{ "id": 4160237, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT COLTER HINCHMAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hinchman", "decision_date": "2008-09-16", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1549", "first_page": "657", "last_page": "667", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 N.C. App. 657" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635719 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640352, 12640353 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0593-01", "/se2d/656/0593-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640352, 12640353, 12640414, 12640415 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0593-01", "/se2d/656/0593-02", "/se2d/657/0023-02", "/se2d/657/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638445 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718753 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 435", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605295 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11470872 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02" }, { "page": "460-61", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" }, { "page": "855" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437376 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 L. Ed. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793005 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8204998 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96", "parenthetical": "\"Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial - for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523768 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520060 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199-200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720417, 4725089, 4720299, 4724022, 4718422 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0611-05", "/nc/313/0611-02", "/nc/313/0611-01", "/nc/313/0611-03", "/nc/313/0611-04" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527407 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-139.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800, 802" }, { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11792739 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117, 120-21" }, { "page": "120-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(g)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 936, "char_count": 23142, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.02114797974916e-08, "percentile": 0.46492015557663785 }, "sha256": "c50a325002dd94ae533d260db93d7a537f3f812eb5df2858185611470afd7986", "simhash": "1:225daf1676ab94f2", "word_count": 3744 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:54:33.452279+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT COLTER HINCHMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nRobert Colter Hinchman (\u201cdefendant\u201d) was charged with driving while impaired (\u201cDWI\u201d), driving after consuming alcohol by a person under age twenty-one, and reckless driving. Defendant was convicted by a jury of DWI and was sentenced to sixty days\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for a period of twelve months subject to terms of probation. Defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence.\nThe evidence at trial tended to show that on 23 June 2004 defendant, who was then under the age of twenty-one, and some of his friends had been drinking alcohol at defendant\u2019s parents\u2019 house before setting out in defendant\u2019s vehicle. While driving, defendant lost control of the vehicle, which struck a guardrail and overturned. Within minutes, Trooper William Brown arrived at the scene. Defendant identified himself as the driver of the car and stated that he was unhurt. Trooper Brown detected an odor of alcohol on defendant\u2019s breath, noticing also that his eyes were red and glassy and that he appeared to be under the age of twenty-one. After asking defendant to take a seat in his patrol car, Trooper Brown administered an Alco-sensor to defendant to establish probable cause that defendant had been drinking. Based upon his observations, Trooper Brown opined that defendant was appreciably impaired by some substance. Trooper Brown then arrested and charged defendant with DWI in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1, driving after consuming by a person under age twenty-one in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.3, and reckless driving in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-140.\nTrooper Brown possessed a permit, issued by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (\u201cDHHS\u201d), allowing him to administer chemical analyses of the blood, and he transported defendant to Pitt County Memorial Hospital (the \u201chospital\u201d) to obtain a blood sample. Trooper Brown read defendant his implied consent rights twice because defendant had difficulty comprehending them the first time. Defendant was allowed up to thirty minutes to contact an attorney or witness to view the testing procedures, but he was unable to reach an attorney. Defendant then submitted to the blood test. June Anderson, who worked in the blood laboratory at the hospital, withdrew defendant\u2019s blood sample, and Trooper Brown submitted it to the State Bureau of Investigations (\u201cSBI\u201d) for chemical analysis. SBI chemical analyst Richard Waggoner, who held a permit, issued by DHHS, to perform chemical analyses of blood, later analyzed the blood sample and completed a laboratory report on 30 August 2004 indicating a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10.\nOn 16 September 2004, the laboratory report was served on defendant. Trooper Brown filed an affidavit and revocation report with the district court on 2 November 2004. The district court entered a revocation order on 5 November 2004 in defendant\u2019s absence, ordering him to surrender his driver\u2019s license and revoking his license for a minimum of thirty days, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5. Defendant surrendered his license on 10 November 2004.\nOn 18 November 2004, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charge of driving while impaired, arguing that the revocation of his license constituted criminal punishment and that further prosecution would subject him to double jeopardy. On 11 April 2005, the district court granted defendant\u2019s motion and later entered a written order dismissing all charges, upon a finding:\n[T]he revocation of Defendant\u2019s drivers license, approximately 140 days after the date of offense, does not constitute the necessary prompt legal action to remove Defendant from the highways of North Carolina in order to protect the public and therefore, is a punishment which prohibits further prosecution of the Defendant for these charges which would subject him to double jeopardy.