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  "id": 4163145,
  "name": "CAMBRIDGE HOMES OF NORTH CAROLINA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI CONSTRUCTION, INC.; EX DECO, INC. a/k/a SEHWA/EXDECO, INC., SEWHA DECOVISION KOREA; SEDECO CO., LTD.; HANWHA CHEMICAL CORPORATION; and HANWHA L&C CORPORATION, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cambridge Homes of North Carolina Ltd. Partnership v. Hyundai Construction, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "2008-12-16",
  "docket_number": "No. COA08-242",
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      "CAMBRIDGE HOMES OF NORTH CAROLINA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI CONSTRUCTION, INC.; EX DECO, INC. a/k/a SEHWA/EXDECO, INC., SEWHA DECOVISION KOREA; SEDECO CO., LTD.; HANWHA CHEMICAL CORPORATION; and HANWHA L&C CORPORATION, Defendants"
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        "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nHanwha Chemical Corporation (\u201cHCC\u201d) and Hanwha L&C Corporation (\u201cHLCC\u201d) (collectively referred to as \u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal an order denying their motions to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.\nIn 2003 and 2004, Cambridge Homes of North Carolina Limited Partnership (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) contracted with Hyundai Construction, Inc. (\u201cHyundai\u201d), a North Carolina company, to provide and install vinyl siding for homes constructed by plaintiff in Mecklenburg and surrounding counties. Hyundai installed vinyl siding manufactured by a Korean company, Sedeco Co., Ltd. (\u201cSedeco\u201d). Sedeco used chemicals provided by HLCC and HCC in manufacturing the vinyl siding it sold to Hyundai. HCC and HLCC are also Korean companies.\nPlaintiff received complaints about the vinyl siding and reported the problems to Hyundai. Hyundai asked HLCC to travel to North Carolina to assist in correcting problems with the siding. In February of 2004, S.M. Lee of HLCC traveled to Charlotte, North Carolina and met with representatives of Hyundai and Sedeco. On 30 March 2004, Seong-Min Lee of \u201cHanwha General Chemicals\u201d sent a memorandum analyzing the components in the siding for HLCC. Plaintiff alleges it incurred damages from repair and replacement of the siding.\nOn 28 March 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint against Hyundai, Ex Deco, Inc. a/k/a Sehwa/ExDeco, Inc. (\u201cEx Deco\u201d), Sewha Decovision Korea, Sedeco, and HCC. Plaintiff asserted claims of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and negligence against the Hanwha defendants. Sedeco filed an answer to the complaint. Hyundai and Ex Deco filed a joint verified answer to the complaint. HCC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to add HLCC as a party. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiff amended its complaint to add HLCC as a party on 31 August 2006. In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleged defendants provided the chemicals used by Sedeco to manufacture the allegedly defective vinyl siding. Motions to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction were filed by HCC on 3 October 2006 and HLCC on 4 December 2006. On 26 September 2007, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss. From this order, defendants appeal.\nI. Grounds for the Appeal\n\u201cThe denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable.\u201d Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 614, 532 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2000) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277(b); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982)).\nII. Standard of Review\n\u201cThe standard of review of an order determining personal jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the record; if so, this Court must affirm the order of the trial court.\u201d Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 133 N.C. App. 139, 140-41, 515 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1999) (citation omitted).\nOur review of the trial court\u2019s order also depends on the procedural posture of the challenge to personal jurisdiction:\nTypically, the parties will present personal jurisdiction issues in one of three procedural postures: (1) the defendant makes a motion to dismiss without submitting any opposing evidence; (2) the defendant supports its motion to dismiss with affidavits, but the plaintiff does not file any opposing evidence; or (3) both the defendant and the plaintiff submit affidavits addressing the personal jurisdiction issues.\nBanc of Am. Secs. LLC v. Evergreen Int\u2019l Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 693, 611 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2005).\nPlaintiff argues the procedural posture in the instant case does not fit neatly into any of the categories, but is most similar to the second category. When HCC moved to dismiss the original complaint on 30 June 2006, it submitted an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss. On 3 October 2006, HCC filed a motion to dismiss without any affidavits or supporting materials. On 4 December 2006, HLCC also filed a motion to dismiss without any supporting affidavits. On 18 May 2007, HLCC and HCC both filed affidavits in support of their motions to dismiss. The record also contains \u201cExhibits attached to Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss.