{ "id": 4163610, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE ENGLISH", "name_abbreviation": "State v. English", "decision_date": "2008-12-16", "docket_number": "No. COA08-613", "first_page": "314", "last_page": "322", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 N.C. App. 314" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640672, 12640673, 12640671 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0661-02", "/se2d/658/0661-03", "/se2d/658/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640566, 12640462, 12640239 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0669-01", "/se2d/657/0374-01", "/se2d/655/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633070 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "\"Because defendant did not introduce any evidence within the meaning of Rule 10, the court erred in depriving him of the right to the closing argument to the jury. As we did in Shuler, we conclude that this error entitles defendant to a new trial.\"" }, { "page": "707" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant did not introduce any evidence within the meaning of Rule 10, and the trial court therefore erred in depriving him of the right to the closing argument to the jury . . . [W]e conclude that this error entitles Defendant to a new trial.\"" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639861 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638765 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "\"[Defendant] did not \"introduce\" evidence within the meaning of Rule 10. As in Bell and Wells, we must conclude the trial court's error in denying defendant the final argument entitles defendant to a new trial.\" (Citations omitted)" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139668 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8435503 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140", "parenthetical": "\"Because defendant did not introduce any evidence within the meaning of Rule 10, the court erred in depriving him of the right to the closing argument to the jury. As we did in Shuler, we conclude that this error entitles defendant to a new trial.\"" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8237129 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant did not introduce any evidence within the meaning of Rule 10, and the trial court therefore erred in depriving him of the right to the closing argument to the jury . . . [W]e conclude that this error entitles Defendant to a new trial.\"" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743616, 3738823, 3736716, 3747564, 3746580, 3747157, 3746068, 3741847, 3747001 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0699-02", "/nc/361/0699-03", "/nc/361/0699-07", "/nc/361/0699-05", "/nc/361/0699-09", "/nc/361/0699-01", "/nc/361/0699-04", "/nc/361/0699-06", "/nc/361/0699-08" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8186794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "\"[Defendant] did not \"introduce\" evidence within the meaning of Rule 10. As in Bell and Wells, we must conclude the trial court's error in denying defendant the final argument entitles defendant to a new trial.\" (Citations omitted)" }, { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hall, 57 N.C. App. 561, 565, 291 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1982) (footnote omitted)" }, { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "588-89", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241331 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hall, 57 N.C. App. 561, 565, 291 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1982) (footnote omitted)" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0449-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 809, "char_count": 18130, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2658279216732355e-07, "percentile": 0.6135543037451218 }, "sha256": "3ee3e52815b1ce1e1559ee34cefa98ac552572d521ddebdeff7a4935b935aab4", "simhash": "1:c56c5669d7379c93", "word_count": 2869 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:43.594733+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE ENGLISH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nBobby Lee English (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals judgments entered after a jury found him to be guilty of: (1) first-degree murder; (2) first-degree burglary; (3) conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary; (4) robbery with a dangerous weapon; and (5) conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Because the trial court erroneously deprived defendant of his right to make the final closing argument to the jury, we hold defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nI. Background\nOn 5 February 2004, Henry Gibson (\u201cGibson\u201d), an eighty-two-year-old military veteran, was beaten to death in his home during the course of a burglary and robbery. At trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show Leiah Helton (\u201cHelton\u201d), Cristal Perryman (\u201cPerryman\u201d), and defendant had spent the week prior to the burglary and robbery \u201csmoking crack\u201d and had exhausted their money. Helton had robbed Gibson previously and knew that he kept a large sum of cash in a \u201csack\u201d inside his recreational vehicle. On 4 February 2004, Helton devised a plan to rob Gibson a second time and recruited Perryman and defendant to assist her in the robbery. Sometime after midnight on 5 February 2004, Helton, Perryman, and defendant were driven to Gibson\u2019s residence by Adrianna Juarez (\u201cJuarez\u201d).\nHelton instructed Juarez to \u201cdrive around for about 15 or 20 minutes, [and] then come back.