{ "id": 4162818, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY LEE DIX", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dix", "decision_date": "2008-12-02", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1440", "first_page": "151", "last_page": "159", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 N.C. App. 151" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632720 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39842, 39210, 39964, 39309, 39663, 39792, 39633, 39823, 39955, 39636, 39538, 39438, 39643, 39292, 39295 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1239-02", "/us/512/1239-07", "/us/512/1239-04", "/us/512/1239-14", "/us/512/1239-10", "/us/512/1239-03", "/us/512/1239-09", "/us/512/1239-06", "/us/512/1239-01", "/us/512/1239-13", "/us/512/1239-08", "/us/512/1239-11", "/us/512/1239-12", "/us/512/1239-05", "/us/512/1239-15" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528320 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. 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TERRY LEE DIX" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nThe State appeals, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(c), from an order suppressing statements made by Terry Lee Dix (\u201cdefendant\u201d) to Detective McMasters of the Asheboro Police Department. The evidence before the trial court at the hearing upon the motion to suppress tended to show that, on March 22, 2006, Detective McMasters and Sergeant Cook of the Randolph County Sheriff\u2019s Department served defendant with warrants charging him with three counts of statutory sex offense, three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, and one count of secret peeping. Detective McMasters and Sergeant Cook located defendant at his residence, where they placed him under arrest. Before being transported to the police station, defendant indicated his willingness to talk with Detective McMasters and tell his story. However, Detective McMasters told defendant to wait until they arrived at the jail. Detective McMasters indicated to defendant that, once at the station, she would first advise defendant of his rights and then listen to his side of the story, \u201c[c]ause there\u2019s two sides to every story.\u201d\nDefendant was then transported in custody to the Randolph County Jail by Sergeant Cook. While he was being transported, defendant made a brief unsolicited oral confession to Sergeant Cook, who related this information to Detective McMasters. At the police station, defendant was taken to an interrogation room and \u201cmirandized\u201d by Detective McMasters. When Detective McMasters asked defendant if he understood his rights, defendant replied, \u201cyeah.\u201d Immediately thereafter, Detective McMasters and defendant engaged in the following conversation:\nMcMasters: Okay. And will you answer some questions for me?\nDefendant: I\u2019m probably gonna have to have a lawyer.\nMcMasters: Okay but, ya know, I mean, okay. But, ya know, I mean, it\u2019s up to you if you wanna answer questions or not. I mean, you can answer till you don\u2019t feel comfortable, whatever and then not answer. Ya know, that\u2019s totally up to you. I know earlier you said you was wanting to talk to me because ....\nDefendant: Yeah.\nMcMasters: ... of course there\u2019s two sides . . .\nDefendant: Yeah.\nMcMasters: ... to every story.\nDefendant: But, no . . .\nMcMasters: Uhm . . .\nDefendant: I. . .\nMcMasters: You wanna talk, ok.\nDefendant: Yeah.\nThereafter, defendant signed a Waiver of Miranda Rights form and Detective McMasters proceeded to conduct a recorded interview with defendant which lasted approximately fifteen minutes.\nAt trial, Detective McMasters testified that, from defendant\u2019s statement, \u201cI\u2019m probably gonna have to have \u00bf lawyer,\u201d she \u201cwas unclear whether he wanted to talk to me or not with the way he approached me at the address on Brittain. He was wanting to tell me what was going on or what had went on.\u201d Detective McMasters was then asked what her purpose was in saying to defendant, \u201cI know, I mean, it\u2019s up to you if you want to answer questions or not. I mean, you can answer till you don\u2019t feel comfortable, whatever, and then not answer. You know, it\u2019s totally up to you. I know . . . you said you was wanting to talk to me.\u201d Detective McMasters replied, \u201cI was wanting to clarify what he was wanting to do.\u201d\nAfter hearing evidence and arguments, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, including, inter alia, the following:\n5) Immediately following advisement of his Miranda Rights, the defendant invoked his right to counsel by stating to the detective, \u201cI\u2019m probably gonna have to have a lawyer\u201d;\n6) Detective McMasters did not ask defendant any questions seeking to clarify his request for an attorney after defendant made his statement. The Court concludes that it is required to resolve any ambiguity in defendant\u2019s statement in favor of the individual. State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 412 S.E.2d 20 (1992);\n7) After defendant\u2019s invocation of his right to counsel, the Waiver secured by Detective McMasters cannot be considered valid. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L.E.2d 378 (1981).\nBased on these conclusions of law, the trial court ordered the defendant\u2019s recorded statement to Detective McMasters suppressed.