{ "id": 4161815, "name": "KOR XIONG, Plaintiff v. INGRID DIANE MARKS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Kor Xiong v. Marks", "decision_date": "2008-11-18", "docket_number": "No. COA08-52", "first_page": "644", "last_page": "657", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 N.C. App. 644" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639687 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks and ellipses omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636049 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, brackets and footnote in original omitted" }, { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641750 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "\"The trial judge's comments during the hearing . . . are not controlling; the written court order as entered is controlling.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500290, 2499842, 2497925, 2497100, 2502519 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0284-03", "/nc/331/0284-01", "/nc/331/0284-02", "/nc/331/0284-04", "/nc/331/0284-05" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524143 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511527, 1511629, 1511511, 1511639, 1511292 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0675-01", "/nc/356/0675-02", "/nc/356/0675-03", "/nc/356/0675-05", "/nc/356/0675-04" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251096 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11201845 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8159777 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks and ellipses omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795905 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371895 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, brackets and footnote in original omitted" }, { "page": "77-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 F.3d 804", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1344593 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/145/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 F.R.D. 324", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 500542 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "citing Rule 59 and declaring plaintiff's motion for new trial a nullity because it was filed before entry of judgment but subsequently denying the motion on its merits" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/180/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 F.2d 808", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1251531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not think a Rule 59(e) motion could have been entertained [in this case]. Our conclusion in this regard is based on the fact that no judgments were ever entered in favor of [defendants], and on the language of Rule 59(e" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/652/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 F.R.D 160", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The phrase 'no later than' [in Rule 59] is used - rather than 'within' - to include post-judgment motions that sometimes are filed before actual entry of the judgment by the clerk.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "840 F.2d 712", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10546392 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713-14", "parenthetical": "motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e) was timely when filed before the entry of judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/840/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 F.2d 182", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 190003 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85", "parenthetical": "\"The wording of Rule 59(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/311/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "929 F.2d 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542151 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/929/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684978 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237734 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11465208 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659389 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441143 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798976, 798784, 798958, 798834, 798940 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0514-02", "/nc/343/0514-04", "/nc/343/0514-03", "/nc/343/0514-01", "/nc/343/0514-05" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918686 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793129 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "\"It is a long-standing rule that a party in a civil case may not raise an issue on appeal that was not raised at the trial level.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131361 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "\"It is a long-standing rule that a party in a civil case may not raise an issue on appeal that was not raised at the trial level.