{ "id": 4164237, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DUANE E. FIELDS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fields", "decision_date": "2009-03-17", "docket_number": "No. COA08-627", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "746", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 N.C. App. 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion when he stopped a vehicle to find out why it was traveling in an area with a history of break-ins" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631245, 12631246 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0199-02", "/se2d/594/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631246, 12631314, 12631219, 12631317, 12631319 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0199-01", "/se2d/596/0016-03", "/se2d/594/0032-01", "/se2d/596/0017-01", "/se2d/596/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640334, 12640335 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0281-01", "/se2d/656/0281-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640330, 12640331, 12640332, 12640333, 12640334, 12640211, 12640351 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0279-02", "/se2d/656/0280-01", "/se2d/656/0280-02", "/se2d/656/0280-03", "/se2d/656/0281-01", "/se2d/655/0406-01", "/se2d/656/0592-02" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639267 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045986 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-39" }, { "page": "171-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 P.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4414851 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/119/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. 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App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527353 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "weaving within lane, plus driving only forty-five miles per hour on the interstate" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160748 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308673, 5304354, 5305838, 5307792, 5307378 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0366-01", "/nc/326/0366-02", "/nc/326/0366-05", "/nc/326/0366-04", "/nc/326/0366-03" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" }, { "parenthetical": "weaving towards both sides of the lane, plus driving twenty miles per hour below the speed limit" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915624 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" }, { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212517 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 756, "char_count": 14330, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6657523105569264e-07, "percentile": 0.6951455470956028 }, "sha256": "3a0dfc1320d037b950ed92cbfe442fd5ab11cee085f86d92f6de03f688d6a0e9", "simhash": "1:61cb9229fe6a1c4f", "word_count": 2311 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.117771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DUANE E. FIELDS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nDuane Edward Fields (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from an order of the trial court that denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. For reasons discussed herein, we reverse.\nI. Background\nAt approximately 4:00 p.m. on 19 May 2005, Detective Heath Little (\u201cDetective Little\u201d) of the Columbus County Sheriff\u2019s Office Drug Enforcement Unit was patrolling Highway 74 when he observed defendant\u2019s car. Detective Little followed defendant\u2019s car for approximately one and a half miles. On three separate occasions, Detective Little saw defendant\u2019s car swerve to the white line on the right side of the traffic lane.\nDue to defendant\u2019s weaving, Detective Little stopped the car under suspicion of driving while impaired. When Detective Little approached defendant\u2019s car, defendant produced his license and registration. Detective Little asked defendant if he had consumed any alcohol. Defendant responded that he had not and pointed to a bottle of Gatorade he had been drinking. Detective Little did not smell aleohol or observe anything in defendant\u2019s car to indicate illegal activity. Detective Little then went back to his vehicle to verify defendant\u2019s license and registration through the police radio.\nApproximately five minutes later, Detective Little returned defendant\u2019s license and registration and observed what appeared to be a pack of rolling papers in the console of the driver\u2019s side door. When he asked defendant what the item was, defendant produced a cover to a pack of rolling papers. Detective Little then asked defendant if there was anything illegal in his vehicle and defendant stated there was not. At trial, Detective Little testified that defendant consented to the search of his car, while defendant testified that Detective Little never asked for his consent. The trial court made a factual finding in its 14 February 2006 order that defendant had consented to the search. While searching defendant\u2019s car, Detective Little recovered 112 grams of marijuana and 124 grams of cocaine in the glove compartment. Defendant was then under arrest.\nDefendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine by transport in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3). On 14 November 2005, defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that the initial stop of his vehicle was unreasonable and that all evidence obtained as a result of that stop should be suppressed. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and concluded that the initial stop of defendant\u2019s car was based on reasonable suspicion and that the amount of time defendant was detained was not unreasonable. Defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine by transportation, pursuant to State v. Alford, and reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Defendant was sentenced to 12 to 15 months\u2019 imprisonment and has remained on bond pending this appeal.\nII. Issues\nDefendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress on the grounds that (1) the initial stop of defendant\u2019s car was not based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity and (2) the length of defendant\u2019s detention was unreasonable.\nIII. Standard of Review\nWhen reviewing a motion to suppress, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive and binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. State v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 702, 649 S.E.2d 646, 648, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 89, 656 S.E.2d 281 (2007). We review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Id.\nIV. Motion to Suppress Evidence\nOn appeal, defendant renews his contention that Detective Little did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping his car. Defendant does not assign error to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, and therefore, these findings are binding on this Court. State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-36, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 240, 594 S.E.2d 199 (2004). Defendant challenges the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that a reasonable suspicion existed to stop his vehicle, arguing that the findings of fact do not support this conclusion. We agree with defendant and therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying the motion to suppress.\nOur federal and state constitutions protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 20. Seizures include brief investigatory detentions, such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69-70 (1994). \u201cTraffic stops have \u2018been historically reviewed under the investigatory detention framework first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).\u2019 \u201d State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (citation omitted). If the investigatory seizure is invalid, evidence resulting from the warrantless stop is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule in both' our federal and state constitutions. State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 394, 386 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1989), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990).\nOur Supreme Court has held that an investigatory stop must be justified by a \u201c \u2018reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.