{ "id": 4165093, "name": "FELISA R. BACCUS, Employee, Plaintiff v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Servicing Agent), Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Baccus v. N.C. Department of Crime Control & Public Safety", "decision_date": "2009-01-20", "docket_number": "No. COA08-204", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "18", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "71 Fed. Reg. 69,360", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "Fed. Reg.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69,390", "parenthetical": "codified at 32 C.F.R. \u00a7 536.97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005 Army Law. 46", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Army Law.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1994 Army Law. 35", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Army Law.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40, n.51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 U.S.C. \u00a7 12103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "parenthetical": "bill analysis by Committee Co-Counsel Brenda J. Carter" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 U.S.C. \u00a7 1131", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "veteran disability pay" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 204", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(g)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 U.S.C. \u00a7 1074", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "medical and dental care" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 U.S.C. \u00a7 503", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 P.3d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11232779 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "holding that national guard members injured while participating in a summer training camp pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 503 are not entitled to state workers' compensation benefits because they are not on \"state duty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/7/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "893 S.W.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10015816 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816-17", "parenthetical": "holding that injuries sustained by national guard members while on active duty training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not compensable under the state workers' compensation system because in this status members are not \"ordered to active state duty by the governor\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/893/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 So. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7586498 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "holding that national guard members who sustain injuries during annual training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not entitled to state workers' compensation benefits because they already receive federal payment and benefits" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/498/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.W.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10126542 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237-38", "parenthetical": "holding that national guard members who are injured while training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not entitled to state workers' compensation benefits because in that status they are entitled to receive federal pay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/535/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 P.3d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11098273 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/22/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Mil. L. Rev. 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mil. L. Rev.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4, n.10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 U.S.C. \u00a7 715", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 C.F.R. \u00a7 536.97", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008 Army Law. 23", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Army Law.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 A.F. L. Rev. 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "A.F. L. Rev.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 U.S.C. \u00a7 101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(12)", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "(19)", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 U.S.C. \u00a7 101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(1)" }, { "page": "(d)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 334", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123110 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "325" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "345-46, 348" }, { "page": "325-27" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "325, 328, n.21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007 Army Law. 30", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Army Law.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619229 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 U.S.C. \u00a7 511", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654-55" }, { "page": "655" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521370 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-86" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549057, 2547238, 2548908, 2547631, 2547999 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0536-05", "/nc/333/0536-03", "/nc/333/0536-02", "/nc/333/0536-01", "/nc/333/0536-04" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525693 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779-80" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "citation omitted; final alteration in original" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567631 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 14, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1309, "char_count": 44085, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3659473969331803 }, "sha256": "f85fa756c954e6604e71626333b840bad330b2580c4bdbe81e3bf736f7594fb2", "simhash": "1:deb82dc45ad844f6", "word_count": 7118 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.117771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "FELISA R. BACCUS, Employee, Plaintiff v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Servicing Agent), Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from an opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) awarding Felisa R. Baccus (\u201cplaintiff\u2019), a former member of the North Carolina National Guard, workers\u2019 compensation benefits due to injuries she sustained while participating in military training at Fort HunterLiggett in California. The sole issue on appeal is whether plaintiff was an \u201cemployee\u201d as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) (2007), and consequently, whether the Commission possessed subject matter jurisdiction. Deputy Commissioner Crystal Redding Stanback concluded plaintiff was an employee as defined in section 97-2(2) and awarded her compensation. The Commission affirmed with some modifications. After careful review, we vacate the opinion and award.