{ "id": 4161705, "name": "LUE SINDA BROWNING MANN, Employee, Plaintiff v. TECHNIBILT, INC., Employer, ST. PAUL-TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY/CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY - HARTFORD INSURANCE, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Mann v. Technibilt, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-10-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-241", "first_page": "193", "last_page": "200", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 N.C. App. 193" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e remand this matter to the Industrial Commission to consider whether the facts of this case support a conclusion that the employer or the insurance carrier should be estopped from denying coverage.\"" }, { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11093273 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e remand this matter to the Industrial Commission to consider whether the facts of this case support a conclusion that the employer or the insurance carrier should be estopped from denying coverage.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987216 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511147, 1511598, 1511217, 1511473, 1511135 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0678-01", "/nc/356/0678-04", "/nc/356/0678-03", "/nc/356/0678-05", "/nc/356/0678-02" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9133544 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625047 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E,2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Company, 222 N.C. 163, 166, 169, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689159 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277, 278" }, { "page": "277, 278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629230 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166, 169" }, { "page": "166, 169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "citing Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 169, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "citing Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 169, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278 (1942)" }, { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Company, 222 N.C. 163, 166, 169, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54001, 53908, 53845, 53911, 53913 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0751-03", "/nc/345/0751-04", "/nc/345/0751-01", "/nc/345/0751-02", "/nc/345/0751-05" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890015 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572767 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573590 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000); Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965)" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000); Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965)" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 662, "char_count": 15168, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.31857494394460834 }, "sha256": "1c0c632db65709e59c8b4040e4c3f6a9c72cfc70e4e6a44825d3079a26b3f199", "simhash": "1:a32903e23e842842", "word_count": 2342 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:30:29.332614+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "LUE SINDA BROWNING MANN, Employee, Plaintiff v. TECHNIBILT, INC., Employer, ST. PAUL-TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY/CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY \u2014 HARTFORD INSURANCE, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nTechnibilt, Inc. (\u201cTechnibilt\u201d) and Hartford Insurance (\u201cHartford\u201d) appeal from the Opinion and Award of the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d), which held Hartford to be liable for Lue Sinda Browning Mann\u2019s (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) occupational disease resulting from her employment with Technibilt. We affirm in part and remand in part.\nI. Background\nPlaintiff has been employed as a press welder at Technibilt since 1989. On or about 2 October 2003, plaintiff alleged she sustained an injury and occupational disease. Technibilt and its insurance carrier at the time, St. Paul-Travelers Insurance Company/Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company (\u201cTravelers\u201d), denied liability pending receipt of plaintiff\u2019s medical records.\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was later accepted, while plaintiff\u2019s claim of injury to her back, hip, and feet was denied. Travelers referred plaintiff to Dr. William M. Pekman (\u201cDr. Pekman\u201d). On 12 February 2004, Dr. Pekman recommended \u201ca trial of non[-]operative treatment\u201d and advised plaintiff that if the non-operative treatment did not relieve her symptoms, she may need to consider surgical decompression.\nOn 23 March 2005, plaintiff requested Travelers approve additional medical treatment. On 1 April 2005, Hartford became Technibilt\u2019s carrier \u201con the risk.\u201d On 13 April 2005, plaintiff returned to Dr. Pekman at the request of Technibilt and Travelers for reevaluation of both hands. Dr. Pekman administered another \u201ctrial of non [-] operative treatment\u201d at plaintiff\u2019s request.\nOn 10 January 2006, plaintiff requested the Commission to order a second medical opinion with a hand specialist selected by plaintiff. Technibilt and Travelers requested the Commission to deny plaintiff\u2019s motion for a second opinion and stated \u201c[t]here is no valid, reasonable reason for a change in treating physicians.\u201d On 14 February 2006, the special deputy commissioner granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for a second opinion and ordered Technibilt and Travelers to provide plaintiff with a \u201cone-time evaluation with a hand specialist of plaintiff\u2019s choice for evaluation and treatment recommendations.\u201d\nOn or about 27 February 2006, Technibilt and Travelers appealed the special deputy commissioner\u2019s Order and requested plaintiff\u2019s claim be assigned for hearing. Technibilt and Travelers alleged that \u201c[Travelers] was not on the risk when [p]laintiff was last injuriously exposed to the alleged hazards of her disease.\u201d Hartford was added as a party on 21 April 2006.\nOn 31 May 2007, the deputy commissioner entered an Opinion and Award, which found \u201cHartford . . . responsible for [plaintiff\u2019s condition beginning April 1, 2005[]\u201d because \u201c[p]laintiff continued to be injuriously exposed and her condition continued to worsen while Hartford . . . provided coverage . . . .