\nOn appeal, the State contends the trial court\u2019s suppression of defendant\u2019s statement was error for the following reasons: 1) defendant\u2019s statement was ambiguous and thus not an invocation of his right to counsel; 2) Detective McMasters did seek clarification following defendant\u2019s ambiguous statement, but was not required to do so; and 3) the trial court was not required to resolve any ambiguity in defendant\u2019s favor. We will first address whether defendant\u2019s statement constituted an invocation of his right to counsel.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact after a hearing concerning the admissibility of a confession are conclusive and binding on this Court when supported by competent evidence. See Barber, 335 N.C. at 129, 436 S.E.2d at 111. The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewable de novo. See id. Under this standard, the legal significance of the findings of fact made by the trial court is a question of law for this Court to decide. See State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 415, 290 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1982).\nThe Miranda right to counsel is the right of a defendant to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation \u201c [i]f . . . he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking.\u201d Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 707 (1966). In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that to invoke his right to counsel, \u201cthe suspect must unambiguously request counsel.\u201d Id. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371. The invocation of the right to counsel \u201c \u2018requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169 (1991)). The test is an objective one that assesses whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have understood the statement to be a request for an attorney. See id. This test examines more than the mere words used by a defendant. See Barber, 335 N.C. at 130, 436 S.E.2d at 111 (\u201cIn deciding whether a person has invoked her right to counsel, therefore, a court must look not only at the words spoken, but the context in which they are spoken as well.\u201d) (citations omitted). In fact, the understanding of the officer to whom a defendant\u2019s statement is made may be indicative of how a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have interpreted the defendant\u2019s statement. See State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 52, 57, 497 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001). As such, \u201cthe likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not\u201d the proper standard. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 168 (emphasis in original). While \u201cthere are no \u2018magic words\u2019 which must be uttered in order to invoke one\u2019s right to counsel,\u201d Barber, 335 N.C. at 130, 436 S.E.2d at 111, \u201ca statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371. It is well settled that, during custodial interrogation, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, all questioning must cease until an attorney is present or the suspect initiates further communication with the police. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981). However, \u201c[i]f the suspect\u2019s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373. Thus, unless the in-custody suspect \u201cactually requests\u201d an attorney, and thus invokes his right to counsel, lawful questioning may continue. Davis, 512 U.S. at 462, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373; State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 655, 566 S.E.2d 61, 70 (2002); State v. Barnes, 154 N.C. App. 111, 118, 572 S.E.2d 165, 170 (2002); see also State v. Ash, 169 N.C. App. 715, 721, 611 S.E.2d 855, 860 (2005). Although the Davis Court noted in dicta that, \u201cwhen a suspect makes an ambiguous statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officer[] to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney,\u201d such clarifying questions are not required. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373.\nIn Davis, the Court held that a suspect\u2019s statement, \u201cMaybe I should talk to a lawyer,\u201d was not a request for counsel. See id. at 462, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the importance of context. The defendant in Davis made the statement about an hour and a half into his interrogation, at which point officers asked the defendant whether he was asking for a lawyer or just making a comment about a lawyer. See id. at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 368. Because a reasonable officer under the circumstances would not have understood the Davis defendant\u2019s statement to be a request for an attorney, the Court ruled the defendant\u2019s right to an attorney was not violated when defendant responded that he did not want a lawyer and officers resumed questioning. See id. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371.