{ "id": 4164777, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MONICA BENITA YOUNG, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Young", "decision_date": "2009-01-20", "docket_number": "No. COA08-161", "first_page": "107", "last_page": "113", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 N.C. App. 107" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639610, 12639611, 12639612 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0557-01", "/se2d/651/0557-02", "/se2d/651/0557-03" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638410 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300", "parenthetical": "\"An entry under a bona fide claim of right avoids criminal responsibility under [the trespass statute].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627391 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "\"An entry under a bona fide claim of right avoids criminal responsibility under [the trespass statute].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "upholding trial court's jury instruction that misdemeanor breaking or entering must be \"wrongful - without any claim of right\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170730 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "upholding trial court's jury instruction that misdemeanor breaking or entering must be \"wrongful - without any claim of right\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695588, 4697255, 4702764, 4698365, 4705246 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0201-03", "/nc/316/0201-05", "/nc/316/0201-04", "/nc/316/0201-01", "/nc/316/0201-02" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750406, 4748969, 4752466, 4756823, 4750137 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0624-04", "/nc/312/0624-05", "/nc/312/0624-02", "/nc/312/0624-03", "/nc/312/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521181 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571686 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477-78", "parenthetical": "reversing breaking and entering conviction on the grounds that jury was not instructed on the \"claim of right\" bondsmen have to break and enter the house of someone who has jumped bail" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712810 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691-93", "parenthetical": "reversing breaking and entering conviction on the grounds that jury was not instructed on the \"claim of right\" bondsmen have to break and enter the house of someone who has jumped bail" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511364 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3737504, 3745989, 3742668, 3743917, 3737270, 3747288, 3736316, 3744189 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0574-05", "/nc/361/0574-07", "/nc/361/0574-06", "/nc/361/0574-03", "/nc/361/0574-04", "/nc/361/0574-01", "/nc/361/0574-02", "/nc/361/0574-08" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8203026 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S. Ct. 1327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11754464, 11753604, 11754374, 11754151, 11754759, 11753676, 11754000, 11754610, 11754294, 11754679, 11753910, 11754074, 11753719, 11754207 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1108-11", "/us/517/1108-01", "/us/517/1108-10", "/us/517/1108-07", "/us/517/1108-14", "/us/517/1108-02", "/us/517/1108-05", "/us/517/1108-12", "/us/517/1108-09", "/us/517/1108-13", "/us/517/1108-04", "/us/517/1108-06", "/us/517/1108-03", "/us/517/1108-08" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790071 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he general rule is that an instruction that evidence is not to be considered accompanied by the withdrawal of that evidence cures any error in its admission.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565398 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he general rule is that an instruction that evidence is not to be considered accompanied by the withdrawal of that evidence cures any error in its admission.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 727, "char_count": 16017, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.548627546539126e-08, "percentile": 0.28514345817072734 }, "sha256": "0caeba9e90806ac15cd5b02e3b744e8a6fe145a2b748800b2c02bb10328854e9", "simhash": "1:978e547656fe5966", "word_count": 2610 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.117771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MONICA BENITA YOUNG, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Monica Benita Young appeals from her conviction of misdemeanor breaking and entering. On appeal, defendant primarily argues that the trial court\u2019s questioning of a witness constituted an impermissible expression of judicial opinion and warrants a new trial. Although we hold that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, we also conclude that defendant\u2019s assertion that the questioning undermined her \u201cclaim of right\u201d defense is unpersuasive given the evidence of the summary ejectment judgment specifically finding defendant had no claim of right to the premises.\nFacts\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following facts. On 4 December 2006, Jacqueline Chambers owned a mobile home (\u201cthe trailer\u201d). The trailer sat on lot 30 at 111 Happy Drive, Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina. Chambers had rented the lot from Linda Medlin for $85.00 per month for about nine years. In February 2006, Chambers moved out of the trailer to let her daughter T\u2019Yara Thomas and her daughter\u2019s friend Arquize Artis live there, with the understanding that Thomas would make the monthly $85.00 lot rental payment to Medlin. Thomas, however, failed to pay the lot rent from February 2006 until March 2007.\nIn June or July 2006, defendant moved into Chambers\u2019 trailer with Thomas. In August 2006, Chambers asked defendant to leave the trailer, but defendant refused. Thomas and Artis brought an eviction action, and on 27 October 2006, a judgment for summary ejectment was entered against defendant by the Halifax County District Court. On 29 October 2006, defendant was escorted from the trailer by law enforcement pursuant to the eviction order.\nOn 5 November 2006 \u2014 one week after defendant\u2019s eviction from Chambers\u2019 trailer \u2014 defendant approached Medlin and entered into a month-to-month lease for the lot on which Chambers\u2019 trailer sat. At that time, Chambers\u2019 monthly $85.00 lot rental payment had gone unpaid for approximately nine months. Defendant paid Medlin $85.00 for the first month\u2019s rent, and Medlin gave her a receipt stating that the payment was for the rental of lot 30. Medlin and defendant also signed a lease agreement contract with the space specifying the premises being leased left blank. At trial, Medlin offered conflicting testimony as to whether she thought she had authority to let defendant use Chambers\u2019 trailer and whether she in fact intended to give defendant permission to use the trailer rather than just the lot.