{ "id": 4163401, "name": "JACINDA BURTON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL C. BURTON, Plaintiff v. PHOENIX FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC. and DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants; DONNA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES M. DAVIS, Plaintiff v. PHOENIX FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC. and DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Burton v. Phoenix Fabricators & Erectors, Inc.", "decision_date": "2009-01-06", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1195-2", "first_page": "779", "last_page": "786", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 N.C. App. 779" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640992, 12640993, 12640991 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0242-02", "/se2d/661/0242-03", "/se2d/661/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639058 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 F.3d 678", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11353240 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/51/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 F. Supp. 1341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7404632 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1355", "parenthetical": "\"Once Bailor collected her worker's compensation payments she relinquished her option to collect tort damages against any party liable for her worker's compensation award.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/854/1341-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11832480 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" }, { "page": "635" }, { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/695/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10901395 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/637/1267-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ind. Code \u00a7 22-3-2-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854", "parenthetical": "\"For actions sounding in tort, the state where the injury occurred is considered the situs of the claim.... This Court has consistently adhered to the lex loci rule in tort actions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512874 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "\"For actions sounding in tort, the state where the injury occurred is considered the situs of the claim.... This Court has consistently adhered to the lex loci rule in tort actions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "\"The issue of whether plaintiff's claim is barred by the Workers' Compensation Act is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358631 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "\"The issue of whether plaintiff's claim is barred by the Workers' Compensation Act is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"An appellate court's review of an order of the trial court denying or allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is de novo, except to the extent the trial court resolves issues of fact and those findings are binding on the appellate court if supported by competent evidence in the record.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659712, 1659780, 1659788, 1659929, 1659838 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0284-03", "/nc/348/0284-04", "/nc/348/0284-01", "/nc/348/0284-02", "/nc/348/0284-05" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655550 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150737 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209557 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" }, { "page": "914-15" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512172 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 833, "char_count": 18575, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.178974567584768e-08, "percentile": 0.38346521360897873 }, "sha256": "95ecae831a04aff5334b45ba74f98d232313bf3965f8ab64b06cd601c54cd262", "simhash": "1:3fa39577c2adbfba", "word_count": 2882 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:43.594733+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "JACINDA BURTON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL C. BURTON, Plaintiff v. PHOENIX FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC. and DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants DONNA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES M. DAVIS, Plaintiff v. PHOENIX FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC. and DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Phoenix Fabricators and Erectors, Inc. (\u201cPhoenix\u201d) appeals from the denial of its motions to dismiss the complaints of plaintiffs Jacinda Burton and Donna Davis pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Burton and Davis brought wrongful death actions alleging that the deaths of their husbands, who were employees of Phoenix\u2019s Indiana office, were the result of intentional tortious conduct while the husbands were working for Phoenix in North Carolina. The critical issue for this appeal is whether Indiana or North Carolina law applies. Under Indiana law, because Burton and Davis received workers\u2019 compensation benefits, they would be barred from bringing a civil action against their employer, Phoenix. Plaintiffs, however, contend that North Carolina law applies and allows them to proceed under Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).\nWe agree with Phoenix that Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 330 N.C. 124, 409 S.E.2d 914 (1991), mandates that we apply Indiana law because plaintiffs\u2019 husbands were covered by Indiana\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Accordingly, we must hold that the trial court erred in denying Phoenix\u2019s motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we reverse.\nFacts\nMichael Burton and Charles Davis, plaintiffs\u2019 decedents, were killed on 30 October 2002 while helping construct a water tower on property owned by Granville County. Both men were employed by Phoenix, an Indiana corporation, worked out of the Indiana office, and were covered by Indiana workers\u2019 compensation.