{ "id": 4164530, "name": "PERSIS NOVA CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a PERSIS-NOVA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY a/k/a P&N HOMES, Plaintiff v. BRUCE K. EDWARDS and KATHLYN E. EDWARDS, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Persis Nova Construction, Inc. v. Edwards", "decision_date": "2009-01-20", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1501", "first_page": "55", "last_page": "67", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 N.C. App. 55" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641836 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634820 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895-96 (1998)" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641758 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "\"Where attorney's fees are available under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5, we review the trial court's denial of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548941 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160887 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730978 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "stating that Section 6-21.5 \"appears to be based on deterring frivolous and bad faith lawsuits by the use of attorney's fees\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524611 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "stating that Section 6-21.5 \"appears to be based on deterring frivolous and bad faith lawsuits by the use of attorney's fees\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "\"Frivolous action in a lawsuit can occur at any stage of the proceeding and whenever it occurs is subject to the legislative ban.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513028 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794819 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267-68", "parenthetical": "citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895-96 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565402 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citing State ex rel. Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facil, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "citing State ex rel. Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facil, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he general rule in this country [is] that every litigant is responsible for his or her own attorney's fees.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659878 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he general rule in this country [is] that every litigant is responsible for his or her own attorney's fees.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53923 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915373 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500290, 2499842, 2497925, 2497100, 2502519 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0284-03", "/nc/331/0284-01", "/nc/331/0284-02", "/nc/331/0284-04", "/nc/331/0284-05" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521963 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160297 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "\"Where attorney's fees are available under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5, we review the trial court's denial of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733357, 4737710, 4739538, 4737908, 4734073 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0284-04", "/nc/318/0284-02", "/nc/318/0284-05", "/nc/318/0284-03", "/nc/318/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522821 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541066 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689", "parenthetical": "quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse \u00a7 13(C) (Supp. 1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527163 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse \u00a7 13(C) (Supp. 1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250958 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508834 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661-62" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656504 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549352, 2550922, 2550897, 2550744, 2552156 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0691-03", "/nc/337/0691-05", "/nc/337/0691-04", "/nc/337/0691-02", "/nc/337/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527893 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1091, "char_count": 27338, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4027755963924176e-07, "percentile": 0.6450540166627475 }, "sha256": "2ee36c9aa443d022fb5489c1566181c2d14138ae75dd9dfd480ea94f556b3909", "simhash": "1:8ee95562227d9152", "word_count": 4421 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.117771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "PERSIS NOVA CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a PERSIS-NOVA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY a/k/a P&N HOMES, Plaintiff v. BRUCE K. EDWARDS and KATHLYN E. EDWARDS, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nDefendants appeal an order denying their motion for sanctions and attorney\u2019s fees brought pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11, and 6-21.5, respectively. We agree with the trial court that the filing of this lawsuit did not violate Rule 11; therefore, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to deny Rule 11 sanctions. We disagree, however, with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that there was no prevailing party in this action. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court\u2019s order and remand the matter for additional findings and conclusions.\nFacts\nIn January 2003, Defendant Bruce Edwards executed a \u201cPurchase Agreement\u201d whereby \u201cBruce & Kathlyn Edwards, as Buyer[s,]\u201d agreed to purchase certain \u201creal estate and [i]mprovements\u201d located in Catawba County from \u201cP & N Homes, Inc.[,]\u201d for the purchase price of $356,975.00. Defendant Kathlyn Edwards did not sign the agreement. Frank Arooji signed the agreement on behalf of the seller. The seller\u2019s logo was printed at the top of the agreement\u2019s first page and identified the seller as both \u201cp&n homes\u201d and \u201cPersis-Nova Construction Co.\u201d\nLater that month, Bruce Edwards and Frank Arooji executed an \u201cAddendum to Purchase Agreement^ ]\u201d The addendum stated that it was between \u201cBruce & Kathlyn Edwards\u201d and \u201cP&N Homes\u201d and detailed the purchase agreement\u2019s purchase price as follows:\n(1) [T]he purchase price is $238,975.00[;]\n(2) Included in contract is $96,000.00 for lot payoff[;]\n(3) Included in contract is $22,000.00 allowance for future upgrades ...[;]\nTherefore, the contract price is $356,975.00[.]\nKathlyn Edwards did not sign the addendum.\nOn 5 March 2004, Bruce and Kathlyn Edwards and Frank Arooji executed a letter, written on letterhead containing the same logo as described above, which stated as follows:\nThis is to certify that Mr. and Mrs. Bruce Edwards and PersisNova Builders have reached an agreement that reads as follows:\nThe final contract price of the construction cost of Mr. and Mrs. Edwards has been finalized at $274,500 .... This total includes all the change orders and upgrades that have occurred, generated, and put in place during the construction of their home located in Somerset Subdivision at Lot 6. The original contract price was based on $238,975.00 .... This agreement has been reached as a result of the meeting that took place between Bruce and Kathy Edwards and Frank Arooji of Persis-Nova Construction on Thursday, March 4, 2004 at Persis Nova\u2019s main office .... It is also verified that Persis Nova Builders has received a total of $232,048.25 ....\nThe balance owed is $42,451.25 ....\nSubsequently, attorney Lisa Jarvis closed Defendants\u2019 construction loan and forwarded funds from the closing to Plaintiff in satisfaction of the purchase agreement.\nOn 27 October 2004, Plaintiff \u201cPersis-Nova Construction, Inc. d/b/a Persis-Nova Construction Company a/k/a P&N Homes\u201d filed a verified complaint commencing this action. The complaint was prepared by the law firm of Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, PA. (\u201cHorack Talley\u201d), listed David L. Edwards and D. Christopher Osborn as Plaintiff\u2019s attorneys, and was signed by David L. Edwards. Frank Arooji verified the complaint. Plaintiff alleged that it was a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Mecklenburg County and that Defendants had not paid $15,000.00 of the $42,451.25 due under the terms of the 5 March 2004 letter. On claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, Plaintiff sought $15,000.00 in compensatory damages.\nDefendants filed an answer and counterclaim on 13 January 2005. In the answer, Defendants admitted that Plaintiff was a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Mecklenburg County. In the counterclaim, Defendants alleged that Plaintiff did not construct the house in either a workmanlike or a timely manner. On a claim of breach of contract, Defendants sought damages in excess of $10,000.00. Plaintiff answered the counterclaim on 18 February 2005.\nAlmost nineteen months later, on or about 1 September 2006, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Defendants filed the affidavit of attorney Curtis R. Sharpe, Jr., who averred as follows:\n4. I have made a diligent search [of the] Catawba County Register of Deeds office. I find no registered certificate of assumed name with respect to P&N Homes nor P&N Homes, Inc. I have found no registered certificate of assumed name with respect to Persis-Nova Construction Co. nor Persis-Nova Construction Company. I have found no registered certificate of assumed name with respect to Persis-Nova Builders.\n5. I have also searched the Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds and find no registration of an assumed name with respect to P&N Homes, P&N Homes, Inc., Persis-Nova Construction Co., nor Persis-Nova Builders. I did find a registered certificate of assumed name for Persis-Nova Construction Company... which indicates that the business is a sole proprietorship and the owner of said business is Ebrahim S. Mowlavi ....\n6. I have searched the roster for the North Carolina Licensing Board for General Contractors. There is no currently licensed contractor in North Carolina with the name Frank Arooji, P&N Homes; P&N Homes, Inc[.]; Persis-Nova Construction Co.; Persis-Nova Construction, Inc.; nor Persis-Nova Builders. There is a licensed contractor known as Ebrahim Safaie Mowlavi, T/A Persis-Nova Construction Company, whose sole qualifier is Ebrahim S. Mowlavi. There is a record of a previous contractor license issued in the name of Farzad Steve Arooji, which was most recently renewed on July 22, 2002, and which is now expired and invalid.\n7. I have searched the Secretary of State\u2019s website and there is no corporation authorized to do business in the State of North Carolina with the name P&N Homes, Inc.; Persis-Nova Construction Company; or Persis-Nova Construction Co.