{ "id": 4165217, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. YAW OSEI ADU", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Yaw Osei Adu", "decision_date": "2009-02-03", "docket_number": "No. COA08-582", "first_page": "269", "last_page": "278", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 N.C. App. 269" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641565 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" }, { "page": "889-90" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "897" }, { "page": "896" }, { "page": "896-97" }, { "page": "897" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" }, { "page": "242-43" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" }, { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491571 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138474 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159151 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651-52" }, { "page": "651-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525533 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733537 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0370-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 821, "char_count": 21702, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13603708169858553 }, "sha256": "ea0195490e7cc3c34f5631fbf979ac105c372bd90d007f902fb829bf4e65ea70", "simhash": "1:1e2a827086025850", "word_count": 3629 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.117771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. YAW OSEI ADU" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nA jury found Yaw Osei Adu (Defendant) guilty on 6 August 2004 of first-degree statutory rape and indecent liberties with a child. The State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that Defendant was married to Nellie Adu (Ms. Adu) in 1996. Defendant lived with Ms. Adu and her daughter, S.A., after the marriage. S.A. testified at trial that in April 2002 she asked Defendant to buy her some clothes and a new bra because all of her bras were torn. Defendant told S.A. that he needed to see her breasts to see what size they were. S.A. lifted her shirt and took off her bra to show Defendant her bra size. S.A. testified that Defendant started sucking her breasts.\nS.A. testified that Defendant picked her up and carried her over Defendant\u2019s shoulder into her bedroom. Defendant placed S.A. on her bed, climbed on top of her and started sucking her breasts again. Defendant kissed S.A. on her mouth and started \u201crocking back and forth\u201d on top of her. After a few minutes, Defendant unzipped his pants, pulled down S.A.\u2019s pants, and tried to insert his penis into S.A.\u2019s vagina. S.A. told Defendant that this hurt her. Defendant waited a few moments before again trying to insert his penis into S.A.\u2019s vagina. S.A. told Defendant that \u201cit still hurts,\u201d and S.A. pulled her pants up. S.A. testified that Defendant turned S.A. over onto her stomach and started \u201crocking' back and forth on [S.A.\u2019s] rear end.\u201d S.A. told Defendant she needed to go to the bathroom. In the bathroom, S.A. \u201cprayed . . . [Defendant would] stop.\u201d S.A. returned to the bedroom and Defendant again \u201crockfed] back and forth\u201d on top of her. S.A. asked Defendant to stop, and he stopped. S.A. testified that she made Defendant place his hand on the Bible and swear he would never touch her again. Defendant made S.A. swear to never tell anyone because if she did, Defendant and Ms. Adu \u201cwould have to get a divorce.\u201d S.A. testified that she felt \u201ctoo dirty\u201d to tell Ms. Adu what had happened when Ms. Adu returned home from work that day.\nS.A. testified that on a later occasion, Defendant hugged S.A. and began kissing her while Ms. Adu was out of the house at work. Defendant laid S.A. down and began rocking back and forth on top of her as he had done before. S.A. testified she could feel Defendant\u2019s penis through his blue jeans. S.A. said she again felt too dirty to tell Ms. Adu what happened that day.\nAbout a week later, S.A. told Ms. Adu that Defendant had rocked back and forth on top of her, and that he had kissed her on the mouth and breasts. The next day, Ms. Adu asked S.A. to tell her what happened in the presence of Defendant. S.A. told Ms. Adu and Defendant that Defendant had rocked back and forth on top of her and sucked her breasts. Defendant said that he and S.A. were just wrestling. S.A. testified that it was not wrestling.\nS.A. further testified that she accompanied Defendant and Ms. Adu to speak with their pastor, Pastor Longobardo. Pastor Longobardo testified that he spoke with Defendant on 12 July 2002, and that Defendant had told him he had had \u201csome bodily contact\u201d with S.A. Defendant told Pastor Longobardo that although he used his hands while touching S.A., no penetration had occurred. Pastor Longobardo also testified that Defendant said that none of the contact he had with S.A. would be viewed as inappropriate in his home country.