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 681", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 986", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9065569, 9065057, 9065826, 9065096, 9065164, 9065006, 9065680, 9065617, 9065941, 9065237, 9065367, 9065755, 9065308, 9065502 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0986-09", "/us/538/0986-02", "/us/538/0986-13", "/us/538/0986-03", "/us/538/0986-04", "/us/538/0986-01", "/us/538/0986-11", "/us/538/0986-10", "/us/538/0986-14", "/us/538/0986-05", "/us/538/0986-07", "/us/538/0986-12", "/us/538/0986-06", "/us/538/0986-08" ] }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "\"Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511396 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "\"Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249578 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "\"Where one party introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571816 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177", "parenthetical": "\"Where one party introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-271", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allowing appeal only by an aggrieved party" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allowing appeal only from a \"judicial order or determination\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "490 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586-87", "parenthetical": "declining to consider alleged impropriety in the State's closing argument when the defendant moved in limine to prevent the State from including certain statements during closing and the State included those statements in its closing argument but defendant did not object" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11797528 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 884", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 324545, 324386, 328131, 323172, 327332, 326430, 327472, 327185, 324946, 328048, 326327, 324376, 328606, 328191 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0884-13", "/us/516/0884-01", "/us/516/0884-11", "/us/516/0884-03", "/us/516/0884-10", "/us/516/0884-09", "/us/516/0884-12", "/us/516/0884-04", "/us/516/0884-06", "/us/516/0884-07", "/us/516/0884-14", "/us/516/0884-08", "/us/516/0884-05", "/us/516/0884-02" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2557546 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 1099", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1142", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11562464, 11562529, 11562560, 11562626, 11562501, 11562406, 11562376, 11562665, 11562347, 11562476, 11562444, 11562361, 11562394, 11562427, 11562590 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1142-08", "/us/523/1142-11", "/us/523/1142-12", "/us/523/1142-14", "/us/523/1142-10", "/us/523/1142-05", "/us/523/1142-03", "/us/523/1142-15", "/us/523/1142-01", "/us/523/1142-09", "/us/523/1142-07", "/us/523/1142-02", "/us/523/1142-04", "/us/523/1142-06", "/us/523/1142-13" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551151 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11465208 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0047-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1230, "char_count": 32495, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0947414567758984e-07, "percentile": 0.7608721589559855 }, "sha256": "04dd586f259fb30bf59238026c2f4d02513139641bc4fb3fa230b6f88073030a", "simhash": "1:9fe1c03f644f51ff", "word_count": 5403 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:30:29.332614+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge MCCULLOUGH concurs.", "Judge McGEE concurs with a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "KOR XIONG, Plaintiff v. INGRID DIANE MARKS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nPlaintiff Kor Xiong appeals from the judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice pursuant to a jury verdict on 7 September 2007 and from the order denying a new trial entered 18 September 2007. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by: (1) \u201cimproperly forcing] plaintiff to choose between excluding relevant evidence regarding his injury or letting in irrelevant evidence that no other person reported injury as a result of the wreck[;]\u201d (2) \u201cimproperly refus[ing] to allow plaintiff to show the jury a copy of Rule 35[;]\u201d (3) \u201crefus[ing] to allow plaintiff to testify that he delayed seeking treatment for financial reasons[;]\u201d and (4) failing to grant a new trial when \u201c [t]here was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict\u201d and evidence was excluded from the trial \u201ccontrary to law.\u201d For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nOn 18 June 2005 Kor Xiong (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) was riding in the back seat of a motor vehicle operated by his nephew, Xeng Pao Vang. When Vang stopped on Highway 73 near Mt. Gilead to wait for traffic to pass before making a left turn, a vehicle operated by Ingrid Diane Marks (\u201cdefendant\u201d) struck Vang\u2019s vehicle from behind. Trooper Dale Walter arrived at the scene following the collision. Trooper Walter completed an accident report (\u201cthe accident report\u201d).\nOn 13 July 2005, nearly a month after the accident, plaintiff sought medical treatment at Stanly Memorial Hospital. The treating physician at the hospital diagnosed plaintiff as having \u201cfacial nerve palsy\u201d and \u201cneck and back pain secondary to trauma.\u201d The next day, 14 July 2005, plaintiff was seen by Dr. John Kilde, an ear, nose & throat specialist. Dr. Kilde confirmed the earlier diagnosis of facial nerve palsy and prescribed prednisone and eye ointment.