{ "id": 4164331, "name": "RONALD REAVES, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiff v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE, Employer, AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Reaves v. Industrial Pump Service", "decision_date": "2009-01-20", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1244", "first_page": "31", "last_page": "43", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 N.C. App. 31" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36", "parenthetical": "quoting Gaines v. L.D. Swain & Son, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 575, 579, 235 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1977)" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636322 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "affirming Commission's application of Pickrell presumption when Commission concluded \" '[t]he evidence fails to show whether decedent had a heart attack that caused the motor vehicle accident or whether the circumstances of the accident caused decedent's heart arrhythmia' \"" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "'.'[W]here the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-12", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551082 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376134 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "quoting Gaines v. L.D. Swain & Son, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 575, 579, 235 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631990 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "quoting McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 754, 3 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1939)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987216 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "quoting McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 754, 3 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1939)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" }, { "page": "848", "parenthetical": "upholding denial of benefits based on lack of \"credible evidence that plaintiff experienced any unusual or abnormal stresses in his work that contributed to his\" heart attack" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.W.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10253921 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1085-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/118/1082-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "concluding plaintiffs heart attack was compensable where plaintiff was exposed to greater temperatures than \"members of the general public\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8995984 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "concluding plaintiffs heart attack was compensable where plaintiff was exposed to greater temperatures than \"members of the general public\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 841", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616098 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729720 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "emphasis original" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "concluding heart attack not compensable where plaintiff's \"physical exertion\" was not \"precipitating cause of [his] heart attack\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543161 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" }, { "page": "71" }, { "page": "71" }, { "page": "71" }, { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523934 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527201 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3747656, 3741864, 3746763, 3742155, 3737745, 3736497, 3746709, 3745531 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0704-05", "/nc/361/0704-02", "/nc/361/0704-08", "/nc/361/0704-01", "/nc/361/0704-03", "/nc/361/0704-06", "/nc/361/0704-04", "/nc/361/0704-07" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8379757 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250454 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514047 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0363-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1160, "char_count": 29903, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.866888237748201e-08, "percentile": 0.5345917850809062 }, "sha256": "1e6f2bbfde13ad44f1f887a0d2ab3f7362cf13a96f880724e82ec337435b31d4", "simhash": "1:733177426c3e4b40", "word_count": 4805 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.117771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "RONALD REAVES, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiff v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE, Employer, AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiff, the representative of deceased employee Ronald Reaves, appeals from the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision denying plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits as a result of the death of Mr. Reaves. Because the Commission failed to address all the issues before it, and, on the issues reached, applied an incorrect legal standard, we must