\nIn an order filed 28 September 2006, the trial court made the following findings of fact:\n1. Plaintiff, Persis-Nova Construction, Inc. is a corporation licensed in the State of North Carolina. Persis-Nova Construction, Inc., however, is an unlicensed general contractor within the meaning of Chapter 87 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Moreover, Persis-Nova Construction, Inc., has no certificate of assumed name registered with the Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds office nor the Catawba County Register of Deeds office.\n2. Persis-Nova Construction Company is not a corporation. Persis-Nova Construction Company is an assumed name of Ebrahim Mowlavi. Ebrahim Mowlavi is not a party to this action.\n3. P&N Homes is not a corporation nor is it an assumed name for any lawfully recognized entity. P&N Homes is a nullity.\n4. The Defendants signed a document on March 5, 2004. The Court notes that this is the only document signed by Defendant Kathlyn E. Edwards. The March 5, 2004 document is between the Defendants and Frank Arooji of Persis-Nova Construction. The first paragraph of the March 5, 2004 document identifies at least two entities, Persis-Nova Construction and Persis-Nova Builders. Neither Persis-Nova Construction, nor PersisNova Builders are corporations. There are no certificates of assumed name registered with respect [to] Persis-Nova Construction nor Persis-Nova Builders. Persis-Nova Construction and Persis-Nova Builders are nullities. Frank Arooji is an unlicensed general contractor within the meaning of Chapter 87 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\n5. The January 4, 2003 document captioned \u201cPurchase Agreement\u201d is between P&N Homes, Inc., and is signed only by Defendant Bruce K. Edwards. P&N Homes, Inc. is not a duly licensed corporation and is a nullity.\n6. P&N Homes, Inc. possesses no general contractors license within the meaning of Chapter 87 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\n7. The addendum to the document captioned \u201cPurchase Agreement\u201d dated January 4, 2003 is between the Defendant, Bruce Edwards, and P&N Homes. P&N Homes is not an assumed name for any legal entity. P&N Homes is an unlicensed general contractor within the meaning of Chapter 87 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\nAfter making these findings, the trial court ordered as follows:\n1. The Defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment is allowed and Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.\n2. The Court also grants Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and dismisses [without] prejudice Defendants\u2019 Counterclaim; the dismissal of Defendants\u2019 counterclaim, however, is without prejudice pending further filings as may be proper and legally cognizable.\nOn 28 September 2006, Defendants filed a \u201cMotion for Sanctions and Motion for Attorneys Fees\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11, and 6-21.5, respectively. At a hearing on the motion conducted 16-17 January 2007, the trial court heard the testimony of Mr. Osborn, Ebrahim Mowlavi,- Frank Arooji, and Ms. Jarvis. In an order entered 9 April 2007, the trial court denied Defendants\u2019 motion. Defendants appeal.\nRule 11\nDefendants first argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for Rule 11 sanctions. \u201cThe trial court\u2019s decision to impose or not to impose mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a) is reviewable de novo as a legal issue.\u201d Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989). Under this standard, this Court \u201cwill determine (1) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law support its judgment or determination, (2) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are supported by a sufficiency of the evidence.\u201d Id. If we make these three determinations in the affirmative, we must uphold the trial court\u2019s decision to impose or deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions under Rule 11. Id.\n\u201cThere are three parts to a Rule 11 analysis: (1) factual sufficiency, (2) legal sufficiency, and (3) improper purpose. A violation of any one of these requirements mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.\u201d Dodd v. Steele, 114 N.C. App. 632, 635, 442 S.E.2d 363, 365 (internal citations omitted), disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 691, 448 S.E.2d 521 (1994). We need not address the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint because Defendants do not argue to this Court that Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was legally insufficient. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a). Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was factually insufficient and was filed for an improper purpose.\n1. Factual Sufficiency\nAnalysis of the factual sufficiency of a complaint requires the court to determine \u201c(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.\u201d Page v. Roscoe, LLC, 128 N.C. App. 678, 681-82, 497 S.E.2d 422, 425 (1998). An inquiry is reasonable if \u201cgiven the knowledge and information which can be imputed to a party, a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances would have terminated his or her inquiry and formed the belief that the claim was warranted under existing law[.]\u201d Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 661-62, 412 S.E.2d 327, 336 (1992).\nStatic Control Components, Inc. v. Vogler, 152 N.C. App. 599, 603-04, 568 S.E.2d 305, 308 (2002). In the case at bar, the trial court found that Plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and that Plaintiff reasonably believed that the complaint was well grounded in fact. Defendants contend that these findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.