{ "id": 4167655, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE BROOKS FOWLER, Dependant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fowler", "decision_date": "2009-05-19", "docket_number": "No. COA08-652", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "30", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525285 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749971 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 954", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6297538, 6296483, 6297031, 6298093, 6296725, 6297782, 6297302 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0954-05", "/us/426/0954-01", "/us/426/0954-03", "/us/426/0954-07", "/us/426/0954-02", "/us/426/0954-06", "/us/426/0954-04" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179579 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 1030", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108204 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075", "parenthetical": "right to be tried before impartial jurors" }, { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "right to be tried before impartial jurors" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/1030-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "recognizing that a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is \"fundamental\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497445 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "recognizing that a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is \"fundamental\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 L. Ed. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441214 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "citing Clark v. Sanger Clinic, P.A., 142 N.C. App. 350, 542 S.E.2d 668, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 450, 548 S.E.2d 524 (2001)" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250810 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "citing Clark v. Sanger Clinic, P.A., 142 N.C. App. 350, 542 S.E.2d 668, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 450, 548 S.E.2d 524 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 545", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299646 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571708 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566577 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 L. Ed. 2d 666", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9441, 9507, 9667, 9669, 9577, 9484 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/1002-06", "/us/422/1002-05", "/us/422/1002-02", "/us/422/1002-01", "/us/422/1002-04", "/us/422/1002-03" ] }, { "cite": "211 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566789 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571662 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080148 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3735905, 3743043, 3746508, 3743410, 3738611, 3744404, 3735988, 3737112, 3740671 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0703-04", "/nc/361/0703-05", "/nc/361/0703-03", "/nc/361/0703-06", "/nc/361/0703-07", "/nc/361/0703-09", "/nc/361/0703-01", "/nc/361/0703-02", "/nc/361/0703-08" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209211 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12126181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12401 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550182, 2549415, 2549431, 2549882, 2549179 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0805-05", "/nc/337/0805-04", "/nc/337/0805-02", "/nc/337/0805-01", "/nc/337/0805-03" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12135816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156491 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" }, { "page": "720" }, { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11792739 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 470", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047837 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627279 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522121 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" }, { "page": "864" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2496608 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "\"The Legislature, within constitutional limitations, can fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11298486 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "\"The Legislature, within constitutional limitations, can fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553301 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" }, { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625444 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" }, { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545728 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "citing Wayne Cty. Citizens Ass'n v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311 (1991)" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525941 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "citing Wayne Cty. Citizens Ass'n v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311 (1991)" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2058.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)", "parenthetical": "providing that the district 'court \"judge shall not enter a final judgment on the motion until after the State has appealed to superior court or has indicated it does not intend to appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1178, 1180-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 900", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 893", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" }, { "page": "893-94" }, { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "\"The defendant may move to suppress evidence or dismiss charges only prior to trial, except the defendant may move to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all of the evidence without prior notice.\"" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "\"If, during the course of the trial, the defendant discovers facts not previously known, a motion to suppress or dismiss may be made during the trial.\"" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1180", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "amended 2007 and 2008" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E. 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607955 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564204 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" }, { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "466-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628180 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512304 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572258, 8572196, 8572230, 8572173, 8572284 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0731-04", "/nc/304/0731-02", "/nc/304/0731-03", "/nc/304/0731-01", "/nc/304/0731-05" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 173", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522235 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8438167 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520-21" }, { "page": "518-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1849, "char_count": 73047, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9131722138343516e-07, "percentile": 0.8459624480037253 }, "sha256": "b388d9b08f3f88b208495cd932bdb78e7946c87d5ddbc11d2744cf01aeba03dc", "simhash": "1:ab0992f6060b1792", "word_count": 11859 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE BROOKS FOWLER, Dependant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nOn 2 January 2007, defendant Wayne Brooks Fowler was arrested for willfully operating a motor vehicle while subject to an impairing substance in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1. On 6 August 2007, defendant made a pretrial motion in district court in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) alleging that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.\nOn 9 October 2007, the Mecklenburg County District Court entered a Preliminary Finding Granting Pretrial Motion to Dismiss in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f). In its Preliminary Finding, after concluding that the arresting officer \u201cdid not possess probable cause to arrest and charge [defendant with Driving While Impaired,\u201d and that \u201ca reasonable person, in same or similar circumstances could not believe the [defendant guilty of Driving While Impaired,\u201d the district court made the preliminary finding that it would grant defendant\u2019s motion and dismiss the charges against him for lack of probable cause.\nThe State gave notice of appeal to superior court from the district court\u2019s Preliminary Finding pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a). The State\u2019s appeal was heard in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. On 15 January 2008, the superior court entered its Order in which it found that the district court\u2019s \u201cConclusions of Law granting the motion to dismiss are based upon the Findings of Fact that are cited in [its] order.