\nOn 7 June 2006 plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court, Montgomery County, alleging personal injury resulting from the 18 June 2005 collision. In an answer filed on or about 18 September 2006, defendant admitted that she failed to reduce her speed as she approached Vang\u2019s vehicle and conceded she was \u201ccareless in the operation of her vehicle.\u201d However, defendant denied that the collision was the proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nOn or about 21 August 2007 plaintiff filed a document containing six motions in limine. The first four motions are not at issue in this appeal. The fifth motion sought permission to us\u00e9 an enlarged copy of Rule 35 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure during closing arguments. The sixth motion sought to prohibit defendant from \u201casking witnesses other than Plaintiff if they or anyone else in the collision was injured.\u201d By a written notation at the bottom of the document, the trial court granted the first four motions, denied the fifth, and granted the sixth, with some modification \u201cby consent of atty\u2019s[.]\u201d\nThe case was tried before a jury in Montgomery County Superior Court on 20 and 21 August 2007. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant on 21 August 2007. On 27 August 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59. Judgment pursuant to the jury verdict was entered on 7 September 2007. Following a hearing on 10 September 2007, the trial court entered an order on 18 September 2007 denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Motions in Limine\nA. Use of Rule 35 During Closing Arguments\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion in limine requesting permission to show the jury a poster-size copy of Rule 35 during closing arguments. However, plaintiff did not seek to offer the poster at trial.\nA ruling on a motion in limine is \u201cmerely preliminary\u201d and not final. State v. Hill, 347 N.C. 275, 293, 493 S.E.2d 264, 274 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1142, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (1998). A trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion in limine is \u201csubject to change during the course of trial, depending upon the actual evidence offered at trial.\u201d Hill, 347 N.C. at 293, 493 S.E.2d at 274 (citation and quotation marks omitted). For this reason, \u201ca motion in limine is insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence.\u201d State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 521, 453 S.E.2d 824, 845, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995). It follows that\n[a] party objecting to an order granting or denying a motion in limine, in order to preserve the evidentiary issue for appeal, is required to object to the evidence at the time it is offered at the trial (where the motion was denied) or attempt to introduce the evidence at the trial (where the motion was granted).\nHill, 347 N.C. at 293, 493 S.E.2d at 274 (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThis Court has applied this rule to closing arguments even though they are not evidence. State v. Williams, 127 N.C. App. 464, 468-69, 490 S.E.2d 583, 586-87 (1997) (declining to consider alleged impropriety in the State\u2019s closing argument when the defendant moved in limine to prevent the State from including certain statements during closing and the State included those statements in its closing argument but defendant did not object). Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff waived appellate review of this issue when he failed to make an offer of proof of an enlarged copy of Rule 35 to the trial court during trial. This assignment of error is dismissed.\nB. Evidence of Other Person\u2019s Injury or Lack Thereof\nPlaintiff moved in limine to prohibit defendant from \u201casking witnesses other than Plaintiff if they or anyone else in the collision was injured\u201d on the grounds that \u201c[e]vidence of another person\u2019s injury or lack thereof . . . is . . . irrelevant under Rule 401.\u201d Plaintiff contends the trial judge erred in response to this motion when he (1) \u201cruled . . . that he would exclude evidence as to the injury status of people other than Plaintiff only if Plaintiff agreed to redact the injury code showing that Plaintiff reported injury to the Trooper at the scene of the accident\u201d and (2) \u201cforced Plaintiff to either redact relevant and properly admissible evidence of Plaintiff\u2019s report of injury at the accident scene or agree to allow irrelevant and prejudicial evidence as to the supposed injury status of others.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nHowever, plaintiff\u2019s contention does not square with the record on appeal. The record shows that before the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion, the parties\u2019 attorneys discussed the issue and their forecasts of evidence with the trial judge at a pre-trial conference. After the discussion, according to the trial court\u2019s notation at the bottom of the motion in limine, the parties modified the motion by mutual consent. While it would have been extremely helpful to our review if the parties had expressly stipulated on the record to the provision that they consented to, we can reasonably infer from the record that defendant agreed to refrain from \u201casking witnesses other than Plaintiff if they or anyone else in the collision was injured\u201d in exchange for plaintiff agreeing to redact all the injury codes from the accident report. At trial, plaintiff did redact the injury codes before introducing the accident report into evidence, and defendant refrained from asking whether anyone else had been injured in the accident.