{ "id": 4163567, "name": "DIANNA S. FLOYD, Employee, Plaintiff v. EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL GROUP, Employer, NATIONAL BENEFITS AMERICA, INC., Carrier, and PENCO PRODUCTS, INC., Employer, ACE USA/ESIS, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Floyd v. Executive Personnel Group", "decision_date": "2008-12-16", "docket_number": "No. COA08-439", "first_page": "322", "last_page": "330", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 N.C. App. 322" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959480 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522566 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080920 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621595 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532-33" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "552-53" }, { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559322 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491520, 491684, 491750, 491596, 491725, 491760, 491635, 491479 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0062-01", "/nc/357/0062-03", "/nc/357/0062-04", "/nc/357/0062-08", "/nc/357/0062-06", "/nc/357/0062-02", "/nc/357/0062-07", "/nc/357/0062-05" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "236" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Allowing plaintiff to seek benefits under the Act would be akin to allowing every person who is injured in the course of a job interview to seek benefits. This is clearly not the pujose of the Act.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-22", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491744, 491866, 491659, 491910 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0460-04", "/nc/357/0460-01", "/nc/357/0460-02", "/nc/357/0460-03" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 748, "char_count": 18653, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.345745800185541e-08, "percentile": 0.4810525632961613 }, "sha256": "e73ec706dce7ec92308a1c5ef0ca5b0bb47a02d2b6e55e11a53b0bd87d219e71", "simhash": "1:b162c5dbdc0a2824", "word_count": 2907 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:43.594733+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and .CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "DIANNA S. FLOYD, Employee, Plaintiff v. EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL GROUP, Employer, NATIONAL BENEFITS AMERICA, INC., Carrier, and PENCO PRODUCTS, INC., Employer, ACE USA/ESIS, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, judge.\nDianna S. Floyd (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from an Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) denying her claim for benefits under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for injuries sustained during an automobile collision. We affirm.\n\u201c[W]hen reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, appellate courts must examine \u2018whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether [those] findings . . . support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004) (citation omitted). \u201cThe Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by such competent evidence, \u2018even though there [is] evidence that would support findings to the contrary.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted). In addition, findings of fact not assigned as error are binding on appeal. Johnson v. Herbie\u2019s Place, 157 N.C. App. 168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 460, 585 S.E.2d 760 (2003). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 701.\nPlaintiff has only challenged a portion of one of the Commission\u2019s findings, Finding of Fact 12. The Commission\u2019s remaining unchallenged findings establish the following:\nDefendant Executive Personnel Group (\u201cEPG\u201d) is a placement agency that supplies temporary workers to various companies, including, among others, defendant Penco Products, Inc. (\u201cPenco\u201d). Penco is a storage product manufacturer. EPG is insured by defendant National Benefits America, Inc. (\u201cNational Benefits\u201d), and Penco is insured by defendant Ace USA/ESIS (\u201cAce USA\u201d).\nPursuant to an arrangement between Penco and EPG, Penco paid EPG a fee that was approximately thirty-two percent higher than the wages paid to the temporary workers. In return, EPG paid the temporary workers hourly wages, handled administrative matters, and obtained a reasonable profit. EPG agreed to provide workers\u2019 compensation insurance for all temporary workers that it supplied to Penco.\nOnce an EPG temporary worker accrued a certain number of hours working for Penco, usually between 500 to 1500 hours, the EPG temporary worker became eligible for permanent employment with Penco. A temporary worker\u2019s eligibility for permanent employment, however, was contingent upon a Penco supervisor\u2019s assessment of Penco\u2019s staffing needs and the worker\u2019s ability. EPG did not participate in Penco\u2019s hiring decisions.\nAll applicants for permanent employment with Penco were required to undergo a pre-employment physical examination and drug screening. After passing the physical examination and drug screening, the prospective employee was required to complete insurance and tax forms, among other paperwork. Moreover, there had been occasions where applicants had completed and passed the pre-employment physical and drug screening, but were never hired by Penco.