, anything like that. Gragg Price Lane was mine and my children\u2019s home. My father\u2019s was just a getaway.\u201d\nOn 13 September 2006, defendant\u2019s brother attacked her. According to the criminal complaint she filed on 18 September 2006, her brother punched her \u201cin the face, head, ribs, and stomach,\u201d and \u201cthreatened to kill [her] and make [her] daughters watch [her die.]\u201d On the criminal complaint, defendant listed her address as Poovey Drive.\nOn 18' September 2006, Detective Aaron S. Barlowe of the Caldwell County Sheriff\u2019s Office began an investigation into defendant\u2019s whereabouts after receiving a report from a social worker that defendant could not be found at Gragg Price Lane. Detective Barlowe spoke with Price on 18 September 2006. Detective Barlowe testified that Price told him that defendant \u201cwas not living there at the residence\u201d and had gone to \u201cstay with her father.\u201d Detective Barlowe testified that Price felt \u201cthat she. ha[d] been gone for more than ten days,\u201d but \u201cat the same time indicated, \u2018She is planning on moving back to the house at some point,\u2019 but did not know when.\u201d Detective Barlowe asked what day defendant \u201cactually moved out and he said he wasn\u2019t very good with dates and couldn\u2019t remember that, but did indicate that she had been gone for two to three weeks, but might have stayed a night.\u201d Price testified that he might have said those things to Detective Barlowe, but could not remember clearly because of the passage of time.\nDetective Barlowe arrested defendant and she signed the following statement on 19 September 2006:\nAbout 10 days after I filed the breaking and entering report when my house was broken into and my daughter\u2019s computer was stolen I went to stay with my father at 5739 Poovey Drive. I decided that if I went to stay with my dad for a week or two, I could get my emotions together. I told Ross that I was going to stay with my dad so I could get my self emotionally stable and I would come back home. I was planning on going back home this past weekend but I was attacked by my brother and I decided to stay with my dad for a little bit longer. I am. moving back into the house on Friday after her [sic] girls are out of school. I still received my mail at 3410 Gragg Price Lane[.] I would pick the mail up or Ross would bring me my mail about twice a week. I went back and stayed the night on the 9th and 14th of September. I was not planning n [sic] moving from the house but only staying for a week or two with my father.\nDetective Barlowe also received the following note from defendant\u2019s father, Robert Abshire: \u201cTo Whom it may Concern, Patricia has staye [sic] at my home for the past 5-6 weeks. During that time she would go to Ross\u2019s Houses [sic] and stay once every 7-10 days[.]\u201d\nII. Subject Matter Jurisdiction\nDefendant first argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was fatally deficient. The indictment alleged, \u201cOn or about August 30 to September 4, 2006[;] the defendant moved to a residence at 5739 Poovey Drive, Granite Falls, NC 28630 and the defendant had not contacted the Caldwell County Sheriff\u2019s Office to change her address within 10 days of that move) [sic].\u201d The indictment stated that the offense had occurred \u201cON OR ABOUT September 14 to 18, 2006.\u201d\nAn indictment must include\nA statement or cross reference in each count indicating that the offense charged was committed on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time. Error as to a date or its omission is not ground for dismissal of the charges or for reversal of a conviction if time was not of the essence with respect to the charge and the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(4) (2005).\nDefendant argues that \u201cthe vagueness and inexactness of the dates alleged for the violation in the indictment are fatal . . . .\u201d Specifically, she argues that by alleging a range of dates during which the offense occurred, \u201cthe violation is so broad as to subject [defendant] to the possibility of being subjected to double jeopardy under the same facts.\u201d We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(4) allows indictments to designate a \u201cperiod of time\u201d during which \u201cthe offense charged was committed.\u201d Here, the indictment alleged a four-day period of time during which the offense could have occurred. \u201c[A] variance as to time ... becomes material and of the essence when it deprives a defendant of an opportunity to adequately present his defense.\u201d State v. Stewart, 353 N.C. 516, 518, 546 S.E.2d 568, 569 (2001) (quotations and citation omitted). \u201cWhen . . . the defendant relies on the date set forth in the indictment to prepare his defense, and the evidence produced by the State substantially varies to the prejudice of the defendant,\u201d an indictment does not meet the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(4). Id. (citations omitted). In Stewart, the indictment listed the date of the offense as \u201c7-01-1991 to 7-31-1991,\u201d and the \u201cdefendant prepared and presented alibi evidence in direct reliance on those dates.\u201d Id. However, the State \u201cpresented no evidence of a specific act occurring during July 1991.\u201d Id. at 519, 546 S.E.2d at 570. Our Supreme Court held that \u201c[u]nder the unique facts and circumstances of this case, . . . the dramatic variance between the date set forth in the indictment and the evidence presented by the State prejudiced defendant by depriving him of an opportunity to adequately present his defense.