\nOn 19 April 2005, the State appealed the order to superior court, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432. Defendant moved to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal on 30 September 2005. The same day, the superior court heard the appeal, vacated the order which had dismissed the charges, and remanded the case to the district court for disposition. Defendant submitted a proposed order seeking an interlocutory appeal, but the court instead entered an order finding that the issues were not appropriately justiciable and that such an appeal would be for the purpose of delay.\nOn 25 January 2007, the district court found defendant guilty of DWI. He was sentenced at the minimum Level 5 to sixty days\u2019 imprisonment suspended for twelve months subject to defendant\u2019s comple-, tion of twenty-four hours of community service, payment of fine and court costs, and compliance with the other regular conditions of probation. Defendant appealed to superior court.\nOn 2 April 2007, defendant again filed a motion to dismiss based upon double jeopardy. The superior' court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that its previous order was the law of the case and the circumstances of defendant\u2019s case did not constitute double jeopardy.\nOn 26 and 27 July 2007, defendant was tried before a jury for DWI. The jury found defendant guilty, and the superior court imposed the sam\u00e9 sentence as the district court had imposed. The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court.\nDefendant first argues that the revocation report was not properly executed and was not \u201cexpeditiously filed\u201d with the court, as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(c), because it was filed on 2 November 2004, 132 days after his arrest on 23 June 2004. In light of these errors, defendant argues, the trial court erred in entering the revocation order.\nThe statute that was applicable at the time defendant was charged states:\nIf a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license is subject to revocation under this section, the charging officer and the chemical analyst must execute a revocation report. ... It is the specific duty of the charging officer to make sure that the report is expeditiously filed with a judicial official as required by this section.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5(c) (2005). This section also provides: \u201cA person whose license is revoked under this section may request in writing a hearing to contest the validity of the revocation. The request may be made at the time of the person\u2019s initial appearance, or within 10 days of the effective date of the revocation . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5(g).\nDefendant did not contest the validity of the revocation order through the means prescribed in the statute. \u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion . . . .\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (2008). Since defendant did not request a hearing to challenge the validity of the civil revocation order, the issue is not properly preserved and is outside the scope of our review in his criminal appeal.\nNext, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the State\u2019s motion to appeal because the State\u2019s motion (1) was filed in the wrong division of the court and (2) failed to specify the legal basis of its appeal, as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432. The applicable statute states:\n(a) Unless the rule against double jeopardy prohibits further prosecution, the State may appeal from the district court judge to the superior court:\n(1) When there has been a decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges as to one or more counts.\n(b) When the State appeals pursuant to subsection (a) the appeal is by written motion specifying the basis of the appeal made within 10 days after the entry of the judgment in the district court. The motion must be filed with the clerk and a copy served upon the defendant.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)-(b) (2007) (emphasis added).\nFirst, we conclude that defendant\u2019s argument that the motion to appeal failed to specify the legal basis of appeal is clearly without merit. The State\u2019s motion to appeal plainly asserted \u201cno competent evidence was presented to support the motion and order to dismiss\u201d and the \u201c[dismissal of the charges was contrary to law.\u201d This Court has found that the State properly stated the basis of appeal where the basis was stated in similar detail. State v. Ward, 127 N.C. App. 115, 117, 120-21, 487 S.E.2d 798, 800, 802 (1997) (holding that the State properly made a motion to appeal where it alleged that no written findings of fact supported the trial court\u2019s decision and the reasons for dismissal of the charges were \u201cnot legally proper reasons for dismissal of criminal charges without a finding of fact\u201d). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error on this point is overruled.\nDefendant also argues that the State\u2019s motion to appeal is captioned as having been filed in the district court division, while N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432 provides that \u201cthe State may appeal ... to the superior court.\" N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1432(a) (emphasis added). Defendant argues, therefore, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion and that its subsequent entry of the order vacating the district court\u2019s dismissal of the charges was error.\nEven assuming the caption to have been incorrect, defendant has shown no prejudice. See Ward, 127 N.C. App. at 120-21, 487 S.E.2d at 802 (superior court did not lose jurisdiction to hear appeal where the State deviated from the technical requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432 by captioning the appeal \u201cNotice of Appeal\u201d rather than \u201cMotion to Appeal\u201d), Therefore, we overrule this assignment of error.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence related to the chemical analysis of his blood. First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the chemical analysis because the State failed to show that the person who withdrew the blood, June Anderson, was a qualified person as defined in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-139.1(c). The applicable statute states: \u201cWhen a blood test is specified as the type of chemical analysis by the charging officer, only a physician, registered nurse, or other qualified person may withdraw the blood sample.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-139.1(c) (2005). Defendant argues that because Ms. Anderson did not testify as to her own qualifications the State could not establish that she was a \u201cqualified person.