{ "id": 4166195, "name": "CITY OF DURHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORPORATION and UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "City of Durham v. Safety National Casualty Corp.", "decision_date": "2009-05-05", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1149", "first_page": "761", "last_page": "765", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "196 N.C. App. 761" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634918 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629230 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362-63", "parenthetical": "quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689159 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527207 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749751 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 N.C. App. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519472 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/56/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790975 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0280-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 526, "char_count": 10450, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.30814904652742303 }, "sha256": "7ef3a8cee70317c3db4d1dc300b31f59e7090e12ac11c3fccb40bcbedbeb5dbf", "simhash": "1:9be9c2461f63acb0", "word_count": 1622 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:58.268450+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "CITY OF DURHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORPORATION and UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nThe City of Durham (Plaintiff) filed an action for declaratory judgment and monetary relief against Defendant and United States Fire Insurance Company (USFIC) on 20 October 2006. The purpose of the action was to determine which of Defendant\u2019s insurance carriers was liable to Plaintiff for excess loss coverage on a workers\u2019 compensation claim made by Margie Pulley (Pulley), a former police officer with the City of Durham.\nDefendant and USFIC filed cross-motions for summary judgment in November 2007. In an order entered 11 February 2008, the trial court granted USFIC\u2019s motion for summary judgment. It further denied Defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion and granted Plaintiff summary judgment against Defendant on the issue of liability under its policy for excess loss coverage. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking entry of a money judgment against Defendant on 6 May 2008. In an order entered 7 July 2008, the trial court granted Plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals.'\nThe relevant facts underlying Pulley\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim are as follows: Pulley began working for Plaintiff in November 1975. At that time, Pulley was the only female public safety officer employed by Plaintiff. While working in the Youth Division from 1980 to 1984, Pulley was repeatedly exposed to traumatic situations, particularly crimes involving child sexual abuse. Pulley began mental health treatment in July 1984 for psychological difficulties she was-experiencing as a result of her employment. Pulley took a three-month medical leave of absence from work as recommended by her psychologist in August 1984. Pulley was transferred to the Records Division in 1986 and was promoted to acting lieutenant for a brief period in 1987. Pulley transferred to the Warrants Division in 1987 and to the Traffic Division in 1988. Pulley took another medical leave of absence in April 1989. When Pulley\u2019s medical leave expired, she was not able to return to work. Pulley\u2019s application for disability retirement was approved in October 1989. Plaintiff filed an employer\u2019s report of injury with the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) on 13 April 1989: The Commission entered an opinion and award granting Pulley temporary total disability compensation benefits beginning 30 April 1989.\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to Defendant. Defendant contends the trial court misapplied the circumstances of Pulley\u2019s underlying workers\u2019 compensation claim to the express terms of Defendant\u2019s insurance policy and incorrectly applied the doctrine of last injurious exposure.\nSummary judgment is properly granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). We review an order allowing summary judgment de novo. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 285, 624 S.E.2d 620, 625 (2006) (citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)).\nPlaintiff had excess workers\u2019 compensation insurance from 1 August 1986 through 1 September 1993 through a policy issued by Defendant. Defendant\u2019s policy provided coverage for loss incurred by Plaintiff above a specified retention level, if the loss resulted from an \u201coccurrence.\u201d Defendant\u2019s policy defined \u201coccurrence\u201d as: \u201cOccupational disease sustained by each Employee shall be deemed to . . . tak[e] place upon the date the Employee ceases work as a result of such disease or upon the date established by the Workers\u2019 Compensation or Employers\u2019 Liability Laws of the appropriate jurisdiction.\u201d\nDefendant argues the word \u201cceases\u201d should be interpreted to include a temporary suspension from employment. Plaintiff argues \u201cceases\u201d should be interpreted only to a permanent termination of employment. However, we need not choose between the two interpretations of \u201cceases\u201d because the plain terms of the policy include \u201cthe date established by the Workers\u2019 Compensation . . . Laws\u201d as an alternative method for determining the date of the occurrence of Pulley\u2019s occupational disease.\nThe Commission\u2019s opinion and award ordered Plaintiff to pay weekly temporary total disability benefits to Pulley beginning 30 April 1989. This date, established by the Commission under North Carolina\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Laws, fell within the period Defendant provided excess insurance coverage to Plaintiff. Therefore, by the plain terms of Defendants policy, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff.\nHowever, Defendant argues we should consider the reason why the Commission established the date of disability as 30 April 1989. Defendant contends the only reason the Commission did not order benefits .to be paid to Pulley for the period between 8 July 1984 and 14 October 1984 was because Plaintiff and Pulley stipulated that Pulley had previously received payment for that time period. Defendant argues that the Commission\u2019s .decision read as a whole establishes Pulley\u2019s date of disability as 8 July 1984, outside the period Defendant provided insurance coverage to Plaintiff.\nHowever, even if the Commission\u2019s opinion and award established Pulley\u2019s date of disability as 8 July 1984, we hold the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of last injurious exposure (the doctrine) in finding Defendant liable to Plaintiff. The doctrine is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57 as:\nIn any case where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any, which was on the risk when the employee was so last exposed under such employer, shall be liable.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57 (2007).\nDefendant argues the trial court misapplied the doctrine. Defendant contends the doctrine should be applied by determining the date of disability and then looking backward in time to determine liability. However, Defendant cites no North Carolina case law to support its interpretation of the doctrine.\nThe purpose of the doctrine is \u201cto eliminate the need for complex and expensive litigation of the issue of relative contribution by each of several employments to a plaintiff\u2019s occupational disease.\u201d Frady v. Groves Thread, 56 N.C. App. 61, 64, 286 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1982), aff\u2019d per curiam, 312 N.C. 316, 321 S.E.2d 835 (1984). Our Court held in Caulder v. Waverly Mills that a \u201cplaintiff need only show (1) that he has a compensable occupational disease and (2) that he was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease while in [the] defendant\u2019s employment.\u201d Caulder v. Waverly Mills, 67 N.C. App. 739, 741, 314 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1984), aff\u2019d, 314 N.C. 70, 331 S.E.2d 646 (1985). Our Supreme Court interpreted the phrase \u201clast injuriously exposed\u201d to mean \u201c \u2018an. exposure which proximately augmented the disease to any extent, however slight.\u2019 \u201d Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 89, 301 S.E.2d 359, 362-63 (1983) (quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942)).\nIn the present case, Pulley\u2019s mental health began deteriorating in 1984 due to her employment stress. However, her employment stress did not cause her to be permanently unable to work at that time. Pulley continued working for Plaintiff and continued experiencing work-related stress for five years, until April 1989. Pulley\u2019s condition worsened after she transferred out of the Youth Division in 1986. Pulley was \u201cunder significant pressure\u201d and had \u201cnumerous outbursts\u201d while working in the Records Division in 1986. Pulley was transferred to the Warrants Division in July 1987. Working in the Warrants Division \u201ccaused [Pulley] so much stress that [she] found it increasingly difficult to concentrate.\u201d While working in the Traffic Division from May 1988 until April 1989, Pulley became \u201cmore frustrated and angry\u201d and \u201c[i]t got to the point where, emotionally, [she] could no longer handle dealing with the public.\u201d Pulley stated: \u201cThe stress I was under due to my work environment finally got so bad that, in April 1989,1 was no longer able to work in any capacity.\u201d\nPulley continued to be \u201cexposed to the hazards\u201d of her occupational disease throughout her employment with Plaintiff until April 1989 when she was unable to continue working in any capacity. Therefore, because Defendant provided excess insurance coverage to Plaintiff in April 1989, we find the trial court correctly applied the doctrine in holding Defendant liable to Plaintiff. We affirm the trial court\u2019s granting of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennon, Graver, Belo, Craig & McKee, PLLC, by Joel M. Craig and Henry W. Sappenfield, for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Robinson & Lawing, L.L.P., by Jane C. Jackson and W. Mark Peck, for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CITY OF DURHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORPORATION and UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellants\nNo. COA08-1149\n(Filed 5 May 2009)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 excess loss coverage \u2014 date of disability\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action to determine which of two insurance carriers was liable for excess loss coverage on a workers\u2019 compensation claim by a police officer suffering from occupational stress. Although the officer had taken an earlier leave of absence, the plain terms of def\u00e9ndant\u2019s policy allow the date of the occurrence of the occupational disease to be established by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Laws, and the Commission ordered plaintiff to pay disability benefits beginning on a date within the period of this defendant\u2019s policy. Moreover, even if the Commission\u2019s award established the date of disability as beginning with the leave of absence, when defendant\u2019s policy was not in effect, the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of last injurious exposure in finding defendant liable because the officer returned to work and continued to be exposed to the hazards of her occupational disease.\nAppeal by Safety National Casualty Corporation (Defendant) from judgments entered 11 February 2008 and 7 July 2008 by Judge A. Leon Stanback, Jr. in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 April 2009.\nKennon, Graver, Belo, Craig & McKee, PLLC, by Joel M. Craig and Henry W. Sappenfield, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nRobinson & Lawing, L.L.P., by Jane C. Jackson and W. Mark Peck, for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0761-01", "first_page_order": 789, "last_page_order": 793 }