vacate the decision and remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the Commission must (1) address the applicability of the Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 370, 368 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1988), presumption; (2) apply the proper legal standard for determining whether Mr. Reaves\u2019 death was caused by extreme work conditions; and (3) address plaintiff\u2019s argument that inadequate safety measures of defendant employer Industrial Pump Service (\u201cIPS\u201d) were a significant contributing factor in Mr. Reaves\u2019 death.,\nFacts\nOn 1 April 2004, Mr. Reaves, who was 54 years old, was working as a welder for IPS. Mr. Reaves underwent a medical examination on 16 January 2004, and the results indicated that (1) his blood pressure was 120/80, (2) his resting heart rate was 76 beats per minute, and (3) he had no prior history of cardiovascular disease.\nMr. Reaves and his work partner, Robert Templeman, a machinist, were scheduled to repair a pump at the International Paper plant in Franklin, Virginia on 1 April 2004. The repair job was supposed to be completed in one day with both Mr. Reaves and Mr. Templeman working a standard 12-hour shift. The pair traveled up to Franklin on 31 March 2004, stayed in a hotel, and went to work the next day.\nOn 1 April 2004, Mr. Reaves and Mr. Templeman arrived at the International Paper plant at about 7:00 a.m., but did not begin working until approximately 10:00 a.m. They were required to work in a pump room in the basement of the plant that had 15- to 18-foot ceilings and was roughly 30 feet wide and 40 feet long. The temperature inside the room was in the mid-80s, and it was hotter and more humid inside the room than outside. The entrance to the room was approximately 30 to 35 feet away from the pump they were repairing. That doorway was 10 feet by 12 feet and led to a well-ventilated hallway that was about five to 10 degrees cooler than the pump room. The pump room itself had an upright fan placed 20 to 25 feet away from where Mr. Reaves and Mr. Templeman were working.\nOnce the pump was disassembled by International Paper employees, Mr. Reaves and Mr. Templeman began their work, first lifting and setting a lathe against the broken pump shaft. This task took about 10 minutes. The pair then set up lighting and arranged their tools around the pump. At that point, Mr. Templeman did his work on the pump for approximately three hours, during which time Mr. Reaves was not required to perform any physical labor, but rather had \u201cdown time\u201d and went in and out of the room. After Mr. Templeman finished, Mr. Reaves worked for approximately 45 minutes, using a welding torch to heat up a metal sleeve to 300 degrees so that it would expand to fit over the broken shaft and then tack-welding the sleeve in place over the shaft.\nAfter Mr. Reaves finished, he and Mr. Templeman went to lunch to let the unit cool down so they could finish their work. They returned to- working on the pump sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. Mr. Templeman machined the sleeve and shaft to the pump over about roughly four hours, during which time Mr. Reaves was not working. Mr. Reaves, however, generally stayed in the room with Mr. Templeman, as it was IPS policy that employees not operate machinery alone. Occasionally, Mr. Reaves would, however, leave the room.\nThe Commission found that at about 7:00 p.m., Mr. Reaves \u201ccomplain[ed] of not feeling well and being hot,\u201d and he told Mr. Templeman he was going to sit down in the hallway outside the pump room. The Commission further found that later, \u201c[a]t approximately 10:30 p.m., [Mr. Reaves] again complained that he was \u2018hot and fatigued\u2019 and Mr. Templeman suggested that he go outside and take a break.\u201d Mr. Templeman believed this was the first time that Mr. Reaves had ever had to walk out of a job site because he was not feeling well and was hot.\nMr. Templeman walked with Mr. Reaves to their work truck. Mr. Reaves got into the truck, and Mr. Templeman told Mr. Reaves that he would be back in about 45 minutes when he needed help reloading the truck. There were no witnesses to what occurred during the 45 minutes Mr. Reaves was alone in the truck.\nWhen Mr. Templeman returned to the truck, he found Mr. Reaves slumped over in the passenger seat. After he received no response from Mr. Reaves when he tapped on the window, Mr. Templeman went to the plant\u2019s EMT station to get help. The medical staff found Mr. Reaves dead in the truck. An autopsy was performed on 2 April 2004, and the medical examiner noted: \u201cAt autopsy the decedent had evidence of severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. . . . Cause of death: Coronary artery disease.\u201d\nPlaintiff filed a claim for death benefits on 22 September 2004, and on 22 September 2006, the deputy commissioner entered an opinion and award denying the claim. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, and in an opinion and award entered 22 June 2007, the Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner\u2019s decision with minor modifications. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nAppellate review of an Industrial Commission decision is limited \u201cto reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence \u201cnotwithstanding evidence that might support a contrary finding.\u201d Hobbs v. Clean Control Corp., 154 N.C. App. 433, 435, 571 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2002). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id.\nI\nPlaintiff first argues that th\u00e9 work-relatedness of Mr. Reaves\u2019 death is unknown, and thus the Commission should have applied the presumption of compensability articulated in Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 370, 368 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1988). Plaintiff argued Pickrell below, but the Commission failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding that issue.\nIn Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586, our Supreme Court held that \u201c[i]n cases . . . where the circumstances bearing on work-relatedness are unknown and the death occurs within the course of employment, claimants should be able to rely on a presumption that death was work-related, and therefore compensable, whether the medical reason for death is known or unknown.\u201d This Court reiterated that holding in Wooten v. Newcon Transp., Inc., 178 N.C. App. 698, 700, 632 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 704, 655 S.E.2d 405 (2007): \u201cWhere the circumstances concerning the causal connection between decedent\u2019s work and his death are unknown, there is a presumption that death was work-related, and therefore compensable, whether the medical reason for death is known or unknown . . . .\u201d\nIn this case, both plaintiff\u2019s and defendant\u2019s expert witnesses agreed that Mr. Reaves suffered a cardiac arrhythmia although they disagreed whether that resulted in an actual heart attack. Both also agreed that exposure to heat can precipitate a cardiac arrhythmia, but disagreed whether it did so in this case. At the time that Mr. Reaves died, he had been alone for a substantial period of time. As the Commission found, however, he had twice complained of being hot and not feeling well. These circumstances are sufficient to at least raise the issue of the applicability of the Pickrell presumption.\n\u201cIt is the duty and responsibility of the full Commission to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to every aspect of the case before it.\u201d Joyner v. Rocky Mount Mills, 92 N.C. App. 478, 482, 374 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1988). The Commission must \u201cdecide all of the matters in controversy between the parties.\u201d Vieregge v. N.C. State Univ., 105 N.C. App. 633, 638, 414 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1992).\nDefendants argue that the Commission did not need to address the Pickrell presumption because the circumstances surrounding Mr. Reaves\u2019 death are known as a result of Mr. Templeman\u2019s testimony. The Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning in Pickrell suggests, however, that the mere fact that another employee can provide testimony regarding some of the circumstances should not, standing alone, be sufficient to negate the possible applicability of Pickrell. The Court explained the purpose of the presumption:\nApplying such a presumption of compensability is fair because the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be liberally construed in order to accomplish its purpose. Employers may be in a better position than the family of the decedent to offer evidence on the circumstances of the death. Their employees ordinarily are the last to see the decedent alive, and the first to discover the body. They know the decedent\u2019s duties and work assignments. Additionally, if employers deem it necessary to determine the medical reason for death, they may notify the medical examiner of the county where the body is found, N.C.G.S. \u00a7' 130A-383 (1986), and utilize the certificate of death which the medical examiner thereafter prepares. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 130A-385(a)(b) (1986). Such reports may be received as evidence, and certified copies thereof have the same evidentiary value as the originals. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 130A-392 (1986).\n322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that IPS\u2019 employee presented testimony regarding what he observed does not necessarily render Pickrell immaterial given that plaintiffs decedent is not here to testify as to what he actually experienced. The Commission must, therefore, address the applicability of the presumption.\nDefendants further argue that the Commission did not err in failing to address the Pickrell presumption because the cause of Mr. Reaves\u2019 death is known and not work-related: coronary artery disease. The Pickrell Court explained, however, \u201c[i]t is these circumstances [bearing on work-relatedness], not the medical reasons for death, which are critical in determining whether a claimant is entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits. A blow to the head, gunshot wound or heart attack may, or may not, be compensable, depending on the manner in which the event occurred. It is this aspect of causation which the presumption of compensability, properly understood, addresses.