\nIn the case at bar, defendant\u2019s statement, \u201cI\u2019m probably gonna have to have a lawyer,\u201d taken out of context, cannot be the sole determinate of whether defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. Defendant had already expressed a desire to \u201ctell his side' of the story\u201d to Detective McMasters, was asked by the detective to wait until they were back at the station, and yet gave a brief, unsolicited oral confession to Sergeant Cook en route to the station. After being told about defendant\u2019s confession to Sergeant Cook, Detective McMasters reasonably expected defendant to continue their former conversation and proceed with the statement defendant apparently wished to make. Thus, when defendant remarked, \u201cI\u2019m probably gonna have to have a lawyer,\u201d Detective McMasters was understandably unsure of defendant\u2019s purpose. By this statement, defendant neither refused nor agreed to answer D\u00e9tective McMasters\u2019s questions without an attorney present. In this context, defendant\u2019s statement was ambiguous because no reasonable officer under the circumstances would have understood defendant\u2019s words as an unambiguous, \u201cactual request\u201d for an attorney at that moment, as opposed to a mere comment about the likelihood that defendant would eventually require the services of an attorney in this matter, which he surely anticipated would involve criminal proceedings. Detective McMasters\u2019s attempt to \u201cclarify what he wanted to do\u201d evidences the ambiguous nature of defendant\u2019s statement under the circumstances. Accordingly, we hold the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s statement was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel was error.\nWe turn next to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that it was required to resolve any ambiguity in defendant\u2019s statement in favor of the individual. The trial court cites language from State v. Torres, a case which predates Davis, as authoritative on the matter. See State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 530, 412 S.E.2d 20, 27 (1992). In Torres, our Supreme Court held that the defendant invoked her right to counsel when she twice inquired of sheriff\u2019s officials whether she needed an attorney. See id. However, in that case, police dissuaded defendant from exercising her right to have counsel present during interrogation. See id. Although the Torres court concluded that the defendant\u2019s statement was unambiguous, the majority noted \u201ceven if defendant\u2019s invocation in this case is termed ambiguous,\u201d the result should remain the same under the rule utilized in a majority of jurisdictions. See id. at 529, 412 S.E.2d at 27. This rule provided that, when faced with an ambiguous invocation of counsel, interrogation must immediately cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the suspect\u2019s true intent. See id. at 529, 412 S.E.2d at 27. However, the rule enunciated in Davis that, \u201c[u]nless the in-custody suspect \u2018actually requests\u2019 an attorney, lawful questioning may continue,\u201d abrogated the then-majority rule discussed in Torres. See Hyatt, 355 N.C. at 655, 566 S.E.2d at 70 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 462, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373). The Davis rule imposes the burden of resolving any ambiguity as to whether a suspect wishes to invoke his right to counsel upon the individual, rather than leaving the question up to the interrogating officer. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 475, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 381-82.\nAlthough the officer is not required to ask any clarifying questions when an ambiguous statement is made, we note that Detective McMasters did not dissuade defendant from exercising his right to have an attorney. As discussed above, it was reasonable for Detective McMasters to expect defendant to continue their former conversation and proceed with the statement defendant apparently wished to make. Accordingly, Detective McMasters\u2019s confusion after defendant\u2019s ambiguous statement was also reasonable. She responded, \u201cIt\u2019s up to you if you wanna answer questions or not. I mean, you can answer till you don\u2019t feel comfortable, whatever and then not answer. Ya know, that\u2019s totally up to you. I know earlier you said you was wanting to talk to me because . . . .\u201d While we do not disturb the trial court\u2019s finding that Detective McMasters asked no clarifying questions, we note that the detective\u2019s response reflects her confusion. The detective\u2019s subsequent testimony further evidences her desire to clarify defendant\u2019s statement. Detective McMasters\u2019s attempt to \u201cclarify what he wanted to do\u201d cannot be equated to badgering, intimidating, threatening, or even ignoring the defendant. Thus, the facts of this case more closely resemble the facts of Davis than those described in Torres. Because this case, like Davis, involves an ambiguous reference to an attorney that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have only understood might be an invocation of the right to counsel, neither the complete cessation of questioning nor the limitation of questioning to clarifying questions was required. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 369. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s assumption that Detective McMasters was required to ask clarifying questions, and its subsequent conclusion that it was required to resolve any ambiguity in the defendant\u2019s favor were error.\nIn his brief, defendant argues that Detective McMasters\u2019s response to defendant\u2019s ambiguous statement, if not a violation of defendant\u2019s rights under Davis, did violate defendant\u2019s rights under Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. That section provides in part, \u201cevery person charged with a crime has the right . . . not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence.\u201d N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 23.\nDefendant\u2019s argument relies heavily on the concurring opinion of Justice Harry Martin in Torres. In that case Justice Martin reasoned, based solely on state constitutional grounds, that continued questioning after an individual\u2019s invocation of the right to counsel violates the right not to give self-incriminating evidence. See Torres, 330 N.C. at 531, 412 S.E.2d at 28. However, defendant\u2019s reliance on this portion of Torres is ill-founded because Justice Martin, like the majority, concluded that the defendant\u2019s request for an attorney in that case was unambiguous and thus tantamount to an invocation of the right to counsel. See id. at 533, 412 S.E.2d at 30. As such, Justice Martin\u2019s reasoning does not apply to the facts of this case.\nIn sum, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact do not support a conclusion that defendant\u2019s waiver of rights was involuntary or that his recorded statement should have been suppressed. Based on the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge should have ruled defendant\u2019s statement admissible. Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge\u2019s order suppressing defendant\u2019s recorded statement and remand this case for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges WYNN and HUNTER concur.\n. Although denominated as conclusions of law, conclusions 5 and 6 contain mixed findings of fact, which do not involve the application of legal principles, see Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 713, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980), and conclusions of law. To the extent the trial court\u2019s conclusions contain findings of fact, these findings are binding upon us if supported by competent evidence. See State v. Barber, 335 N.C. 120, 129, 436 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1239, 129 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1994). Otherwise, we review these conclusions de novo. See id.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Charles E. Reece, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY LEE DIX\nNo. COA07-1440\n(Filed 2 December 2008)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 ambiguous invocation of right\nThe trial court erred in a multiple statutory sex offense, multiple indecent liberties with a child, and secret peeping case by concluding that defendant\u2019s statement \u201cI\u2019m probably gonna have to have a lawyer\u201d constituted an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel requiring suppression of his recorded statement because: (1) although when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officer to clarify whether he actually wanted an attorney, such clarifying questions are not required; (2) defendant\u2019s statement, taken out of context, cannot be the sole determinate of whether defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel when defendant had already expressed a desire to \u201ctell his side of the story\u201d to a detective, was asked by the detective to wait until they were back at the station, and yet gave a brief, unsolicited oral confession to a sergeant en route to the station; (3) after being told about defendant\u2019s confession to the sergeant, the detective reasonably expected defendant to continue their formal conversation and proceed with the statement defendant apparently wished to make; (4) defendant\u2019s statement was ambiguous since no reasonable officer under the circumstances would have understood defendant\u2019s words as an unambiguous actual request for an attorney at that moment, as opposed to a mere comment about the likelihood that defendant would eventually require the services of an attorney in this matter; and (5) the detective\u2019s attempt to clarify what defendant wanted to do evidenced the ambiguous nature of defendant\u2019s statement under the circumstances.\n2. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 resolution of ambiguity in favor of defendant not required\nThe trial court was not required in a multiple statutory sex offense, multiple indecent liberties with a child, and secret peeping case to resolve any ambiguity in defendant\u2019s statement about the need for counsel in defendant\u2019s favor because: (1) the detective did not dissuade defendant from exercising his right to have an attorney, and the detective\u2019s attempt to clarify what defendant wanted to do could not be equated to badgering, intimidating, threatening, or even ignoring defendant; (2) this case involved an ambiguous reference to an attorney that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have only understood might be an invocation of the right to counsel, and thus, neither the complete cessation of questioning nor the limitation of questioning to clarifying questions was required; and (3) the detective was not required to ask clarifying questions.\nAppeal by the State from judgment entered 15 August 2007 by Judge John O. Craig in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 August 2008.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Charles E. Reece, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0151-01", "first_page_order": 183, "last_page_order": 191 }