\nI. Background\nIn 2003, plaintiff was a member of the North Carolina Army National Guard and assigned to a unit and company based out of Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Plaintiff was also employed in a civilian capacity as a personal nursing assistant.\nOn or about 25 March 2003, plaintiff was \u201cordered to active duty for training (ADT)\u201d from 11 May 2003 until 25 May 2003 and instructed to report to Eastover, South Carolina, to attend a motor transport operator course. The order listed its authority as 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f) and stated that it was \u201ccontingent upon Congress enacting appropriations[.]\u201d The order contained the following heading \u201cState of North Carolina, Office of the Adjutant General\u201d and was signed \u201cfor the Adjutant General\u201d by \u201cCharles E. Jackson, Col, MP, NCARNG G3[.]\u201d On or about 14 April 2003, plaintiff received an amended order which changed the dates and location for the training; pursuant to the amended order, plaintiff was required to report from 2 May 2003 until 17 May 2003 at Fort Hunter-Liggett in California.\nOn 8 May 2003, while plaintiff was training at Fort Hunter-Liggett in California pursuant to the amended order, she sustained injuries while participating in a training exercise. In an effort to avoid a truck that was backing up towards her, plaintiff jumped onto a chain link fence and tried to climb it; her legs became entangled in the fence, causing injuries to her hip, back, and legs.\nPlaintiff was incapacitated and unable to perform her military or civilian employment from 8 May 2003 until 5 November 2003. As a result of her injuries, she received $2,676.80 per month in gross incapacitation pay from the federal government from 8 May 2003 until 5 November 2003. In addition, upon filing for severance pay with the Veterans\u2019 Administration of the federal government, plaintiff was found eligible for benefits based upon a total disability rating of thirty percent (30%). She was awarded $330.00 per month in severance pay for approximately one year, after which her benefits increased to $439.00 per month and continue for the rest of her life. At the time defendant filed this appeal, this was the only compensation plaintiff had received as a result of her injuries. In addition to the federal compensation, defendant paid plaintiff approximately $273.00 per month for participating in her monthly/weekend drill for the North Carolina National Guard from the time she sustained her injuries (8 May 2003) until approximately June 2004.\nDue to her injuries and physical limitations, plaintiff was discharged from the Army Reserve effective 13 August 2004; however, she was not simultaneously discharged from the North Carolina National Guard. She was later determined to be physically unfit to continue with the North Carolina National Guard. Since sustaining her injuries, plaintiff has not been able to return to her civilian employment as a nursing assistant. With the exception of a brief period of employment with Church\u2019s Chicken, a job which plaintiff had to leave due to her physical limitations, she has not returned to civilian employment in any capacity since 3 February 2004.\nIn September 2004, plaintiff filed for state workers\u2019 compensation benefits for the injuries she sustained on 8 May 2003. Defendant denied liability asserting that plaintiff \u201cwas not on State active duty under orders of the Governor at the time of the alleged injury; therefore, she would not be considered an \u2018employee\u2019 under the [North Carolina] Workers\u2019 Compensation Act[,]\u201d and the Commission did not possess subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff argued that while at Fort Hunter-Liggett, she was on \u201cState active duty under orders of the Governor\u201d and that the Commission did have subject matter jurisdiction. The Commission found and concluded that plaintiff was an employee as defined by section 97-2(2), specifically that she was on \u201cactive duty training with the North Carolina National Guard under orders of the Governor.\u201d Defendant appeals.\nII. Analysis\nIn order to determine whether the Commission had subject matter jurisdiction, we must: (1) interpret what \u201cState active duty under orders of the Governor\u201d means, an issue of first impression for this Court; and (2) decide whether the training plaintiff was participating in on 8 May 2003, i.e., active duty for training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f), fits within that definition.\nIt is well settled that to be entitled to maintain a proceeding for compensation under the Workers\u2019] Compensation Act the claimant must have been an employee of the alleged employer at the time of his injury .... Thus, the existence of the employer-employee relationship at the time of the accident is a jurisdictional fact. . . . [T]he finding of a jurisdictional fact by the Industrial Commission is not conclusive on appeal even though there be evidence in the record to support such finding. The reviewing court has the right, and the duty, to make its own independent findings of such jurisdictional facts from its consideration of all the evidence in the record. The claimant has the burden of proof that the employer-employee relation existed at the time the injury by accident occurred.\nLucas v. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976) (internal citations omitted). \u201cWhen interpreting a statute, we ascertain the intent of the legislature, first by applying the statute\u2019s language and, if necessary, considering its legislative history and the circumstances of its enactment.\u201d Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 362 N.C. 457, 460, 665 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2008) (citations omitted). Further,\n\u201c[T]he Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be liberally construed, whenever appropriate, so that benefits will not be denied upon mere technicalities or strained and narrow interpretations of its provisions. . . . [S]uch liberality should not, however, extend beyond the clearly expressed language of those provisions, and our courts may not enlarge the ordinary meaning of the terms used by the legislature or engage in any method of \u2018judicial legislation.