{ "id": 4163160, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. ROBERT LEE WOOTEN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wooten", "decision_date": "2008-12-16", "docket_number": "No. COA08-734", "first_page": "524", "last_page": "531", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 N.C. App. 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639124 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 1683", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 U.S. 728", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159137 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/334/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738504 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1074", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566069 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571060 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564852 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11298486 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568279 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2b)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "870" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(2b)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(4)(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 707, "char_count": 18217, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1332921273722355e-07, "percentile": 0.576682462954404 }, "sha256": "de20d8e391be6575b37a895a3004fde03338b78c3c44efd7ca34e13a1bc7abfc", "simhash": "1:cea9d4a476ba0634", "word_count": 2882 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:43.594733+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. ROBERT LEE WOOTEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nRobert Lee Wooten (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals the Honorable Jay D. Hockenbury\u2019s order enrolling defendant in satellite-based monitoring (\u201cSBM\u201d) for his natural life pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nOn 23 October 2006 defendant entered a no contest plea to the offense of taking indecent liberties with a minor in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1 in connection with an incident that occurred 31 October 2001. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed three counts of engaging in first-degree statutory sex offense and one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act. Defendant was sentenced to a minimum term of 20 months to a maximum term of 24 months to be served in the North Carolina Department of Correction.\nOn 24 January 2008, four days prior to defendant\u2019s expected release from prison, a hearing was held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B to determine his eligibility for SBM. The parties stipulated at the hearing that defendant had been convicted on 25 April 1989 for taking indecent liberties with a minor. Based on this prior conviction, defendant was classified as a \u201crecidivist\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(2b). Because defendant was a recidivist and because his 2006 conviction for taking indecent liberties with a minor constituted a \u201csexually violent offense\u201d as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) the court determined the defendant was subject to SBM for the duration of his life following his release from custody. Defendant appeals.\nI. Jurisdiction\nDefendant argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether he was eligible for SBM because defendant had not yet achieved the status required for enrollment. While defendant concedes that he was given proper notice of his hearing, was represented by counsel, and had an opportunity to present evidence and question witnesses, he argues the failure to follow the statutory notice provisions is a jurisdictional flaw that requires vacating the trial court\u2019s order. We disagree.\nJurisdiction is \u201c[t]he legal power and authority of a court to make a decision that binds the parties to any matter properly brought before it.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 869 (8th ed. 2004). The court must have subject matter jurisdiction, or \u201c[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought,\u201d in order to decide a case. Id. at 870. \u201cA universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity.\u201d Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964).\nThe General Assembly \u201cwithin constitutional limitations, can fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.\u201d Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941). \u201cWhere jurisdiction is statutory and the Legislature requires the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the Court to certain limitations, an act of the Court beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.\u201d Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 75, 215 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).\n\u2022 Defendant\u2019s eligibility hearing for SBM was held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) which reads:\nIf the Department determines that the offender falls into one of the categories described in G.S. 14-208.40(a), the Department shall schedule a hearing in the court of the county in which the offender resides. The Department shall notify the offender of the Department\u2019s determination and the date of the scheduled hearing by certified mail sent to the address provided by the offender pursuant to G.S. 14-208.7. The hearing shall be scheduled no sooner than 15 days from the date the notification is mailed. Receipt of notification shall be presumed to be the date indicated by the certified mail receipt.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) (2007). A literal reading of the statute could prevent a court from making the SBM determination until the offender is released from prison, locates a residence, and registers their address with the local sheriff\u2019s department pursuant to the sex offender registry. \u201c[W]here a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.\u201d Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors, 296 N.C. 357, 361, 250 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1979).\nThe Legislature intended the SBM program apply to\nany person sentenced to intermediate punishment on or after [the effective date] and to any person released from prison by parole or post-release supervision on or after that date. This section also applies to any person who completes his or her sentence on or after the effective date of this section who is not on post-release supervision or parole.