\nOur statutory mandate is to review rulings of the trial court which aggrieve the party seeking review. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277 (2007) (allowing appeal only from a \u201cjudicial order or determination\u201d); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-271 (2007) (allowing appeal only by an aggrieved party); N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, . . . the complaining party [must] obtain a ruling [from the trial court] upon the party\u2019s request, objection or motion.\u201d); see also Fayetteville Publ\u2019g Co. v. Advanced Internet Tech., Inc., 192 N.C. App.-,-, 665 S.E.2d 518, 522 (2008) (\u201cThe trial judge\u2019s comments during the hearing . . . are not controlling; the written court order as entered is controlling.\u201d).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff speculated as to evidence which might be offered by defendant at trial and requested a preliminary ruling from the trial court to exclude that evidence. The trial court then reviewed the parties\u2019 forecasts of evidence, and determined preliminarily, subject to a final determination after the presentation of evidence at trial, that evidence of other persons\u2019 injuries or lack thereof would be relevant only if plaintiff introduced into evidence the accident report which contained the injury codes. See, e.g., State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981) (\u201cWhere one party introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.\u201d). Plaintiff and defendant then reached an agreement \u2014 defendant would not seek to put on evidence of the lack of injury to other passengers in the car and plaintiff would redact the injury codes from the accident report. At trial, both' parties abided by the pre-trial agreement.\nPlaintiff in effect sought to \u201cfish in [the] judicial pond[] for legal advice.\u201d National Travel Servs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 289, 294, 569 S.E.2d 667, 670 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (disapproving the use of a declaratory judgment action to determine prospectively whether a certain act would violate an injunction). Plaintiff\u2019s counsel weighed the advice and made a conscious trial strategy decision to redact the injury codes from the accident report in order to keep from opening the door to defendant presenting evidence of the lack of injuries to others that the jury might well have considered persuasive against plaintiff. Plaintiff lived up to his end of the bargain at trial, as did defendant.\nPlaintiff has therefore not presented a question which can be reviewed by this Court. The record contains no order or ruling of the trial court \u201cforcing\u201d plaintiff to redact the injury codes. Plaintiff cannot be considered aggrieved by the trial court when he consciously made a bargain with defendant and then received the benefit of it. Furthermore, this Court does not second-guess matters of trial strategy. See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236, 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (\u201cDecisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.\u201d), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986, 155 L. Ed. 2d 681. Accordingly, we dismiss this assignment of error.\nIII. Exclusion of Evidence of Plaintiffs Finances\nIn his next argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of his financial status at the time of the accident. We disagree.\nOn direct examination plaintiffs counsel asked and plaintiff answered, without objection from defendant, questions as to plaintiffs age and marital status. When plaintiffs counsel asked plaintiff what his wages were at the time of the accident, defendant\u2019s counsel objected to the question on relevancy grounds. The trial court allowed the question and answer concerning plaintiff\u2019s wages. Defendant requested a bench conference to discuss the admissibility of further evidence of plaintiff\u2019s financial condition. The bench conference was not transcribed by the court reporter, but the record includes a narrative per N.C.R. App. P. 9(c):\nPlaintiff argued that the jury needed to understand that plaintiff was young, married and made only $8.50 per hour. Plaintiff argued to Judge Craig that this was very relevant evidence as it explains why plaintiff waited for several weeks before seeking medical attention despite his symptoms. Defendant argued that . . . evidence of plaintiff\u2019s ability to pay medical bills [was prohibited by] the \u201creverse collateral source\u201d [rule].\nAfter hearing from both parties, the trial court instructed plaintiff\u2019s counsel not to ask further questions regarding plaintiff\u2019s financial status.\nOn appeal, plaintiff argues Judge Craig ruled at the bench that Plaintiff could not present evidence of Plaintiff\u2019s inability to pay medical bills or financial hardship to explain his delay in treatment. Judge Craig also ruled that Plaintiff could not present evidence of Plaintiffs other financial obligations at the time of the accident.