\u201d Helton retrieved the ax handle she had brought along to subdue Gibson and handed it to defendant to conceal under his sweatshirt. As Helton, Perryman, and defendant approached Gibson\u2019s residence, Helton instructed defendant to strike Gibson with the ax handle on her signal.\nHelton disguised her appearance and knocked on Gibson\u2019s door three times before he answered. Helton gave Gibson a false name and stated that her car had run out of gas and that she needed money. Gibson opened the door and invited Helton, Perryman, and defendant inside his residence. Helton subsequently signaled for defendant to attack Gibson. Defendant pulled the ax handle from underneath his sweatshirt, dropped it to the ground, and punched Gibson in the face. Gibson remained unconscious for approximately two to three minutes. While Gibson remained unconscious, Helton asked him repeatedly where he kept his money. After Gibson failed to respond, Helton hit him in the face with the ax handle multiple times.\nHelton and defendant searched through Gibson\u2019s clothes and found a gun wrapped in newspaper. Helton threw the gun on the floor near the door so she could retrieve it on the way out. In the meantime, Perryman searched Gibson\u2019s residence and found money hidden under the couch. Perryman stated \u201cI found the money. Let\u2019s go.\u201d Perryman walked out the door and began putting money into her pockets.\nThe sequence of events that follow are disputed. Perryman testified defendant exited Gibson\u2019s residence three to four seconds after her. Approximately four minutes later, Helton exited Gibson\u2019s residence holding a knife and stated, \u201cIt\u2019s done. It\u2019s over . .. I slit his throat.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s account of what transpired during and after the robbery varied slightly with Perryman\u2019s trial testimony. Defendant stated it took Helton approximately thirty to forty-five seconds to exit Gibson\u2019s residence with a knife in hand. Defendant\u2019s statement to police was introduced through testimony from State Bureau of Investigations (\u201cSBI\u201d) Agent Charlie Morris.\nHelton testified that after Perryman exited Gibson\u2019s residence, she followed to ensure Perryman would not hide the stolen money from her. Helton testified that she stopped Perryman and asked her \u201c[w]here\u2019s it at?\u201d Helton informed Perryman that the group needed to stay together and walked back to the entrance of Gibson\u2019s residence. Helton testified that defendant met her at the door and stated \u201c[w]ait out here.\u201d After approximately three to five minutes, defendant exited the residence and stated, \u201cI took care of it.\u201d The group subsequently split $5,000.00 in cash they had stolen and drove back to Helton\u2019s apartment to purchase more \u201ccrack.\u201d\nLaura Rolland, Gibson\u2019s neighbor, called law enforcement the following evening after she noticed Gibson\u2019s door had remained open all day while the temperature outside was thirty degrees. Burke County deputy sheriffs found Gibson deceased, lying on the floor of his residence. Gibson\u2019s chest, sternum, and six ribs had been crushed by blunt force trauma, which caused massive internal bleeding.\nPerryman, Helton, and defendant subsequently confessed to their involvement in these crimes through written statements to various law enforcement officers. Helton pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and agreed to testify on behalf of the State. In exchange, the State agreed not to seek the death penalty against her. Perryman pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify on behalf of the State. In exchange, the State dismissed other charges pending against her.\nOn 4 September 2007, defendant\u2019s case proceeded to trial. Defendant did not testify on his own behalf or call other witnesses. On 11 September 2007, the jury found defendant to be guilty of: (1) first-degree murder; (2) first-degree burglary; (3) conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary; (4) robbery with a dangerous weapon; and (5) conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Because defendant\u2019s first-degree murder conviction was based on felony murder, the trial court arrested judgment on the first-degree burglary conviction.\nThe trial court found defendant to be a prior record level III offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for his first-degree murder conviction. Defendant\u2019s remaining charges were consolidated and the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of a minimum of 96 to a maximum of 125 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nII. Issues\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying defendant the right to make a final closing argument to the jury; (2) denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss both conspiracy charges based upon insufficiency of the evidence; (3) entering judgment on two counts of conspiracy; and (4) instructing the jury on the theory of acting in concert. Defendant also argues a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\nIII. Right, to Closing Argument\nThe dispositive issue before this Court is whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying defendant the right to make the final closing argument to the jury.\nRule 10 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts confers upon the defendant in a criminal trial the right to both open and close the final arguments to the jury, provided that \u201cno evidence is introduced by the defendant^]\u201d N.C. Super, and Dist. Ct. R. 10 (2007). This right has been deemed to be critically important and the improper deprivation of this right entitles a defendant to a new trial. State v. Shuler, 135 N.C. App. 449, 455, 520 S.E.2d 585, 590 (1999) (citing State v. Hall, 57 N.C. App. 561, 565, 291 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1982) (footnote omitted)); see also State v. Hennis, 184 N.C. App. 536, 539, 646 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2007) (\u201c[Defendant] did not \u201cintroduce\u201d evidence within the meaning of Rule 10. As in Bell and Wells, we must conclude the trial court\u2019s error in denying defendant the final argument entitles defendant to a new trial.