\u201d A hearing on the motions to dismiss was held on 29 May 2007. The trial court relied upon affidavits, discovery, and other materials presented in ruling on the motion.\nWhen, as here, the defendant presents evidence in support of his motion, the \u201c \u2018allegations [in the complaint] can no longer be taken as true or controlling and plaintiff[ ] cannot rest on the allegations of the complaint.\u2019 \u201d In that event, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish personal jurisdiction, the court must consider: \u201c(1) any allegations in the complaint that are not controverted by the defendant\u2019s affidavit and (2) all facts in the affidavit (which are uncontroverted because of the plaintiff\u2019s failure to offer evidence).\u201d\nDailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 69, 662 S.E.2d 12, 16 (2008).\nIII. Analysis\nThis Court applies a two-step analysis to determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Industries Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 119, 638 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2006); Cox v. Hozelock, Ltd., 105 N.C. App. 52, 53, 411 S.E.2d 640, 641-42 (1992). First, jurisdiction must be authorized by our \u201clong-arm\u201d statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4. Tom Togs, Inc., 318 N.C. at 364, 348 S.E.2d at 785; Skinner, 361 N.C. at 119, 638 S.E.2d at 208; Cox, 105 N.C. App. at 53, 411 S.E.2d at 642. \u201cSecond, if the long-arm statute permits consideration of the action, exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.\u201d Skinner, 361 N.C. at 119, 638 S.E.2d at 208.\nThere are two types of long-arm jurisdiction. Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. \u201cSpecific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from or is related to defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum.\u201d Skinner, 361 N.C. at 122, 638 S.E.2d at 210. The Court considers several factors in deciding whether specific jurisdiction exists: \u201c(1) the extent to which the defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiff\u2019s claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether, the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.\u201d Woods Intern., Inc. v. McRoy, 436 F. Supp. 2d 744, 748-49 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cGeneral jurisdiction exists when the defendant\u2019s contacts with the state are not related to the cause of action but the defendant\u2019s activities in the forum are sufficiently continuous and systematic.\u201d Skinner, 361 N.C. at 122, 638 S.E.2d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cThe threshold level of minimum contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction is significantly higher than for specific jurisdiction.\u201d Woods Intern., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (quoting ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)).\nThe long-arm statute \u201cis a legislative attempt to allow the courts of this State to assert in personam jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and is accorded a liberal construction in favor of finding personal jurisdiction, subject only to due process limitations.\u201d Kaplan School Supply v. Henry Wurst, Inc., 56 N.C. App. 567, 570, 289 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1982) (citations omitted). \u201cWhen personal jurisdiction is alleged to exist pursuant to the long-arm statute, the question of statutory authority collapses into one inquiry-whether defendant has the minimum contacts necessary to meet the requirements of due process.\u201d Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 671, 541 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2001) (quotation and internal brackets omitted).\n\u201cIn determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process, the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d Id.\nThe factors to consider when determining whether defendant\u2019s activities are sufficient to establish minimum contacts are: (1) the quantity of the contacts; (2) the quality and nature of the contacts; (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interests of the forum state, and (5) the convenience to the parties.\nCooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cMinimum contacts do not arise ipso facto from actions of a defendant having an effect in the forum state.\u201d DeSoto Trail, Inc. v. Covington Diesel, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 637, 639, 335 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1985) (quotation omitted). \u201c[W]hile application of the minimum contacts standard will vary with the quality and nature of defendant\u2019s activity, it is essential in each case that there be some act by which defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state . . . .