\nIn a civil case, appellate review is limited to questions actually presented to and ruled on by the trial court. N.C.R. App: P. 10(b)(1), Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 690, 562 S.E.2d 82, 95 (2002) (\u201cIt is a long-standing rule that a party in a civil case may not raise an issue on appeal that was not raised at the trial level.\u201d), aff\u2019d, 358 N.C. 160, 190, 594 S.E.2d 1, 21 (2004). Additionally, \u201ca party must preserve the exclusion of evidence for appellate review by making a specific offer of proof unless the significance of the evidence is ascertainable from the record.\u201d In re Dennis v. Duke Power Co., 341 N.C. 91, 102, 459 S.E.2d 707, 714 (1995).\nThe record contains no indication that plaintiff made an offer of proof as to any evidence of plaintiff\u2019s financial condition beyond evidence that he was young, married, and earned only $8.50 per hour. In fact, plaintiff\u2019s argument to the trial judge in favor of admission of evidence of plaintiff\u2019s financial condition, quoted above, sought only the admission of evidence of exactly those three facts. Evidence that plaintiff was young and married was admitted without objection by defendant; evidence of plaintiff\u2019s hourly wage was admitted over defendant\u2019s objection. Because evidence as to all three items requested by plaintiff was before the jury and because plaintiff failed to make an offer of proof as to any further evidence of defendant\u2019s financial condition we conclude that there is nothing for this Court to review. Accordingly, we dismiss this argument.\nIV. Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 59 Motion\nA. Jurisdiction\nAs a threshold matter, defendant moves this Court to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s Rule 59 motion on the grounds that plaintiff\u2019s motion for new trial was filed before judgment was entered, and therefore not properly before the trial court. However, defendant did not file a separate motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal, first raising this issue in her brief. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s Rule 59 ruling is denied. Smithers v. Tru-Pak Moving Systems, 121 N.C. App. 542, 545, 468 S.E.2d 410, 412 (\u201cA motion to dismiss an appeal must be filed in accord with Appellate Rule 37, not raised for the first time in the brief[.]\u201d), disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 514, 472 S.E.2d 20 (1996).\nHowever, an appellate court has the power to inquire into jurisdiction in a case before it at any time, even sua sponte. Hedgepeth v. N.C. Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App. 338, 341, 543 S.E.2d 169, 171 (2001). Jurisdiction is the \u201cpower to hear and determine causes.\u201d McCullough v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 871, 109 S.E. 789, 793 (1921) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The question of whether a trial court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a Rule 59 motion for new trial which was filed before the entry of judgment appears to be an issue of first impression in North Carolina. Rule 59 requires that \u201c[a] motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment!)]\u201d but does not speak directly to whether a motion for new trial may be filed before entry of judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(b).\nA case from this Court, Watson v. Dixon, states that \u201cRules 50 and 59 of our Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly provide that these post-trial motions cannot be filed until after entry of judgment. . . . Thus, [the oral motions for j.n.o.v. and new trial] were not properly before the trial court as post-trial motions under Rules 50 and 59.\u201d 130 N.C. App. 47, 51, 502 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1998), reaff\u2019d on reh\u2019g, 132 N.C. App. 329, 511 S.E.2d 37 (1999), affd, 352 N.C. 343, 532 S.E.2d 175 (2000). However, this language in Watson appears to be dicta because the dispositive question was whether the 30-day time period for filing notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure began to run when the order denying the motion for new trial was rendered in open court, or began to run when the written order denying the motion was entered. Rule 3 plainly states that the 30-day period begins to run \u201cfrom the date of entry of the order[.]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(3). Furthermore, a requirement that a Rule 59 motion for new trial may not be made until after entry of judgment is contrary to practice in our trial courts and to the greater weight of authority in federal cases addressing this question.\nThe federal circuits appear to be generally in accord as to this issue, holding that a motion for new trial may be filed before entry of judgment. See Dunn v. Truck World, Inc., 929 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1991) (\u201cIf. . . the question [is whether the loser may file a motion for new trial] before the entry of judgment, then the answer is easy. It may. Rule 59 says that the motion must come \u2018not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.\u2019 A pre-judgment motion satisfies this requirement.