\u2019 [Finally], it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature would leave an important matter regarding the administration of the Act open to inference or speculation; consequently, the judiciary should avoid \u2018ingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted, which [it] believes ought to have been embraced.\u2019 \u201d\nId. at 463, 665 S.E.2d at 453 (citation omitted; final alteration in original).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) provides in pertinent part: \u201cThe term \u2018employee\u2019 shall include members of the North Carolina national guard while on State active duty under orders of the Governor and members of the North Carolina State Defense Militia while on State active duty under orders of the Governor.\u201d In its opinion and award, the Commission did not actually interpret the meaning of section 97-2(2). Rather, it simply noted that the statute had been amended in 1999 and that it believed defendant\u2019s interpretation was too narrow. Specifically, the Commission concluded:\n5. The amendment to the statute clarified the language to specify that it covered more than injuries at drill, in camp, and while on special duty under orders of the Governor. The amendment clarifies that members of both the North Carolina National Guard and the North Carolina State Guard are considered employees under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act while on State active (not just special) duty under orders of the Governor. It appears that the amendment clarified the intent of the legislature to make the statute more inclusive, rather than exclusive. Defendant\u2019s interpretation would preclude State workers\u2019 compensation coverage for members of the North Carolina National Guard while at camp or participating in drills even in North Carolina unless the Governor issued a special order. . . . [T]he Full Commission is not persuaded that the statutory intent is as narrow as Defendant argues.\nOn appeal, defendant argues, as it did below, that \u201cState active duty under orders of the Governor\u201d only includes those instances where North Carolina National Guard members are called into service of the State by the Governor in the event of a state emergency, such as a natural disaster, and that it does not include training. In all other circumstances, defendant claims North Carolina National Guard members are federal employees, paid with federal funds, who exclusively receive federal benefits. Finally, defendant argues the current statute is clear and unambiguous and must be implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.\nPlaintiff does not make any effort to define \u201cState active duty.\u201d Rather, plaintiff advances the reasoning contained in the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law number five cited supra, i.e., that defendant\u2019s interpretation is too narrow, especially because North Carolina National Guard members who are injured while training in North Carolina would not be covered under the Act. Plaintiff further asserts that when a North Carolina National Guard member receives orders pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f): (1) he or she is under the command and control of the Governor and (2) the Governor effects said command and control through orders issued by the State Adjutant General. Consequently, she asserts that orders issued by the Adjutant General pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f) are \u201corders of the Governor.\u201d\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act does not define \u201cState active duty\u201d or \u201cunder orders of the Governor.\u201d Consequently, we review the statute\u2019s legislative history. Section 97-2(2) was amended in 1999; prior to the amendment, the statute provided:\nThe term \u201cemployee\u201d shall include members of the North Carolina national guard, except when called into the service of the United States, and members of the North Carolina State guard, and members of these organizations shall be entitled to compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of the performance of their duties at drill, in camp, or on special duty under orders of the Governor.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) (1991).\nPlaintiff asserts the 1999 amendment was intended to make workers\u2019 compensation coverage broader and more inclusive for North Carolina National Guard members. She further contends that this Court\u2019s decisions in Britt v. N.C. Dept. of Crime Control and Public Safety, 108 N.C. App. 777, 425 S.E.2d 11, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 536, 429 S.E.2d 554 (1993), and Duncan v. N.C. Dept. of Crime Control and Public Safety, 113 N.C. App. 184, 437 S.E.2d 654 (1993), demonstrate that she is an employee under the current, more inclusive statutory definition. In those cases, we respectively held that: (1) a North Carolina National Guard member, who was injured while completing basic Army training camp (\u201c \u2018initial active duty training\u2019 \u201d) in Alabama pursuant to 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 511(d) (Britt, 108 N.C. App. at 779-80, 425 S.E.2d at 13); and (2) a North Carolina National Guard member who was injured in a jeep accident while returning' to his local unit following the completion of a routine weekend drill at Fort Bragg (Duncan, 113 N.C. App. at 184-86, 437 S.E.2d at 654-55), were employees within the ambit of section 97-2(2).\nDefendant argues the 1999 amendment was intended to narrow the provision of benefits. Specifically, defendant asserts it was intended to limit workers\u2019 compensation benefits to North Carolina National Guard members who are injured while responding to a state emergency, such as a natural disaster or civil unrest, pursuant to a specific call to \u201cState active duty\u201d by the Governor. Defendant also asserts that Britt and Duncan are inapplicable because: (1) they were decided pursuant to the more inclusive, pre-amendment definition; (2) under current federal law, National Guard members are members of the Army at all times; and (3) the 1999 amendment deleted the language stating that National Guard members are employees while performing their duties at camp or drill.