\nPlaintiff began working for EPG in April of 2003 and had worked \u201coff and on\u201d as a temporary worker at Penco for about two years. In February of 2004, plaintiff completed an application for permanent employment with Penco. In June of 2004, Penco supervisors advised plaintiff that she would have to complete a drug screening and physical examination. Penco scheduled the physical examination with Dr. Domingo Rodriguez-Cue in Williamston, North Carolina. The Commission found that:\n[p]laintiff understood that the physical would be on her own time and that she would not be paid for attending or for the mileage incurred by attending the exam. Defendant EPG did not require plaintiff to undergo the physical examination or drug testing to maintain her temporary employment.\nOn 17 June 2004, at 10:50 a.m., plaintiff underwent a pre-employment physical examination and drug screen at Dr. Rodriguez-Cue\u2019s office. On the way home from the examination, at 12:51 p.m., plaintiff was involved in an automobile collision.\nOn 21 July 2004, plaintiff filed a Form 18 claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits for wrist, ankle, and knee injuries sustained during the collision pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-22 to -24 (2007). This claim was denied. The matter was first heard before a Deputy Commissioner on 20 July 2006. On 26 April 2007, the Deputy Commissioner entered an Opinion and Award finding that plaintiff was not an employee of Penco at the time of the automobile accident, but that plaintiff did have an employment relationship with EPG and that EPG was liable for plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nAfter a hearing on the matter, the Full Commission affirmed the Deputy\u2019s determination that Penco was not plaintiff\u2019s employer at the time of the collision and was therefore not liable for plaintiff\u2019s injuries; however, the Commission concluded that plaintiff\u2019s collision did not arise out of, and was not in the course of, her employment with EPG. Therefore, the Commission reversed the Deputy\u2019s determination that EPG was liable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Plaintiff appeals.\nI. Liability of Penco\nFirst, we address plaintiff\u2019s contention that the Commission erred in concluding that the motor vehicle accident did not arise from and did not occur in the scope and course of plaintiff\u2019s employment with Penco. We find our decision in Huntley v. Howard, Lisk Co., 154 N.C. App. 698, 573 S.E.2d 233 (2002), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 38.9 (2003), to be controlling on the facts of this case.\nIt is well established that our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-1 to -200 (2007), applies only when an employer-employee relationship exists. Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 365, 148 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1966). The Act defines \u201cemployee\u201d as:\nevery person engaged in . . . employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and also minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, but excluding persons whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his employer ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) (2007) (emphasis added). Thus, the existence of an employment agreement is essential for the formation of an employer-employee relationship. Huntley, 154 N.C. App. at 702, 573 S.E.2d at 235.\nIn Huntley, the plaintiff, a prospective employee, was injured while taking a driving test that was part of the job application process for a position with the defendant. Id. at 702, 573 S.E.2d at 236. The plaintiff argued that the North Carolina Industrial Commission, not the trial court, had exclusive original jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claims against the defendant. In rejecting this argument, we reasoned that because there was \u201cno agreement, written or oral, between the parties, or, for that matter, a promise of employment conditioned upon the pre[-] employment inspection^\u201d the requisite employer-employee ' relationship did not exist between the parties. Id. Accordingly, we held that the plaintiff\u2019s injury was not compensable under the Act, and the North Carolina Industrial Commission had no subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Id. (\u201cAllowing plaintiff to seek benefits under the Act would be akin to allowing every person who is injured in the course of a job interview to seek benefits. This is clearly not the puj\u00f3se of the Act.\u201d) Id.\nHere, the Commission found that \u201c[although it was plaintiff\u2019s understanding that she was going to be hired as a permanent employee by Penco ... if she passed the physical and drug screen, the greater weight of the evidence shows that the successful completion of Penco\u2019s pre-employment physical and drug test did not guarantee employment.\u201d The Commission also found that there had been instances where employees had p\u00e1ssed the pre-employment physical exam and drug screen, but were never hired by Penco. Plaintiff did not assign error to these findings of fact, and they are, therefore; binding on appeal. Johnson, 157 N.C. App. at 180, 579 S.E.2d at 118. Accordingly, the Commission\u2019s factual findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove the requisite employer-employee relationship necessary to recover workers\u2019 compensation benefits from Penco under the Act.