\nMs. Jarvis, the closing attorney, testified that she had closed \u201chundreds\u201d of loans for \u201cPersis Nova\u201d over approximately ten years. She also testified that she explained her understanding of the parties\u2019 dispute to attorneys at Horack Talley. Ms. Jarvis testified that she understood that Defendants owed Plaintiff money as a result of the closing. Finally, Ms. Jarvis testified that she sent Horack Talley a copy of the articles of organization of Persis-Nova Construction, Inc. Mr. Osborn, one of the attorneys who filed the complaint, testified that he filed the complaint \u201cbased on the information that was provided to [Horack Talley] by Miss Jarvis[.]\u201d Mr. Osborn further testified that he reviewed the 5 March 2004 letter and that he verified that Persis-Nova Construction, Inc. had filed articles of organization with the Secretary of State. Mr. Osborn also testified that he alleged PersisNova Construction, Inc. was doing business as Persis-Nova Construction Company \u201cbecause that comported with the information that [he] obtained from [the] client[.]\u201d Finally, Mr. Osborn testified that he did not know exactly what steps he took to verify that Persis-Nova Construction, Inc. was doing business as Persis-Nova Construction Company, but that he did not \u201cregularly go and check assumed names [databases] unless [he had] some cause or reason to.\u201d This evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings that Plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and that Plaintiff reasonably believed that the complaint was well grounded in fact.\nDefendants present no authority for their suggestion that Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was factually insufficient per se because neither Persis-Nova Construction, Inc. nor any of the parties to the contract were contractors licensed under N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 87. Regardless, we do not find Defendants\u2019 suggestion persuasive. The test to be applied in analyzing the factual sufficiency of a complaint is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. Defendants\u2019 argument is overruled.\n2. Improper Purpose\n\u201cAn improper purpose is \u2018any purpose other than one to vindicate rights ... or to put claims of right to a proper test.\u2019 \u201d Mack v. Moore, 107 N.C. App. 87, 93, 418 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1992) (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse \u00a7 13(C) (Supp. 1992)).\nFor example, an improper purpose may be inferred from \u201cthe service or filing of excessive, successive, or repetitive [papers]...,\u201d from \u201cfiling successive lawsuits despite the res judicata bar of earlier judgments,\u201d from \u201cfailing to serve the adversary with contested motions,\u201d from filing numerous dispositive motions when trial is imminent, from \u201cthe filing of meritless papers by counsel who have extensive experience in the pertinent area of law,\u201d from \u201cfiling suit with no factual basis for the purpose of \u2018fishing\u2019 for some evidence of liability,\u201d from \u201ccontinuing to press an obviously meritless claim after being specifically advised of its meritlessness by a judge or magistrate,\u201d or from \u201cfiling papers containing \u2018scandalous, libellous, and impertinent matters\u2019 for the purpose of harassing a party or counsel.\u201d\nId. Under Rule 11, an objective standard is used to determine whether a paper was filed for an improper purpose, and the movant has the burden of proving an improper puipose. Bryson, 330 N.C. at 656, 412 S.E.2d at 333. In the present case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed the complaint for the improper purpose of collecting \u201cmoney from the Defendants that is uncollectible by virtue of Chapter 87 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\u201d Again, we disagree.\nIn its second finding of fact, the trial court found that Plaintiff filed its complaint for the purpose of putting its claims of rights under the contract to a proper test: Defendants did not assign error to this finding, and, thus, this finding is binding on this Court. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a). See also Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97-98, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). The filing of a complaint for the purpose of collecting a contract balance is proper. The trial court\u2019s finding. supports its conclusion that the complaint was not filed for an improper purpose. Defendants\u2019 argument is overruled.\nThe evidence adduced at the hearing by Plaintiffs [sic] with regard to Defendants\u2019 Rule 11 motion indicated, by a preponderance, that the attorney signing the original complaint which was filed in this action believed that the action was merely a collection of a contract balance for the purchase of improvements to real property owned by the Defendants.\nSection 6-21.5\nDefendants next argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for attorney\u2019s fees brought pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5. In denying Defendants\u2019 motion, the trial court found that\n[b]y [the 28 September 2006 summary judgment order], the claims of the Plaintiffs [sic] and Defendants were each and all dismissed.\nThus, the trial court concluded,\n[t]here was no \u201cprevailing party\u201d as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 and the Defendants have failed to meet the primary threshold for an award of attorneys\u2019 fees under the referenced statute.\nBased solely upon this conclusion, the trial court denied Defendants\u2019 motion for fees. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no prevailing party in this action. After careful consideration, we agree.