\u201d Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296 N.C. 510, 515, 251 S.E.2d 610, 614 (1979) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted) (citation omitted).\nEven if a defendant\u2019s contact with the forum state is direct and intentional, where the defendant\u2019s involvement with the contact is \u201cpassive,\u201d personal jurisdiction may be lacking. Skinner, 361 N.C. at 124, 638 S.E.2d at 211 (concluding no personal jurisdiction over a non-resident trust created for the purpose of being assigned income from mortgage notes, where the only contact with North Carolina is that some of the notes happen to be secured with North Carolina property). \u201cWhich party initiates the contact is taken to be a critical factor in assessing whether a nonresident defendant has made purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.\u201d Banc of Am. Secs. LLC, 169 N.C. App. at 698, 611 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting CFA Medical, Inc. v. Burkhalter, 95 N.C. App. 391, 395, 383 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1989)) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). \u201cNonresident defendants must engage in acts by which they purposely avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State to support a finding of minimum contacts.\u201d Lulla v. Effective Minds, LLC, 184 N.C. App. 274, 279, 646 S.E.2d 129, 133 (2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (citation omitted). \u201cThe purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or unilateral activity of another party or a third person.\u201d Adams, KLeemeier, Hagan, Hannah & Fouts, PLLC v. Jacobs, 158 N.C. App. 376, 381, 581 S.E.2d 798, 802, rev\u2019d on other grounds by, 357 N.C. 651, 588 S.E.2d 465 (2003) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985)) (internal ellipses, brackets and quotation marks omitted).\nA. Personal Jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute\nDefendants argue that the trial court erred in determining that the long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction over HCC and HLCC. We disagree.\nPlaintiff contends defendants are subject to jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7' 1-75.4(1)(d) & (4)(b) (2007). We agree that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(4)(b). The relevant portion of the statute provides:\nA court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j), Rule 4(jl), or Rule 4Q3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under any of the following circumstances:\n(4) Local Injury; Foreign Act. \u2014 In any action for wrongful death occurring within this State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury . . . :\nb. Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade;\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(4)(b) (2G07).\nDefendants contend the trial court\u2019s findings of fact in support of personal jurisdiction are not supported by competent evidence. Defendants did not assign error to finding of fact number six. In its order, the trial court found\nThe vinyl siding was manufactured by Sedeco and it incorporated chemical compounds created by Hanwha L&C and resins sold by Defendant Hanwha Chemical Corporation (\u201cHCC\u201d) to Hanwha L&C.\nFindings of fact that are not assigned as error are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Construing the long-arm statute liberally, we conclude that the resins and the chemical compounds used to manufacture the vinyl siding constitute products, materials, or things processed, serviced or manufactured by HCC and HLCC which were used or consumed in North. Carolina in the ordinary course of trade. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(4)(b); see also DeSoto Trail, Inc., 77 N.C. App. at 639, 335 S.E.2d at 796 (construing the long-arm statute liberally, installation of an engine by defendant in New Jersey was a product serviced and used in North Carolina within the ordinary course of trade). This assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Due Process Analysis\nDefendants next argue that HCC and HLCC lack certain minimum contacts with North Carolina to satisfy the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis. We agree.\n1. HCC\u2019s Contacts\nThe trial court made the following findings of fact with regard to HCC\u2019s contacts with North Carolina:\n6. The vinyl siding was manufactured by Sedeco and it incorporated chemical compounds created by Hanwha L&C and resins sold by Defendant Hanwha Chemical Corporation (\u201cHCC\u201d) to Hanwha L&C.\n7. Hanwha L&C and HCC are related companies.\n10. Hanwha L&C and HCC were connected in the manufacture and distribution of vinyl siding products into the stream of commerce.\n11. Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by Defendants Hanwha L&C and HCC were used or consumed within this State.\n12. Hanwha L&C and HCC injected their products into the stream of commerce without any indication that they desired to limit the area of distribution of their product so as to exclude North Carolina.\n14. Plaintiff\u2019s causes of action arise directly from the intended use of Hanwha L&C\u2019s and HCC\u2019s products in North Carolina, by which Cambridge, a North Carolina resident, was allegedly injured.