\nThe legislative record surrounding the 1999 amendment is scant. After examining what information is available, it is difficult to definitively conclude whether the amendment was intended to narrow or broaden the statutory definition. Session Law 1999-418 was entitled: \u201cAn Act to Clarify When Members of The North Carolina National Guard and North Carolina State Guard Are Employees Subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d By stating that its intent was to. clarify rather than to codify, we believe the legislature intended to correct some aspect of this Court\u2019s interpretations in Britt and Duncan and that these cases informed \u201cthe circumstances of [the amendment\u2019s] enactment.\u201d Shaw, 362 N.C. at 460, 665 S.E.2d at 451. Consequently, we examine the analysis and reasoning presented in those cases.\nIn Britt, 108 N.C. App. at 779, 425 S.E.2d at 13, this Court based its conclusion that a North Carolina National Guard member injured while participating in Initial Active Duty for Training pursuant to 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 511(d) was an employee within the ambit of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in part on our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Baker v. State, 200 N.C. 232, 234, 156 S.E. 917, 918 (1931). In Baker, our Supreme Court stated that \u201cthe National Guard is an organization of the State militia, which does not become a part of the United States Army until the Congress declares an emergency to exist which calls for its services in behalf of the nation.\u201d Id. Because an emergency situation did not exist when the plaintiff in Britt was ordered to perform his mandatory training, the Court essentially concluded that he was not \u201c \u2018called into the service of the United Statesf.]\u2019 \u201d Britt, 108 N.C. App. at 778, 425 S.E.2d at 12 (citation omitted). The Court also reasoned that the plaintiff was covered under the Act given the explicit language stating that National Guard members were covered for, inter alia, injuries \u201c \u2018arising out of and in the course of the performance of their duties\u2019 \u201d at drill and in camp. Id. (citation omitted).\nIn Duncan, this Court followed the reasoning advanced in Britt in concluding that a North Carolina National Guard member injured while returning to his local unit following a routine weekend drill was an employee as defined by section 97-2(2). There, the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety raised similar arguments to those it advances in the instant case, specifically that the plaintiff: Was not an employee as defined in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act because he had been called into service of the United States for a weekend drill, was an employee of the federal government at the time of his injury, and had received federal compensation benefits from the federal government. The Court rejected the defendant\u2019s contentions, and because the Commission had allowed the defendant a \u201ccredit\u201d for the incapacitation pay he had received from the federal government, the Court concluded it was not permitting \u201cdouble recovery\u201d by affirming the award of compensation. Duncan, 113 N.C. App. at 186; 437 S.E.2d at 655.\nIn the instant case, neither defendant nor plaintiff support their arguments as to what \u201cwhile on State active duty under orders of the Governor\u201d means, or perhaps stated more accurately what the parties contend it does not mean, with any real discussion of or citation to legal authority. Rather, both support the bulk of their respective arguments with citation to general web sites containing generic, unauthoritative information. In considering the statutory language, the legislative record, and the circumstances of the 1999 amendment\u2019s enactment, including this Court\u2019s decisions in Brill and Duncan, it seems evident that the phrase \u201cwhile on State active duty under orders of the Governor\u201d differentiates between active service to the State of North Carolina and service to the federal government and includes those instances when a National Guard member is operating under the Governor\u2019s command and control pursuant to a specific call to state service. Also, the redaction of the drill and camp language would appear to indicate that the 1999 amendment was enacted with the intent of eliminating workers\u2019 compensation coverage for training, i.e., that it was restrictive in intent.\nKeeping in mind the aforementioned rules of statutory construction, we do not believe the term \u201cState active duty\u201d is unambiguous and note that the interpretations respectively advanced by defendant and plaintiff both require us to read words into the statute that are not there. Given that (1) section 97-2(2) appears to distinguish between state and federal service, (2) both parties\u2019 arguments implicate the state and federal functions of the National Guard, and (3) the National Guard involves a unique, dual state-federal structure, we next consider the broader universe of North Carolina law as well as federal law in an effort to construe the meaning of \u201cState active duty\u201d in section 97-2(2).\n\u201cState active duty\u201d is not defined in any provision of the North Carolina General Statutes, the North Carolina Administrative Code, nor the United States Code. Nevertheless, as discussed infra, upon reviewing chapter 127A of the North Carolina General Statutes and Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code, we ultimately conclude that plaintiff was not \u201con State active duty under orders of the Governor\u201d when she sustained her injuries.\nA. Additional North Carolina Law (Chapter 127A)\nChapter 127A specifically deals with the organization and administration of the State militia, of which the North Carolina National Guard is apart. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-3. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-16 is the only statutory provision which both encompasses the power of the Governor to call up the North Carolina National Guard and also uses the \u201cState Active Duty\u201d terminology. It provides:\n(a) The Governor shall be commander in chief of the militia and shall have power to call out the militia to execute the laws, secure the safety of persons and property, suppress riots or insurrections, repel invasions and provide disaster relief.\n(b) The Governor shall have the additional power, subject to the availability of funding, to place individuals, units, or parts of units of the North Carolina National Guard in a State Active Duty status to assist with the planning, support, and execution of activities connected with the swearing in and installation of the Governor and other members of the Council of State.