\nSheronda Harris (Harris), an investigator with the child protective services division of the Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS), testified for the State. Harris testified that on 18 July 2002, Ms. Adu reported inappropriate sexual conduct had occurred between S.A. and Defendant. Harris interviewed Defendant at his home and Defendant told Harris he used to wrestle with S.A. \u201clike she was a boy.\u201d Defendant told Harris he had held S.A.\u2019s breasts while wrestling and that he had ended up on top of her at one point. He admitted his conduct was inappropriate.\nHarris testified that after speaking with Defendant, she spoke with S.A. that same day. S.A. told Harris that she \u201chad had sex with [Defendant]\u201d based on overhearing girls at school say sex was how babies were made. Harris allowed Defendant to remain in the home at that point, but he was not permitted to have any unsupervised contact with S.A. The following day, 19 July 2002, Harris asked Defendant to move out of the family home. Harris referred S.A. to Family Services of the Piedmont and also to Dr. Angela Stanley (Dr. Stanley) at the Child Evaluation Clinic of the Moses Cone Health System, for a medical exam. After DSS received the results from Dr. Stanley\u2019s examination, DSS substantiated its report of sexual abuse by Defendant.\nDr. Stanley testified that a genital examination of S.A. revealed a notch or healed tear at her hymen\u2019s 9:00 o\u2019clock position, which was consistent with genital penetration. Based on her physical examination of S.A., Dr. Stanley found a possible certainty of sexual maltreatment.\nMs. Adu testified on voir dire that her father, S.A.\u2019s grandfather, had lived in their family home until 1998. Ms. Adu testified that they lived in a two-bedroom home, and that her father chose to move out after the birth of Ms. Adu\u2019s other daughter because there was so little room. During the summer of 1999, after Ms. Adu\u2019s father had moved out of the home, Ms. Adu took S.A. and a friend to visit her father. About a month after this visit, S.A. told Ms. Adu that she did not want to visit her grandfather again because he had kissed her and \u201c \u2018stuck his tongue in [S.A.\u2019s] mouth.\u2019 \u201d Ms. Adu testified that she had found a stain on S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s underwear and blood on S.A.\u2019s underwear. Ms. Adu stated the spot on S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s underwear was the result of a boil on his buttocks, and that the blood on S.A.\u2019s underwear was from S.A.\u2019s beginning her period.\nDefendant filed a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412 requesting that the trial court allow him to present evidence of prior sexual abuse of S.A. by her grandfather as an alternative explanation for the trauma to her vaginal area. At the Rule 412 hearing, Defendant testified that S.A.\u2019s grandfather had lived in their home until Ms. Adu found blood on S.A.\u2019s panties and on S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s underwear. Defendant testified that Ms. Adu confronted S.A.\u2019s grandfather and kicked him out of the residence because \u201che had raped [S.A.]\u201d Defendant also presented as evidence S.A.\u2019s taped interview in which S.A. stated that \u201c[w]hat happened to me [with Defendant] is something similar to what happened .... with my grandfather.\u201d\nDuring the Rule 412 hearing and at trial, Defendant argued that the fondling by S.A.\u2019s grandfather caused the trauma to S.A.\u2019s vagina. Upon a finding that there was no credible evidence of penetration by S.A.\u2019s grandfather that could serve as an alternate explanation to the vaginal trauma, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s Rule 412 motion. Thus, the trial court ruled that Defendant could not present any evidence concerning S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s prior sexual abuse of S.A. and redacted any mention of the prior sexual abuse stated in S.A.\u2019s videotaped statement and in Dr. Stanley\u2019s medical report.\nDefendant testified in his own defense and denied the allegations. Defendant also testified that he was a third-degree black belt in Tae Kwon Do and that he did touch S.A. when giving her Tae Kwon Do lessons. However, Defendant stated that he did not touch S.A. in an inappropriate way.\nDuring the State\u2019s recross-examination of Defendant, the following exchange occurred:\nTHE STATE: [Defendant], you testified that you were never given an opportunity to provide a written statement to anybody; isn\u2019t that right?