\u201d Id. (quotations and citation omitted).\nHere, the State\u2019s evidence focused on events that occurred between 30 August 2006 and 19 September 2006. The State presented evidence of defendant\u2019s whereabouts between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006 in the form of defendant\u2019s signed statement from 19 September 2006. In that statement, she stated, \u201cAbout 10 days after I filed the breaking and entering report when my house was broken into and my daughter\u2019s computer was stolen I went to stay with my father at 5739 Poovey Drive.\u201d Defendant testified that she filed the breaking and entering report on 20 August 2006. It follows from that evidence that defendant \u201cwent to stay\u201d at her father\u2019s home between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006. Whether that evidence was sufficient to support every element of the crime charged is the subject of defendant\u2019s next argument.\nIII. Insufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant moved to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and the close of all evidence. The trial court verbally denied the motion in both instances. Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant changed her address, and therefore the trial court should have granted her motion to dismiss. We agree.\nOur review of the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss is well understood. [W]here the sufficiency of the evidence ... is challenged, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, with all favorable inferences. We disregard defendant\u2019s evidence except to the extent it favors or clarifies the State\u2019s case. When a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. Substantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\nState v. Hinkle, 189 N.C. App. 762, 766, 659 S.E.2d 34, 36-37 (2008) (quotations and citation omitted; alteration in original).\nThe crime in question, failing to register a \u201cchange of address\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11, has three essential elements: (1) the defendant is \u201ca person required to register,\u201d (2) the defendant \u201cchanges address,\u201d and (3) the defendant fails to \u201cprovide written notice of the new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9, 14-208.11 (2005). Defendant does not dispute that she is \u201ca person required to register.\u201d She does dispute, however, that she changed her address.\nThe term \u201cchange of address\u201d is not defined in the statute or the case law. The statute includes a list of definitions, but neither \u201cchange\u201d nor \u201caddress\u201d is among them. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6 (2005). We have previously addressed whether defendants violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11 by failing to register a change of address, but in each of those cases, the \u201cchange of address\u201d in question was obvious or was not at issue on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 178 N.C. App. 154, 164, 630 S.E.2d 732, 738 (2006) (noting that the \u201cdefendant\u2019s problems with his father\u2019s girlfriend began soon after he began living at th[e registered] address [in June 2003], and caused defendant to move out soon thereafter,\u201d which supported the State\u2019s position that the defendant was no longer living at the registered address in June 2004); State v. Harrison, 165 N.C. App. 332, 333, 598 S.E.2d 261, 261 (2004) (noting that when a sheriff\u2019s deputy visited the defendant\u2019s registered address in March 2002, the \u201coccupant informed the deputy that she had been residing in the house since May 2001 and did not know defendant\u201d); State v. Holmes, 149 N.C. App. 572, 578, 562 S.E.2d 26, 31 (2002) (noting that the defendant notified the sheriff\u2019s office by telephone \u201cwhen he moved from Fifth Street to East Raleigh Avenue on 18 August 1998,\u201d but failed to fill out a change of address form until 6 November 1998); State v. Parks, 147 N.C. App. 485, 487, 556 S.E.2d 20, 22 (2001) (noting that the defendant had submitted Registration Program information under false pretenses when he registered his ex-wife\u2019s address even after she \u201cinformed him by letter that she was obtaining a divorce, and that her home in Concord would no longer be his residence,\u201d \u201cinstalled new locks on the doors to her house and transported defendant\u2019s personal property to his sister\u2019s home\u201d while the defendant was still incarcerated). Accordingly, we find the existing case law uninstructive on this point.\n\u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.\u201d In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 292, 643 S.E.2d 920, 923 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, however, we are confronted with language that is not clear and unambiguous. At trial, both the jury and the judge questioned the statute\u2019s meaning. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge requesting \u201ca copy of law stating what constitutes a residence in regards to sex offenders . . . .\u201d The trial judge read the note in open court to the attorneys and commented, \u201cI looked in the statute yesterday to see whether or not there was any definition for change of address, because that is\u2014 that\u2019s the term of art that\u2019s used in this statute and is definitely ambiguous....