\u201d This argument ignores the governing statute and decisions of this Court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-139.1(c) specifically provides: \u201cEvidence regarding the qualifications of the person who withdrew the blood sample may be provided at trial by testimony of the charging officer or by an affidavit of the person who withdrew the blood sample and shall be sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence regarding the person\u2019s qualifications.\u201d This Court has held that where a law enforcement officer \u201ctestified that the sample was drawn by a blood technician at [the h]ospital[, t]his is evidence that the sample was drawn by a qualified person.\u201d State v. Watts, 72 N.C. App. 661, 664, 325 S.E.2d 505, 507, disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 611, 332 S.E.2d 83 (1985). Furthermore, where \u201cthe only evidence before the trial court was that a nurse was present to withdraw the blood[, and t]here was no evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding to the contrary,\u201d this Court held the State carried its burden of proof to show compliance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-139.1(c). Richardson v. Hiatt, 95 N.C. App. 196, 199-200, 381 S.E.2d 866, 868, reh\u2019g granted and modified on other grounds, 95 N.C. App. 780, 384 S.E.2d 62 (1989).\nIn the case before us, Trooper Brown testified:\nQ. And the person who drew the blood samples, Ms. Anderson, where did you get this person from?\nA. The blood lab at the hospital.\nQ. And . . . what did you see this person doing?\nA. She was working in the blood lab and had on a lab tech I uniform\u2014\nA. \u2014which was pink pants and a white shirt and her name tag, and I observed her draw the blood.\nQ. And this particular area where Ms. Anderson was working, is that an area that everyone would just have access to?\nA. No, ma\u2019am.\nHere, Trooper Brown\u2019s testimony that Ms. Anderson worked at the blood laboratory at the hospital was sufficient to show that she was a qualified person under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-139.1(c).\nDefendant further suggests Ms. Anderson\u2019s absence at trial \u201cdenied defendant his rights of confrontation and cross examination.\u201d Defendant did not assign this issue as error; thus, it is outside the scope of our review. N.C.R. App. P 10(a) (\u201c[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal . . . .\u201d). Defendant\u2019s further allegation that Trooper Brown\u2019s testimony about Ms. Anderson\u2019s qualifications was hearsay is unsupported by argument or cited authority in the brief; therefore, we take it as abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2008).\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting the laboratory report and the chemical analyst\u2019s permit because they were inadmissible testimonial evidence under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). However, this Court has held that the affidavit of a chemical analyst is nontestimonial evidence under Crawford when the \u201caffidavit [i]s limited to his objective analysis of the evidence and routine chain of custody information.\u201d State v. Heinricy, 183 N.C. App. 585, 591, 645 S.E.2d 147, 151, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 90, 656 S.E.2d 593 (2007). As in Heinricy, the laboratory report in the present case was limited to chain of custody information and the chemical analyst\u2019s affidavit that the blood alcohol concentration in the sample was found to be \u201c0.10 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of whole blood\u201d upon analysis of the sample \u201cin accordance with methods approved by the Commission for Health Services.\u201d Because the results of the chemical analysis were admissible as part of the laboratory report, we need not consider defendant\u2019s further argument that the trial court should have sustained defendant\u2019s objection to SBI Agent Aaron Joncich\u2019s testimony of defendant\u2019s blood alcohol concentration, where he simply read the information from the report.\nSeemingly as an afterthought, defendant states: \u201cFor these same reasons, Mr. Waggoner\u2019s permit should not have been admitted by and through Agent Joncich.\u201d Assuming that defendant purports to characterize Mr. Waggoner\u2019s permit as testimonial evidence inadmissible pursuant to Crawford, this argument is without merit. As our Supreme Court has noted:\n[T]he [United States] Supreme Court in Crawford indicated in dicta that business records are not testimonial. [Crawford, 541 U.S.] at 56, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 195-96 (\u201cMost of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial \u2014 for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.\u201d). The distinction between business records and testimonial evidence is readily seen. Among other attributes, business records are neutral, are created to serve a number of purposes important to the creating organization, and are not inherently subject to manipulation or abuse.\nState v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 435, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143, cert, denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Clearly, Mr. Waggoner\u2019s permit to perform chemical analyses of blood issued by the DHHS was neutral evidence and was created to serve a number of purposes other than to be used as evidence at trial, and it is not the type of testimonial evidence described in Crawford.\nLastly, defendant argues that his driver\u2019s license revocation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 constituted criminal punishment, and therefore, his later conviction of DWI violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. This Court has already addressed the issue of whether license revocation constitutes a civil remedy or a criminal punishment. In State v. Evans, 145 N.C. App. 324, 334, 550 S.E.2d 853, 860 (2001), this Court held:\nHaving examined N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 in light of the two-part analysis established by Hudson, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that Hudson requires a conclusion that the driver\u2019s license revocation found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis under both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution.\nDefendant argues that the rationale applied by this Court in Evans is inapplicable under the circumstances of his particular case because the delay of 135 days between his arrest and the license revocation did not serve the intended purposes of the statute. Nevertheless, we find dispositive additional language from Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997), overruling its earlier decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989). The Halper Court stated: \u201cSimply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual ease serves the goals of punishment.