{ "id": 4161231, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ARTER NARRON, III", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Narron", "decision_date": "2008-10-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-129", "first_page": "76", "last_page": "86", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 N.C. App. 76" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "312 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755385 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639155 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 347, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (2006); and State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 165, 604 S.E.2d 886, 907 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 S.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "quoting Sugg v. Baker, 258 N.C. 333, 335, 128 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1962); State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971); State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1985); and State v. Mitchell, 48 N.C. App. 680, 682, 270 S.E.2d 117, 118 (1980)" }, { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/626/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638744 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 361, 259 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634721 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803286 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8210049 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 347, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (2006); and State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 165, 604 S.E.2d 886, 907 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552785 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526305 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570109 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560672 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47", "parenthetical": "quoting Sugg v. Baker, 258 N.C. 333, 335, 128 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1962); State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971); State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1985" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 F.3d 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7650433 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/99/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517737 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566967 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8413687 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3735876 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 361, 259 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524323 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508082 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350548 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569892 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630812 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4748896 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Shuping, 312 N.C. 421, 323 S.E.2d 350 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11796427 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Shuping, 312 N.C. 421, 323 S.E.2d 350 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 139.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding admission of Breathalyzer results" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570756 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding admission of Breathalyzer results" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-139.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(lb)" }, { "page": "(3a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 440, 323 S.E.2d 343, 349 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079887 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 440, 323 S.E.2d 343, 349 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697700 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975)" }, { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562770 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975)" }, { "page": "499-500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562180 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508874 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627639 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "citing Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 101 S.E.2d 413 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525941 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "citing Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 101 S.E.2d 413 (1958)" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755385 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0361-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1028, "char_count": 24606, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.23604375901954e-08, "percentile": 0.47747165954462983 }, "sha256": "36caa730c5229162d62497c67e1f2dc5fed3373f32aaf254c33fc05cce90e499", "simhash": "1:ab627773e5f361fc", "word_count": 3970 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:30:29.332614+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ARTER NARRON, III" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARROWOOD, Judge.\nJohn Narron, III (Defendant) appeals from judgment entered upon his conviction of impaired driving, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1. We affirm.\nDefendant was arrested on 13 January 2007 in Greenville, North Carolina, and charged with impaired driving. He was convicted in Pitt County District Court and appealed to Superior Court for trial de novo. On 5 February 2007 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge of impaired driving, on the grounds that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1 violated the North Carolina and U.S. Constitutions. He specifically challenged the statute\u2019s provision addressing chemical analysis as evidence of a defendant\u2019s blood alcohol concentration. On 10 August 2007 Judge Clifton W. Everett, Jr., entered an order denying Defendant\u2019s dismissal motion.\nDefendant was tried before a Pitt County jury on 15 October 2007. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show in pertinent part, the following: Officer W.O. Terry of the Greenville, North Carolina, Police Department testified that, while on patrol in the early morning hours of 13 January 2007, he saw Defendant in the driver\u2019s seat of a motor vehicle that was stopped \u201cin the middle of the travel lane\u201d on the left side of a downtown street. Terry approached Defendant and noticed that Defendant\u2019s eyes were red and glassy and that he had an odor of alcohol. Terry summoned a traffic safety officer and about five minutes later Greenville Police Department Corporal Michael Montanye arrived at the scene.\nOfficer Montanye testified that at 1:30 a.m. on 13 January 2007 he was on duty as a traffic safety officer in Greenville. In response to Terry\u2019s call, Montanye drove to Cotanche Street, where he saw the Defendant in a vehicle \u201cstopped in the left travel lane.\u201d Defendant told Montanye he had been at a party where he drank three beers. The officer observed that Defendant\u2019s eyes were glassy, that he was talkative, and that he smelled of alcohol. Officer Montanye performed two tests on an alcosensor, a portable machine that measures alcohol in a person\u2019s breath. When both tests showed a positive result for the presence of alcohol, Montanye placed defendant under arrest and took him to the Pitt County Detention center. There he administered an Intoxylizer test which showed an alcohol concentration of 0.08.\nDefendant did not present evidence at trial. After the presentation of evidence, the trial court submitted the case to the jury. Defendant moved for a special jury instruction regarding proof of the Defendant\u2019s blood alcohol concentration; his motion was denied. The jury found Defendant guilty of impaired driving, and the court entered judgment accordingly. From this judgment and conviction, Defendant appeals.\nStandard of Review\nDefendant argues that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional. \u201c[T]he judicial duty of passing upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is one of great gravity and delicacy. This Court presumes that any act promulgated by the General Assembly is constitutional and resolves all doubt in favor of its constitutionality.\u201d Guilford Co. Bd. of Education v. Guilford Co. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 511, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1993) (citing Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 101 S.E.2d 413 (1958)) (other citations omitted). \u201cIn challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of proof is on the challenger, and the statute must be upheld unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground.\u201d Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ., 110 N.C. App. at 511, 430 S.E.2d at 684-85 (citing Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 411 S.E.2d 143 (1991)) (other citation omitted). Moreover:\nA well recognized rule in this State is that, where a statute is susceptible to two interpretations \u2014 one constitutional and one unconstitutional \u2014 the Court should adopt the interpretation resulting in a finding of constitutionality.\nIn re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1978) (citations omitted).\nDefendant argues that certain language in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1(a)(2) (2007) renders the statute unconstitutional. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1 provides in pertinent part that:\n(a) A person commits the offense of impaired driving if he drives any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within this State:\n(1) While under the influence of an impairing substance; or\n(2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The results of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration!)]\nDefendant contends that the provision that \u201c[t]he results of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1(a)(2) \u201cconstitutes a mandatory presumption violative of his right to due process secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.\u201d We disagree.\nDefendant asserts a violation of the \u201cprinciples of due process of law which require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged and which preclude placing upon a defendant any burden to prove the nonexistence of any such element.\u201d State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 499, 268 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1980) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975)). \u201cThe three essential elements of the offense of impaired driving are (1) driving a vehicle (2) upon any public vehicular area (3)while under the influence of an impairing substance or \u2018[a]fter having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of [0.08] or more.\u2019 N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1 [(2007)]\u201d. State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 524, 342 S.E.2d 855, 856-57 (1986).\nThus, \u201cthere are two ways to prove the single offense of impaired driving: (1) showing appreciable impairment; or (2) showing an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.\u201d State v. McDonald, 151 N.C. App. 236, 244, 565 S.E.2d 273, 277 (2002) (citing State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 440, 323 S.E.2d 343, 349 (1984)). The present appeal concerns proof of impairment by showing an alcohol concentration of .08 or more. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(lb) (2007), defines \u201calcohol concentration\u201d as \u201c[t]he concentration of alcohol in a person, expressed either as: a. Grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or b. Grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(3a) (2007) defines \u201cchemical analysis\u201d in relevant part as \u201c[a] test or tests of the breath [or] blood... of a person to determine the person\u2019s alcohol concentration or presence of an impairing substance, performed in accordance with G.S. 20-139.1, including duplicate or sequential analyses.\u201d\nIn the instant case, the chemical analysis was performed on an Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, which showed Defendant\u2019s blood alcohol concentration to be eight one-hundredths grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath (.08). \u201cThe Intoxilyzer is a breath-testing instrument approved for use by the North Carolina [Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).] Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-139.1 [(2007)], [DHHS] has adopted procedures for the use of this instrument which are codified at [10A N.C.A.C. 41B.0320 and 41B.0321 (December 2007)].\u201d Machines such as the Intoxilyzer 5000 have been used for decades to measure blood alcohol concentration by chemical analysis of an individual\u2019s breath. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705, (1965) (upholding admission of Breathalyzer results). Appellate cases have noted the general reliability of this chemical analysis, observing as early as 1984 that \u201cthe science of breath analysis for alcohol concentration has become increasingly reliable ... and increasingly accepted as a means for measuring blood alcohol concentration.\u201d State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 372, 323 S.E.2d 316, 322 (1984). Smith expressly associated the reliability of chemical analysis with the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1:\n[Scientific and technological advancements which have made possible this type of analysis have removed the necessity for a subjective determination of impairment^] . . . Indeed, our legislature\u2019s recognition of this reliable and accurate innovation of blood alcohol concentration testing is manifested in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1(a)(2) which now provides that a person who \u201cafter having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after driving, an alcohol concentration of [0.08] or more\u201d, commits the offense of impaired driving.\nId. at 373, 323 S.E.2d at 323.\nHowever, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 20-138.1 and 139.1, statutory criteria must be met before results of a chemical analysis are admissible in court. The defendant may challenge the admissibility of a chemical analysis of his blood alcohol level. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 139.1 (2007) provides in relevant part that:\n(a) In any implied-consent offense under G.S. 20-16.2, a person\u2019s alcohol concentration ... as shown by a chemical analysis is admissible in evidence. This section does not limit the introduction of other competent evidence as to a person\u2019s alcohol concentration or results of other tests showing the presence of an impairing substance, including other chemical tests.\n(b) The results of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration. A chemical analysis of the breath administered pursuant to the implied-consent law is admissible in any . . . proceeding if. . .\n(1) It is performed in accordance with the rules of the Department of Health and Human Services.\n(2) The person performing the analysis had ... a current permit...\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1 states:\n(al) A person who has submitted to a chemical analysis of a blood sample, pursuant to G.S. 20-139.1(d), may use the result in rebuttal as evidence that the person did not have, at a relevant time after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.\n(bl) Nothing in this section shall preclude a person from asserting that a chemical analysis result is inadmissible pursuant to G.S. 20-139.1(b2).\n. In addition to technical challenges set out in the statutes, a defendant presumably could impeach the admissibility, credibility, or weight of the results of chemical analysis in traditional ways.\nAs a corollary of the accepted reliability of chemical analysis, and of and the presence of statutory standards for their admissibility, the longstanding common law rule is that results of a chemical analysis are sufficient evidence to submit the issue of a defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration to the factfinder:\nOnce the trial court determined that the chemical analysis of defendant\u2019s breath was valid, then the reading constituted reliable evidence and was sufficient to satisfy the State\u2019s burden of proof under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1(a)(2).\nState v. Phillips, 127 N.C. App. 391, 394, 489 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1997) (citing State v. Shuping, 312 N.C. 421, 323 S.E.2d 350 (1984)). In 2006 the North Carolina General Assembly formally codified this rule by amending N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1 to state that \u201c[t]he results of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentrationf.]\u201d Defendant asserts that this amendment creates an impermissible presumption. We do not agree.'\n\u201cA presumption of fact is defined as an inference of the existence of one fact from the existence of some other fact, or an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known.\u201d Bryant v. Burns-Hammond Const. Co., 197 N.C. 639, 643, 150 S.E. 122, 124 (1929). \u201cInferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of fact finding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime \u2014 that is, an \u2018ultimate\u2019 or \u2018elemental\u2019 fact \u2014 from the existence of one or more \u2018evidentiary\u2019 or \u2018basic\u2019 facts.\u201d State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 499-500, 268 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court has explained further that:\nThe word presumption, as lucidly pointed out by Stansbury, N. C. Evidence \u00a7 215 (2d Ed., 1963), has been used in different senses, but always upon the premise that when a certain basic fact is established another (presumed) fact is assumed or inferred. The following situations illustrate the varying uses of the word presumption: (1) If evidence to disprove the presumed fact will not be heard, we have a rule of substantive law, sometimes loosely called \u201ca conclusive presumption\u201d; (2) If the basic fact authorizes, but does not compel, the jury to find the assumed facts, we have a permissible inference or prima facie evidence; (3) If the basic fact compels the jury to find the assumed fact unless and until sufficient evidence of its nonexistence has been introduced, we have a true presumption, and, in the absence of sufficient proof to overcome it, the jury must find according to the presumption.\nState v. Cooke, 270 N.C. 644, 649, 155 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1967).