\n16. On March 29, 2004, HCC R&D Center Analysis Group, which is owned by HCC, produced a memorandum reporting test results of a sample of the allegedly defective vinyl siding. The memorandum was drafted by Mr. Seong-Min Lee, who is an employee of Hanwha L&C, and the test analysis results page was signed by Messrs, Bong-Keun Seo, Hee Bock Yoon, and Young-Choon-Kwon, who are employees of HCC R&D Center and who conducted testing on the vinyl siding product sample. The test/arialysis results report was furnished by HCC R&D Center in both Korean and English.\nThese findings do not support a conclusion that HCC purposely availed itself of North Carolina\u2019s jurisdiction. Conspicuously absent from the trial court\u2019s order is a finding that HCC initiated contact with Hyundai or any other North Carolina company or otherwise solicited business activities in North Carolina. Lulla v. Effective Minds, LLC, supra.\nFindings ten and twelve are conclusions of law and subject to de novo review. In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 154, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006). The mere fact that HCC was \u201cconnected\u201d to the manufacture and distribution of vinyl siding is not sufficient to support a conclusion that HCC purposely availed itself of North Carolina jurisdiction by injecting its products into the stream of commerce. Arguably, HCC was \u201cconnected\u201d to the production of vinyl siding by the fact that HCC manufactured a resin which was sold to HLCC which was then incorporated into a component used to manufacture the vinyl siding. However, under these facts, in order to assert personal jurisdiction, HCC\u2019s connection must be more than fortuitous, random, or ipso facto. Adams, Kleemeier, supra.; DeSoto Trail, Inc., 77 N.C. App. at 639, 335 S.E.2d at 796.\nPlaintiff argues that by manufacturing a resin that was sold to HLCC, HCC injected its product into the stream of commerce without limiting its distribution, thereby availing itself of North Carolina jurisdiction. Plaintiff also argues that because finding number twelve was not specifically challenged in defendants\u2019 brief, this finding should be affirmed. We disagree.\nPlaintiff cites Liberty Finance Co. v. North Augusta Computer Store, 100 N.C. App. 279, 395 S.E.2d 709 (1990), in support of this argument. In that case the defendant alleged the trial court relied on incompetent evidence to support its findings. Id. at 283, 395 S.E.2d at 711. This Court determined since defendant had \u201cnot directed this Court in its brief to any particular place in the record which would support its position\u201d it did not meet its burden of showing error on the trial court\u2019s part. Id. The Liberty Court also determined defendant\u2019s affidavit constituted competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings in favor of asserting personal jurisdiction. Id. at 283-85, 395 S.E.2d at 712.\nHere, defendants properly assigned error to \u201cfinding\u201d number twelve and argue that the trial court erred in determining personal jurisdiction over defendants was proper. Since we determined finding number twelve is really a conclusion of law, it is subject to de novo review.\nPurposeful availment has been found where a corporation \u201cdelivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.\u201d World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 502 (1980). A foreign manufacturer cannot shield itself from liability for injuries caused by a defective product in the forum state where it has no direct contacts by simply funneling its products through a completely separate and uncontrolled subsidiary. Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 50, 306 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1983). Foreign manufacturers who export their products to the United States for distribution throughout the United States and neither intend nor anticipate the distribution to be limited to a particular state or states or attempts to limit its distribution, may be subject to personal jurisdiction in any U.S. state. Id. at 49, 306 S.E.2d at 567-68 (citing McCombs v. Cerco Rentals, 622 S.W.2d 822 (1981)). The foreseeability that is \u201ccritical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant\u2019s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.\u201d World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S. Ct. at 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 501. The stream of commerce theory applies to products liability cases such as this one. Considine v. West Point Dairy Products, 111 N.C. App. 427, 430, 432 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1993).\nAfter careful review, we conclude the evidence does not support a finding that HCC reasonably anticipated or should have reasonably anticipated its product would be sold in North Carolina. In HCC\u2019s affidavit, HCC denies that it provided chemicals to siding manufacturers, asserts that HCC did not solicit any business in North Carolina, nor did it contract with any North Carolina resident or a North Carolina distributor. HCC also asserted that it did not have any knowledge that its resins would be used to manufacture the siding. Plaintiff did not present affidavits or other evidence to contradict HCC\u2019s assertions.