{ "id": 4165839, "name": "LARRY W. PIGG, and wife, GLORIA VANDIVER, Plaintiffs v. BOYD B. MASSAGEE, JR. and PRINCE, YOUNGBLOOD and MASSAGEE, Partnership, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Pigg v. Massagee", "decision_date": "2009-04-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1270", "first_page": "348", "last_page": "351", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "196 N.C. App. 348" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633957, 12633958, 12633959 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. 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Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640633, 12640634, 12640635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0483-01", "/se2d/658/0483-02", "/se2d/658/0483-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640552 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0663-04" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639755, 12639756, 12639757, 12639758, 12639759, 12639760, 12639761, 12639762, 12639763, 12639764, 12639765, 12639766, 12639767, 12639768, 12639769, 12639770, 12639771, 12639772 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0071-10", "/se2d/652/0071-01", "/se2d/652/0071-02", "/se2d/652/0071-03", "/se2d/652/0071-04", "/se2d/652/0071-05", "/se2d/652/0071-06", "/se2d/652/0071-07", "/se2d/652/0071-08", "/se2d/652/0071-09", "/se2d/652/0071-11", "/se2d/652/0071-01", "/se2d/652/0071-02", "/se2d/652/0071-03", "/se2d/652/0071-04", "/se2d/652/0071-05", "/se2d/652/0071-01", "/se2d/652/0071-02" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634634, 12634635, 12634636, 12634637, 12634638, 12634639, 12634640, 12634641, 12634642, 12634643, 12634644, 12634645, 12634646, 12634647, 12634648, 12634649, 12634650, 12634651, 12634652, 12634653, 12634654 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0368-11", "/se2d/623/0368-01", "/se2d/623/0368-02", "/se2d/623/0368-03", "/se2d/623/0368-04", "/se2d/623/0368-05", "/se2d/623/0368-06", "/se2d/623/0368-07", "/se2d/623/0368-08", "/se2d/623/0368-09", "/se2d/623/0368-10", "/se2d/623/0368-14", "/se2d/623/0368-12", "/se2d/623/0368-13", "/se2d/623/0368-15", "/se2d/623/0368-16", "/se2d/623/0368-17", "/se2d/623/0368-18", "/se2d/623/0368-19", "/se2d/623/0368-20", "/se2d/623/0368-21" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788265 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470441 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738344 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.E. 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269648 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "\"An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "\"An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007 WL 3256828", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*2" }, { "page": "*1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006 WL 10918", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 439, "char_count": 8157, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13609557931755867 }, "sha256": "8fa38812ddf9737549d1360ac73ac7522574f0d2ff272d935dd712e5b4b7d7e3", "simhash": "1:050cc47b440f34ff", "word_count": 1331 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:58.268450+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JACKSON, STEPHENS, and STROUD." ], "parties": [ "LARRY W. PIGG, and wife, GLORIA VANDIVER, Plaintiffs v. BOYD B. MASSAGEE, JR. and PRINCE, YOUNGBLOOD and MASSAGEE, Partnership, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nLarry W. Pigg and his wife, Gloria Vandiver, (together, \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) appeal from an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for relief from judgment in a collateral matter. Boyd B. Massagee, Jr. (\u201cdefendant\u201d) and the partnership, Prince, Youngblood & Massagee, (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d) have moved this Court to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 appeal and to enter sanctions against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also have moved this Court to grant sanctions against defendants. For the reasons set forth below, we deny plaintiffs\u2019 motion, grant defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 appeal, and remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing on sanctions to be entered against plaintiffs.\nIn addition to the relevant procedural facts set forth below, we note that in Etter v. Pigg, 175 N.C. App. 419, 623 S.E.2d 368, 2006 WL 10918 (2006) (unpublished) (\u201cEtter I\u201d) and Etter v. Pigg, 186 N.C. App. 679, 652 S.E.2d 71, 2007 WL 3256828 (2007) (unpublished) \"Etter II\"), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 176, 658 S.E.2d 483 (2008), plaintiffs previously were the respondents in a collateral matter relating to a property line dispute. Although plaintiffs proceeded pro se throughout most of the Etter litigation at both the trial and appellate levels, defendants represented plaintiffs by filing a response and counterclaim at the beginning of the Etter v. Pigg property line dispute.\nOn 23 October 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants seeking relief for defendants\u2019 alleged (1) professional negligence, (2) breach of implied contract, and (3) partnership liability for the individual defendant\u2019s actions. On 16 June 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 for relief from a final judgment entered on 5 June 2006. On 24 June 2008, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion. On 22 July 2008, plaintiffs appealed from an order denying their motion. On 20 November 2008, defendants moved this Court to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 frivolous appeal and to enter sanctions against plaintiffs. On 25 November 2008, plaintiffs in turn moved this Court to grant sanctions against defendants.\nInitially, we hold that the trial court\u2019s order entered on 24 July 2008 is interlocutory in that it does not dispose of the entire case. See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (\u201cAn interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d) (citing Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194, 88 S.E. 231 (1916)). Such orders ordinarily are not immediately appealable. Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). However, when \u201c(1) the order represents a final judgment as to one or more claims in a multiple claim lawsuit or one or' more parties in a multi-party lawsuit,\u201d and (2) the trial court certifies that \u201cthere is no just reason to delay the appeal,\u201d Rule 54 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure permits an immediate appeal. Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 269 n.1, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569 (2007) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b)).\nAppellants have the' burden of showing that an appeal is proper. Johnson v. Lucas, 168 N.C. App. 515, 518, 608 S.E.2d 336, 338, aff\u2019d, 360 N.C. 53, 619 S.E.2d 502 (per curiam) (2005). When an appeal is from an interlocutory order, \u201cthe appellants] must include in [their] statement of grounds for appellate review \u2018sufficient facts and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects a substantial right.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4)). However, the appellants must do more than merely assert that the order affects a substantial right; they must show why the order affects a substantial right. Id. \u201cWhere the appellant fails to carry the burden of making such a showing to the [C]ourt, the appeal will be dismissed.\u201d Id. (citing Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994)).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiffs assert that their appeal follows from a final judgment of the superior court pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7A-27(b). Notwithstanding plaintiff\u2019s bald assertion, the trial court\u2019s order denying plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 60(b) motion does not contain a certification pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54, and plaintiffs\u2019 brief does not address (1) why there is no just reason to delay the appeal, or (2) what substantial right will be lost absent immediate appeal. \u201cIt is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellants\u2019] right to appeal from an interlocutory order[.]\u201d Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994). Because plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing this Court that this appeal is properly before us, we grant defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss this appeal as interlocutory.\nWith regard to defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions, we note that plaintiffs\u2019 motion was made pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(4) to set aside a purportedly void judgment in a collateral matter. Plaintiffs argue that the underlying judgment was void for failure to join necessary parties in the previously litigated property dispute resolved in Etter I and Etter II. However, in Etter II we squarely addressed this issue and held that the purportedly necessary parties, the Fosters, other neighbors whose land also adjoined the Etters\u2019 property, were not necessary parties. See Etter II, 186 N.C. App. 679, 652 S.E.2d 71, 2007 WL 3256828 at *2. Our Supreme Court subsequently denied plaintiffs\u2019 petition for discretionary review. See Etter v. Pigg, 362 N.C. 176, 658 S.E.2d 483.\nWe view this appeal as a transparent attempt to re-litigate prior orders from several trial courts, prior opinions of this Court, and an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 previous petition for discretionary review by the Supreme Court. Although we do not wish to discourage legitimate efforts to seek a just result pursuant to the laws of the State, we are satisfied upon a thorough review of the record and our prior opinions that the same theory posited by plaintiffs in the case sub judice already has been vetted and held to be unpersuasive and incorrect. Accordingly, we grant defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and remand the matter for a hearing on sanctions pursuant to Rule 34(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.C. R. App. P. 34(c) (2007).\nDismissed; Remanded for hearing on sanctions.\nPanel consisting of:\nJudges JACKSON, STEPHENS, and STROUD.\n. The final judgment entered 5 June 2006 was entered with respect to the prior Etter v. Pigg proceedings rather than the current Pigg v. Massagee lawsuit. See Etter II, 186 N.C. App. 679, 652 S.E.2d 71, 2007 WL 3256828 at *1.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gloria A. Vandiver and Larry W. Pigg, Pro se, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "No brief, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LARRY W. PIGG, and wife, GLORIA VANDIVER, Plaintiffs v. BOYD B. MASSAGEE, JR. and PRINCE, YOUNGBLOOD and MASSAGEE, Partnership, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1270\n(Filed 7 April 2009)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of Rnle 60 motion\nAn appeal was dismissed as interlocutory where the order appealed from was a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, did not contain a certification, and the brief did not address why there was no just reason for delay or the substantial right that would be lost without immediate appeal.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 sanctions \u2014 attempt to re-litigate\nA motion for sanctions against plaintiff was granted on appeal where the appeal was a transparent attempt to re-litigate prior orders from several trial courts, prior appellate opinions, and an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 previous petition for discretionary review by the Supreme Court.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 24 June 2008 by Judge John W. Smith in Henderson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 March 2009.\nGloria A. Vandiver and Larry W. Pigg, Pro se, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nNo brief, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0348-01", "first_page_order": 376, "last_page_order": 379 }