\nAn Act to Protect North Carolina\u2019s Children/Sex Offender Law Changes, ch. 247, sec. 15(1), 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1074, 1079.\nThe legislation became effective 16 August 2006. Defendant completed his sentence for a Class F felony and was eligible for release, but not eligible for post-release supervision after the effective date of the legislation. Therefore, defendant is a person who fits the criteria the legislature intended for participation in the SBM program.\nThe statute seeks to encompass multiple categories of offenders at different stages in the judicial process, the notice provisions found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) are merely that, notice provisions to protect the due process rights of offenders who are not currently incarcerated. Defendant\u2019s interpretation would create a situation where the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over an entire class of offenders to whom the legislature intended the statute applied. Therefore, defendant\u2019s interpretation is rejected. The trial court properly exercised jurisdiction in the present case.\nII. Reportable Conviction\nDefendant argues that the court\u2019s reliance on his 1989 conviction to determine his status as a recidivist was error. Defendant argues that the statute requires the prior conviction that determines recidivism must be a reportable conviction as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4). Defendant bases his argument on the enrollment requirement since only those offenders convicted of indecent liberties after 1 January 1996 are required to enroll in the sex offender registry, and therefore defendant\u2019s 1989 conviction is not reportable. We disagree with defendant\u2019s argument that a prior conviction must be reportable to be considered by the trial court when making the recidivism determination.\nSBM is applicable to\n[a]ny offender who is convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by G.S. 14-208.6(4) and who is required to register under Part 3 of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes because the defendant is classified as a sexually violent predator, is a recidivist, or was convicted of an aggravated offense as those terms are defined in G.S. 14-208.6.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(1) (2007). The defendant does not challenge that his 2006 conviction was a reportable conviction as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4). Nevertheless, defendant argues that he cannot be considered a recidivist under the statute. Recidivist is defined as \u201ca person who has a prior conviction for an offense that is described in G.S. 14-208.6(4).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(2b) (2007) (emphasis added). A reportable offense is defined as\nA final conviction for an offense against a minor, a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses unless the conviction is for aiding and abetting. A final conviction for aiding and abetting is a reportable conviction only if the court sentencing the individual finds that the registration of that individual under this Article furthers the purposes of this Article as stated in G.S. 14-208.5.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4)(a) (2007). A sexually violent offense includes the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child as described in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, there is nothing in the statutory language that requires the prior conviction in a recidivism determination must be for a reportable offense. The code is clear that the prior conviction must be for an offense that is described in the statute defining reportable offenses. The interpretation offered by defendant would give no effect to the words \u201cis described in\u201d found in the statute. The court determined the defendant was a recidivist because the offense on which defendant\u2019s recidivism determination was made is clearly one described in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5, even though it is not reportable because it predates the act. \u201cWe are bound by well-accepted rules of statutory construction to give effect to this plain and unambiguous meaning and we therefore decline any attempt to ascertain a contrary legislative intent.\u201d State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 556, 648 S.E.2d 819, 822 (2007).\nIII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present a legally sound argument that the SBM program violated the ex post facto guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. We disagree.\nTrial counsel did argue before the trial court that the statute violated the ex post facto guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions regarding the trial court\u2019s recidivism determination. Defendant contends that the argument presented was not legally sound, and therefore rendered counsel\u2019s assistance ineffective.\nIn asserting what the defendant contends is the proper ex post facto argument regarding the SBM scheme, defendant argues that the monitoring equipment is a modern day scarlet letter, intended to shame the offender. He also argues that offenders subject to SBM are restricted in where they may go and work. He further argues that the lifetime duration shows the punitive purpose of the SBM statute. Defendant\u2019s trial counsel forwarded these same arguments at defendant\u2019s hearing.\nDefendant contends that trial counsel only presented these arguments regarding defendant\u2019s 1989 conviction. However, if the enhanced penalty existed at the time of the commission of the crime to which the penalty will attach, it does not offend the ex post facto guarantees if the enhancement is based on crimes committed prior to the enactment. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 92 L. Ed. 1683, 1687 (1948). While the issue being contested at the time trial counsel made his various ex post facto arguments was defendant\u2019s recidivism status, trial counsel\u2019s arguments wavered between defendant\u2019s 1989 conviction and his 2006 conviction. The trial court understood trial counsel\u2019s argument regarding ex post facto was directed at the statute as applied to defendant and not limited to defendant\u2019s 1989 conviction. Specifically, the trial court held\n[tjhat counsel for Defendant, contends that the statute requiring the Defendant to be enrolled in a lifetime satellite based monitoring program as well as lifetime registration is unconstitutional in violation of the following provisions of both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions:\ne. that the statute\u2019s implementation is ex post facto as applied to this Defendant.