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that decedents were assigned to work on the exterior of the water tower at a height of over 80 feet above the ground without having any \u201cfall arrest protection.\u201d The men were knocked from the structure and fell to their deaths after a crane, which was lifting a section of the water tower into place, failed, causing the section being lifted to strike the previously erected portion of the tower.\nOn or about 30 October 2002, Amerisure Insurance Company, the workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier for Phoenix, filed \u201cFirst Report of Employee Injury, Illness\u201d forms for both decedents with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Board for the State of Indiana. One month later, Jacinda Burton signed an \u201cAgreement to Compensation Between the Dependents of Deceased Employee and Employer.\u201d The record does not contain a similar document signed by Donna Davis. Thereafter, Amerisure commenced the payment of benefits to the Estates of Michael Burton and Charles Davis in accordance with the Indiana Worker\u2019s Compensation Act. As of 19 January 2006, Amerisure had paid $312,270.47 in medical expenses to the Estate of Charles Davis and $487.00 in medical expenses to the Estate of Michael Burton. Additionally, Amerisure has made weekly death benefit payments of $588.00 to both plaintiffs. As of 25 January 2006, Jacinda Burton had received $104,284.00 and Donna Davis had received $104,784.00 in death benefit payments. The death benefit payments will continue for a total of 500 weeks until each plaintiff has received $294,000.00.\nOn 10 June 2004, plaintiffs filed companion tort actions in Granville County Superior Court against three defendants: Phoenix; Granville County; and Davis, Martin, Powell & Associates, one of the project\u2019s contractors. Plaintiffs alleged that Phoenix \u201cintentionally engaged in conduct with regard to lack of tie off protection which was substantially certain to cause injury or death and said conduct was intentional, gross, willful, wanton, and recklessly negligent.\u201d As for defendants Granville \u25a0 County and Davis, Martin, Powell & Associates, plaintiffs alleged negligence consisting of a failure to certify the safety of Phoenix\u2019s equipment and work practices and breach of a non-delegable duty of providing a safe work site.\nAll of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Subsequently, Phoenix also filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 actions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants Granville County and Davis, Martin, Powell & Associates, but denied Phoenix\u2019s motions for summary judgment and for dismissal.\nPhoenix filed an appeal from the denial of its Rule 12(b)(1) motion that this Court dismissed as improperly interlocutory. See Burton v. Phoenix Fabricators & Erectors, Inc., 185 N.C. App. 303, 648 S.E.2d 235 (2007). Our Supreme Court allowed Phoenix\u2019s petition for discretionary review of this decision for the sole purpose of reversing this Court\u2019s dismissal based on the Court\u2019s determination that the denial of Phoenix\u2019s motions affected a substantial right. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of the merits of Phoenix\u2019s appeal. Burton v. Phoenix Fabricators & Erectors, Inc., 362 N.C. 352, 661 S.E.2d 242 (2008).\nDiscussion\nWhen considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court is not limited to the pleadings, \u201c \u2018but may review or accept any evidence, such as affidavits, or it may hold an evidentiary hearing.\u2019 \u201d Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 493, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (quoting 2 James W. Moore et al., Moore\u2019s Federal Practice, \u00a7 12.30(3) (3d ed. 1997)), appeal dismissed, 348 N.C. 284, 501 S.E.2d 913 (1998). On appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court applies a de novo standard of review. Id. (\u201cAn appellate court\u2019s review of an order of the trial court denying or allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is de novo, except to the extent the trial court resolves issues of fact and those findings are binding on the appellate court if supported by competent evidence in the record.\u201d).\nPhoenix claims that plaintiffs, by electing to accept benefits under Indiana\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, are barred from pursuing this action under the exclusive remedy provision of that Act. For that reason, Phoenix argues, North Carolina courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over these actions. See McAllister v. Cone Mills Corp., 88 N.C. App. 577, 579, 364 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1988) (\u201cThe issue of whether plaintiff\u2019s claim is barred by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d).\nPlaintiffs argue, however, that the rule of lex loci applies to their tort action. See Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 335, 368 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1988) (\u201cFor actions sounding in tort, the state where the injury occurred is considered the situs of the claim.... This Court has consistently adhered to the lex loci rule in tort actions.\u201d). According to plaintiffs, North Carolina law governs because it is the state where the injury occurred.\nOur Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation in Braxton, 330 N.C. at 125, 409 S.E.2d at 914, in which a North Carolina resident, employed by a North Carolina plumbing subcontractor, was injured while working on a construction site in Virginia due to the alleged negligence of an electrical subcontractor. The plaintiff received benefits pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation statute and also filed suit in North Carolina against the electrical subcontractor, seeking punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 125-26, 409 S.E.2d at 914-15. Under Virginia workers\u2019 compensation law, the action was barred, but under North Carolina law, it was not. Id. at 126, 409 S.E.2d at 915. The Supreme Court observed that the appeal presented it with a \u201cnovel question of first impression\u201d regarding which State\u2019s law to apply. Id.