\nIn the instant case, we are called upon to decide whether the provision that \u201cresults of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration\u201d creates an unconstitutional presumption. We are concerned with the interpretation of \u201cshall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove,\u201d as there is no dispute about the phrases \u201cresults of a chemical analysis\u201d or \u201ca person\u2019s alcohol concentration.\u201d We conclude that the challenged provision does not create an evidentiary or factual presumption, but simply states the standard for prima facie evidence of a defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration.\n\u201c \u2018Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.\u2019 If the language of a statute is clear, then the Court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms.\u201d State v. Crow, 175 N.C. App. 119, 123, 623 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2005) (quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)). \u201cNontechnical statutory words are to be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning.\u201d Comr. of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 54 N.C. App. 601, 605, 284 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1981) (citations omitted)).\nAs noted by Defendant, the word \u201cshall\u201d connotes that the action referred to is mandatory. \u201cIt is well established that \u2018the word \u2018shall\u2019 is generally imperative or mandatory.\u201d Multiple Claimants v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 361 N.C. 372, 378, 646 S.E.2d 356, 360 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 361, 259 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1979)). \u201cThe definition of the word \u2018deemed\u2019 in the legal context is \u2018considered\u2019 or \u2018treated as if.\u2019 black\u2019s law dictionary 415 (6th ed. 1990); Bryan A. Garner, A dictionary of modern legal usage 254 (2d ed. 1995).\u201d Ward v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 166 N.C. App. 726, 731, 603 S.E.2d 896, 900 (2004) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary treats \u201csufficient evidence\u201d as synonymous with \u201csatisfactory evidence\u201d which it defines as \u201cevidence that is sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the truth[;] Also termed sufficient evidence.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 599 (8th ed. 2004). Finally, the word \u201cprove\u201d means \u201cto establish the truth of a fact or hypothesis by satisfactory evidence.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1261 (8th ed. 2004).\nThe phrase at issue contains no obscure or technical terms. We conclude that in the context of \u201cresults of chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration\u201d the meaning of the phrase \u201cshall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove\u201d is that properly admitted results of a chemical analysis \u201cmust be treated as prima facie evidence of\u2019 a defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration.\n\u201cIn interpreting statutes, ... it is always presumed that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law.\u201d Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977). Accordingly, our conclusion is further supported by the fact that the language of the amendment is essentially the same as the established common law rule that \u201c[o]nce it is determined that the chemical analysis of the defendant\u2019s breath was valid, then a reading of [0.08] constitutes reliable evidence and is sufficient to satisfy the State\u2019s burden of proof as to this element of the offense of DWI.\u201d Shaping, 312 N.C. at 431, 323 S.E.2d at 356.\nWe also conclude that the provision that \u201cresults of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration,\u201d which we construe as a statement of the standard for prima facie evidence of a person\u2019s alcohol concentration, does not create a legal presumption.\nAs discussed above, the essential feature of a true presumption is that proof of a basic fact permits or requires the fact finder to find a different, elemental, fact. For example, \u201c[mjalice may be presumed upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a killing by the intentional use of a deadly weapon, nothing else appearing.\u201d State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 172, 367 S.E.2d 895, 907 (1988) (citation omitted). Thus, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the basic fact \u2014 a defendant\u2019s use of a deadly weapon to commit a killing \u2014 allows the jury to find the elemental fact \u2014 that the defendant acted with malice.\nThe Defendant does not articulate what he contends is the elemental fact to be \u201cpresumed\u201d upon proof of the basic fact of the existence of a properly admitted chemical analysis of his alcohol concentration, and we conclude there is none. For example, the statute does not state that \u201cresults of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove\u201d e.g., a person\u2019s degree of intoxication, or his operation of a vehicle on a state highway.\nThe \u201cresult of a chemical analysis\u201d is a report of a person\u2019s alcohol concentration, and the statute provides that the result of such a test constitutes prima facie evidence of the defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration as reported in the results. In other words, the statute simply authorizes the jury to find that the report is what it purports to be \u2014 the results of a chemical analysis showing the defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration. This is the definition of prima facie evidence of an element of any criminal offense or civil cause of action \u2014 that the jury may find it adequate proof of a fact at issue. However, there is no \u201cpresumption\u201d created with regards to some other element or factual issue. \u201cAppellee contends that the instruction at issue here did not create a presumption, mandatory or otherwise. ... We agree that no such presumption was established here. . . . The instruction did not state that upon finding certain predicate facts, the jury could infer that a necessary element of the [State\u2019s] case had been met.\u201d Koonce v. Pepe, 99 F.3d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1996).