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE STATE: And isn\u2019t it true, [Defendant], that when you took [S.A.] to Family Services of the Piedmont that you had a conversation with Detective Hines [of the Greensboro Police Department] in the parking lot?\nDEFENDANT: Yes. I didn\u2019t know she was [a] detective at the time.\nTHE STATE: And she said'that if you came [to] meet her, you\u2019d have a chance to tell your side of the story, didn\u2019t she?\nDEFENDANT: She didn\u2019t explain it. She told me to come to her office.\nTHE STATE: And did you ever go into her office and tell her your side of the story?\nDEFENDANT: Yeah. When I was going, my wife came to me and told me that we need to get an attorney.\nTHE STATE: Did you ever go in and meet with Detective Hines and tell her your side of the story?\nDEFENDANT: No.\nDuring the State\u2019s closing argument, the State referenced Defendant\u2019s failure to speak with Detective Hines. The State asked: \u201cWhy didn\u2019t [Defendant] go and talk to Detective Hines when she offered him the opportunity to tell his side of the story?\u201d Defendant objected to this statement but his objection was overruled.\nThe jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree statutory rape and indecent liberties with a child. Sentencing of Defendant was delayed because Defendant\u2019s whereabouts were unknown after 5 August 2004. Defendant was sentenced on 16 October 2007 to four consecutive active sentences with a combined total term of imprisonment of not less than 227 months and not more than 284 months with the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of S.A\u2019s grandfather\u2019s sexual abuse of S.A. pursuant to Rule 412. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(2) (2007) provides that:\n(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such behavior:\n(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant^]\nDefendant argues that evidence of S.A.\u2019s sexual abuse by S.A.\u2019s grandfather was relevant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(2) as an alternative explanation for the notching in S.A.\u2019s vaginal area. In State v. Ollis, 318 N.C. 370, 376, 348 S.E.2d 777, 781, (1986), a child testified she had been raped by two men on the same day, and our Supreme Court held that it was error to exclude evidence of the second rape in the defendant\u2019s trial. Additionally, our Court held in State v. Wright, 98 N.C. App. 658, 662, 392 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1990), that it was error for the trial court to exclude evidence that the child victim masturbated with a washcloth and her fingers, when this would have been an alternative explanation for the child\u2019s red and irritated genitalia.\nUnlike in Ollis and Wright, the excluded evidence in the case before us is insufficient to establish an alternative explanation for the physical findings in S.A.\u2019s vaginal area. The evidence of sexual abuse of S.A. by her grandfather tended to show that S.A.\u2019s grandfather had kissed S.A., but there was no evidence of abuse to S.A.\u2019s vaginal area by her grandfather. The only evidence of S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s abuse that could have provided an alternative explanation for the notching on S.A.\u2019s vaginal area was the evidence that Ms. Adu found blood on S.A.\u2019s panties and on S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s underwear. However, Ms. Adu testified that the blood stain on S.A.\u2019s panties was from S.A.\u2019s period and the stain on S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s underwear was from a boil on his buttocks. Defendant presented no other evidence to refute Ms. Adu\u2019s testimony as to the stains. Accordingly, the evidence of the stains on S.A.\u2019s panties and S.A.\u2019s grandfather\u2019s underwear do not provide any evidence that the abuse by S.A.\u2019s grandfather involved penetration. Thus, S.A.\u2019s abuse by her grandfather would not have provided an alternative explanation for the notching on S.A.\u2019s vaginal area and was properly excluded pursuant to Rule 412. Defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question Defendant about his failure to make a statement to law enforcement and in allowing the State to reference Defendant\u2019s silence in the State\u2019s closing argument. We agree. However, we hold that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn State v. Boston, 191 N.C. App. 637, 651-52, 663 S.E.2d 886, 896 (2008), our Court held that a defendant\u2019s silence could not be used as substantive evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt. In Boston and Satterwhite, the defendants were convicted of first-degree arson after the defendants and an accomplice set fire to a house. Id. at 640-41, 663 S.E.2d at 889-90. The trial court overruled defendant Boston\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s questioning of the accomplice about Boston\u2019s failure to submit to police questioning prior to Boston\u2019s arrest. Id. at 646-47, 663 S.E.2d at 893. We held that although the trial court erred in allowing the use of Boston\u2019s silence as substantive evidence of her guilt, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 653-54, 663 S.E.2d at 897.