\u201d Technibilt and Hartford appealed the Opinion and Award to the Full Commission.\nThe Commission entered its unanimous Opinion and Award on 14 December 2007. The Commission found Hartford to be liable for plaintiff\u2019s occupational disease and ordered Technibilt and Hartford to pay \u201call medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by plaintiff as a result of the compensable disease . . . .\u201d Technibilt and Hartford appeal.\nII. Issues\nTechnibilt and Hartford argue the Commission erred when it: (1) found that plaintiff\u2019s last injurious exposure occurred when Hartford was the carrier \u201con the risk\u201d and (2) failed to make any findings on whether Travelers was estopped from denying the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s claim.\nTIL Standard of Review\nOur Supreme Court has stated:\nwhen reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, appellate courts must examine \u201cwhether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether [those] findings . . . support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by such competent evidence, \u201ceven though there [is] evidence that would support findings to the contrary.\u201d\nMcRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000); Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965)).\n\u201c[T]he full Commission is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence , . . .\u201d Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. The Commission\u2019s mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law and its conclusions of law applying the facts are fully reviewable de novo. Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1982); Cauble v. Soft-Play, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 526, 528, 477 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1996), disc. rev. denied, 345 N.C. 751, 485 S.E.2d 49 (1997).\nIV. Last Injurious Exposure\nTechnibilt and Hartford argue that the Commission erred when it entered findings of fact \u201cregarding the last injurious exposure issue . . . .\u201d We disagree.\nTechnibilt and Hartford assign error to findings of fact numbered 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, which state:\n16. Dr. Caulfield testified that plaintiff\u2019s press welder job with defendant is a substantial causative factor of plaintiff\u2019s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and that persons who do that job have a higher risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome than members of the population not similarly exposed. Dr. Caulfield recommended surgery on plaintiffs right hand first and then perhaps the left hand. Dr. Caulfield indicated that plaintiffs condition had gotten worse from 2003 to 2006 as plaintiff continued to work for defendant and that a delay in surgery creates a risk of permanent muscle weakness.\n19. Since April 1, 2005, plaintiffs condition has continued to worsen as she continued working in her same position for defendant. Plaintiff testified that the numbness and pain is worse and is a nine or ten on a one to ten scale. The more baby seats plaintiff welds in a day, the worse her symptoms are. Plaintiff testified that due to the numbness in her hands she had difficulty combing her hair, talking on the telephone, and driving to work.\n20. Due to the worsening and severity of her pain from continued employment with defendant since April 1, 2005, plaintiff wishes to proceed with carpal tunnel surgery. However, plaintiff has been unable to get her group insurance to approve the surgery even though defendants have refused responsibility.\n21. Prior to April 1, 2005, plaintiffs condition was not such that surgery was a necessity, nor did it cause plaintiff any incapacity from work. Plaintiffs condition progressed and was augmented due to her continued employment with defendant following April 1, 2005. Since then, plaintiff has been diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as opposed to only right carpal tunnel syndrome which has progressed to the point of necessitating operative treatment.\n22. Dr. Peltzer, Dr. Pekman, and Dr. Caulfield are of the opinion that plaintiffs employment with defendant caused her condition and that if plaintiff continues such employment her condition is likely to worsen or be aggravated.\n23. The undersigned find that plaintiffs occupational disease was caused by her employment with defendant. Based upon the greater weight of the evidence, the .undersigned find that plaintiffs occupational disease was augmented and worsened by her employment with defendant following April 1, 2005 when defendant Hartford Insurance came on the risk for defendant. Therefore, defendant Hartford Insurance was on the risk at the time of plaintiffs last injurious exposure.\nTechnibilt and Hartford also assign error to the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law numbered 2, which states:\n2. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57 where an occupational disease is compensable \u201cthe employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any, which was on the risk when the employee was last exposed under such employer, shall be liable\u201d. Last injurious exposure is defined as an exposure that proximately augmented the disease to any extent, how-\u2019 ever slight. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 88, 301 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1985) (citing Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 169, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278 (1942)); See also Caulder v. Waverly Mills, 314 N.C. 70, 331 S.E.2d 646 (1985). The greater weight of the evidence supports that plaintiff\u2019s last injurious exposure to the conditions of her job with defendant that caused or augmented her occupational disease was after April 1, 2005 when Hartford Insurance Company came on the risk for defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57. Therefore, Hartford Insurance is liable for plaintiff\u2019s occupational disease beginning April 1, 2005.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57 (2005) states:\nIn any case where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any, which was on the risk when the employee was so last exposed under such employer, shall be liable.\nOur Supreme Court defined the term \u201clast injuriously exposed\u201d to mean \u201c \u2018an exposure which proximately augmented the disease to any extent, however slight.\u2019 \u201d Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 89, 301 S.E,2d 359, 362 (1983) (quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Company, 222 N.C. 163, 166, 169, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278 (1942)).