\u2019 \u201d Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000)). Reasonable suspicion is a \u201cless demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence].]\u201d Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 576. \u201cThe stop must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.\u201d Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441-42, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906). A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable suspicion existed. State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (citations omitted), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008).\nThe requisite degree of suspicion must be high enough \u201cto assure that an individual\u2019s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.\u201d State v. Murray, 192 N.C. App. 684, 687, 666 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2008). A police officer must develop more than an \u201cunparticularized suspicion or hunch\u201d before he or she is justified in conducting an investigatory stop. See id. (holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion when he stopped a vehicle to find out why it was traveling in an area with a history of break-ins).\nWe have previously held that weaving can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired. However, in each instance, the defendant\u2019s weaving was coupled with additional specific articulable facts, which also indicated that the defendant was driving while impaired. See, e.g., State v. Aubin, 100 N.C. App. 628, 397 S.E.2d 653 (1990) (weaving within lane, plus driving only forty-five miles per hour on the interstate), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 334, 402 S.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842, 116 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1991); State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989) (weaving towards both sides of the lane, plus driving twenty miles per hour below the speed limit), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990); State v. Adkerson, 90 N.C. App. 333, 368 S.E.2d 434 (1988) (weaving within lane five to six times, plus driving off the road); State v. Thompson, 154 N.C. App. 194, 571 S.E.2d 673 (2002) (weaving within lane, plus exceeding the speed limit).\nWhen determining if reasonable suspicion exists under the totality of circumstances, a police officer may also evaluate factors such as traveling at an unusual hour or driving in an area with drinking establishments. In State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251, 255, 590 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2004), the defendant was weaving within his lane and touching the designated lane markers on each side of the road. We concluded that the defendant\u2019s weaving combined with the fact that he was driving at 1:43 a.m. in an area near bars was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired. Id. Similarly, we found that the facts in State v. Watson, 122 N.C. App. 596, 599-600, 472 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1996), established a reasonable suspicion, due to the fact that the defendant was weaving within his lane and driving on the dividing line of the highway at 2:30 a.m. on a road near a nightclub.\nIn order to preserve an individual\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights, it is of the utmost importance that we recognize that the presence of any one of these factors is not, by itself, proof of any illegal conduct and is often quite consistent with innocent travel. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11 (1989). It is only when these factors are \u201ctaken together [that] they amount to reasonable suspicion.\u201d Id. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court stated:\nThe scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. . . . Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights .... [S]imple \u201c \u2018good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.\u2019 ... If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be \u2018secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,\u2019 only in the discretion of the police.\u201d\nTerry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 (citations omitted).\nIn Roberson, 163 N.C. App. at 135, 592 S.E.2d at 737, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s order that granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The defendant in Roberson delayed proceeding through a. traffic light for approximately eight-to-ten seconds upon the light turning green. Although the incident occurred at 4:30 a.m. in an area of town where several bars were located, we held that those factors viewed collectively did not create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. We adopted the following reasoning of the Idaho Court of Appeals:\nIn this case, the officer relied upon his prior training which suggested that forty percent of all people who make a delayed response to a traffic signal are driving while under the influence of alcohol. However, such inferences must still be evaluated against the backdrop of everyday driving experience. It is self-evident that motorists often pause at a stop sign or traffic light when their attention is distracted or preoccupied by outside influences.\nId. at 134; 592 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting State v. Emory, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (1991)).\nSimilarly, we hold that defendant\u2019s weaving within his lane, standing alone, is insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. To hold otherwise would extend the grounds for reasonable suspicion farther than our Courts ever have. The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances in Jacobs and Watson. Here, Detective Little did not observe defendant violating any laws such as driving above or significantly below the speed limit. Furthermore, defendant was stopped at approximately 4:00 p.m., which is not an unusual hour, and there was no evidence that defendant was near any places to purchase alcohol. The totality of circumstances do not give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. Thus, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we need not address whether the length of defendant\u2019s detention was unreasonable.\nV. Conclusion\nBased on the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges McGEE and JACKSON concur.\n. In State v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), the Court held that a defendant may enter a guilty plea containing a protestation of innocence when the defendant intelligently concludes that a guilty plea is in his best interest and the record contains strong evidence of actual guilt. Id. at 37-39, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 171-72.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Grady L. Balentine, Jr., for the State.", "Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DUANE E. FIELDS, Defendant\nNo. COA08-627\n(Filed 17 March 2009)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 traffic stop\u2014motion to suppress evidence\u2014lack of reasonable suspicion\nThe trial court erred in a trafficking in cocaine by transportation case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop based on suspicion of driving while impaired due to defendant\u2019s weaving his vehicle because: (1) although the Court of Appeals has previously held that weaving can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired, it is usually coupled with additional specific articulable facts to also indicate that defendant was driving while impaired; (2) defendant\u2019s weaving within his lane, standing alone, was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol; and (3) the totality of circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle when the detective did not observe defendant violating any laws such as driving above or significantly below the speed limit, defendant was stopped at approximately 4:00 pm which was not an unusual hour, and there was no evidence that defendant was near any places to purchase alcohol.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 14 February 2006 by Judge William C. Gore, Jr., in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 January 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Grady L. Balentine, Jr., for the State.\nRudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 772, "last_page_order": 778 }