\nSection 6-21.5 provides as follows:\nIn any civil action, special proceeding, or estate or trust proceeding, the court, upon motion of the prevailing party, may award a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee to the prevailing party if the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party in any pleading. The filing of a general denial or the granting of any preliminary motion, such as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12, a motion to dismiss pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50, or a motion for summary judgment pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56, is not in itself a sufficient reason for the court to award attorney\u2019s fees, but may be evidence to support the court\u2019s decision to make such an award. A party who advances a claim or defense supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of law may not be required under this section to pay attorney\u2019s fees. The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its award of attorney\u2019s fees under this section.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5 (2007). This statute, enacted in 1984 and amended in 2006, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and this Court numerous times. E.g., Sunamerica Fin. Corp. v. Bonham, 328 N.C. 254, 400 S.E.2d 435 (1991). Prior decisions have focused on the sufficiency of a pleading to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact, see, e.g., Sprouse v. N. River Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 311, 325, 344 S.E.2d 555, 565, (\u201cThe sufficiency of a pleading is after all a question of law for the court.\u201d) (citing Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970)), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 284, 348 S.E.2d 344 (1986), but also have discussed a trial court\u2019s discretionary authority , to award attorney\u2019s fees. See Willow Bend Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. Robinson, 192 N.C. App. 405, 417, 665 S.E.2d 570, 577 (2008) (\u201cWhere attorney\u2019s fees are available under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5, we review the trial court\u2019s denial of attorney\u2019s fees for abuse of discretion.\u201d) (citation omitted). To date, however, neither Court has addressed the question of who is a \u201cprevailing party\u201d under this statute. But see House v. Hillhaven, Inc., 105 N.C. App. 191, 195-96, 412 S.E.2d 893, 896 (adopting the \u201cmerits test\u201d to determine who was a \u201cprevailing party\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-19.1), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 284, 417 S.E.2d 251 (1992); H.B.S. Contr\u2019rs, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 57, 468 S.E.2d 517, 522-23 (adopting the \u201cmerits test\u201d to determine who was a \u201cprevailing party\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16B), disc. review improvidently allowed, 345 N.C. 178, 477 S.E.2d 926 (1996) (per curiam).\nBecause Section 6-21.5 provides for an award of attorney\u2019s fees in derogation of the common law, this statute must be strictly construed. Sunamerica, 328 N.C. at 257, 400 S.E.2d at 437. See also Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 159, 500 S.E.2d 54, 71 (1998) (\u201c[T]he general rule in this country [is] that every litigant is responsible for his or her own attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d) (citations omitted). In construing a statute, \u201cour primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.\u201d Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991) (citing State ex rel. Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facil, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981)). \u201cThe first consideration in determining legislative intent is the words chosen by the legislature.\u201d O & M Indus. v. Smith Eng\u2019g Co., 360 N.C. 263, 267-68, 624 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2006) (citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895-96 (1998)). When the words are unambiguous, \u201cthey are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings.\u201d Id. at 268, 624 S.E.2d at 348.\nSection 6-21.5 is unambiguous in providing that attorney\u2019s fees may be awarded against the \u201closing party in any pleading.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5 (emphasis added). Thus, by the plain language of the statute, attorney\u2019s fees may be awarded against more than one party in an action. In other words, a \u201cprevailing party,\u201d as used in Section 6-21.5, is a party who prevails on a claim or issue in an action, not a party who prevails in the action.\nThis reading of the statute is bolstered by dicta in Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 330 N.C. 681, 413 S.E.2d 268 (1992). In that case, plaintiff Investors Title brought multiple claims against multiple defendants, including defendant Southeastern Shelter Corporation. Investors prevailed on some, but not all, of its claims against Southeastern at trial, and Southeastern prevailed on a crossclaim against a co-defendant. The trial court awarded attorney\u2019s fees to Investors under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney\u2019s fees on the ground that Section 75-1.1 did not apply to Investors. The Supreme Court then stated:\nAttorney\u2019s fees are also not allowable in this case under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5..'.. Since both parties were able to sustain and prevail on several different issues through the various stages of this case, one cannot reasonably say that there was a complete lack of a justiciable issue as to either party.