\nId. (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to section 127A-16, at the very least, \u201cState active duty\u201d does appear to entail a call to state service by the Governor to respond to an emergency or to assist with certain formal state government activities. Noticeably absent from this section and the entirety of chapter 127A is any mention of a call to \u201cState active duty\u201d for the purposes of training. We believe this absence, combined with the 1999 amendment\u2019s redaction of the \u201ccamp\u201d and \u201cdrill\u201d language contained in the prior version of the statute, provides support for defendant\u2019s argument that \u201cState active duty\u201d does not include training ordered pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f).\nHowever, chapter 127A does present some ambiguity as to whether \u201cState active duty\u201d possesses a specific meaning in and of itself or if it is simply synonymous with state service in a general sense. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-98 (2007) describes the calling up of the State militia \u201cto execute the law, secure the safety of persons and property, suppress riots or insurrections, repel invasions or provide disaster relief\u2019 as a call to \u201cactive State service [,]\u201d thus supporting the argument that \u201cState' active duty\u201d is synonymous with state, as opposed to federal, service in a general sense. However, the different awards established for North Carolina National Guard members and units in chapter 127A support the argument that \u201cState active duty\u201d is a particular form of the broader category of State service. Regardless of this ambiguity, however, chapter 127A, article 8, which is entitled \u201cPay of Militia,\u201d clearly indicates that when a North Carolina National Guard member is called or ordered into state service, he or she is: (1) under the authority of the Governor; (2) performing service to the State of North Carolina; and (3) paid by the State with state funds. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 127A-105-108 (2007).\nB. Dual State-Federal Structure of the National Guard\nBecause of the unique, dual state-federal structure of the National Guard, we next examine this relationship in an effort to obtain greater clarity as to the distinction between state and federal service.\nThe National Guard is the only reserve component of the United States\u2019 military to also have a non-federal mission. Serving as the state militia, the National Guard\u2019s unique dual military role has been explained as follows:\nPerhaps the most unique aspect of the National Guard is that it exists as both a federal and state force. As a federal force, the Guard provides ready, trained units as an integral part of America\u2019s field forces. In its state role, the National Guard protects life and property and preserves peace, order, and public safety under the direction of state and federal authorities. No other reserve military force in the world has such an arrangement, and the National Guard\u2019s.dual allegiance to state and nation has often been the subject of much controversy and misunderstanding .... National Guard troops serve at the direction of the state governors until the president [sic] of the United States orders them to active duty for either domestic emergencies or overseas service.\nRobert L. Martin, Military Justice in the National Guard: A Survey of the Laws and Procedures of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, 2007 Army Law. 30, 32 (2007) [hereinafter, Martin, Military Justice] (footnote omitted; alteration in original). Since 1933, all persons who have enlisted in their State national guard, i.e., \u201cthe National Guard of the various States\u201d have also been required to enlist in the federal component of the Guard, i.e., \u201cthe National Guard of the United States.\u201d Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345, 110 L. Ed. 2d 312, 325 (1990). \u201cIn the latter capacity they [are] part of the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the Army, but unless and until ordered to active duty in the Army, they retain[] their status as members of a separate State Guard unit.\u201d Id. at 345, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 325. \u201c[A] member of the Guard who is ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his or her status in the State Guard for the entire period of federal service.\u201d Id. at 346, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 325. However, when \u201c \u2018 \u201crelieved from active duty in the military service of the United States all individuals and units . . . revert to their [state] National Guard status.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Id. (citations omitted). In sum, as stated by the United States Supreme Court, \u201call [National Guard members] . . . must keep three hats in their closets\u2014 a civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an army hat \u2014 only one of which is worn at any particular time.\u201d Id. at 348, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 327. In other words, except for those instances where individual members of a state National Guard are on federal active duty, members retain their state affiliation, status, and duties. See id. at 345-46, 348, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 325-27. As such, in the instant case, unless plaintiffs order to active duty for training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f) qualifies as federal active duty, she was functioning in a state capacity and subject to the command and control of the governor. \u2022\nC. Statuses of National Guard Members (Title 10 and Title 32)\nAs discussed infra, title 10 and title 32 of the United States Code indicate that plaintiffs status in the case sub judice was not federal active duty and consequently, that she was functioning in a state capacity when she sustained her injuries. Federal \u201cactive duty\u201d is defined as \u201cfull-time duty in the active military service of the United States\u201d but \u201cdoes not include full-time National Guard duty.\u201d 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(d)(1) (2000); 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(12) (2000) (same). \u201cFull-time National Guard duty\u201d is defined as\ntraining or other duty, other than inactive duty, performed by a member of the Army National Guard of the United States ... in the member\u2019s status as a member of the National Guard of a State or territory . . . under section 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32 for which the member is entitled to pay from the United States or for which the member has waived pay from the United States.\n10 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(d)(5) (2000); 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(19) (2000) (same). In other words, a National Guard member is only on federal \u201cactive duty\u201d as a member of the United States Army when called to federal service pursuant to Title 10. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 346, 350 n.21, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 325, 328, n.21; see also Martin, Military Justice, 2007 Army Law. at 31 (footnote omitted) (\u201c[wjhile the National Guard is a component of the U.S. Armed Forces, it is also the militia of the individual state when not serving in a federal status. More simply put, unless called into federal service under Title 10, the National Guard remains primarily under the control of the states and their governors\u201d).\nIn contrast to a call to federal service pursuant to Title 10, when participating in training under the authority of Title 32, a National Guard member is generally acting in his or her state capacity.\nFederally funded [Army National Guard] training duty, referred to as \u201cTitle 32 duty,\u201d is ordered by the state governor and paid for with federal funds. This form of duty is used for weekend drills, annual training, and most schools and assignments within the United States. Most National Guard duty falls into this category. Conversely, \u201cTitle 10 duty\u201d is duty ordered by the President or the Secretary of the [Army] under the authority of federal law and paid for with federal funds. This form of duty is used for basic (initial) military training, overseas training missions, and occasions when the Guard is called or ordered to active duty (mobilized) by the U.S. Government.\nGrant Blowers and David P.S. Charitat, Disciplining The Force\u2014 Jurisdictional Issues In The Joint And Total Force, 42 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1997). \u201cIn 1956, Congress revised, codified, and enacted into law, Title 32 of the U.S. Code, entitled \u2018National Guard.\u2019. .. Title 32 generally serves as a compilation of most federal statutes affecting the National Guard while serving under state control, yet funded through [Department of Defense] appropriations.\u201d Christopher R. Brown, Been There, Doing That in a Title 32 Status: The National Guard Now Authorized to Perform its 400-Year Old Domestic Mission in Title 32 Status, 2008 Army Law. 23, 29 [hereinafter, Brown, Title 32 Status]. Title 32 training includes: \u201cInactive Duty for Training (IDT, that is, weekend drills) and annual training (AT)[, which] are performed under the authority of 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(a) ... [as well as t]raining . . . performed under [32 U.S.C.] \u00a7 502(f).\u201d Rich, The National Guard, 1994 Army Law. at 40, n.51 (emphasis added).\nIn sum, as the federal scheme indicates, when plaintiff was training under the authority of 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(f), she was: (1) wearing her state militia hat; (2) under the command and control of the Governor; and (3) not on federal \u201cactive duty.\u201d Nevertheless, this does not compel the conclusion that our legislature intended \u201cState active duty\u201d to include training pursuant to Title 32, and we reiterate that such an interpretation requires us to read words into section 97-2(2) which simply are not there.\nD. \u201cState Active Duty\u201d in the Federal Context\n32 C.F.R. \u00a7 536.97 (2008), which governs the \u201cScope for claims under [the] National Guard Claims Act [32 U.S.C. \u00a7 715]\u201d provides:\n(a) Soldiers of the Army National Guard (ARNG) can perform military duty in an active duty status under the authority of Title 10 of the United States Code, in a full-time National Guard duty or inactive-duty training status under the authority of Title 32 of the United States Code, or in a state active duty status under the authority of a state code.\n(1) When ARNG soldiers perform active duty, they are under federal command and control and are paid from federal funds. For claims purposes, th[e]se soldiers are treated as active duty soldiers.. . .\n(2) When ARNG soldiers perform full-time National Guard duty or inactive-duty training, they are under state command and control and are paid from federal funds. . . .\n(3) When ARNG soldiers perform state active duty, they are under state command and control and are paid from state funds.. . .\n(Emphasis added.) While the situations this regulation addresses are not exactly on point, the explicit distinction it makes between federal active duty (Title 10 duty), Title 32 duty, and state active duty and its \u201cdefinition\u201d of state active duty, i.e., a call to state service performed under the authority of state law and under the command and control of the Governor which is. paid by the State with state funds, are consistent with the general definition of \u201cstate active duty\u201d as articulated in numerous military law review articles.\nNational Guard forces perform their historical, militia-based domestic operational missions when their governors. mobilize them in state controlled and funded SAD [state active duty] status. State laws dictate when state authorities may call upon their National Guard to perform SAD, generally providing broad authority for the use of militias to quell domestic disturbances or assist in disaster relief when local and state government civil resources have been exhausted. The states typically pay their National Guard personnel serving in a SAD status at the same rate of pay that the Soldiers . .. receive while serving in a federal status. During a SAD response, the states may use federal equipment provided to the states\u2019 National Guard units for training purposes; however, the states must reimburse the Federal Government for the use of certain resources, such as fuel.\nBrown, Title 32 Status, 2008 Army Law. at 29 (footnotes omitted). \u201c[S]tate active duty... is performed under [the] authority of state law and paid for with state funds[.]\u201d Rich, The National Guard, 1994 Army Law. at 40 (footnote omitted). \u201cState active duty (SAD) is specifically defined by state law. In general, it refers to the National Guard under the control of the governor, performing a state mission, paid for by state funds.\u201d Kevin Cieply, Charting A New Role For Title 10 Reserve Forces: A Total Force Response To Natural Disasters, 196 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 4, n.10 (2008). In sum, these articles further support the argument that at least in the federal context, \u201cState active duty\u201d is generally defined as: A call to state service pursuant to state.law where National Guard members serve under the command and control of the Governor and are paid by the State with state funds.\nE. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) and \u201cState Active Duty\u201d\nWhile the above general definition is not controlling as to what our legislature intended \u201cState active duty\u201d to mean within the context of section 97-2(2), this definition does square with the concept of \u201cstate service\u201d set out in chapter 127A of the North Carolina General Statutes and discussed supra, i.e., those instances when National Guard members are called to perform state service by the Governor under the authority of state law and are paid by the State with state funds. Furthermore, we believe the explicit differentiation between federal \u201cactive duty\u201d; Title 32 duty, (including, inter alia, full-time national guard duty); and \u201cstate active duty\u201d contained in the federal scheme provides insight as to why our legislature deemed it necessary to amend section 97-2(2) to clarify when National Guard members are state employees for purposes of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, particularly given this Court\u2019s decisions in Britt and Duncan, which respectively awarded benefits to a Guard member injured while training pursuant to Title 10 and to a Guard member injured presumably while training pursuant to Title 32. Therefore, we conclude that pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2), \u201cState active duty\u201d includes those instances where a North Carolina National Guard member is: Called into service of the State of North Carolina; operating under the command and control of the Governor pursuant to state law; and paid by the State with state funds. Consequently, we further conclude it does not encompass Title 32 training.\nOur conclusion is consistent with the vast majority of other states that have considered the compensability of a National Guard member\u2019s injuries incurred while training pursuant to Title 32. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 22 P.3d 535, 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that injuries sustained during weekend training activities undertaken pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not cornpensable because to be on \u201cactive service\u201d and thus to qualify for workers\u2019 compensation benefits, national guard members \u201cmust be ordered by the governor to provide full-time service ... in response to an emergency confronting the state\u201d); Kentucky Nat\u2019l Guard v. Bayles, 535 S.W.2d 234, 237-38 (Ky. 1976) (holding that national guard members who are injured while training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not entitled to state workers\u2019 compensation benefits because in that status they are entitled to receive federal pay); Lucas v. Military Dep\u2019t, 498 So. 2d 161, 166 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that national guard members who sustain injuries during annual training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not entitled to state workers\u2019 compensation benefits because they already receive federal payment and benefits); Cochran v. Missouri Nat\u2019l Guard, 893 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Mo. 1995) (holding that injuries sustained by national guard members while on active duty training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502 are not compensable under the state workers\u2019 compensation system because in this status members are not \u201cordered to active state duty by the governor\u201d); Banker v. Oklahoma Army Nat\u2019l Guard, 7 P.3d 509, 510 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (holding that national guard members injured while participating in a summer training camp pursuant to 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 503 are not entitled to state workers\u2019 compensation benefits because they are not on \u201cstate duty\u201d). In addition, we note that because plaintiff was performing full-time national guard duty she was entitled to receive and did receive some federal benefits for her injuries in accordance with federal law. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 1074(a) (2000) (medical and dental care); 37 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 204(g), (h) (2000) (incapacitation pay); 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 1131 (2000) (veteran disability pay). In contrast, National Guard members \u201cperforming state active duty are not covered by federal medical or disability benefits. [When] p\u00e9rforming state missions[, they] are only protected under state worker\u2019s compensation laws.\u201d Martin, Military Justice, 2007 Army Law. at 34 (footnote omitted).\nIn the instant case, it is undisputed that plaintiff was injured while training pursuant to Title 32 and that she was paid with federal and not state funds. As a result, plaintiff was not on \u201cState active duty\u201d pursuant to section 97-2(2) when she sustained her injuries. Because plaintiff was not an employee as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2), the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn sum, for the reasons stated herein, we conclude that plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) when she sustained her injuries. As such, the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nVacated.\nJudges ELMORE and GEER concur.\n. The North Carolina National Guard and the North Carolina State Defense Militia are distinctly different components of our organized State militia. The North Carolina National Guard consists of \u201cregularly commissioned, warrant and enlisted personnel between such ages as may be established by regulations promulgated by the secretary of the appropriate service].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-3 (2007). The State Defense Militia \u201cconsist\u00eds] of commissioned, warrant and enlisted personnel called, ordered, appointed or enlisted therein by the Governor under the provisions of Article 5 of . . . Chapter [127A.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-5 (2007). National Guard members \u201creceive federal recognition by the United States government [and] hold a dual status both as State troops and as a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-29 (2007). In contrast, State Defense Militia members cannot be members of a reserve component of the armed forces. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-80(b). Finally, unlike with the National Guard which can be called into federal military service, the State Defense Militia \u201cshall not be called, ordered, or in any manner drafted, as such, into the military service of the United States].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-80(d) (2007).