\u201d); Douglas v. Union Carbide Corp., 311 F.2d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1962) (\u201cThe wording of Rule 59(b) was designed to be broad enough to permit the motion to be made both before and after the entry of judgment.. . . [W]e think the defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdicts and grant a new trial [made before entry of judgment] was timely made and was in substantial compliance with the pertinent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\u201d); see also Lewis v. U. S. Postal Service, 840 F.2d 712, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1988) (motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e) was timely when filed before the entry of judgment); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 advisory committee\u2019s note, 161 F.R.D 160 (1995) (\u201cThe phrase \u2018no later than\u2019 [in Rule 59] is used \u2014 rather than \u2018within\u2019 \u2014 to include post-judgment motions that sometimes are filed before actual entry of the judgment by the clerk.\u201d); 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 2812 at 135 (2d ed. 1995) (\u201c[T]here is nothing to prevent making a motion for a new trial before judgment has been entered.\u201d). But see Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1981) (\u201c[W]e do not think a Rule 59(e) motion could have been entertained [in this case]. Our conclusion in this regard is based on the fact that no judgments were ever entered in favor of [defendants], and on the language of Rule 59(e), which we think clearly contemplates entry of judgment as a predicate to any motion.\u201d); Pedigo v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 180 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (citing Rule 59 and declaring plaintiff\u2019s motion for new trial a nullity because it was filed before entry of judgment but subsequently denying the motion on its merits), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 145 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1998).\nWe reconcile Watson with the federal authorities by concluding that though a motion for new trial may be filed before entry of judgment, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion until after entry of judgment. As Stephenson cautioned, \u201cwere we to permit Rule 59(e) motions without entry of judgment, litigants could obtain appellate review of partial judgments by simply appealing a Rule 59(e) order, completely by-passing the requirements [that only final judgments may be appealed from.]\u201d 652 F.2d at 811. This caution is well-taken when the trial court rules on a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment prior to entry of judgment in the cause. However, no such concern arises here because the trial court first entered the judgment on 7 September 2007, then heard the Rule 59 motion on 10 September 2007 and entered the order denying a new trial on 18 September 2007. Therefore we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction and the motion for new trial was properly before the trial court. Accordingly, we will review on the merits the order denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial.\nB. Standard of Review\nThe standard of review for denial of a Rule 59 motion is well-settled:\nAccording to Rule 59, a new trial may be granted for the reasons enumerated in the Rule. By using the word may, Rule 59 expressly grants the trial court the discretion to determine whether a new trial should be granted. Generally, therefore, the trial court\u2019s decision on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 will not be disturbed on appeal, absent abuse of discretion. [This Court] recognize [s] a narrow exception to the general rule, applying a de novo standard of review to a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(8), which is an error in law occurring at the trial and objected to by the party making the motion.\nGreene v. Royster, 187 N.C. App. 71, 77-78, 652 S.E.2d 277, 282 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, brackets and footnote in original omitted) (emphasis added).\nC. Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7)\nPlaintiff contends the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury\u2019s verdict. Plaintiff argues that the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s designated expert witness, Dr. Kilde, was unequivocal and conclusive. Plaintiff contends that because defendant did not put forth any evidence, the testimony of Dr. Kilde was determinative and the jury could not reasonably have found in defendant\u2019s favor on the evidence before it. We disagree.\nA motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) does not involve a question of law, therefore it is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Greene, 187 N.C. App. at 77-78, 652 S.E.2d at 282. The trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion \u201conly upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In ruling on a Rule 59(a)(7) motion, the trial court should \u201cset aside a jury verdict only in those exceptional situations where the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice[,]\u201d Strum v. Greenville Timberline, LLC, 186 N.C. App. 662, 667, 652 S.E.2d 307, 310 (2007) (citation, quotation marks and ellipses omitted), because \u201c [i]t is the jury\u2019s function to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses[.]\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).\n\u201cEven though evidence is uncontradicted, the credibility of the evidence is exclusively for the jury.