\u201d After some discussion, the prosecutor recommended \u201cjust to read the instruction again, so they can hear the law as to the elements.\u201d The trial judge replied, \u201cIt\u2019s a bad law or a poorly worded law; poorly worded instruction.\u201d The judge then brought the jury back to the courtroom and re-read portions of the jury instructions. Addressing the jury\u2019s request for a definition, he stated:\nMembers of the jury, the words I have used in these instructions are to be given their ordinary meaning. There is no extra special meaning or different meaning than these words are used commonly in the English language. I\u2019m not going to define any words for you, but I\u2019m simply going to instruct you that you are to use the ordinary meanings that these words have as commonly used in the English language.\nWe agree with Judge Poovey that the term \u201cchange of address\u201d is ambiguous.\n\u201c[W]hen the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment.\u201d Id. (quotations and citations omitted). \u201cIn discerning the intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible.\u201d State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 836, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005) (citation omitted).\nThe purpose of the Registration Program is\nto assist law enforcement agencies\u2019 efforts to protect communities by requiring persons who are convicted of sex offenses or of certain other offenses committed against minors to register with law enforcement agencies, to require the exchange of relevant information about those offenders among law enforcement agencies, and to authorize the access to necessary and relevant information about those offenders to others ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 (2005). In reaching this conclusion, the General Assembly specifically recognized that \u201claw enforcement officers\u2019 efforts to protect communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses or certain offenses against minors are impaired by the lack of information available to law enforcement agencies about convicted offenders who live within the agency\u2019s jurisdiction.\u201d Id.\nThe section that follows the registration requirement, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9A, sets out how law enforcement agencies verify each registrant\u2019s \u201caddress\u201d:\n(1) Every year on the anniversary of a person\u2019s initial registration date, the Division shall mail a nonforwardable verification form to the last reported address of the person.\n(2) The person shall return the verification form to the sheriff within 10 days after the receipt of the form.\n(3) The verification form shall be signed by the person and shall indicate whether the person still resides at the address last reported to the sheriff. If the person has a new address then the person shall indicate that fact and the new address.\n(4) If the person fails to return the verification form to the sheriff within 10 days after receipt of the form, the person is subject to the penalties provided in G.S. 14-208.11. If the verification form is returned to the sheriff as undeliverable, the sheriff shall make a reasonable attempt to verify that the person is residing at the registered address. . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9A (2005). A reasonable reading of \u00a7 14-208.9A indicates that one sends mail to an \u201caddress\u201d and a person can reside at an \u201caddress.\u201d Section 14-208.7 sets out the information that a registrant must register with the sheriff and it specifies that a registrant must list her \u201chome address.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(b).(l) (2005). The penalty provisions in \u00a7 14-208.11 refer to a registrant\u2019s \u201caddress,\u201d rather than a registrant\u2019s \u201chome address,\u201d but this may be explained by the separate obligation of certain nonresident registrants who are \u201cemployed or expectf] to be employed at an institution of higher education\u201d to register the \u201caddress of' the educational institution at which the person is or expects to be employed.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(al), (b)(6) (2005). Such nonresident registrants must register both their home addresses and their work addresses. Defendant does not fall into this category of registrants and the only address that the Registration Program required her to register in 2006 was her \u201chome address.\u201d Therefore, with respect to her appeal, we read the terms \u201caddress\u201d and \u201chome address\u201d interchangeably. Accordingly, reading \u00a7 14-208.9A with \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.5, 14-208.7, and 14-208.9, we define a \u201chome address,\u201d as it applies to the Registration Program, as a place where a registrant resides and where that registrant receives mail or other communication.\nWe caution that this definition of \u201chome address\u201d is not synonymous with \u201cdomicile,\u201d just as \u201cresidence and domicile are not convertible terms.\u201d Hall v. Board of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 605, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1972). \u201cDomicile\u201d is a term of art and has a more fixed meaning in the law than \u201chome address\u201d or \u201cresidence.