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\nSignificantly, defendant\u2019s own expert witness, Dr. Arthur Davis, acknowledged that the pre-existing coronary artery disease would not, by itself, have caused Mr. Reaves\u2019 death: \u201cNow, the coronary sclerosis by itself, de novo, cannot cause sudden death. You have to have a malignant dysrhythmia.\u201d He also agreed that there were numerous known causes of dysrhythmia. Dr. Davis\u2019 testimony places this case within the potential scope of Pickrell and Wooten because it raises, but does not answer, the question: what was the precipitating cause of the dysrhythmia? See Wooten, 178 N.C. App. at 703, 632 S.E.2d at 528 (affirming Commission\u2019s application of Pickrell presumption when Commission concluded \u201c \u2018[t]he evidence fails to show whether decedent had a heart attack that caused the motor vehicle accident or whether the circumstances of the accident caused decedent\u2019s heart arrhythmia\u2019 \u201d). Contrary to defendants\u2019 contention, Mr. Reaves did not specifically die of a pre-existing condition; there was some precipitating cause'for the dysrhythmia that resulted in his death.\nThis fact distinguishes this case from Gilbert v. Entenmann\u2019s, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 619, 440 S.E.2d 115 (1994), on which defendants rely. In Gilbert, the employee died of a subarachnoid hemorrhage, a non-compensable cause that is deadly in and of itself without a precipitating event. Id. at 623, 440 S.E.2d at 118. See also Wooten, 178 N.C. App. at 702, 632 S.E.2d at 528 (\u201cHowever, in Gilbert, the Court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to the Pickrell presumption because decedent died from a subarachnoid hemorrhage, which is not a compensable cause. In contrast, an injury caused by a heart attack may be compensable if the heart attack is due to an accident, such as when the heart attack is due to unusual or extraordinary exertion or extreme conditions.\u201d (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).\nDefendants finally argue that if the Pickrell presumption does apply in this case, they \u201cclearly presented evidence which rebutted any presumption.\u201d Defendants\u2019 contention, however, overlooks the fact that the Commission did not address Pickrell at all. This Court may not decide for the first time on appeal whether defendants rebutted the presumption. We, therefore, remand so that the Commission may make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the applicability of the Pickrell presumption. As the Commission may conclude on remand that the Pickrell presumption does not apply in this case or that defendants presented sufficient evidence to rebut it, we address plaintiffs other assignments of error.\nII\nPlaintiff acknowledges that in the absence of the Pickrell presumption, plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Mr. Reaves\u2019 death arose out of his employment. The Commission\u2019s pertinent conclusion of law- states:\nThe greater weight of the evidence showed that decedent\u2019s job duties at the [International Paper] mill in Franklin, from a physical standpoint, were easier than most of the jobs he performed and that decedent worked in the same temperatures as those to which he was normally exposed. Therefore, the employment did not subject decedent to a greater risk or hazard than that to which he was normally exposed. . . . Decedent\u2019s working conditions did not involve unusual or extraordinary exertion or excessive exposure to heat. The greater weight of the evidence also failed to show that the conditions of decedent\u2019s employment placed him at a greater risk of overheating than members of the general public not so employed. . . . Therefore, decedent\u2019s death, which occurred on April 1, 2004; was not the result of an injury by accident arising out of decedent\u2019s employment with defendant-employer.\nThe finding of fact supporting this conclusion stated that \u201cdecedent\u2019s death was not caused by extraordinary exertion or by exposure to a greater hazard or risk than that to which decedent was otherwise exposed and therefore did not arise out of his employment with defendant-employer. \u201d\nAs a general principle, \u201c[w]hen an employee is conducting his work in the usual way and suffers a heart attack, the injury does not arise by accident and is not compensable.\u201d Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 71, 399 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1991). Nonetheless, \u201can injury caused by a heart attack may be compensable if the heart attack is due to an accident, such as when the heart attack is due to unusual or extraordinary exertion or extreme conditions.\u201d Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff contends on appeal that the Commission applied the wrong test for determining whether Mr. Reaves\u2019 heart attack was due to extreme conditions.