\nThe Court first acknowledged that the principal set out in Boudreau applied, and Virginia law governed \u201cas to the tort law controlling the rights of the litigants in the lawsuit allowed by this decision . . . .\u201d Id. at 126-27, 409 S.E.2d at 915. Nevertheless, the Court held that a different rule applied \u201cin regard to the \u2018exclusive remedy bar\u2019 imposed by statute . . . .\u201d Id. at 127, 409 S.E.2d at 915. The Court held: \u201cTo determine whether the law says that plaintiff, in return for collecting workers\u2019 compensation benefits, has traded away his right to sue in this situation, we look to the law which guarantees his receipt of those benefits, which is the law of North Carolina.\u201d Id.\nIn other words, the law of the state providing the workers\u2019 compensation benefits determines whether the workers\u2019 compensation statute of that state provides an exclusive remedy barring additional recovery through a tort action. The Court explained:\nPublic policy considerations point to the same result. All the parties are North Carolina citizens; the plaintiff\u2019s contract of employment and the contracts giving rise to the workers\u2019 compensation coverage were signed here; and the plaintiff was receiving benefits under our workers\u2019 compensation statute. Under these circumstances, North Carolina\u2019s interests in implementing the protections afforded by our statute are paramount.\nId., 409 S.E.2d at 916. As a result, even though the injury in Braxton occurred in Virginia, the Supreme Court held that \u201cthe workers\u2019 compensation law of North Carolina governs the question of whether this action has been precluded by statute . . . .\u201d Id. at 129, 409 S.E.2d at 916.\nWe are bound by Braxton. In this case, there is no dispute that plaintiffs\u2019 husbands were covered by the Indiana Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and, indeed, plaintiffs have each received significant amounts in workers\u2019 compensation benefits as beneficiaries of the particular bargain that Indiana struck between employers and employees. Since the law of Indiana guarantees the deceased employees\u2019 receipt of workers\u2019 compensation benefits, Braxton requires that we look to the law of Indiana to determine whether plaintiffs\u2019 claims are precluded by Indiana\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation statutes.\nIndiana\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, similar to North Carolina\u2019s, contains an exclusive remedy provision that bars employees\u2019 actions for accidental injury or death. See Ind. Code \u00a7 22-3-2-6 (2006). Indiana courts have, however, interpreted this exclusive remedy provision as preserving employees\u2019 rights to bring actions for intentional torts against their employers. See Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind. 1994) (\u201c[W]e hold that the [workers\u2019 compensation] act itself does not include employers\u2019 intentional torts within its coverage. The exclusivity provision is expressly limited to personal injury or death . . . which occurs \u2018by accident.\u2019 . . . [T]he intentional torts of an employer are necessarily beyond the pale of the act.\u201d).\nNevertheless, the Indiana Court of Appeals held in Williams v. Delta Steel Corp., 695 N.E.2d 633, 635 (Ind. Ct. App.) (internal citations omitted), transfer denied, 706 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. 1998), that \u201can employee, by accepting and receiving compensation under the Act, concedes that the injury was accidental in nature .... Thus, the employee is precluded from repudiating that position by claiming that his injury was not accidental but was instead caused by the employer\u2019s intentional acts.\u201d The court observed that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act allows an employee to recover both compensation benefits and tort damages \u201conly in situations in which the action at law is brought against a third person. In all other cases, an employee may recover at law, if such an action is maintainable, or under the Act, but he may not recover under both.\u201d Id. at 636 (internal citation omitted). The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 637. See also Bailor v. Salvation Army, 854 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (\u201cOnce Bailor collected her worker\u2019s compensation payments she relinquished her option to collect tort damages against any party liable for her worker\u2019s compensation award.\u201d), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 51 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 1995).\nIn this case, application of Indiana law compels the conclusion that plaintiffs\u2019 action is barred by the Indiana workers\u2019 compensation exclusive remedy provision. It is undisputed that plaintiffs accepted workers\u2019 compensation benefits pursuant to Indiana\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation statute. Although the trial court\u2019s orders denying Phoenix\u2019s motions to dismiss found that plaintiffs have \u201cnot signed any final settlement agreement indicating consideration for or release of any other claims\u201d against Phoenix, this fact is inconsequential under Indiana law. Under Williams, an employee elects his or her remedy \u201cby accepting and receiving compensation under the Act . . . \u201c 695 N.E.2d at 635. Since plaintiffs accepted benefits under Indiana\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, they are precluded, under Indiana law, from bringing an intentional tort claim. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Act now \u201caffords the exclusive remedy\u201d for plaintiffs against Phoenix. Id. at 637.