\u201d (Citations omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 699, 653 S.E.2d 148 (2007); State v. Bell, 179 N.C. App. 430, 433, 633 S.E.2d 712, 714 (2006) (\u201cDefendant did not introduce any evidence within the meaning of Rule 10, and the trial court therefore erred in depriving him of the right to the closing argument to the jury . . . [W]e conclude that this error entitles Defendant to a new trial.\u201d); State v. Wells, 171 N.C. App. 136, 140, 613 S.E.2d 705, 708 (2005) (\u201cBecause defendant did not introduce any evidence within the meaning of Rule 10, the court erred in depriving him of the right to the closing argument to the jury. As we did in Shuler, we conclude that this error entitles defendant to a new trial.\u201d), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 179, 658 S.E.2d 661 (2008).\nNorth Carolina law regarding whether a defendant \u201cintroduced\u201d evidence at trial pursuant to Rule 10 has evolved over the past twenty-five years. In Hall, this Court stated:\nthe proper test as to whether an object has been put in evidence is whether a party has offered it as substantive evidence or so that the jury may examine it and determine whether it illustrates, corroborates, or impeaches the testimony of a witness. If the party shows it to a witness to refresh his recollection, it has not been offered into evidence.\n57 N.C. App. at 564, 291 S.E.2d at 814. Our Supreme Court subsequently adopted the test enunciated in Hall and applied it to a case in which the cross-examination of the State\u2019s witness resulted in the admission of the contents of the defendant\u2019s post-arrest statement. State v. Macon, 346 N.C. 109, 114, 484 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1997). The defendant\u2019s statement had not otherwise been offered into evidence. Id. Our Supreme Court held:\nAlthough the writing was not itself introduced into evidence by defendant, Officer Denny\u2019s reading of its contents to the jury satisfies the requirement in Rule 10 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts that evidence has to be introduced by defendant in order to deprive him of the opening and closing arguments to the jury. The jury received the contents of defendant\u2019s statement as substantive evidence without any limiting instruction, not for corroborative or impeachment purposes, as defendant did not testify at trial and the statement did not relate in any way to Officer Denny.\nId.\nFollowing our Supreme Court\u2019s analysis in Macon, this Court stated that \u201c[although not formally offered and accepted into evidence, evidence is also \u2018introduced\u2019 when [a] new matter is presented to the jury during cross-examination and that matter is not relevant to any issue in the case.\u201d Shuler, 135 N.C. App. at 453, 520 S.E.2d at 588 (citation omitted) (emphasis original). This Court further stated:\nNew matters raised during the cross-examination, which are relevant, do not constitute the \u201cintroduction\u201d of evidence within the meaning of Rule 10. To hold otherwise, would place upon a defendant the intolerable burden of electing to either refrain from the exercise of his constitutional right to cross-examine and thereby suffer adverse testimony to stand in the record unchallenged and un-impeached or forfeit the valuable procedural right to closing argument.\nId. at 453, 520 S.E.2d at 588-89 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\nHere, at the close of all the evidence, the State argued defendant had waived his right to make the final closing argument to the jury based upon his introduction of substantive evidence through defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Burke County Sheriff\u2019s Detective Dean Hennessee (\u201cDetective Hennessee\u201d) concerning the statement of Jerry Perryman. The following colloquy represents the testimony relied upon by the State to show defendant \u201cintroduced\u201d evidence pursuant to Rule 10:\n[Defense counsel]: . . . You filed a report, did you not \u2014 there\u2019s one \u2014 and I would be happy to show you my copy if you have difficulty locating yours \u2014 activity date February 10, 2004, a conversation with Jerry Perryman?\n[Detective Hennessee]: Yes sir.\n[Defense counsel]: Now, Jerry Perryman is the fellow whose residence . . . Helton was found in, is that correct?\n[Detective Hennessee]: That\u2019s correct.\n[Defense counsel]: And you were present when she was located there?\n[Detective Hennessee]: Yes, I was.\n[Defense counsel]: And because she was located there, I think you indicated in the first paragraph or so you found it necessary and important as part of you investigation to interview Jerry Perryman as well?\n[Detective Hennessee]: Yes, sir.\n[Defense counsel]: Directing your attention, please, sir, to paragraph 3 on that first page, that first sentence, did Perryman report that. . . Helton told them they had done something bad?\n[Detective Hennessee]: Yes, sir.\n[Defense counsel]: Directing your attention please, sir, to the top of the following page. Did Perryman report to you and to then-investigator- \u2014 that\u2019s John Suttle, is that correct?\n[Detective Hennessee]: Yes.\n[Defense counsel]: And Suttle \u2014 that on Saturday before [Helton] brought the gun to his house, he noticed that the knuckles on [Helton\u2019s] hand were scratched, is that correct?\n[Detective Hennessee]: Yes, sir.