\nId. at 695, 413 S.E.2d at 275. This language clearly implies that attorney\u2019s fees are available under Section 6-21.5 against any party who raises an issue in which there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact.\nWe also note that this Court has previously stated that \u201c[t]he legislative purpose of [Section 6-21.5] is to discourage frivolous legal action[.]\u201d Short v. Bryant, 97 N.C. App. 327, 329, 388 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1990). See also Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 600, 603, 344 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1986) (stating that Section 6-21.5 \u201cappears to be based on deterring frivolous and bad faith lawsuits by the use of attorney\u2019s fees\u201d), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 320 N.C. 669, 360 S.E.2d 772 (1987). This purpose would be circumvented by limiting the statute\u2019s application to the party who prevails in an action. Short, 97 N.C. App. at 329, 388 S.E.2d at 206 (\u201cFrivolous action in a lawsuit can occur at any stage of the proceeding and whenever it occurs is subject to the legislative ban.\u201d).\nIn this case, the trial court properly found that Plaintiff did not prevail on the claims set forth in its complaint and that Defendants did not prevail on the counterclaim set forth in their answer. As a corollary, however, Defendants prevailed on Plaintiffs claims, and Plaintiff prevailed on Defendants\u2019 counterclaim. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously concluded that Defendants were not prevailing parties in this action.\nThe decision to award or deny attorney\u2019s fees under Section 6-21.5 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, we must remand this case to the trial court to make further findings and conclusions resolving Defendants\u2019 motion for attorney\u2019s fees. Upon remand, the trial court should consider all of the criteria for an award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5 before making its decision to award or deny fees.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.\nJudges STEELMAN and GEER concur.\n. \u201cWhile it is true that a trial court may not, on summary judgment, make findings of fact resolving disputed issues of fact, when \u2014 as here \u2014 the material facts are undisputed, an order may include a recitation of those undisputed facts.\u201d In re Estate of Pope, 192 N.C. App. 321, 329, 666 S.E.2d 140, 147 (2008) (citations omitted). When the recitation of undisputed facts appears \u201chelpful or necessary, the court should let the judgment show that the facts set out therein are the undisputed facts.\u201d Capps v. City of Raleigh, 35 N.C. App. 290, 292, 241 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1978).", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Smith Currie & Hancock, LLP, by Robert J. Greene, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Crowe & Davis, P.A., by H. Kent Crowe, for Defendants-Appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PERSIS NOVA CONSTRUCTION, INC., d/b/a PERSIS-NOVA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY a/k/a P&N HOMES, Plaintiff v. BRUCE K. EDWARDS and KATHLYN E. EDWARDS, Defendants\nNo. COA07-1501\n(Filed 20 January 2009)\n1. Pleadings\u2014 Rule 11 sanctions \u2014 reasonable inquiry\nThe trial court did not err in a breach of contract and unjust enrichment case by denying defendants\u2019 motion for N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11 sanctions because: (1) the evidence supported the trial court\u2019s findings that plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and that plaintiff reasonably believed that the complaint was well-grounded in fact; (2) defendants presented no authority for their suggestion that plaintiffs complaint was factually insufficient per se since none of the parties to the contract were licensed contractors; and (3) the filing of a complaint for the purpose of collecting a contract balance is proper.\n2. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 prevailing party\nThe trial court erred in a breach of contract and unjust enrichment case by denying defendants\u2019 motion for attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 based on the erroneous conclusion that there was no prevailing party in this action, and the case is remanded to the trial court to make further findings and conclusions, because: (1) a prevailing party under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 is a party who prevails on a claim or issue in an action, and not a party who prevails in the action; (2) attorney fees are available under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 against any party who raises an issue in which there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact; (3) the legislative purpose of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 is to discourage frivolous action, and this purpose would be circumvented by limiting the statute\u2019s application to the party who prevails in an action; and (4) although the trial court properly found' that plaintiff did not prevail on the claims set forth in its complaint and that defendants did not prevail on the counterclaim set forth in their answer, defendants prevailed on plaintiff\u2019s claims and plaintiff prevailed on defendants\u2019 counterclaim.\nAppeal by Defendants from order entered 9 April 2007 by Judge Jesse B. Caldwell, III, in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 August 2008.\nSmith Currie & Hancock, LLP, by Robert J. Greene, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nCrowe & Davis, P.A., by H. Kent Crowe, for Defendants-Appellants." }, "file_name": "0055-01", "first_page_order": 87, "last_page_order": 99 }