\u201d Coltrane v. Lamb, 42 N.C. App. 654, 658, 257 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1979). Furthermore, the jury is allowed to \u201cminimize or wholly disregard the testimony given by plaintiffs\u2019 medical experts\u201d if they do not find it credible. Albrecht v. Dorsett, 131 N.C. App. 502/506, 508 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1998). In Albrecht, the defendant did not bring forth an expert to contradict the testimony of the plaintiff\u2019s expert, but on cross-examination the plaintiff\u2019s experts gave contradicting responses to their direct testimony. Id.\nContrary to plaintiff\u2019s argument, Dr. Kilde\u2019s testimony was not unequivocal. Dr. Kilde testified in a deposition that was shown to the jury at trial regarding the causes of facial nerve palsy and his examination of plaintiff as follows: Plaintiff was diagnosed with facial nerve palsy, which is commonly known as Bell\u2019s Palsy. Facial nerve palsy may be idiopathic, meaning it occurs via virus without reason, or it may be trauma-induced. Dr. Kilde testified that he could not differentiate between a \u201cclassic viral Bell\u2019s Palsy\u201d and a \u201ctraumatic Bell\u2019s Palsy\u201d on a physical exam. Dr. Kilde testified that there was no evidence plaintiff sustained any fractures to his skull. Dr. Kilde did not definitively state that plaintiff\u2019s facial nerve palsy was caused by the accident. On cross-examination Dr. Kilde admitted that the majority of Bell\u2019s Palsy cases are not related to traumas.\nWhile Dr. Kilde\u2019s testimony on cross-examination did not directly contradict his previous statements, it did leave room for doubt regarding the cause of plaintiff\u2019s nerve palsy, doubt which the jury was free to resolve in defendant\u2019s favor. The equivocal testimony of Dr. Kilde together with evidence that defendant waited almost a month to seek medical treatment was sufficient to justify the jury\u2019s verdict that defendant\u2019s actions were not the cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Even though reasonable minds might have differed as to the cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries, the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion for new trial did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Coltrane, 42 N.C. App. at 658, 257 S.E.2d at 447-48.\nD. Motion pursuant to Rule 59(a)(8)\nPlaintiff claims the trial court erred in not granting his motion for new trial on the basis of two evidentiary issues: \u201c[p]laintiff [(1)] was forced to redact information from evidence contrary to law and [(2)] was not allowed to testify as to his reasons for not seeking treatment immediately following the accident.\u201d He contends that a trial court\u2019s evidentiary rulings are questions of law; therefore the evidentiary rulings should be reviewed de novo. However, we do not reach the merits of either evidentiary question.\nRule 59(a)(8) provides that a new trial may be granted if an \u201cerror in law occurr[ed] at the trial and [was] objected to by the party making the motion.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(8) (emphasis added). It is well-settled that \u201ca party must preserve the exclusion of evidence for appellate review by making a specific offer of proof unless the significance of the evidence is ascertainable from the record.\u201d Dennis, 341 N.C. at 102, 459 S.E.2d at 714. Applying the rule and reasoning of Dennis to Rule 59, we conclude that an offer of proof is required to constitute a sufficient objection under Rule 59(a)(8) when the error alleged is the exclusion of evidence.\nHowever, plaintiff \u201cmade no offer of proof as to the other testimony he contends was erroneously excluded by the trial court.\u201d Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523, 530, 574 S.E.2d 35, 40 (2002), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 675, 577 S.E.2d 630 (2003). Plaintiff did not offer Trooper Walter\u2019s unredacted accident report into evidence at trial. Likewise, plaintiff made no offer of proof as to any evidence of his financial condition other than what had already been admitted by the trial court. Absent a sufficient objection pursuant to Rule 59(a)(8) we conclude the trial court did not err when it failed to grant plaintiff a new trial on either of his evidentiary grounds.\nV. Conclusion\nWe conclude that plaintiff did not preserve for appellate review any of his assignments of error arising from the trial. As to his Rule 59 motion, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict or err when it failed to grant plaintiff a new trial-on evidentiary grounds. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudge MCCULLOUGH concurs.\nJudge McGEE concurs with a separate opinion.\n. We wish to emphasize that our ruling in defendant\u2019s favor sub judice does not imply recognition of a \u201creverse collateral source rule\u201d in any way. As far as we can tell, no such rule exists. While the well-established \u201ccollateral source rule\u201d excludes evidence that the plaintiff\u2019s injury was compensated from another source, Badgett v. Davis, 104 N.C. App. 760, 763, 411 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 284, 417 S.E.2d 248 (1992), we are not aware of a \u201creverse collateral source rule\u201d which categorically excludes evidence of a plaintiff\u2019s overall financial condition or lack of another source for compensation for his injuries.