\nOn 4 December 2006, police, officers contacted Chambers to report that they had found defendant at the trailer, accompanied by a locksmith whom defendant had hired to change the locks. Chambers went to the scene and found defendant inside the trailer. At that time, Chambers took out a warrant against defendant for misdemeanor breaking and entering, and defendant was arrested.\nOn 12 January 2007, defendant was found guilty in Halifax County District Court of misdemeanor breaking and entering and was sentenced to 30 days incarceration with 30 days credit for time served. Defendant gave notice of appeal to superior court. Following trial in superior court, the jury found defendant guilty of misdemeanor breaking and entering. The trial court sentenced her to 40 days incarceration with 40 days credit for time served. Defendant timely appealed to this Court. Defendant appeared pro se in both district court and superior court.\nDiscussion\nDefendant contends that the trial court violated her right to a fair trial conducted by an impartial judge when the trial court posed two questions to witness Linda Medlin. These questions, defendant argues, impermissibly expressed the trial court\u2019s opinion that defendant obtained a claim of right to Chamber\u2019s trailer under false pretenses and indicated to the jury that it should find defendant guilty.\nThe trial court\u2019s questioning of Medlin followed both direct and cross-examination of Medlin by the State and defendant. During the State\u2019s direct examination, Medlin testified: \u201cAll I remember was telling [defendant] \u2014 She said [Chambers] wasn\u2019t there. Nobody was staying in the trailer so I thought I had okay for her, you know, to stay.\u201d Asked to clarify where, precisely, she thought it was okay for defendant to stay, Medlin replied, \u201cWell, to rent the lot, I guess so.\u201d Medlin then testified that although she remembered talking with defendant about the trailer, she could not remember what she said.\nOn defendant\u2019s cross-examination, Medlin testified that she had told defendant she could stay in Chambers\u2019 trailer and merely pay lot rent. Then, however, on the State\u2019s re-direct examination, Medlin testified that she did not remember what, if anything, she said to defendant \u201cabout whether or not she could go into the trailer on Lot 30 and stay there.\u201d\nAt this point, the trial court interrupted to ask Medlin the following questions:\nThe Court: On the day that you talked \u2014 Let me take you back to the day that you talked to Ms. Young about that contract that you all say you entered into and that she paid you $85. Did she tell you that nine days prior to that a judge had -ordered her off that property?\nA. No, sir.\nThe Court: Did she tell you that at some time prior to that, the sheriff had been there and had asked her to leave and she had left off that property?\nA. No, sir.\nWhen the trial court convened the next day, defendant moved to strike the trial court\u2019s questions and Medlin\u2019s responses. The trial court granted the motion and agreed to issue a curative instruction to the jury. The trial court asked defendant if that would be satisfactory, and defendant answered \u201cyes.\u201d The trial court also asked defendant whether she wished to make any other motions, and defendant replied, \u201cNot at this time.\u201d When the jury entered the courtroom, the trial court gave the following instruction:\nBefore we resume with out [sic] testimony, the defense has made a motion to strike a portion of the testimony from yesterday or the evidence from yesterday and I\u2019m granting that motion.\nAt this time, I\u2019m going to instruct you to disregard and strike from the evidence any questions that I may have asked of a witness \u00e1nd any response that the witness may have given in response to that question and you\u2019re not to consider that in the evidence in this case or during your deliberations.\nRule 10(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure states: \u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d Here, when defendant objected to the trial court\u2019s questioning of Medlin, she received precisely the relief that she sought: her motion to strike was granted, and the trial court issued an immediate curative instruction that defendant agreed was satisfactory. Defendant\u2019s argument on appeal that this instruction was not sufficient to cure any error was not properly preserved for review. Failure to preserve an issue for appellate review \u201cordinarily justifies the appellate court\u2019s refusal to consider the issue on appeal.\u201d Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008).\nMoreover, withdrawal of evidence and a curative instruction are generally enough to avert any prejudice. State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 133, 282 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1981) (\u201c[T]he general rule is that an instruction that evidence is not to be considered accompanied by the withdrawal of that evidence cures any error in its admission.\u201d). In the present case, the trial judge issued a curative instruction immediately after granting defendant\u2019s motion to strike his questioning of Medlin from the record. Defendant makes no argument, and we can see no reason, why the general rule that withdrawal and a curative instruction are sufficient to avert prejudice should not apply here.\nIn any event, even if we assume arguendo that the trial court erred, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Not every impermissible opinion expressed by a trial court is grounds for a new trial. \u201cUnless the comment might reasonably have had a prejudicial effect on defendant\u2019s trial, the error will be considered harmless.\u201d State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 408, 459 S.E.2d 638, 662 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478, 116 S. Ct. 1327 (1996). \u201cA defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2007).