\nIn the present case, the State argues that the references the State made at trial about Defendant\u2019s silence were used solely for impeachment purposes and not as substantive evidence of Defendant\u2019s guilt. However, the State also asked:\nIf [Defendant] didn\u2019t do anything, why didn\u2019t he tell [Ms. Adu] that when she first told him? Remember, she said he didn\u2019t deny it? He didn\u2019t really fully admit it, but he didn\u2019t deny it. And when he went to Pastor Longobardo, he didn\u2019t say, \u201cI absolutely did not do this.\u201d When he saw Sheronda Harris, he didn\u2019t say, \u201cI did not do this.\u201d Why didn\u2019t he go and talk to Detective Hines when she offered him the opportunity to tell his side of the story?\nSimilar references by the State to a defendant\u2019s silence during closing arguments have been held to violate a defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. Amend. V. In State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 266, 555 S.E.2d 251, 273 (2001), the State referenced the defendant\u2019s post-arrest silence after the defendant was convicted of felony murder during sentencing arguments to the jury. The State used the defendant\u2019s silence in an attempt to prove the defendant had the mental capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions. Id. The State argued the following to the jury:\nHe started out that he was with his wife and child or wife and children or something that morning. We know he could talk, but he decided just to sit quietly. He didn\u2019t want to say anything that would \u201cincriminate himself.\u201d So he appreciated the criminality of his conduct all right.\nWard, 354 N.C. at 266, 555 S.E.2d at 273. Our Supreme Court held that the above comments on the defendant\u2019s silence violated the defendant\u2019s rights under both the N.C. and U.S. Constitutions. Id.\nIn State v. Hoyle, 325 N.C. 232, 382 S.E.2d 752 (1989), the defendant was on trial for first-degree murder and argued that he had acted in self-defense. The State made the following statement in its closing argument:\nWho said anything, until yesterday, about [the victim] having grabbed his gun? Who? When was there an opportunity to say that? For months and that night. You think what you would do. If somebody had severely beaten you, if somebody had caused you to think that you had to defend yourself, if somebody had struggled with you over a gun and had accidently shot themselves, don\u2019t you think, when the police were there and polite and nice and trying to get to the truth . . . don\u2019t you think you would tell him then?\nId. at 236, 382 S.E.2d at 754. Our Supreme Court held that the State\u2019s use of the defendant\u2019s silence violated the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to remain silent. Id. at 236-37, 382 S.E.2d at 754.\nIn State v. Shores, 155 N.C. App. 342, 573 S.E.2d 237, (2002), our Court granted the defendant a new trial and held that the State impermissibly questioned why the defendant, charged with second-degree murder and claiming self-defense, had failed to tell anyone prior to testifying at trial that the victim had threatened his life. Id. at 351-52, 573 S.E.2d at 242-43. The State in Shores made the following statement during its closing argument:\nLadies and gentleman of the jury, what would be wrong when you\u2019re represented by a lawyer [with] calling up the police or having the lawyer call them up and say \u201clet me tell you some more, let me tell you the rest of this?\u201d He didn\u2019t do that. He didn\u2019t call the DA\u2019s office. He didn\u2019t call any police officer. He didn\u2019t call the investigating officer. He didn\u2019t do any of that. Right on that stand he said \u201cI have told this story for the first time today other than [to] my lawyers.\u201d\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, ask yourself now \u201cwhy on earth would I wait until now to try to tell that story if I had that kind of story? Why would I do that?\u201d\nShores, 155 N.C. App. at 348, 573 S.E.2d at 240.\nAs in Hoyle, Ward, and Shores, the State in this case referenced Defendant\u2019s silence to insinuate that an innocent man would have freely spoken with Detective Hines, and that Defendant\u2019s failure to do so permitted an inference of guilt. We hold the State\u2019s comments during its closing argument violated Defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.