\nPlaintiff contends that Hyundai\u2019s and Ex Deco\u2019s Verified Answer is competent evidence to support the finding that HCC was connected with the distribution and manufacture of vinyl siding in the stream of commerce. We disagree. Hyundai and Ex Deco\u2019s Answer admits plaintiff\u2019s allegation that HCC and HLCC were in the business of providing chemicals to siding manufacturers, the chemicals were used in North Carolina and they knew or reasonably should have known that the chemicals were being used and would be used in products shipped and installed throughout the United States. Admissions in the answer of one defendant are not competent evidence against a codefendant. Manufacturing Co. v. Construction Co., 259 N.C. 649, 652, 131 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1963); see also Barclays American v. Haywood, 65 N.C. App. 387, 389, 308 S.E.2d 921, 923 (1983) (\u201cFacts admitted by one defendant are not binding on a co-defendant.\u201d).\nFurthermore, there is no evidence that HCC exported its product for distribution in the United States. HCC admits it manufactured a chemical resin which was incorporated into another product manufactured by another Korean company. HCC\u2019s \u201cproducts\u201d were the resins sold to HLCC, a Korean company. HLCC\u2019s affidavit asserted it does not have any distributors in North Carolina. HLCC\u2019s chemical compound was sold to another Korean company, Sedeco. There is no evidence of any agreement between HCC and HLCC or HCC and Sedeco to distribute HCC\u2019s products in the United States. Cf. Warzynski v. Empire Comfort Systems, 102 N.C. App. 222, 229, 401 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1991) (concluding foreign manufacturer purposely injected its product into the stream of commerce without any indication it desired to limit the area of distribution by entering sales agreement with distributor). HCC\u2019s connection to Hyundai was through two separate Korean companies: HLCC and Sedeco. During oral arguments, counsel for plaintiff conceded that HCC\u2019s involvement in supplying the resins was another step removed from the manufacturing process when compared to HLCC\u2019s involvement. \u201cAlthough contacts that are isolated or sporadic may support specific jurisdiction if they create a substantial connection with the forum, the contacts must be more than random, fortuitous or attenuated.\u201d Havey v. Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 815, 616 S.E.2d 642; 647 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Under these facts, HCC\u2019s connection with North Carolina is too attenuated to make it reasonably foreseeable that it would be summoned into court here.\nAlthough finding number sixteen indicates HCC was connected to a memorandum analyzing the chemical components in the siding, this memorandum was drafted in March of 2004, after problems were reported with the siding. Plaintiff argues this finding is relevant because it shows an intent by HCC to serve consumers in North Carolina. However, this finding shows that HCC conducted an analysis of its product after it had been sold and incorporated into another product. HCC\u2019s only connection to North Carolina arises from its relationship with HLCC. See Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296 N.C. at 517, 251 S.E.2d at 615 (defendant whose only contact in North Carolina consisted of his signature on a conditional promissory note to guarantee payment for a North Carolina creditor was an \u201cisolated, fortuitous contact\u201d); Sola Basic Industries v. Electric Membership Corp., 70 N.C. App. 737, 321 S.E.2d 28 (1984) (no personal jurisdiction where defendant\u2019s only contact with North Carolina was when plaintiff removed a transformer purchased by defendant to North Carolina; defendant did not choose the repair location); see also Skinner, supra.\nPlaintiff also argues there is general jurisdiction over HCC. We disagree. \u201cThe test for general jurisdiction is more stringent [than the test for specific jurisdiction] as there must be continuous and systematic contacts between the defendant and forum state.\u201d Havey, at 819, 616 S.E.2d at 649 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The trial court made no findings to support a conclusion that HCC had continuous and systematic contacts with North Carolina.\nSince we determined HCC lacks the minimum contacts necessary to support a conclusion that HCC purposely availed itself of North Carolina\u2019s jurisdiction, we need not reach whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. See Buying Group, Inc., 296 N.C. at 515, 251 S.E.2d at 614 (it is essential that defendant purposeful avail itself of business activities in the forum state); Tejal Vyas, LLC v. Carriage Park, Ltd. P\u2019ship., 166 N.C. App. 34, 38, 600 S.E.2d 881, 885 (2004) (citations omitted) (\u201cTo generate minimum contacts, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state and invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of North Carolina.