\u201d See, e.g., id. at 605, 187 S.E.2d at 55 (\u201cDomicile denotes one\u2019s permanent, established home as distinguished from a temporary, although actual, place of residence. When absent therefrom, it is the place to which he intends to return (animus revertendi); it is the place where he intends to remain permanently, or for an indefinite length of time, or until some unexpected event shall occur to induce him to leave (animus manendi').\"'). The General Assembly chose to use the terms \u201chome address\u201d and \u201cresidence\u201d rather than \u201cdomicile,\u201d and we would be overstepping our bounds by reading \u201cdomicile\u201d into the statute.\nWe note that the State urges us to read \u201caddress\u201d as \u201clocation,\u201d which we decline to do because such a reading is inconsistent with \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.7 and 14-208.9A, is inconsistent with the statute\u2019s purpose, and is logistically impossible. The State explains in its brief that \u201ceven a person who is temporarily at a location with a different address from the one at which he or she is registered is required to notify the sheriff of that change no later than the tenth day after the address change.\u201d If any change in location triggered an address change, then every registrant would be under a continuing obligation to re-register her address every ten days unless she never left her registered address. Each time a registrant left her address to go to work or to the post office or to the grocery store, she would trigger an address change, which in turn would trigger a new registration requirement. A prudent registrant would register her address as the sheriffs office and return every ten days to submit a new registration form stating her address as the sheriff\u2019s office. Registering a registrant\u2019s location every ten days does not further the statute\u2019s purpose of increasing the reliability of information about registered sex offenders because the -only information available is a series of snapshots of a registrant\u2019s location every ten days. Furthermore, it appears from the limited cases previously before this Court that law enforcement agencies do not enforce the Registration Program in this manner and instead expect registrants to register their \u201chome address\u201d as stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(b)(l). The General Assembly has resolved these problems for certain registrants by requiring them to wear Global Positioning System monitors, which use satellites to track registrants\u2019 locations through time and space. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.40, 14-208.40A (2007) (establishing a satellite-based monitoring system for registrants who are sexually violent predators, recidivists, convicted of aggravated offenses, or have \u201ccommitted an offense involving the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor\u201d and \u201crequire [] the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring\u201d).\nReturning to the case at bar, with a definition of \u201chome address\u201d in hand, we hold that the State did not present substantial evidence that defendant changed her address between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006 as alleged in the indictment. We view the evidence \u201cin the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 665, 652 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, the State presented no evidence that defendant stopped receiving mail or other communications at Gragg Price Lane between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006. According to defendant\u2019s statement, she still received her mail at Gragg Price Lane and either picked up the mail herself or had Price bring her the mail. During direct examination by the State, Price testified that defendant received her mail at Gragg Price Lane during that time, and that defendant came by the house to collect it.\nThe State also did not present substantial evidence that defendant had stopped residing at Gragg Price Lane between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006 and started residing at Poovey Drive. The only evidence that the State offered on this matter was Officer Barlowe\u2019s testimony about what Price and defendant\u2019s father had told him. Officer Barlowe testified that, on 18 September 2006, Price told him that defendant went to stay with her father two or three weeks earlier. Officer Barlowe also testified that, on 18 September 2006, Robert Abshire told him that defendant had been staying at Poovey Drive for about two weeks. The State offered an undated note written by Robert Abshire saying that defendant had stayed at Poovey Drive \u201cfor \u25a0 the past 5-6 weeks,\u201d but never established when the note was written or that defendant began her stay at Poovey Drive between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006. The State also offered defendant\u2019s criminal complaint in which she listed her address as Poovey Drive. However, the complaint is dated 18 September 2006 and does not support a finding that defendant resided at Poovey Drive before 18 September 2006 or took up a residence there between 30 August 2006 and 4 September 2006.