\u201d Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 501 (emphasis added). In abrogation of this statement, the Hudson Court held:\nThe analysis applied by the Halper Court deviated from our traditional double jeopardy doctrine in two key respects. . . . The second significant departure in Halper was the Court\u2019s decision to \u201casses[s] the character of the actual sanctions imposed,\u201d 490 U.S., at 447, rather than, as Kennedy demanded, evaluating the \u201cstatute on its face\u201d to determine whether it provided for what amounted to a criminal sanction, 372 U.S., at 169.\nWe believe that Halper\u2019s deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill considered. As subsequent cases have demonstrated, Halper\u2019s test for determining whether a particular sanction is \u201cpunitive,\u201d and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable. . . . Under Halper\u2019s method of analysis, a court must also look at the \u201csanction actually imposed\u201d to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated. Thus, it will not be possible to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated until a defendant has proceeded through a trial to judgment. But in those cases where the civil proceeding follows the criminal proceeding, this approach flies in the face of the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the government from even \u201cattempting a second time to punish criminally.\u201d' Helvering, 303 U.S., at 399 (emphasis added).\nHudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 460-61 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the characterization of a sanction as either civil or criminal is determined on the face of the statute and is not determined on an individual basis.\nAlthough N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 has been amended five times between the arrest at issue in Evans, which occurred in 1998, Evans, 145 N.C. App. at 325, 550 S.E.2d at 855, and defendant\u2019s arrest in this case, which occurred in 2004, the changes are minor and have little effect on the substance of the law. Defendant does not argue that any of the changes to the face of the statute transform the character of the sanction from civil to criminal, but rather, argues only that the length of time between his arrest and the license revocation counters the recognized principle behind the law that \u201c[t]he safety of the impaired driver and other people using the state\u2019s highways depends upon immediately denying the impaired driver access to the public roads.\u201d Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 494, 340 S.E.2d 720, 733 (1986) (emphasis added). In the absence of any argument that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 as written in 2004 differed in any material way from \u00a7 20-16.5 as written in 1998, we are not persuaded that this Court\u2019s reasoning in Evans should not be equally convincing in determining whether \u00a7 20-16.5 as amended in 2004 created a civil or criminal sanction. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Evans, we conclude that defendant\u2019s license revocation in 2004 pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5 was a civil remedy. Defendant\u2019s argument that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution were violated is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III, Special Counsel, for the State.", "The Robinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT COLTER HINCHMAN\nNo. COA07-1549\n(Filed 16 September 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 DWI appeal \u2014 driver\u2019s license revocation \u2014 not contested by statutory means\nA driver\u2019s license revocation was beyond the scope of a criminal appeal where defendant did not contest the validity of the revocation order through the means prescribed by statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.5(c) and (g).\n2. Courts\u2014 dismissal in district court \u2014 appeal to superior court \u2014 legal basis specified\nThere was no merit in a DWI prosecution to defendant\u2019s argument that the State failed to specify the legal basis of the motion to appeal from district to superior court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(b).\n3. Courts\u2014 appeal from district to superior court \u2014 caption in motion\nDefendant did not show prejudice from an incorrect listing of the court division in the caption of a motion to appeal a DWI dismissal in the district court to the superior court, even assuming that the caption was incorrect.\n4. Witnesses\u2014 qualification of person drawing blood \u2014 testimony of highway patrol trooper \u2014 sufficiency\nA highway patrol trooper\u2019s testimony in a DWI prosecution that the person who drew defendant\u2019s blood worked in a hospital blood laboratory was sufficient to show that the person was qualified under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-139.1(c).\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 assignment of error \u2014 argument and citation of authority \u2014 requirements\nThe question of whether a lab tech\u2019s absence at trial violated defendant\u2019s right to confrontation was beyond the scope of the review where defendant did not assign error to the issue. Moreover, defendant\u2019s argument that a trooper\u2019s testimony about a lab tech\u2019s qualifications was hearsay was not supported by argument or citation of authority.\n6. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to confrontation \u2014 laboratory report and chemical analyst\u2019s permit \u2014 nontestimonial\nA laboratory report and a chemical analyst\u2019s permit in a DWI prosecution were nontestimonial. The lab report was limited to chain of custody and blood alcohol concentration, and the permit to perform blood chemical analysis was neutral evidence created to serve a number of purposes other than evidence at trial.\n7. Constitutional Law\u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 driver\u2019s license revocation after DWI arrest \u2014 civil penalty\nA driver\u2019s license revocation after a DWI arrest was a civil remedy and did not violate double jeopardy even though defendant argued that the time between arrest and revocation did not serve the intended purpose of the revocation statute.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 27 July 2007 by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2008.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III, Special Counsel, for the State.\nThe Robinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0657-01", "first_page_order": 685, "last_page_order": 695 }