\u201d\nDefendant does not challenge this finding of fact and it is binding on appeal. The trial court then concluded \u201cthe Defendant\u2019s arguments to dismiss the State\u2019s motion based on the language of the statute and the constitutionality of the statute are without merit. . . .\u201d Defendant does not challenge the court\u2019s conclusion of law.\nDefendant must show two things to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. First, defendant must show that his counsel\u2019s performance was \u201cdeficient,\u201d such that the errors committed were \u201cso serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u2018counsel\u2019 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.\u201d Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). Second, defendant must show \u201cthat counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\u201d Id. Prejudice is established by showing \u201cthat there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Id. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. \u201cUnless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.\u201d Id. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.\nDefendant cannot prove either element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. While trial counsel may have been a bit disorganized, and may have inartfully presented his constitutional arguments, trial counsel\u2019s performance did not rise to the level of deficient as it is explained in Strickland, particularly when counsel at trial presented essentially the same arguments as presented here. Further, based on the trial judge\u2019s findings and holding, it is clear that even if defendant\u2019s trial counsel had presented the exact ex post facto argument to the trial court, that he now presents to us, the trial court would have reached the same result. Without a showing that absent trial counsel\u2019s errors a different result would have been reached, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.\nWhile defendant asserts in his brief that the SBM statute violates the ex post facto guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions, he does not assign as error the trial court\u2019s holding denying that argument and therefore it is not properly before this court and we cannot address it.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. ROBERT LEE WOOTEN\nNo. COA08-734\n(Filed 16 December 2008)\n1. Indecent Liberties\u2014 eligibility for satellite-based monitoring \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in a taking indecent liberties with a minor case to, determine whether defendant was eligible for satellite-based monitoring (SBM) under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B even though defendant contends he had not yet achieved the status required for enrollment because: (1) a literal reading of the statute would prevent a court from making the SBM determination until the offender is released from prison, locates a residence, and registers their address with the local sheriff\u2019s department under the sex offender registry; (2) where a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded; (3) defendant is a person who fits the criteria the Legislature intended for participation in the SBM program since he completed his sentence for a Class F felony and was eligible for release but not eligible for post-release supervision after the effective date of the legislation; and (4) the statute sought to encompass multiple categories of offenders at different stages in the judicial process, and the notice provisions in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B are merely to protect the due process rights of offenders who are not currently incarcerated.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 prior convictions \u2014 reportable offense \u2014 recidivist status \u2014 sexually violent offense\nThe trial court did not err in a taking indecent liberties with a minor case by relying on defendant\u2019s 1989 conviction to determine his status as a recidivist in establishing his eligibility for satellite-based monitoring because: (1) contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, a prior conviction is not required to be a reportable offense to be considered by the trial court when making the recidivism determination; (2) defendant did not challenge that his 2006 conviction was a reportable conviction as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(4); (3) a reportable offense under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(4)(a) includes a sexually violent offense such as the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1; and (4) the prior conviction must be for an offense that is described in the statute defining reportable offenses, and the offense on which defendant\u2019s recidivism determination was made was described in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.5 even though it was not reportable since it predated the act.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 alleged failure to present legally sound argument \u2014 violation of ex post facto guarantees\nDefendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in a taking indecent liberties with a minor case based on his trial counsel\u2019s alleged failure to present a legally sound argument that the satellite-based monitoring (SBM) program violated the ex post facto guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions because: (1) trial counsel did argue that the statute violated the ex post facto guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions regarding the trial court\u2019s recidivism determination, and the trial court understood the argument was directed at the statute as applied to defendant and not limited to his 1989 conviction; (2) while trial counsel may have inartfully presented his constitutional arguments, trial counsel\u2019s performance did not rise to the level of deficiency particularly when trial counsel presented essentially the same arguments as those presented on appeal; and (3) defendant failed to show a different result would have been reached absent trial counsel\u2019s alleged error.\nAppeal by defendant from an order entered 24 January 2008 by Judge Jay D. Hockenbury in Greene County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 October 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0524-01", "first_page_order": 556, "last_page_order": 563 }