\nIn Dillingham v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 320 N.C. 499, 358 S.E.2d 380 (1987), the Supreme Court held:\n\u201c[Wjhere the employment subjects a workman to a special or particular hazard from the elements, such as excessive heat or cold, likely to produce sunstroke or freezing, death or disability resulting from such cause usually comes within the purview of the compensation acts. . . . The test is whether the employment subjects the workman to a greater hazard or risk than that to which he otherwise would be exposed.\u201d\nId. at 503, 358 S.E.2d at 382 (emphasis added) (quoting Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 842-43, 32 S.E.2d 623, 624 (1945)). The test in Dillingham focuses on whether the hazardous conditions to which the employee was exposed are greater than those conditions encountered by the general public. See id. at 504, 358 S.E.2d at 382 (\u201cIt is clear that the type of heavy clothing required by his employment exposed plaintiff to a greater danger of overheating than that to which he otherwise would have been subjected. Members of the public not so employed would not ordinarily wear heavy layers of clothing such as coveralls, boots, gloves, and a hood in an enclosed space with temperatures reaching 85 degrees.\u201d (emphasis added)); Madison v. Int\u2019l Paper Co., 165 N.C. App. 144, 154, 598 S.E.2d 196, 202 (2004) (concluding plaintiffs heart attack was compensable where plaintiff was exposed to greater temperatures than \u201cmembers of the general public\u201d). See also 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 5.04[1] (2006) (\u201cSunstroke, heat prostration, freezing, pneumonia, and other effects of exposure to heat and cold arise out of the employment. . . if the exposure is accentuated by the nature and conditions of the employment, or, to use a familiar formula, if the exposure is greater' than that to which the general public is subject.\u201d).\nThe Commission\u2019s finding of fact on this issue focused on whether Mr. Reaves was exposed \u201cto a greater hazard or risk than that to which decedent was otherwise exposed.\u201d As the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law confirms, the Commission found dispositive the fact that this particular work assignment involved the \u201csame temperatures as those to which [Mr. Reaves] was normally exposed.\u201d This reasoning is inconsistent with Dillingham since it does not focus on the correct comparison: Mr. Reaves\u2019 working conditions versus conditions to which the general public is exposed. As the leading workers\u2019 compensation commentator has noted, \u201c[t]he proper application of the increased-risk test is exemplified by the following beautifully blunt statement in a Texas sunstroke case: \u2018In the case before us the very work which the deceased was doing for his employer exposed him to a greater hazard from heat stroke than the general public was exposed to for the simple reason that the general public were not pushing wheelbarrow loads of sand in the hot sun on that day.\u2019 \u201d 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 5.04[2] (2006) (quoting American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 S.W.2d 1082, 1085-86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)).\nCiting Cody, 328 N.C. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 106, and Dye v. Shippers Freight Lines, 118 N.C. App. 280, 282, 454 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1995), defendants contend that the Commission nonetheless was required to consider whether Mr. Reaves\u2019 working conditions on the day he died were different than his regular work conditions. Defendants misread Cody. In Cody, 328 N.C. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 106 (emphasis original) (internal citation omitted), the Supreme Court observed that a heart attack may be compensable if \u201cdue to unusual or extraordinary exertion or extreme conditions.\u201d \u201c[U]nusual\u201d and \u201cextraordinary\u201d modify \u201cexertion\u201d and not \u201cextreme conditions.\u201d Cody cannot reasonably be read to require a finding of unusually extreme conditions. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in reciting this test, referred back to its decision in Dillingham, which sets out the increased-risk test that the Commission should have applied. Cody, 328 N.C. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 106.\nFactually, neither Cody nor Dye is material to this case since each involved analysis of the \u201cunusual exertion\u201d prong of the test and not extreme conditions. See Cody, 328 N.C. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 107 (concluding heart attack not compensable where plaintiff\u2019s \u201cphysical exertion\u201d was not \u201cprecipitating cause of [his] heart attack\u201d); Dye, 118 N.C. App. at 283, 454 S.E.2d at 848 (upholding denial of benefits based on lack of \u201ccredible evidence that plaintiff experienced any unusual or abnormal stresses in his work that contributed to his\u201d heart attack). Nothing in Cody or Dye can be read as providing that an employee is not entitled to compensation if a heart attack resulted from extreme conditions that were a routine aspect of the employee\u2019s job. That outcome would, however, be the necessary result of defendants\u2019 argument.