\nThe State argues that even if it was error to allow the State to question Defendant about his lack of statements to law enforcement, and to mention this failure during closing arguments, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. \u201cA violation of the [defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2007). In Boston and Satterwhite, our Court set forth several factors to be considered in determining whether the constitutional error of using a defendant\u2019s silence as substantive evidence of guilt was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Boston, 191 N.C. App. at 651-52, 663 S.E.2d at 896. These factors included\nwhether the State\u2019s other evidence of guilt was substantial; whether the State emphasized the fact of [the defendant\u2019s] silence throughout the trial; whether the State attempted to capitalize on [the defendant\u2019s] silence; whether the State commented on [the defendant\u2019s] silence during closing argument; whether the reference to [the defendant\u2019s] silence was merely benign or de minimis-, and whether the State solicited the testimony at issue.\nId. at 652-53, 663 S.E.2d at 896-97.\nIn applying these factors to the present case, we hold that the trial court\u2019s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to Defendant\u2019s silence, the State presented substantial evidence of Defendant\u2019s guilt based on S.A.\u2019s account of the events, as well as the results of Dr. Stanley\u2019s physical examination which she found to reveal a possible certainty of sexual maltreatment. Additionally, the State presented the testimony of Harris who testified that Defendant admitted to holding S.A.\u2019s breasts while wrestling and that Defendant had ended up on top of S.A. at one point. The State also presented the testimony of Pastor Longobardo who testified that Defendant told him he had had bodily contact with S.A.\nOther Boston and Satterwhite factors support the conclusion that the trial court\u2019s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. The State made mention of Defendant\u2019s silence to law enforcement briefly on two occasions during the trial but these references were de minimis. See id. Also, it does not appear from the record or the transcript that the State attempted to capitalize on Defendant\u2019s silence. See id.\nOnly two of the Boston and Satterwhite factors support a conclusion that the trial court\u2019s error was prejudicial: (1) the State referenced Defendant\u2019s silence to law enforcement during its closing argument, and (2) the State solicited Defendant\u2019s testimony regarding his silence. See id. However, having considered all of these factors, the State presented substantial evidence of Defendant\u2019s guilt other than Defendant\u2019s silence to law enforcement, and the error of referencing Defendant\u2019s silence was not prejudicial. Thus, we conclude \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same verdict even had the trial court disallowed the contested testimony.\u201d Id. at 653-54, 663 S.E.2d at 897.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges BRYANT and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson, for the State.", "Robert W. Ewing for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. YAW OSEI ADU\nNo. COA08-582\n(Filed 3 February 2009)\n1. Rape\u2014 statutory \u2014 physical findings \u2014 evidence of other abuse \u2014 insufficient for alternate explanation of physical findings \u2014 excluded\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution of the victim\u2019s stepfather for statutory rape and indecent liberties by excluding under the rape shield statute evidence of prior sexual abuse of the victim by her grandfather where the excluded evidence was insufficient to establish an alternate explanation for physical findings. N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 412.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to remain silent \u2014 questions concerning failure to make statement \u2014 closing argument\u2014 harmless error\nThere was harmless error in a prosecution for statutory rape and indecent liberties where the State was allowed to question defendant about his failure to make a statement to law enforcement and the State was allowed to reference defendant\u2019s silence in its closing argument. There was substantial other evidence of guilt.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 23 October 2007 by Judge John O. Craig, III in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson, for the State.\nRobert W. Ewing for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0269-01", "first_page_order": 301, "last_page_order": 310 }