\nII. Liability of EPG\nNext, we turn to plaintiff\u2019s argument that the Commission erred in determining that plaintiff\u2019s car accident did not arise from or occur within the scope of her employment with EPG. Plaintiff contends that EPG directly benefited from having plaintiff obtain permanent employment with Penco. She argues that Penco\u2019s hiring of EPG workers furthered EPG\u2019s business relationship with Penco and served as incentive for temporary workers to seek employment with EPG. Therefore, plaintiff reasons that plaintiff\u2019s doctor\u2019s appointment was related to and was within the scope of her employment with EPG. We disagree.\nFor an injury to be compensable under the Act, it must be an \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6). \u201cWhether an injury arises out of and in the course of... employment is a mixed question of fact and law, and our review is thus limited to whether the findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence.\u201d Creel v. Town of Dover, 126 N.C. App. 547, 552, 486 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1997).\nThe phrase \u201carising out of\u2019 refers to the requirement that there be some causal connection between the injury and claimant\u2019s employment. \u201cIn the course of\u2019 refers to the time and place constraints on the injury; the injury must occur\n\u201cduring the period of employment at a place where an employee\u2019s duties are calculated to take him[.]\u201d\nId. at 552-53, 486 S.E.2d at 481 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The controlling test when determining whether an injury \u201carises out of the employment\u201d is whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the nature of the employment. Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 404, 233 S.E.2d 529, 532-33 (1977).\nHere, the Commission found as fact in Finding of Fact 12:\n[P]laintiff\u2019s having her pre-employment physical on June 17, 2004 was solely for the purpose of the possibility of employment with defendant Penco and was not in furtherance of or related to her employment as a temporary worker with defendant EPG. Plaintiff\u2019s temporary employment through defendant EPG and assignment to defendant Penco did not require plaintiff to attend the pre-employment physical and testing. . . . [The physical and drug screen were] not related to her duties for defendant EPG. Defendant EPG was not involved in the payment of or scheduling of the physical exam and drug testing. In addition, plaintiff\u2019s job duties with defendant EPG did not require plaintiff to drive her personal vehicle to fulfill her employment duties.\nThere is competent evidence in the record to support this finding of fact. There is evidence in the record that EPG is a temporary placement agency that placed plaintiff to work at the Penco manufacturing plant and that plaintiffs placement with Penco did not require her to drive from worksite to worksite. Likewise, Eleanor Gardner, the Human Resources Manager at Penco, testified that Penco does not require temporary workers to pursue permanent employment. There is evidence that EPG did not pay for plaintiffs doctor\u2019s visit, nor did EPG have any role in scheduling the visit. Likewise, plaintiff testified that \u201cshe wasn\u2019t on company time\u201d at the time of the collision.\nThe Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s job duties with EPG did not require her to drive an automobile, supports the conclusion that the risk of an automobile collision was not a risk to which plaintiff was exposed because of the nature of her employment with EPG. As such, plaintiff\u2019s employment with EPG was not a- contributing proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injury; therefore, plaintiff\u2019s injury did not \u201carise from\u201d her employment with EPG. Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 404, 233 S.E.2d at 533. Moreover, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact also support the conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s injury did not occur within the scope of her employment with EPG, as the injury occurred on \u201cher own time\u201d rather than on company time, and it did not occur at a place where plaintiff\u2019s duties were \u201ccalculated to take [her].\u201d Creel, 126 N.C. App. at 552-53, 486 S.E.2d at 478. Thus, the Commission properly concluded that plaintiff\u2019s automobile accident did not arise out of or in the course or her employment with EPG, and plaintiff\u2019s injuries are, therefore, not compensable under the Act.\nIII. Arguments Not Before the Commission\nPlaintiff raises two additional arguments in support of her contention that the Commission erred in concluding that the automobile accident did not occur during the course of plaintiffs employment with EPG and Penco. First, relying on the common law loaned servant doctrine, plaintiff contends that she was an employee of both the temporary agency EPG and Penco, the special employer, at the time of the collision. Second, plaintiff contends that although her work for Penco usually required her to work inside of the manufacturing plant, the automobile accident occurred during the scope of her employment with Penco under the special errand exception.\nPlaintiff, however, raises these arguments for the first time on appeal. The \u201claw does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\u201d on appeal. Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934). We briefly note that we find neither of these arguments persuasive; however, because these arguments were not raised before the Full Commission, we will not address them on appeal.