{ "id": 4161689, "name": "MICHELLE STOJANIK, on behalf of the Estate of and the Heirs of the Estate of BONNIE LYNN WOODRING, Plaintiff v. R.E.A.C.H. OF JACKSON COUNTY, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Stojanik v. R.E.A.C.H. of Jackson County, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-11-04", "docket_number": "No. COA08-534", "first_page": "585", "last_page": "591", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 N.C. App. 585" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703", "parenthetical": "\"Based upon this forecast of evidence, we conclude that the scattered incidents of crime through a period beginning in 1959 were not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the abduction and subsequent murder of plaintiff's intestate was reasonably foreseeable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639270 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525175 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "37" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575062 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" }, { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/206/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53997 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624576 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2504877 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570953, 8570927, 8570804, 8570876, 8570845 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0452-05", "/nc/297/0452-04", "/nc/297/0452-01", "/nc/297/0452-03", "/nc/297/0452-02" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549364 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566400 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212179 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671-72", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 692, "char_count": 12750, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13573745033011578 }, "sha256": "5d51cd752a393e6b6544b8577b62e68f908e8c35395db5b4b684ab26f07c66c4", "simhash": "1:c63e5c1203593ee1", "word_count": 2039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:30:29.332614+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "MICHELLE STOJANIK, on behalf of the Estate of and the Heirs of the Estate of BONNIE LYNN WOODRING, Plaintiff v. R.E.A.C.H. OF JACKSON COUNTY, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nMichelle Stojanik, administratrix of the Estate of Bonnie Lynn Woodring and on behalf of the Heirs of the Estate of Bonnie Lynn Woodring (\u201cplaintiff\u2019), appeals from order entered, which granted R.E.A.C.H. of Jackson County, Inc.\u2019s (\u201cdefendant\u201d) motion for summary judgment. We affirm.\nI. Background\nOn 20 February 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint and alleged claims of \u201cnegligence/gross negligence\u201d and wrongful death. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint asserted: (1) Bonnie Lynn Woodring (\u201cthe victim\u201d) and the victim\u2019s son were guests at defendant\u2019s abused women\u2019s shelter on 18 September 2006; (2) the victim\u2019s husband gained access to the shelter and killed the victim; (3) defendant failed to provide \u201cadequate security, control, policies and procedures, measures and/or equipment\u201d for the premises; (4) defendant\u2019s acts were the direct and proximate cause of the victim\u2019s death; and (5) plaintiff and other family members have been deprived of the victim\u2019s \u201clove, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, and advice, as well as her service, protection, care and assistance.\u201d\nOn 18 May 2007, defendant answered plaintiff\u2019s complaint and alleged the defenses of: (1) failure to join an indispensable party; (2) independent intervening cause; and (3) release. Defendant\u2019s second defense stated:\nIf it is determined that the defendant was in any negligent [sic] as alleged in the complaint, which has been and again is denied, then the intentional and criminal action of [the vietim\u2019s husband] which included breaking into a neighbors home to steal a shotgun, evading law enforcement on outstanding arrest warrants, breaking into the emergency shelter, kidnapping [defendant\u2019s] employee, threatening [defendant\u2019s] employee with a shotgun, taking the [victim] hostage while at gunpoint and ultimately shooting and killing the [victim], all act to sever any and all causation from any alleged negligence on the part of [defendant] to the death of [the victim] by superseding any negligence of the defendant and insulates the defendant from liability for damages.\nDefendant subsequently moved for summary judgment \u201con the grounds that there are no issues of material fact and that the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law.\u201d Defendant tendered \u201call discovery which ha[d] been conducted in the case to date\u201d in support of its motion for summary judgment.\nDefendant\u2019s motion was heard 17 March 2008. The forecast of evidence at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment tended to establish: (1) defendant\u2019s abused women\u2019s shelter is divided into two sections, a residential section and a work space section for defendant\u2019s employees; (2) the shelter has two wood framed glass panel exterior doors; (3) it is defendant\u2019s policy to require all doors to be locked at all times; (4) the victim\u2019s husband entered the shelter through an unlocked door; (5) the victim\u2019s husband forced one of defendant\u2019s employees into the residential section of the shelter; (6) when defendant\u2019s employee refused to tell the victim\u2019s husband where the victim was, the victim\u2019s husband opened \u201c[t]he front shelter door[,]\u201d which set off the alarm system; (7) the victim then entered the common area to confront her husband; and (8) the victim\u2019s husband took the victim outside, beat her, brought her back into the shelter, shot, and killed her.\nOn 26 March 2008, the trial court filed its order, which: (1) \u201cdenie[d] Defendant\u2019s motion as to Defendant\u2019s Third Defense (Release)[]\u201d and (2) \u201cgrant[ed] Defendant\u2019s Motion as to Defendant\u2019s Second Defense (Independent Intervening Cause).\u201d Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Issue\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred when it granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on independent intervening cause.\nIII. Standard of Review\nSummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The party moving for summary judgment ultimately has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact.\nA defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by (1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiffs case is non-existent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense. Summary judgment is not appropriate where matters of credibility and determining the weight of the evidence exist.\nOnce the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\nWe review an order allowing summary judgment de novo. If the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\nWilkins v. Safran, 185 N.C. App. 668, 671-72, 649 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).\nIV. Independent Intervening Cause\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred when it granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment because \u201ca reasonable jury could conclude that either the affirmative act of leaving the back door unlocked or the negative act of failing to properly secure the premises with a steel door was a proximate cause of [the victim]\u2019s death. (Emphasis original). We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has \u201cemphasized that summary judgment is a drastic measure, and it should be used with caution. This is especially true in a negligence case in which a jury ordinarily applies the reasonable person standard to the facts of each case.