\nThe State did not present evidence of any other indicia that defendant had changed her residence. It did not show, for example, that defendant had removed her personal belongings from Gragg Price Lane to Poovey Drive. Instead, defendant testified that she left all of her personal belongings at Gragg Price Lane, including her pets, and that she returned each day to retrieve new clothing for herself and her children and to feed her animals. She testified that she never packed a suitcase. The State did not show that defendant stopped sleeping at Gragg Price Lane. According to the State\u2019s evidence, defendant slept at Gragg Price Lane twice after the alleged address change. The State did not show that defendant stopped holding out Gragg Price Lane to the public as her address. The State\u2019s only evidence that defendant held out a different address to the public was her criminal complaint, which was dated and filed well after the alleged change of address occurred. To present substantial evidence that a defendant has changed her address within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11, the State need not necessarily show that the defendant removed her personal belongings from a particular address, stopped sleeping at a particular address, or stopped holding out to the public a particular address as her own; however, in this case, something more was needed.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and we vacate defendant\u2019s conviction.\nVacated.\nJudge STROUD concurs.\nJudge HUNTER dissents by separate opinion.\n. Although judgments from defendant\u2019s indecent liberties with a child case appear to have been entered as State\u2019s exhibits during the trial, the judgments were not a part of the record on appeal and we rely solely on testimony for information about her conviction.\n. The General Assembly amended several sections of the Registration Program effective 1 December 2006 and 1 June 2007. However, defendant\u2019s alleged crimes occurred before these amendments took effect, so we evaluate her conviction under the 2005 statutes.\n. See People v. North, 112 Cal. App. 4th 621 (2003), for a more complete discussion of the logistical problems posed by requiring registrants to register their \u201clocations.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." }, { "text": "HUNTER, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI agree with the majority that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. I disagree, however, with the majority\u2019s conclusion\u2019 that the trial court erred in denying Patricia Dawn Abshire\u2019s (\u201cdefendant\u201d) motion to dismiss. Instead, I would hold that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11 (2005), requiring registration of sex offenders, and would therefore find no error.\nAs the majority correctly notes, in considering a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of insufficient evidence, \u201c \u2018we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, with all favorable inferences. We disregard defendant\u2019s evidence except to the extent it favors or clarifies the State\u2019s case.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hinkle, 189 N.C. App. 762, 766, 659 S.E.2d 34, 36 (2008) (citation omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, \u201c \u2018the trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of .each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u2019 \u201d Id. at-, 659 S.E.2d at 36-37 (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as \u201c \u2018evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 766, 659 S.E.2d at 37 (citation omitted).\nI agree with the majority that there are three essential elements for the crime of failing to register a \u201cchange of address\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11. Those elements are that (1) the defendant is a \u201c[a] person required ... to register,\u201d (2) the defendant \u201cchange[s his or her] address,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11, and (3) the defendant fails to \u201cprovide written notice of the new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a) (2005). In the instant case, defendant only argues that she did not \u201cchange [her] address\u201d in order to trigger a violation.\nThe majority defines \u201caddress\u201d for purposes of the Registration Program, \u201cas a place where a registrant resides and where that registrant receives mail or other communication.\u201d I do not read the statute so narrowly.\n\u201cThe purpose of the Article is to prevent recidivism because \u2018sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitment and . . . protection of the public from sex offenders is of paramount governmental interest.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sakobie, 165 N.C. App. 447, 450, 598 S.E.2d 615, 617 (2004) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 (2003)). An additional purpose of the registry requirement is to assist \u201claw enforcement officers\u2019 efforts to protect communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who commit [a] sex offense]]\u201d by providing information as to where the registrant resides. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14.208.5 (2005). Under the majority\u2019s definition, a person required to register could easily thwart these purposes by receiving his or her mail at a post office box. Instead, I would define \u201caddress\u201d as the place where the person is actually living, whether temporary or permanent.\nThis definition of \u201caddress\u201d is consistent with our Supreme Court\u2019s definition of residence. Hall v. Board of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972). When distinguishing domicile and residence, the Court held:\nResidence simply indicates a person\u2019s actual place of abode, whether permanent or temporary. Domicile denotes one\u2019s permanent, established home as distinguished from a temporary, although actual, place of residence. When absent therefrom, it is the place to which he intends to return (animus revertendi); it is the place where he intends to remain permanently, or for an indefinite length of time, or until some unexpected event shall occur to induce him to leave (animus manendi).