\nWe hold that the controlling test is the one set out in Dillingham. We note that the Commission did, in its conclusion of law, also state that \u201c[t]he greater weight of the evidence . . . failed to show that the conditions of decedent\u2019s employment placed him at a greater risk of overheating than members of the general public not so employed.\u201d The Commission, however, made no findings of fact supporting this conclusion. Instead, the only findings arguably related to the extreme conditions issue were that although only a two-man crew was not normal operating procedure, it was adequate for that job; the men were used to the work hours and that type of work; the job was performed in temperatures cooler than temperatures under which Mr. Reaves normally worked; Mr. Reaves had not previously left a job site because of being hot; and \u201c[t]he job performed at the [International Paper] mill that day was easier than most of the work decedent normally performed and the [International Paper] job was no hotter or more fatiguing than any of their other 12-hour jobs.\u201d\nThus, all of the Commission\u2019s findings on the issue of extreme conditions relate only to its conclusion that \u201c[t]he greater weight of the evidence showed that decedent\u2019s job duties at the [International Paper] mill in Franklin, from a physical standpoint, were easier than most of the jobs he performed and that decedent worked in the same temperatures as those to which he was normally exposed.\u201d We note that the Commission did report that plaintiffs expert witness as to industrial safety \u201cwas of the opinion that on April 1, 2004, decedent was subjected to a work hazard, namely, a hot and humid workspace, with poor ventilation.\u201d The Commission also reported the conflicting opinions of the medical experts as to whether the working conditions were excessively hot or humid. The Commission did not make findings resolving the issues suggested by this testimony except as to find generally \u201cthat decedent\u2019s death was not caused by extraordinary exertion or by exposure to a greater hazard or risk than that to which decedent was otherwise exposed.\u201d\nIn sum, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law address whether Mr. Reaves was exposed to greater heat on the day of his death than he usually encountered during a normal day on the job, an issue immaterial to the test articulated in Dillingham. Where, as here, \u201cthe findings of the Commission are based on a misapprehension of the law, the case should be remanded so \u2018that the evidence [may] be considered in its true legal light.\u2019\u201d Johnson v. Southern Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 705, 599 S.E.2d 508, 512 (2004) (quoting McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 754, 3 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1939)).\nIll\nPlaintiff additionally argues that the Commission erred in failing to make any determination regarding whether inadequate training was a significant contributing factor in Mr. Reaves\u2019 death. Plaintiff points to the testimony of Debra S. Meurs, the industrial safety expert, and plaintiff\u2019s expert witness, Dr. William Holt, as indicating that Mr. Templeman\u2019s lack of proper training in recognizing and reacting to work hazards resulted in an inadequate response to Mr. Reaves\u2019 complaints that ultimately contributed to his death.\nThe Commission made the following findings summarizing Ms. Meurs\u2019 expert opinion:\n26. Ms. Meurs was of the opinion that on April 1, 2004, decedent was subjected to a work hazard, namely, a hot and humid workspace, with poor ventilation. According to Ms. Meurs, OSHA regulations required [IPS] to properly train decedent and Mr. Templeman in the recognition and response to the presence of work hazards, and no documentation exists that either decedent or Mr. Templeman had received such training.\n27. Ms. Meurs believed that Mr. Templeman\u2019s response to decedent\u2019s complaint was inadequate, and that decedent should have been taken to a medical facility. Mr. Templeman\u2019s response, according to Ms. Meurs, is attributable to his lack of training, and his actions on April 1, 2004, contributed to decedent\u2019s death.\nAlthough we note that Ms. Meurs was not competent to testify regarding medical causation, she was competent to testify regarding industrial safety issues.\nIn addition to Ms. Meurs, Dr. Holt testified that in his medical opinion, the decision to take \u201cMr. Reaves to his work truck versus to an on-site medical facility\u201d was a contributing factor in Mr. Reaves\u2019 death. The Commission made a finding reflecting part of Dr. Holt\u2019s medical opinion on this issue: \u201cDr. Holt believed that had decedent been taken to an EMT or other medical professional when he complained of feeling ill, decedent would have been properly examined and assessed and appropriate treatment provided, including using a defibrillator if decedent had suffered an arrhythmia.