\u201d); see also CFA Medical, Inc., 95 N.C. App. at 394-95, 383 S.E.2d at 216. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of HCC\u2019s motion to dismiss.\n2.HLCC\u2019s Contacts\nThe trial court made the following findings of fact relating to HLCC\u2019s contacts:\n3. Hyundai contacted Defendant Hanwha L&C Corporation (\u201cHanwha L&C\u201d) and Defendant Sedeco, which are both Korean companies, and requested that Hanwha L&C and Sedeco produce vinyl siding samples with specific colors, strengths and other features.\n4. Thereafter, Hanwha L&C and Sedeco produced vinyl siding samples and provided them to Hyundai.\n6. The vinyl siding was manufactured by Sedeco and it incorporated chemical compounds created by Hanwha L&C and resins sold by Defendant Hanwha Chemical Corporation (\u201cHCC\u201d) to Hanwha L&C.\n7. Hanwha L&C and HCC are related companies.\n8. Hyundai, Sedeco and Hanwha L&C discussed Plaintiff\u2019s vinyl siding requirements; produced, reviewed and approved vinyl siding samples; and knew that Hyundai was a United States company.\n9. Hanwha L&C knew that its chemical compound would be used in the manufacture of vinyl siding.\n10. Hanwha L&C and HCC were connected in the manufacture' and distribution of vinyl siding products into the stream of commerce.\n11. Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by Defendants Hanwha L&C and HCC were used or consumed within this State.\n12. Hanwha L&C and HCC injected their products into the stream of commerce without any indication that they desired to limit the area of distribution of their product so as to exclude North Carolina.\n14. Plaintiff\u2019s causes of action arise directly from the intended use of Hanwha L&C\u2019s and HCC\u2019s products in North Carolina, by which Cambridge, a North Carolina resident, was allegedly injured.\n15. From February 12 through February 15, 2004, Mr. S.M. Lee, who is a representative of Hanwha L&C, traveled to Charlotte, North Carolina to meet with Hyundai\u2019s and Sedeco\u2019s representatives regarding the allegedly defective vinyl siding.\n18. Upon learning of certain alleged quality problems associated with the vinyl siding, Hyundai, Sedeco and Hanwha L&C met to discuss improving the quality of the vinyl siding. Thereafter, Sedeco continued to manufacture vinyl siding for Hyundai, which incorporated Hanwha L&C\u2019s chemical compounds.\nDefendants argue findings of fact numbers three, four, eight, ten, eleven and fourteen are not supported by the record or are supported by inadmissible documents. Findings number three, four, and eight would support a conclusion that HLCC purposely availed itself of North Carolina jurisdiction because these findings indicate HLCC designed its product for Hyundai and was aware it was dealing with a North Carolina company. See Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, supra (sufficient contacts found where defendant entered into contract with North Carolina plaintiff and knew contract would be performed in North Carolina). We therefore examine whether these findings are supported by competent evidence.\nPlaintiff\u2019s amended complaint alleged that both HCC and HLCC \u201chad reason to know of the particular purpose for which the Sedeco Siding and Hanwha Chemicals were required \u2014 use in and for exterior siding on homes in the southeastern United States.\u201d HLCC\u2019s affidavit asserted HLCC had no knowledge of what would become of its chemical compound beyond the general knowledge that it would be used to manufacture siding in Korea. HLCC\u2019s affidavit also asserted that HLCC \u201cdoes not design any of its products, including the product at issue, specifically for the North Carolina market.\u201d These assertions contradict plaintiff\u2019s allegations in its unverified complaint, therefore there must be other competent evidence to base a finding that HLCC was aware it was dealing with a North Carolina company. See Bruggeman, 138 N.C. App. at 615-16, 532 S.E.2d at 218; cf: Liberty Finance, supra (evidence in defendant\u2019s affidavit was competent to support trial court\u2019s findings). HLCC admitted it knew its chemical compound would be used in the manufacture of vinyl siding by Sedeco in its responses to plaintiff\u2019s interrogatories. However, there is no competent evidence to support a finding that HLCC was aware that the siding would be sold outside of Korea or that HLCC provided samples of the chemical compound to Hyundai.\nPlaintiff argues that Sedeco\u2019s answer constitutes competent evidence to support findings three, four and eight. However, Sedeco\u2019s answer is unverified and, as previously noted, answers of co-defendants are not admissible evidence against another defendant. Manufacturing Co., supra; Barclays American, supra.; see also Brown v. Refuel Am., Inc., 186 N.C. App. 631, 634, 652 S.E.2d 389, 392 (2007) (\u201cFactual allegations in Defendants\u2019 unverified answer are not competent evidence[.]\u201d) and Dixon v. Hill, 174 N.C. App. 252, 620 S.E.2d 715 (2005) (denials in an unverified answer are not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion).\nWe find the facts of this case similar to Charter Med., Ltd. v. Zigmed, Inc., 173 N.C. App. 213, 617 S.E.2d 352 (2005). In Charter Medical, this Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant because there was no evidence in the record that defendant attempted to benefit from the laws of North Carolina by entering the market here. In that case, plaintiff submitted a purchase order to defendant for a medical machine in New Jersey. Later, plaintiff asked defendant to ship the machine to its North Carolina facility. After delivery of the machine, defendant sent technicians to North Carolina for eight days to install the machine. This Court concluded since a substantial portion of the work was performed outside of North Carolina, these were not sufficient minimum contacts to subject defendant to North Carolina jurisdiction. Id.\nSimilarly here, only after Hyundai requested HLCC travel to North Carolina to fix the siding did HLCC enter North Carolina. Essential to asserting personal jurisdiction over a non-resident is a finding that a defendant\u2019s conduct made it foreseeable it could be summoned into court in North Carolina. Other cases have found minimum contacts where a foreign defendant contracted with a North Carolina resident or was otherwise aware that its activities would impact the North Carolina market. See Tom Togs, Inc., 318 N.C. at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 787 (concluding defendant clothing distributor purposely availed itself of North Carolina jurisdiction where defendant initiated contact with plaintiff and was told when he purchased plaintiffs clothing that it would be specially cut and shipped from North Carolina); Cox v. Hozelock, Ltd., 105 N.C. App. at 55-56, 411 S.E.2d at 643 (defendant injected its products into the stream of commerce by selling products to distributor who resold them to retail stores in North Carolina); Banc of Am. Secs. LLC, supra.\nHere, the findings that HLCC dealt directly with Hyundai, a North Carolina company, are not supported by competent evidence. The other findings are insufficient to conclude HLCC purposely availed itself of North Carolina\u2019s jurisdiction.\nWe next examine whether HLCC\u2019s other business activities in North Carolina would satisfy the due process requirement. The trial court also found that:\n20. Hanwha L&C has had the following additional contacts with the State of North Carolina.\nA. In June, 2006, Hanwha L&C sold and shipped more than $20,000.00 worth of construction products to Charlotte, North Carolina.\nB. From October 29, 2006 until November 3, 2006, several representatives of Hanwha L&C were present in North Carolina to conduct due diligence concerning the potential purchase of a company that maintained a factory in North Carolina.\nC. In December, 2006, Hanwha L&C sold and delivered more than $25,000 worth of construction products to Waynesville, North Carolina.\n21. Hanwha L&C\u2019s meeting in February 2004 with Sedeco and Hyundai, its sales and shipments to consumers in North Carolina in June and December 2006, and the due diligence it conducted in North Carolina relating to the purchase of a company that maintains a factory in North Carolina in October and November of 2006 indicate an intent to serve consumers in the North Carolina market specifically.\n23. Although not disclosed in discovery, Hanwha L&C owns a manufacturing plant, or has a division or subsidiary (e.g. Maxforma Plastics, LLC) that owns a manufacturing plant in Opelika, Alabama. The plant in Alabama is one factory in its operations network and it manufactures bumper beams and bumper cores for automobiles. Both Hanwha L&C America Corporation and Max Forma Plastics, LLC are registered as corporations in Alabama. Maxforma Plastics, LLC manufactures products for Hyundai Motor Manufacturing that are incorporated into Hyundai\u2019s automobiles. Hyundai\u2019s automobiles are sold in dealerships throughout North Carolina.\nHLCC produced invoices indicating \u201cHanwha Corporation\u201d shipped products to Waynesville, North Carolina in December 2006 and to Charlotte, North Carolina in June 2006. HLCC admits in its affidavit that it shipped products to North Carolina after the date of service of the complaint. From 29 October 2006 to 3 November 2006, HLCC conducted due diligence regarding the potential purchase of a company that owns a factory in North Carolina. Since these activities occurred after the complaint was filed and after the date of injury, we conclude these contacts are insufficient to determine HLCC reasonably anticipated being summoned into North Carolina courts in March 2006. In addition, although a subsidiary of HLCC operates a plant in Alabama that supplies bumpers to Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, no evidence was presented to support the finding that those products are sold or distributed outside of Alabama. Accordingly, we reverse.\nIV. Conclusion\nThe trial court\u2019s findings relating to HCC\u2019s contacts do not support a conclusion that HCC purposely availed itself of North Carolina\u2019s jurisdiction. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact in support of asserting jurisdiction over HLCC are not supported by competent evidence. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s denial of HCC\u2019s and HLCC\u2019s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges TYSON and ELMORE concur.\n. Plaintiff also asserted six other claims against the other named defendants in the complaint.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CALABRIA, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Nexsen Pruet, PLLC by David A. Senter and Gregory T. Higgins for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP by Tracy E. Tomlin and Joseph S. Dowdy for defendants-appellants Hanwha Chemical Corporation and Hanwha L&C Corporation."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CAMBRIDGE HOMES OF NORTH CAROLINA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI CONSTRUCTION, INC.; EX DECO, INC. a/k/a SEHWA/EXDECO, INC., SEWHA DECOVISION KOREA; SEDECO CO., LTD.; HANWHA CHEMICAL CORPORATION; and HANWHA L&C CORPORATION, Defendants\nNo. COA08-242\n(Filed 16 December 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 jurisdiction immediately appealable\nThe denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable.\n2. Jurisdiction\u2014 long-arm statute \u2014 products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured and used or consumed in North Carolina in ordinary course of trade\nThe trial court did not err by determining that the long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction over defendants HCC and HLCC in an action seeking damages for repair and replacement of vinyl siding on homes constructed by plaintiff because: (1) defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(4)(b); and (2) construing the long-arm statute liberally, the resins and the chemical compounds used to manufacture the vinyl siding constituted products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by HCC and HLCC which were used or consumed in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade.\n3. Jurisdiction\u2014 personal jurisdiction \u2014 lack of minimum contacts \u2014 due process \u2014 general jurisdiction\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant HCC\u2019s motion to dismiss based on lack of minimum contacts with North Carolina (NC) to satisfy the due process prong of personal jurisdiction because: (1) the findings of fact did not support a conclusion that HCC purposefully availed itself of NC\u2019s jurisdiction; (2) conspicuously absent from the trial court\u2019s order was a finding that HCC initiated contact with Hyundai or any other NC company or otherwise solicited business activities in NC; (3) the mere fact that HCC was connected to the manufacture and distribution of vinyl siding was not sufficient to support a conclusion that HCC purposely availed itself of NC jurisdiction by injecting its product into the stream of commerce; (4) the evidence did not support a finding that HCC reasonably or should have reasonably anticipated its product would be sold in NC; (5) although plaintiff contends Hyundai\u2019s and Ex Deco\u2019s verified answer was competent evidence to support the finding that HCC was connected with the distribution and manufacture of vinyl siding in the stream of commerce, admissions in the answer of one defendant are not competent evidence against a codefendant; (6) there was no evidence that HCC exported its product for distribution in the United States; (7) HCC\u2019s only connection to NC arose from its relationship with HLCC; and (8) the trial court made no findings to support a conclusion that HCC had continuous and systematic contacts with NC for general jurisdiction.\n4. Jurisdiction\u2014 personal jurisdiction \u2014 lack of minimum contacts \u2014 due process\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant HLCC\u2019s motion to dismiss based on lack of minimum contacts with North Carolina (NC) to satisfy the due process prong of personal jurisdiction because: (1) only after Hyundai requested that HLCC travel to NC to fix the siding did HLCC enter NC; (2) the findings that HLCC dealt directly with Hyundai, an NC company, were not supported by competent evidence and the other findings were insufficient to conclude HLCC purposefully availed itself of NC\u2019s jurisdiction; (3) HLCC\u2019s activities of shipping products to NC were after the complaint was filed, and thus these contacts were insufficient to determine HLCC reasonably anticipated being summoned into NC courts in March 2006; and (4) although a subsidiary of HLCC operated a plant in Alabama that supplied bumpers, no evidence was presented to support the finding that those products were sold or distributed outside of Alabama.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 26 September 2007 by Judge J. Gentry Caudill in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 2008.\nNexsen Pruet, PLLC by David A. Senter and Gregory T. Higgins for plaintiff-appellee.\nNelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP by Tracy E. Tomlin and Joseph S. Dowdy for defendants-appellants Hanwha Chemical Corporation and Hanwha L&C Corporation."
  },
  "file_name": "0407-01",
  "first_page_order": 439,
  "last_page_order": 456
}