\nId. at 605,187 S.E.2d at 55. Thus, to serve the purpose intended by the sex offender registration statute, when a person required to register changes residence, even temporarily, that new address is the person\u2019s official \u201caddress\u201d which must be registered with the State. Even if defendant in the case at bar was not changing her domicile permanently to her parents\u2019 home, there was sufficient evidence that she changed her residence such that a reasonable jury could find she was required to change her address in accordance with the statute.\nFurthermore, I find support for such a definition in the Act\u2019s treatment of non-resident students and for non-resident workers. These classifications of offenders are defined as persons who are not residents of North Carolina and are here for a specific purpose, yet they must register pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a)(l). In either situation, it is immaterial as to where the registrant is receiving mail or other communications. Instead, registration is required because the individual will be living in North Carolina for at least some period of time. Thus, the question is whether defendant in this case, was living at her parents\u2019 home and failed to register this change. I would hold that the State provided sufficient evidence that defendant had in fact began living at her parents\u2019 home and failed to register.\nThe State presented evidence tending to show that defendant was living at her parents\u2019 home in Granite Falls, North Carolina, and not at her registered address in Hudson, North Carolina. Indeed, Ross Price, with whom defendant had been living prior to her move to the unregistered, address, indicated that defendant had not been living with him for three weeks and he did not know where she was. Mr. Price also informed Detective Barlowe that as of 18 September 2006, defendant had been gone from his residence for approximately two to three weeks but may have stayed there a night. Although defendant testified that she kept her own phone line at the Price residence, Mr. Price testified that he suspected defendant had visited his place after she began living with her parents to help him with his phone bill.\nMoreover, defendant\u2019s father, Robert Abshire, provided a note on defendant\u2019s behalf that defendant gave to Detective Barlowe when she was arrested. The note indicated that defendant had been staying at Mr. Abshire\u2019s home for five to six weeks prior to her arrest. Additionally, there was evidence defendant completed an affidavit on 18 September 2006 to have charges taken out against her brother for an assault in which she listed her parents\u2019 address in Granite Falls as her residence.\nThis evidence, and the fact that defendant admitted she had only spent two nights at the residence of Mr. Price, support a reasonable inference that defendant changed her address thereby triggering the requirement to notify the sheriff of her new address. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and would reject defendant\u2019s assignments of error.\n. In determining that the State had not presented sufficient evidence, the majority relies, in part, on defendant\u2019s testimony. As the majority quotes in its opinion and as I have quoted here, defendant\u2019s evidence is disregarded \u201c \u2018except to the extent it favors or clarifies the State\u2019s case.\u2019 \"Hinkle,-N.C. App. at-, 659 S.E.2d at 36 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the majority has incorrectly applied the standard of review in this case.", "type": "dissent", "author": "HUNTER, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy Strickland, for the State.", "James N. Freeman, Jr., for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PATRICIA DAWN ABSHIRE, Defendant\nNo. COA07-1185\n(Filed 16 September 2008)\n1. Sexual Offenders\u2014 sex offender registration \u2014 date of offense \u2014 indictment sufficient\nAn indictment for failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute was not fatally deficient as to the time during which the offense occurred where it alleged that defendant moved \u201con or about August 30 to September 4, 2006,\u201d and that the offense occurred \u201con or about September 14 to 18, 2006.\u201d\n2. Sexual Offenders\u2014 registration \u2014 temporary move\nThe State did not present sufficient evidence that a registered sex offender had changed her address without notice in violation of the registration statute where she temporarily stayed with her father, but continued to receive her mail at the registered address and did not present any other indicia that she had changed her residence, such as moving her belongings and pets, or not holding out the registered address to the public as her address. The only address defendant was required to register was her home address, which is not synonymous with domicile.\nJudge HUNTER dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 February 2007 by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Caldwell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 March 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy Strickland, for the State.\nJames N. Freeman, Jr., for defendant." }, "file_name": "0594-01", "first_page_order": 622, "last_page_order": 636 }