\u201d\nDespite the findings acknowledging evidence regarding inadequate training and its role in Mr. Reaves\u2019 death, the Commission failed to make any ultimate findings as to whether IPS properly trained Mr. Templeman about how to identify and respond to work hazards or whether any lack of training led to an inadequate response that was a significant contributing factor in Mr. Reaves\u2019 death. \u201c \u2018While the [Full] [Commission is not required to make findings as to each fact presented by the evidence, it is required to make specific findings with respect to crucial facts upon which the question of plaintiff\u2019s right to compensation depends.\u2019 \u201d Perry v. CKE Rests., Inc., 187 N.C. App. 759, 763, 654 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (2007) (quoting Gaines v. L.D. Swain & Son, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 575, 579, 235 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1977)). \u201cIf the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact are insufficient to allow this Court to determine the parties\u2019 rights upon the matters in controversy, the proceeding must be remanded to the Full Commission for proper findings of fact.\u201d Id. at 654 S.E.2d at 36.\nDefendants contend that the Commission did, in fact, address the issue, pointing to the Commission\u2019s finding of fact and conclusion of law that Mr. Reaves\u2019 death was not \u201ccaused by the willful failure of defendant-employer to comply with any statutory requirement.\u201d It is, however, apparent from review of the opinion and award that this finding and conclusion was not intended to address the inadequate training issue, but rather related to plaintiff\u2019s claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-12 (2007), which provides: \u201cWhen the injury or death is caused by the willful failure of the employer to comply with any statutory requirement or any lawful order of the Commission, compensation shall be increased ten percent (10%).\u201d\nBecause plaintiff asserted as part of her claim for compensation that the lack of training was a significant contributing factor in Mr. Reaves\u2019 death, the Commission was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law resolving the issue presented. See Vieregge, 105 N.C. App. at 638, 414 S.E.2d at 774. On remand, therefore, the Commission must also make findings of fact and conclusions of law on this aspect of plaintiff\u2019s claim. Because we are remanding for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, we need not address plaintiff\u2019s remaining arguments.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges WYNN and CALABRIA concur.\n. See Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (\u2018.\u2018[W]here the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shipman & Wright, LLP, by Gary K. Shipman and William G. Wright, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Nicole D. Viele and Meredith Taylor Berard, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RONALD REAVES, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiff v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE, Employer, AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA07-1244\n(Filed 20 January 2009)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 Pickrell presumption \u2014 circumstances sufficient to raise issue\nAn Industrial Commission denial of workers\u2019 compensation death benefits was remanded for findings and conclusions about the Pickrell presumption that the death was work-related and compensable. The circumstances are sufficient to raise an issue concerning the Pickrell presumption; the fact that another employee testified about what he observed does not necessarily render Pickrell immaterial.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 standard \u2014 working conditions versus general public \u2014 not versus prior job assignments\nThe Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation case should have focused on the decedent\u2019s working conditions versus the general public, rather than on whether this' assignment involved a greater risk than that to which decedent was normally exposed.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 inadequate training \u2014 issue raised in claim \u2014 not directly addressed\nAn Industrial Commission workers\u2019 compensation decision was remanded for further findings on whether inadequate training was a significant contributing factor in decedent\u2019s death where plaintiff had asserted the issue as part of the claim. While defendant argued that the Commission had addressed the issue, that finding and conclusion addressed whether defendant complied with statutory requirements, not the inadequate training issue.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 22 June 2007 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 April 2008.\nShipman & Wright, LLP, by Gary K. Shipman and William G. Wright, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Nicole D. Viele and Meredith Taylor Berard, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0031-01", "first_page_order": 63, "last_page_order": 75 }