\n. \u201cThe North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure are, for the most part, verbatim recitations of the federal rules. Decisions under the federal rules are thus pertinent for guidance and enlightenment in developing the philosophy of the North Carolina rules.\u201d Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 164, 381 S.E.2d 706, 713 (1989) (citations omitted).", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." }, { "text": "McGEE, Judge,\nconcurring.\nI concur in the majority opinion in full and write separately only to reiterate that our decision in this case should not be perceived as being inconsistent with the holding in Watson v. Dixon, 130 N.C. App. 47, 502 S.E.2d 15 (1998). To the extent that the Watson Court\u2019s statement that \u201cRules 50 and 59 of our Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly provide that these post-trial motions cannot be filed until after entry of judgment\u201d was not necessary to a determination of the issue before the Court, Watson, N.C. App. at 51, 502 S.E.2d at 19, said statement was dicta and, therefore, is not binding on the specific issue addressed in Section IV.A. of the opinion in the present case.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "McGEE, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Van Laningham & Associates, PLLC by R. Bradley Van Laningham, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, by Paul A. Daniels, for defendant-appellees. \\" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KOR XIONG, Plaintiff v. INGRID DIANE MARKS, Defendant\nNo. COA08-52\n(Filed 18 November 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 motion in limine \u2014 closing argument \u2014 no offer of proof\nPlaintiff did not preserve for appellate review the question of whether the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine requesting permission to use a poster-size copy of Rule 35 during his closing argument where he did not seek to make an offer of proof during trial. A ruling on a motion in limine is not sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal because it is preliminary and subject to change, and this rule has been applied to closing arguments.\n2. Evidence\u2014 motion in limine \u2014 pretrial conference \u2014 agreement between attorneys \u2014 assignment of error dismissed\nAn assignment of error was dismissed in an automobile accident case where the plaintiff\u2019s counsel entered into a bargain with opposing counsel at the pretrial conference regarding the admission of certain evidence, received the benefit of that bargain, and cannot now be considered aggrieved. Furthermore, the appellate court does not second-guess trial strategy.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 exclusion of evidence \u2014 offer of proof required\nAn appellate argument was dismissed in an automobile accident case where plaintiff contended that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of his financial status at the time of the accident but did not make the required offer of proof.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 motion for new trial \u2014 first raised in brief \u2014 sna sponte consideration of jurisdiction\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal from a Rule 59 ruling was denied where defendant did not file a separate motion but raised it for the first time in her brief. However an appellate court has the power to inquire into the jurisdiction of a case before it at any time, even sua sponte.\n5. Civil Procedure\u2014 motion for new trial \u2014 filed before entry of judgment\nA Rule 59 motion for a new trial may be filed before entry of judgment, but the trial court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion until after entry of judgment.\n6. Negligence\u2014 new trial denied \u2014 medical evidence of causation \u2014 not conclusive \u2014 credibility for jury\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff a new trial in an automobile accident case pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) where plaintiff contended that his medical testimony was conclusive and that the jury could not have reasonably found in defendant\u2019s favor on the evidence before it. The credibility of the evidence is for the jury, and plaintiff\u2019s expert testimony left some room for doubt regarding the cause of plaintiff\u2019s condition.\n7. Civil Procedure\u2014 new trial on evidence issues denied\u2014 sufficient objection \u2014 offer of proof required\nThe trial court did not err by denying plaintiff a new trial under Rule 59(a)(8) on two evidentiary issues in an automobile accident case where plaintiff did not make an offer of proof. An offer of proof is required to constitute a sufficient objection under Rule 59(a)(8) when the error alleged is the exclusion of evidence.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered on or about 7 September 2007 and order entered 18 September 2007 by Judge John O. Craig, III in Montgomery County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 August 2008. \u25a0\nVan Laningham & Associates, PLLC by R. Bradley Van Laningham, for plaintiff-appellants.\nTeague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, by Paul A. Daniels, for defendant-appellees. \\" }, "file_name": "0644-01", "first_page_order": 676, "last_page_order": 689 }