\u201d Williams v. Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 402, 250 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1979) (internal citations omitted). \u201cSummary judgment for defendant, in a negligence action, is proper where the evidence fails to show negligence on the part of defendant, or where contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff is established, or where it is established that the purported negligence of defendant was not the proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injury.\u201d Hale v. Power Co., 40 N.C. App. 202, 203, 252 S.E.2d 265, 267 (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 805 (1979).\n\u201cActionable negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under similar conditions.\u201d Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (1992). \u201cTo recover damages for actionable negligence, plaintiff must establish (1) a legal duty, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately caused by such breach.\u201d Petty v. Print Works, 243 N.C. 292, 298, 90 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1956) (citation omitted).\n\u201cThe general rule is that the intervening or superseding criminal acts of another preclude liability of the initial negligent actor when the injury is caused by the criminal acts.\u201d Tise v. Yates Construction Co., 345 N.C. 456, 460, 480 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1997). \u201c[I]f between the negligence and the injury there is the intervening crime or wilful and malicious act of a third person producing the injury but that such was not intended by the defendant, and could not have been reasonably foreseen by it, the causal chain between the original negligence and accident is broken.\u201d Ward v. R.R., 206 N.C. 530, 532, 174 S.E. 443, 444 (1934) (internal quotation omitted).\nIt is axiomatic that to establish the element of foreseeability, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant foresaw the injury in the exact form in which it occurred. The plaintiff need only show that in the exercise of reasonable care the defendant should have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.\nFoster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 642, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1981) (citations omitted).\nIn Foster, the plaintiff sued the owners of a shopping mall for injuries she received after being assaulted in the mail\u2019s parking lot. 303 N.C. at 638, 281 S.E.2d at 37. In the year prior to the assault on the plaintiff, thirty-one criminal incidents had been reported at the mall. Id. at 642, 281 S.E.2d at 40. Our Supreme Court stated:\nWe cannot hold as a matter of law that the thirty-one criminal incidents reported as occurring on the shopping mall premises within the year preceding the assault on [the] plaintiff were insufficient to charge [the] defendants with knowledge that such injuries were likely to occur. The issue of foreseeability should therefore be determined by the jury, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of [the] defendants.\nId.\nHere, defendant\u2019s forecast of evidence tended to establish: (1) the victim received defendant\u2019s Resident and Shelter Handbook, which stated \u201c [y]ou will need to assist staff in determining how dangerous your abuser may be. If you are in danger it will be in the best interest of you, your children and other residents and staff to be placed in a shelter in another countyf;]\u201d (2) the victim never advised defendant\u2019s employees that she needed to be transferred to a shelter in another county; (3) \u201cin [defendant\u2019s] 30 years, [it] ha[s] never had an abuser come on the property previous to this [incident] [;]\u201d and (4) \u201c[t]he majority of abusers do it in the secrecy of their home. . . . [t]hey do not want people outside of their home to know they are doing anything.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s forecast of evidence tended to establish: (1) the location of defendant\u2019s shelter is kept confidential; (2) defendant requires all doors to be locked at all times; (3) defendant maintained a \u201cpanic\u201d button in its employees\u2019 office space; (4) the victim asked defendant\u2019s employees for a 911 telephone; (5) the victim\u2019s husband had attempted to murder the victim in the past, threatened to find her, and to \u201cfinish the job[;]\u201d and (6) upon re-entry into defendant\u2019s shelter, the victim expressed concern about her husband \u201cfinding [her] and trying to talk to [her].\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegations of the victim\u2019s husband\u2019s prior actions and the shelter\u2019s safety measures in place at the time of the victim\u2019s murder were not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the victim\u2019s husband would attempt to find and gain access to the shelter to harm the victim. See Brown v. N.C. Wesleyan College, 65 N.C. App. 579, 583, 309 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1983) (\u201cBased upon this forecast of evidence, we conclude that the scattered incidents of crime through a period beginning in 1959 were not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the abduction and subsequent murder of plaintiff\u2019s intestate was reasonably foreseeable.\u201d). Plaintiff failed to forecast evidence that the victim\u2019s death due to her husband\u2019s criminal actions was foreseeable to defendant and not an independent intervening cause of the victim\u2019s death. Ward, 206 N.C. at 532, 174 S.E. at 444. The trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nThe victim\u2019s husband\u2019s actions could not, as a matter of law, have been reasonably foreseen by defendant based on the parties\u2019 forecasts of evidence. The trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on \u201c[d]efendant\u2019s Second Defense (Independent Intervening Cause).\u201d The trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, P.A., by Brett Dressier, and Matthews & Associates, by David P Matthews and Jason C. Webster, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Dean & Gibson, PLLC, by Rodney Dean and Leila W. Rogers, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHELLE STOJANIK, on behalf of the Estate of and the Heirs of the Estate of BONNIE LYNN WOODRING, Plaintiff v. R.E.A.C.H. OF JACKSON COUNTY, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA08-534\n(Filed 4 November 2008)\nNegligence\u2014 killing at abused women\u2019s shelter \u2014 not reasonably foreseeable\nSummary judgment was properly granted for defendant in an action which resulted from the killing of a spousal abuse victim in defendant\u2019s shelter. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations about the prior actions of the victim\u2019s husband and the shelter\u2019s safety measures were not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the victim\u2019s husband would find and gain access to the shelter to harm the victim.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 26 March 2008 by Judge Mark Powell in Jackson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2008.\nSellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, P.A., by Brett Dressier, and Matthews & Associates, by David P Matthews and Jason C. Webster, for plaintiff-appellant.\nDean & Gibson, PLLC, by Rodney Dean and Leila W. Rogers, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0585-01", "first_page_order": 617, "last_page_order": 623 }