\nIV. Sufficiency of Factual Findings\nBy her final assignments of error, plaintiff contends that the Commission erred by failing to make findings of fact regarding the consequences of not submitting to a pre-employment physical examination and drug screening, the details surrounding the scheduling of plaintiff\u2019s doctor appointment, and the benefits to both employers of having their employees submit to such examinations. We disagree.\n\u201c \u2018[T]he Commission is not required ... to find facts as to all credible evidence. That requirement would place an unreasonable burden on the Commission. Instead the Commission must find those facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 602, 532 S.E.2d 207, 213 (2000) (citation omitted). As previously discussed, the Commission made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions of law. Therefore, its findings of fact are sufficient. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award denying plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits for the injuries sustained during her automobile collision.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and .CALABRIA concur.\n. The Full Commission did not expressly find this fact; however, there is evidence in the record to support it. We include it solely to help establish the factual background of the case.\n. Finding of Fact 12 is the only finding of fact that plaintiff challenges on appeal. Plaintiff only assigns error, however, to the extent that the \u201cCommission distinguishes between the employers EPG (the temporary personnel service) and Penco (the manufacturing business.)\u201d While it is not clear to which portion of Finding of Fact 12 plaintiff objects, we assume arguendo, that plaintiff has assigned error to all of Finding of Fact 12.\n. Under the loaned servant doctrine, \u201ca general employee of one can also be the special employee of another while doing the latter\u2019s work and under his control.\u201d Henderson v. Manpower, 70 N.C. App. 408, 413, 319 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1984).\n. The \u201cspecial errand\u201d exception \u201callows an employee to recover for injuries sustained while traveling to or from work if the ipjuries occur while the employee is engaged in a special duty or errand for his employer.\u201d Dunn v. Marconi Communications, Inc., 161 N.C. App. 606, 612, 589 S.E.2d 150, 155 (2003).", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Horn & Vosburg, PLLC, by Martin J. Horn, for plaintiff appellant.", "Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by David A. Rhoades and Meredith Taylor Berard for Penco Products, Inc. and ACE USA/ESIS defendant appellees.", "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A. Hamilton, for Executive Personnel Group and National Benefits America, Inc., defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANNA S. FLOYD, Employee, Plaintiff v. EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL GROUP, Employer, NATIONAL BENEFITS AMERICA, INC., Carrier, and PENCO PRODUCTS, INC., Employer, ACE USA/ESIS, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA08-439\n(Filed 16 December 2008)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 employer-employee relationship \u2014 temporary worker applying for permanent job \u2014 car accident\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s findings in a workers\u2019 compensation case supported its conclusion that plaintiff did not prove the requisite employer-employee relationship where she was working as a temporary employee of Penco and was injured in a car accident as she was going home after a physical examination required for permanent employment. The great\u00e9r weight of the evidence was that successful completion of the physical and drug test did not guarantee employment.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 employment with temporary agency \u2014 car accident after applying for permanent job\u2014 not compensable\nThe Industrial Commission properly concluded that a workers\u2019 compensation plaintiff did not suffer an accident arising from the course of her employment with a temporary agency, and that her injuries were not compensable, where she was injured in a car accident while going home from a physical exam required for an application for permanent employment at her work site. Plaintiff\u2019s temporary employment did not require her to attend the physical and did not require her to drive her personal vehicle. This was not a risk to which plaintiff was exposed because of the nature of her employment.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 issues first raised on appeal \u2014 not addressed\nIssues in a workers\u2019 compensation case raised for the first time on appeal were not addressed.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 findings-sufficient\nThe Industrial Commission made sufficient findings in a workers\u2019 compensation case to support its conclusions, even though plaintiff contended that there were matters which were not addressed. The Commission is not required to find facts on all credible evidence.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Opinion and Award entered 4 December 2007 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 2008.\nHorn & Vosburg, PLLC, by Martin J. Horn, for plaintiff appellant.\nCranfill Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by David A. Rhoades and Meredith Taylor Berard for Penco Products, Inc. and ACE USA/ESIS defendant appellees.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A. Hamilton, for Executive Personnel Group and National Benefits America, Inc., defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0322-01", "first_page_order": 354, "last_page_order": 362 }