\nPlaintiffs, however, contend Braxton is a \u201cresults oriented\u201d opinion that seeks to maximize North Carolina employees\u2019 rights rather than to establish a conflict of laws rule regarding exclusive remedy provisions. Insofar as Braxton is susceptible of a reading that establishes such a rule, plaintiffs suggest that Braxton is an anomalous departure from the well-established doctrine of lex loci. Regardless, only the Supreme Court may revisit Braxton. We are bound by Braxton and nothing in that opinion suggests that its rule applies only when it would expand the remedies available to the plaintiff.\nMoreover, Braxton and our application of Braxton to the facts of this case are consistent with the weight of authority. As Professor Larson has stated, \u201c [i]t is generally held that, if a damage suit is brought in the forum state by the employee against the employer or statutory employer, the forum state will enforce the bar created by the exclusive-remedy statute of a state that is liable for workers\u2019 compensation as the state of employment relation, contract, or injury.\u201d 9 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 144.01 (2008). Failure to enforce the exclusive remedy defense of a foreign state, Professor Larson observes, can result in \u201cirremediable harm to the employer .... Because of this [], then, a foreign exclusive-remedy defense to common-law suit against the employer will usually be honored . ...\u201d Id.\nThe Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 184 (1971) reaches the same conclusion: \u201cRecovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted in any state if the defendant is declared immune from such liability by the workmen\u2019s compensation statute of a state under which the defendant is required to provide insurance against the particul\u00e1r risk and under which (a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury . . . .\u201d Comment (b) states the rationale for this rule, echoing the public policy concerns identified in Braxton:\nIt is thought unfair that a person who is required to provide insurance against a risk under the workmen\u2019s compensation statute of one state which gives him immunity from liability for tort or wrongful death should not enjoy that immunity in a suit brought in other states. Also to deny a person the immunity granted him by a workmen\u2019s compensation statute of a given state would frustrate the efforts of that state to restrict the cost of industrial accidents and to afford a fair basis for predicting what these costs will be. All states are sympathetic with the policies underlying workmen\u2019s compensation, and all states grant certain persons immunity from liability for tort or wrongful death, although the provisions of the various statutes do differ in matters of detail. For all of these reasons, a state will not hold a person liable for tort or wrongful death under the circumstances stated in the present rule.\nUnder the rule of this Section, a defendant will be accorded immunity from tort or wrongful death liability if he is given such immunity by the workmen\u2019s compensation statute of any state under which he is required to provide insurance against the particular risk and under which the plaintiff has already obtained an award for the injury. A person who accepts an award under the workmen\u2019s compensation statute of a given state may justly be held bound by the provisions of that statute insofar as immunity from tort and wrongful death liability is concerned.\nId. cmt. b.\nIn this case,-denying Phoenix the benefit of Indiana\u2019s exclusive remedy provision would, in the words of the Restatement, \u201cfrustrate the efforts\u201d of Indiana to restrict the costs of industrial accidents. It would add a layer of unpredictability to a workers\u2019 compensation framework designed to \u201cafford a fair basis for predicting what these costs will be.\u201d Id. Such a result would not be consistent with the reasoning in Braxton.\nBecause Braxton requires us, when determining exclusive remedy issues, to look to the law that guarantees an employee his receipt of workers\u2019 compensation benefits and because Indiana law bars plaintiffs\u2019 actions, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Phoenix\u2019s 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse.\nReversed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Price, Smith, Hargett, Petho & Anderson, by William Benjamin Smith, for plaintiff s-appellees.", "Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by Kenneth R. Keller, J. Patrick Haywood, and William J. McMahon, IV, for defendant-appellant Phoenix Fabricators and Erectors, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JACINDA BURTON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL C. BURTON, Plaintiff v. PHOENIX FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC. and DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants DONNA DAVIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES M. DAVIS, Plaintiff v. PHOENIX FABRICATORS AND ERECTORS, INC. and DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA06-1195-2\n(Filed 6 January 2009)\nWrongful Death\u2014 election of workers\u2019 compensation benefits \u2014 Indiana Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\nPlaintiff wives of husbands killed in work-related accidents in North Carolina while employed in their employer\u2019s Indiana office were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Indiana Workers\u2019 Compensation Act from bringing an intentional tort action in North Carolina against the employer where they had accepted benefits for their husbands\u2019 deaths under the Indiana Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nAppeal by defendant from orders entered 16 May 2006 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III in Granville County Superior Court. This case was originally heard in the Court of Appeals 27 March 2007. Upon remand by order from the North Carolina Supreme Court filed 10 April 2008.\nPrice, Smith, Hargett, Petho & Anderson, by William Benjamin Smith, for plaintiff s-appellees.\nCarruthers & Roth, P.A., by Kenneth R. Keller, J. Patrick Haywood, and William J. McMahon, IV, for defendant-appellant Phoenix Fabricators and Erectors, Inc." }, "file_name": "0779-01", "first_page_order": 811, "last_page_order": 818 }