\nWe conclude that the statutory amendment simply codifies the common law threshold for prima facie evidence of a defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration. Therefore, there was no need for the trial court to call to the jury\u2019s attention that the chemical analysis was the basis of the trial court\u2019s determination that the State had presented prima facie proof of the element. If a case is submitted to the jury, then by definition, the court has determined that the State presented \u201csufficient evidence to prove\u201d each of the elements of the offense. However, we perceive no prejudice to the Defendant in the court\u2019s statement to the jury that \u201cresults of a chemical analysis are deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration.\u201d\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a special jury instruction. We disagree.\n\u201cA trial court\u2019s jury instruction \u2018is for the guidance of the jury.\u2019 Furthermore, the purpose \u2018is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.\u2019 \u2018In a criminal trial the judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law arising from all the evidence presented.\u2019 A judge has the obligation \u2018to instruct the jury on every substantive feature of the case.\u2019 \u201d\nState v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 346-47, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2006) (quoting Sugg v. Baker, 258 N.C. 333, 335, 128 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1962); State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971); State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1985); and State v. Mitchell, 48 N.C. App. 680, 682, 270 S.E.2d 117, 118 (1980)).\n\u201cHowever, \u2018[t]he burden upon the defendant is to show more than a possibility that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner.\u2019 Further, \u2018[w]here the instructions to the jury, taken as a whole, present the law fairly and clearly to the jury, we will not find error even if isolated expressions, standing alone, might be considered erroneous.\u2019 \u201d\nState v. Freeman, 185 N.C. App. 408, 419, 648 S.E.2d 876, 884 (2007) (quoting State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 347, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (2006); and State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 165, 604 S.E.2d 886, 907 (2004)).\nDefendant\u2019s argument, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a special instruction, is premised on his contention that the instruction given by the court created an impermissible presumption. As discussed above, we have rejected this argument. We conclude that the court\u2019s instructions adequately informed the jury of the law as applied to the evidence presented at trial. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons discussed above, we conclude the Defendant had a fair trial, free of reversible error.\nNo error.\nJudges BRYANT and JACKSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARROWOOD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Counsel Isaac T Avery, III, and Assistant Attorney Generals Kathryne E. Hathcock and Christopher W. Brooks, for the State.", "The Law Office of Matthew J. Davenport, DA., by Matthew J. Davenport, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ARTER NARRON, III\nNo. COA08-129\n(Filed 7 October 2008)\n1. Motor Vehicles\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 chemical analysis of alcohol concentration \u2014 constitutionality of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1(a)(2)\nThe language in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1(a)(2) that the results of a chemical analysis shall be deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person\u2019s alcohol concentration does not violate a defendant\u2019s constitutional right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in a driving while impaired case because: (1) Smith, 312 N.C. 361 (1984), expressly associated the reliability of chemical analysis with the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1; (2) statutory criteria must be met under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-138.1 and 139.1 before results of a chemical analysis are admissible in court, and defendant may challenge the admissibility of a chemical analysis of his blood alcohol level; (3) in addition to technical challenges set out in the statutes, a defendant could impeach the admissibility, credibility or weight of the .results of chemical analysis in traditional ways; (4) the longstanding common law rule is that results of a chemical analysis are sufficient evidence to submit the issue of a defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration to the factfinder; (5) the challenged provision does not create an evidentiary or factual presumption, but simply states the standard for prima facie evidence of a defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration; (6) the language of the amendment is essentially the same as the established common law rule; and (7) the pertinent phrase does not create a legal presumption, and the statute simply authorizes the jury to find that the report is what it purports to be, namely the results of a chemical analysis showing defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration.\n2. Motor Vehicles\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 request for special instruction denied\nThe trial court did not err in an impaired driving case by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a special instruction regarding proof of defendant\u2019s blood alcohol concentration because: (1) defendant\u2019s argument is based on the erroneous premise that the instruction given by the court created an impermissible presumption; and (2) the court\u2019s instructions adequately informed the jury of the law as applied to the evidence presented at trial.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 16 October 2007 by Judge Kenneth F. Crow in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 August 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Counsel Isaac T Avery, III, and Assistant Attorney Generals Kathryne E. Hathcock and Christopher W. Brooks, for the State.\nThe Law Office of Matthew J. Davenport, DA., by Matthew J. Davenport, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0076-01", "first_page_order": 108, "last_page_order": 118 }