\nThe trial court relied upon our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Macon and ruled that the preceding testimony \u201cconstitute[d] actually offering evidence, and . . . the State ha[d] the right to open and close.\u201d\nThe facts presented in Macon are clearly distinguishable from those at bar. In Macon, the State\u2019s witness read the notes of another officer concerning the defendant\u2019s post-arrest statement on cross-examination. 346 N.C. at 114, 484 S.E.2d at 541. The defendant had not testified and the State had not presented any evidence regarding the defendant\u2019s post-arrest statement. Id. As this Court has recognized, \u201c[i]n Macon, the evidence at issue involved a new matter, not relevant to Officer Denny\u2019s testimony on direct, as the State\u2019s witnesses had not previously mentioned anything about the defendant\u2019s post-arrest statement.\u201d Wells, 171 N.C. App. at 140, 613 S.E.2d at 707.\nHere, on direct examination Detective Hennessee testified at length regarding the course of his investigation. Detective Hennessee initially observed the crime scene and collected evidence later processed by the SBI. Shortly thereafter, Perryman voluntarily gave law enforcement officers information about these crimes. Perryman agreed to allow officers to record her telephone conversations with Helton. Detective Hennessee testified that these recorded conversations tended to support Perryman\u2019s account of what had transpired on 5 February 2004. Detective Hennesse also testified that Perryman identified several items that had been stolen from Gibson\u2019s residence during the course of his murder, including a hand gun and coins.\nDetective Hennessee also provided testimony regarding his visit with Helton at the Women\u2019s Correctional Center in which he obtained her statement. Detective Hennessee testified to the substance of Helton\u2019s statement, the relevant portions of which are as follows: during the attack, defendant started to pull Gibson\u2019s clothes off and handed them to Helton. Helton searched the pockets and found a gun wrapped in \u201csome kind of paper.\u201d Helton then threw the gun toward the door. After the group had finished committing these crimes and arrived back at Helton\u2019s apartment, defendant showed Helton the gun. Helton purchased the gun from defendant. Helton \u201ccarried the gun around . . . and point[ed] it at [her crack dealer].\u201d Helton subsequently \u201cpassed out\u201d and when she awoke, the gun and her \u201cscales\u201d were missing.\nBased upon the evidence introduced by the State on direct examination, we hold Detective Hennessee\u2019s cross-examination testimony regarding Helton\u2019s possession of Gibson\u2019s gun clearly did not present a \u201cnew matter\u201d to the jury. Shuler, 135 N.C. App. at 453, 520 S.E.2d at 588.\nThe State concedes in its brief that \u201c[t]he only disputed issue in this case among the co-defendants was whether Helton or defendant actually killed the victim by crushing his rib cage and rupturing his lungs. Both accused the other of [Gibson\u2019s] murder.\u201d Helton\u2019s credibility as a witness and co-defendant was a critical matter at issue in the case at bar. Because we have held that Detective Hennessee\u2019s cross-examination testimony that Helton possessed Gibson\u2019s gun when she arrived at Jerry Perryman\u2019s residence did not constitute \u201ca new matter,\u201d defense counsel\u2019s solicitation of such evidence could have been an attempt to impeach Helton\u2019s earlier testimony that Gibson\u2019s gun was missing after she had fallen asleep.\nBecause Detective Hennessee\u2019s cross-examination testimony did not present a \u201cnew matter\u201d to the jury, defendant did not introduce evidence pursuant to Rule 10. Id. The trial court erroneously deprived defendant of his right to make the final closing argument to the jury. Based upon numerous precedents set by this Court reviewing the consequences of and the remedy for this error, defendant is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 455, 520 S.E.2d at 590; Hennis, 184 N.C. App. at 539, 646 S.E.2d at 400; Bell, 179 N.C. App. at 433, 633 S.E.2d at 714; Wells, 171 N.C. App. at 140, 613 S.E.2d at 708. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nIV. Conclusion\nDefendant did not \u201cintroduce\u201d evidence at trial pursuant to N.C. Super, and Dist. Ct. R. 10. The trial court erroneously deprived defendant of his right to make the final closing argument to the jury. Due to prior precedents stating the remedy for this error, defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nNew Trial.\nJudges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.", "Marilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE ENGLISH\nNo. COA08-613\n(Filed 16 December 2008)\nCriminal Law\u2014 final closing argument \u2014 cross-examination\u2014 new evidence not introduced\nA defendant in a first-degree murder prosecution was erroneously deprived of his right to make the final closing argument where he did not introduce new evidence during cross-examination, as the trial court ruled. A detective was cross-examined about possession of a gun stolen from the victim after testifying on direct examination about a codefendant\u2019s statements concerning the gun. Credibility was an issue because the codefendants were accusing each other, and the cross-examination of the detective could have been an attempt to impeach the codefendant.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered on or after 11 September 2007 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in Burke County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.\nMarilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0314-01", "first_page_order": 346, "last_page_order": 354 }