\nGiven the overwhelming evidence against defendant, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that, had the court not questioned Medlin, a different result would have been reached at trial. See State v. Rushdan, 183 N.C. App. 281, 286, 644 S.E.2d 568, 572 (holding that trial court\u2019s witness interrogation did not cause defendant prejudice when there was already \u201coverwhelming evidence\u201d showing defendant\u2019s guilt), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 574, 651 S.E.2d 557 (2007). Although defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s questions undermined her \u201cclaim of right\u201d defense by suggesting to the jury that Medlin had been \u201cfooled\u201d by defendant into entering the lease agreement, defendant\u2019s \u201cclaim of right\u201d had already been thoroughly countered by Medlin\u2019s testimony that Medlin only owned the lot and not the trailer; the fact that the $85.00 defendant paid Medlin for a one-month lease agreement correspond to the amount due only for the lot; and, most significantly, the evidence of the summary ejectment judgment that had, only seven days prior to defendant\u2019s rental agreement with Medlin, resulted in defendant\u2019s eviction. That judgment contained explicit findings establishing that the trailer was owned by Chambers and that \u201c[t]he Defendant has no legal claim to remain in the residence.\u201d In light of the judgment\u2019s statement that defendant had no legal claim of right to remain in the residence, and the undisputed fact that Chambers and not Medlin owned the trailer, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a contrary verdict even if the trial court had not questioned Medlin. Accordingly, any error made by the trial court was harmless.\nDefendant next argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss. A defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence: (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595, 573 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2002). Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion. Id. at 597, 573 S.E.2d at 869. On review of a denial of a motion to dismiss, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Id. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869. Unless favorable to the State, the defendant\u2019s evidence is not to be taken into consideration. Id. Contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence do not warrant dismissal, but rather are for the jury to resolve. Id.\nDefendant was convicted of misdemeanor breaking and entering under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(b) (2007), which states: \u201cAny person who wrongfully breaks or enters any building is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.\u201d Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present substantial evidence of (1) a breaking or entry, (2) into a building, (3) that was wrongful at the time. A breaking or entry is wrongful when it is without the consent of the owner or tenant or other claim of right. See, e.g., State v. Mathis, 126 N.C. App. 688, 691-93, 486 S.E.2d 475, 477-78 (1997) (reversing breaking and entering conviction on the grounds that jury was not instructed on the \u201cclaim of right\u201d bondsmen have to break and enter the house of someone who has jumped bail), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 349 N.C. 503, 509 S.E.2d 155 (1998); State v. Wheeler, 70 N.C. App. 191, 195, 319 S.E.2d 631, 634 (\u201cOur Courts have held that an entry is punishable under this statute only if it is wrongful, i.e., without the owner\u2019s consent.\u201d), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 624, 323 S.E.2d 925 (1984), cert. denied, 316 N.C. 201, 341 S.E.2d 583 (1986); State v. Chambers, 52 N.C. App. 713, 723, 280 S.E.2d 175, 181 (1981) (upholding trial court\u2019s jury instruction that misdemeanor breaking or entering must be \u201cwrongful \u2014 without any claim of right\u201d). Cf. State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 462, 101 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1958) (\u201cAn entry under a bona fide claim of right avoids criminal responsibility under [the trespass statute].\u201d).\nIt is undisputed that defendant broke or entered into Chambers\u2019 trailer without the consent of Chambers or the tenants. Although defendant points to her lease agreement with Medlin as establishing a claim of right, we have previously outlined the substantial evidence that defendant had no claim of right to enter Chambers\u2019 trailer, including the judgment specifically finding that defendant \u201chas no legal claim to remain in the residence.\u201d Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant did not have a claim of right to enter Chambers\u2019 trailer. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott T. Slusser, for the State.", "Betsy J. Wolfenden for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MONICA BENITA YOUNG, Defendant\nNo. COA08-161\n(Filed 20 January 2009)\n1. Evidence\u2014 impermissible opinion \u2014 withdrawal of evidence and curative instruction \u2014 failure to demonstrate prejudice\nThe trial court did not violate defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial in a misdemeanor breaking and entering case by posing two questions to witness Medlin that allegedly express the trial court\u2019s opinion that defendant obtained a claim of right to the pertinent trailer under false pretenses because: (1) when defendant objected to the trial court\u2019s questioning of this witness, defendant received precisely the relief she sought since her motion to strike was granted and the trial court issued an immediate curative instruction that defendant agreed was satisfactory; (2) defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, and withdrawal of evidence and a curative instruction are generally enough to avert any prejudice; and (3) even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, including a summary ejectment judgment\u2019s statement that defendant had no legal claim of right to remain in the pertinent residence and the undisputed fact that Chambers, and not Medlin, owned the trailer.\n2. Burglary and Unlawful Breaking or Entering\u2014 misdemeanor breaking and entering \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 claim of right\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of misdemeanor breaking and entering because: (1) it was undisputed that defendant broke or entered into a trailer without the consent of the owner or the tenants; and (2) although defendant points to her lease agreement with the lot owner to establish a claim of right, defendant had no claim of right to enter the trailer when a summary ejectment judgment specifically found that defendant had no legal claim to remain in the residence.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 September 2007 by Judge Paul G. Gessner in Halifax County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott T. Slusser, for the State.\nBetsy J. Wolfenden for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0107-01", "first_page_order": 139, "last_page_order": 145 }