\nA condition peculiar to the workplace which accelerates the progress of an occupational disease to such an extent that the disease finally causes the worker\u2019s incapacity to work constitutes a source of danger and difficulty to that worker and increases the possibility of that worker\u2019s ultimate loss. It constitutes, therefore, a hazard of the disease as the term \u201chazard\u201d is commonly used.\nCaulder v. Waverly Mills, 314 N.C. 70, 75, 331 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1985); see also Fetner v. Granite Works, 251 N.C. 296, 301, 111 S.E.2d 324, 327-28 (1959) (\u201cG.S. 97-57 creates an irrebuttable presumption \u2014 a presumption of law. The last day of work was the date of disablement and the last thirty days of work was the period of last injurious exposure in the case at bar. The Commission may not arbitrarily select any 30 days of employment, other than the last 30 days, within the seven months[\u2019] period for convenience or protection of any of the parties, even if there is some evidence which may be construed to support such selection.\u201d (Citations omitted)); Shockley v. Cairn Studios, Ltd., 149 N.C. App. 961, 563 S.E.2d 207 (2002), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 678, 577 S.E.2d 888 (2003).\nAfter thorough review of the record on appeal, transcript, depositions, and plaintiff\u2019s medical records, we hold competent evidence in the record supports the Commission\u2019s challenged findings of fact. McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700. These findings of fact, together with the Commission\u2019s other unchallenged findings of fact, support its conclusion of law numbered 2. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Estoppel of Denying Compensability\nTechnibilt and Hartford argue that the Commission erred when it failed to make any findings on whether Travelers was estopped from denying the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s claim. We agree.\n\u201cWhile the Commission is not required to make findings as to each fact presented by the evidence, it must find those crucial and specific facts upon which the right to compensation depends so that a reviewing court can determine on appeal whether an adequate basis exists for the Commission\u2019s award.\u201d Johnson v. Southern Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 705, 599 S.E.2d 508, 511 (2004) (citations omitted). Because competent evidence was presented on whether Travelers was estopped from denying the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s claim, the Commission must address the issue of estoppel. See Purser v. Heatherlin Properties, 137 N.C. App. 332, 338, 527 S.E.2d 689, 693 (2000) (\u201c[W]e remand this matter to the Industrial Commission to consider whether the facts of this case support a conclusion that the employer or the insurance carrier should be estopped from denying coverage.\u201d).\nHere, as in Purser, \u201cthe Industrial Commission failed to consider the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the factual scenario at hand.\u201d 137 N.C. at 338, 527 S.E.2d at 693. We remand this matter to the Commission for further proceedings and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding all issues raised by the evidence upon which Travelers\u2019s and Hartford\u2019s liability depends.\nVI. Conclusion\nCompetent evidence in the record on appeal supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact. McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700. These findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law on the last injurious exposure. Id. These conclusions of law are not erroneous as a matter of law. The Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award on this issue is affirmed.\nThe Commission erred when it failed to make findings of fact with respect to the effect of Travelers\u2019s acceptance of plaintiff\u2019s claim. Johnson, 358 N.C. at 705, 599 S.E.2d at 511. This matter is remanded for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a determination of whether Travelers is estopped from denying the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s claim.\nAffirmed in Part; Remanded in Part.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief filed, by employee-plaintiff", "York Williams Barringer Lewis & Briggs, LLP, by Stephen Kushner, for defendant-appellants Technibilt, Ltd. and Hartford Insurance Company.", "Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Samuel E. Barker, for defendant-appellee St. Paul-Travelers Insurance Company/Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUE SINDA BROWNING MANN, Employee, Plaintiff v. TECHNIBILT, INC., Employer, ST. PAUL-TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY/CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY \u2014 HARTFORD INSURANCE, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA08-241\n(Filed 7 October 2008)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 last injurious exposure \u2014 liability of second insurer\nCompetent evidence supported the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings and conclusions that plaintiff employee\u2019s last injurious exposure to the conditions of her employment that augmented or worsened her occupational disease (bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome) occurred after the date a second workers\u2019 compensation insurer came on the risk for the employer so that the second insurer was liable for compensation for plaintiff\u2019s occupational disease.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 compensability \u2014 estoppel\u2014 remand for findings and conclusions\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by failing to make any findings on whether a former workers\u2019 compensation insurer for defendant employer was estopped from denying the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s occupational disease claim, and the case is remanded to the Commission for further proceedings and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue.\nAppeal by defendants from Opinion and Award entered 14 December 2007 by Commissioner Buck Lattimore for the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 2008.\nNo brief filed, by employee-plaintiff\nYork Williams Barringer Lewis & Briggs, LLP, by Stephen Kushner, for defendant-appellants Technibilt, Ltd. and Hartford Insurance Company.\nHedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Samuel E. Barker, for defendant-appellee St. Paul-Travelers Insurance Company/Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "0193-01", "first_page_order": 225, "last_page_order": 232 }