\n. The Governor\u2019s power to order National Guard members to respond to state emergencies is set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-16(a) (2007). Also, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 127A-16(b) provides that the Governor, as commander in chief, can order North Carolina National Guard members to a \u201cState Active Duty status\u201d to assist with certain formal government activities. We discuss these provisions infra.\n. Section 511(d) has since been redesignated as 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 12103(d).\n. Session Law 1999-418 originated as Senate Bill 877 and was first assigned to the Senate Judiciary II Committee. At a 20 April 1999 meeting of this committee, the bill \u201cwas explained by [its sponsor] Senator Kerr\u201d and by \u201cJon Williams, with the NC Department of Crime Control and Public Safety[.]\u201d Minutes of Senate Judiciary II Committee, April 20, 1999, 1999 General Assembly, First Regular Session (Senate Bill 877). Unfortunately, these explanations are not available for our review. A bill analysis prepared by legislative staff counsel for the meeting states that the law \u201camends the definition of \u2018employee\u2019 under the North Carolina Worker[s\u2019] Compensation Act to include members of the North Carolina national guard and members of the North Carolina state guard while on State active duty under orders of the Governor.\" Id. (bill analysis by Committee Co-Counsel Brenda J. Carter).\n. The opinion does not specify the statutory authority pursuant to which the plaintiff was called to weekend training. However, it would appear to be 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(a) (2000), which provides: \u201cUnder regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army . . . each company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the National Guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned, shall . . . assemble for drill and instruction ... at least 48 times each year[.]\u201d See also Steven B Rich, The National Guard, Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, and Posse Comitatus: The Meaning and Implications of \u201cIn Federal Service, \u201d 1994 Army Law. 35, 40, n.51 [hereinafter Rich, The National Guard] (National Guard weekend drills are performed under the authority of 32 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(a)).\n. Thus, we suggest the legislature may want to amend section 97-2(2) to include a definition of \u201cState active duty.\u201d\n. We focus our discussion on chapter 127A of the North Carolina General Statutes, which is entitled \u201cMilitia,\u201d and Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code, which are respectively entitled \u201cArmed Forces\u201d and \u201cNational Guard.\u201d\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 127A-45, -45.1 (2007) respectively establish the \u201cNorth Carolina National Guard State Active Duty Award\u201d for \u201cmembers of the North Carolina National Guard who, by order of the Governor, satisfactorily serve a tour of State active duty\u201d and the \u201cNorth Carolina National Guard Governor\u2019s Unit Citation\u201d for \u201cany unit of [the] North Carolina national guard distinguishing itself by extraordinary heroism or meritorious service while in a State active duty status.\u201d In contrast, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 127A-45.2, -45.2A (2007) establish awards for North Carolina national guard units who distinguish themselves \u201cthrough heroism or meritorious service to the State of North Carolina.\u201d\n. \u201cThe National Guard Claims Act authorizes the settlement of claims for damages caused by National Guard Soldiers in certain limited circumstances. The Act only applies when National Guard personnel are under state control, [and are] being paid with federal funds, such as when they are performing full-time National Guard duties or are on inactive duty training.\u201d R. Peter Masterton, \u201cManaging a Claims Office,\" 2005 Army Law. 46, 61 (footnotes omitted).\n. This section did not contain the \u201cstate active duty\u201d language at the time our legislature amended section 97-2(2) as it was not adopted until 2006 and not in effect until 2007. See 71 Fed. Reg. 69,360, 69,390 (Nov. 30, 2006) (codified at 32 C.F.R. \u00a7 536.97).\n. We note that our conclusion is also supported by the sample \u201cState active duty\u201d order which is present in the record but which the Deputy Commissioner and the Commission did not consider because this evidence was excluded on various grounds. This order: (1) specifically states that the National Guard Member is \u201cordered to State Active Duty (SAD)\u201d in response to Hurricane Isabel; (2) lists its authorization as \u201c[c]onfirm[ing] verbal orders of the Adjutant General\u201d; (3) states that the call to duty is \u201cBy Order of the Governor\u201d; (4) states that \u201cState pay and allowances\u201d are authorized and that \u201c[p]ersons in a federal pay status . . . must be in an official leave status when placed on State Duty Orders\u201d; and (5) provides that \u201c[p]ersonnel listed on this order are authorized [to receive] the NCNG State Active Duty Award.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lewis & Daggett, Attorneys at Law, P.A., by Griffis C. Shuler and Christopher M. Wilkie, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sharon Patrick-Wilson, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FELISA R. BACCUS, Employee, Plaintiff v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Servicing Agent), Defendants\nNo. COA08-204\n(Filed 20 January 2009)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 National Guard member \u2014 injured during training \u2014 not a state employee\nThe Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction in a workers\u2019 compensation case, and should not have awarded benefits to a member of the North Carolina National Guard injured during military training in California. Plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(2), which includes those instances where a North Carolina National Guard member is called into service of the State of North Carolina; operates under the command and control of the Governor pursuant to state law; and is paid by the State with state funds. Plaintiff was injured while training pursuant to Title 32 of the U.S. Code and was paid with federal and not state funds.\nAppeal by defendants from an opinion and award entered 27 November 2007 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 September 2008.\nLewis & Daggett, Attorneys at Law, P.A., by Griffis C. Shuler and Christopher M. Wilkie, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sharon Patrick-Wilson, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 33, "last_page_order": 50 }