\u201d The Order further concluded that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6 and 20-38.7 \u2014 which \u201callow[ed] the State to appeal the [district [c]ourt determination on [defendant's motion to dismiss based on a lack of probable cause\u201d \u2014 violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions, the Former Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 3 and Article IV, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution. The superior court remanded the matter to district court \u201cfor the entry of an order consistent with th[e superior c]ourt\u2019s findings.\u201d The State gave notice of appeal to this Court and certified that the appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari on 10 June 2008, and defendant filed a motion to dismiss on 30 October 2008.\nIn considering whether this appeal is properly before us, we are guided by two well-established principles. First, \u201c[t]he [S]tate\u2019s right of appeal in a criminal proceeding is entirely statutory; it had no such right at the common law. [Accordingly, statutes granting a right of appeal to the [S]tate must be strictly construed.\u201d State v. Murrell, 54 N.C. App. 342, 343, 283 S.E.2d 173, 173 (1981), disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 731, 288 S.E.2d 804 (1982). Second, \u201c[a]s a general rule, the appellate courts will not review interlocutory orders entered by a superior court in a criminal case.\u201d State v. Monroe, 330 N.C. 433, 436, 410 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1991); see also Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (\u201cAn interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d), reh\u2019g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). \u201cAn appeal from such [an] order will be dismissed unless the order affects some substantial right and will work injury to the appellant if not corrected before appeal from the final judgment.\u201d Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1949).\nIn the present case, the State concedes that the superior court\u2019s 15 January 2008 Order from which it appeals is interlocutory, and does not argue that it will suffer injury if its appeal is not heard prior to entry of a final judgment in this matter. Nevertheless, the State asserts that it is authorized to appeal the superior court\u2019s 15 January Order pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l). We disagree.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) provides that the State \u201cmay appeal from the superior court to the appellate division . . . [w]hen there has been a decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges as to one or more counts,\u201d provided that \u201cthe rule against double jeopardy [does not] prohibit]] further prosecution.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) (2007). Here, although the State concedes that the superior court\u2019s Order was not \u201ca decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges\u201d against defendant, see id. (emphasis added), the State asserts that it has a right of appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) because \u201cthe effect of the superior court\u2019s order [wa]s to dismiss the DWI charge whether or not the court pronounce[d] a dismissal per se.\u201d (Emphasis added.) However, since statutes authorizing an appeal by the State in a criminal case must be strictly construed, see State v. Harrell, 279 N.C. 464, 466-67, 183 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1971), we decline to extend the application of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) to grant the State a right of appeal to the Appellate Division from a superior court\u2019s interlocutory order which may have the same \u201ceffect\u201d of a final order but requires further action for finality. Therefore, we hold the State has no statutory right of appeal to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1445(a)(l) from the superior court\u2019s 15 January 2008 Order.\nThe State also asserts that it is authorized to appeal the superior court\u2019s 15 January Order pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) in pari materia with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e). Again, we disagree.\nWhen strictly construing a statute to determine whether it authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case, we must \u201cresort first to the words of the statute,\u201d and be certain to interpret the \u201cwords and phrases of a statute . . . contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute.\u201d See In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). Additionally, while \u201cthe caption [of a statute] will not be permitted to control when the meaning of the text is clear,\u201d \u201c[w]here the meaning of a statute is doubtful, its title may be called in aid of construction.\u201d Dunn v. Dunn, 199 N.C. 535, 536, 155 S.E. 165, 166 (1930). Further, \u201c[w]hen multiple statutes address a single subject, this Court construes them in pari materia to determine and effectuate the legislative intent.\u201d Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523-24, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998).\nThe title of the statute upon which the State relies as its authority to appeal the superior court\u2019s 15 January 2008 Order to this Court is \u201cAppeal to superior court.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7 (2007) (emphasis added). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) provides, in part: \u201cThe State may appeal to superior court any district court preliminary determination granting a motion to suppress or dismiss. . . . Any further appeal shall be governed, by Article 90 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) (emphasis added). In addition, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f), which was enacted pursuant to the same enabling legislation as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a), see Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006, ch. 253, \u00a7 5, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1180-83, provides that, when a district court judge \u201cpreliminarily indicates\u201d that a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress evidence or dismiss charges for an implied-consent offense made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) \u201cshould be granted, the judge shall not enter a final judgment on the motion until after the State has appealed to superior court or has indicated it does not intend to appeal.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6(f) (2007) (emphasis added). In other words, according to the plain language of the statutory subsection immediately preceding N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a), the prohibition regarding the district court\u2019s entry of a final judgment granting a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion applies only to the State\u2019s appeal to superior court.\nFurther, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432 provides, in part:\n(a) Unless the rule against double jeopardy prohibits further prosecution, the State .may appeal from the district court judge to the superior court:\n(1) When there has been a decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges as to one or more counts.\n(e) If the superior court finds that the order of the district court was correct, it must enter an order affirming the judgment of the district court. The State may appeal the order of the superior court to the appellate division upon certificate by the district attorney to the judge who affirmed the judgment that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l), (e) (2007) (emphasis added). In other words, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l) gives the State a statutory right of appeal to superior court from a district court\u2019s order dismissing criminal charges against a defendant, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) gives the State a statutory right of appeal to this Court from a superior court\u2019s order affirming a district court\u2019s dismissal. However, the statutory right of appeal conferred upon the State pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) is only a right of appeal to superior court from a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to dismiss or suppress.\nThus, we conclude that the General Assembly\u2019s reference to \u201c[a]ny further appeal\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) does not give the State a right of appeal to the Appellate Division pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a715A-1432(e) after the State has appealed from district court to superior court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a). Therefore, we hold the State has no statutory right of appeal to this Court from the superior court\u2019s 15 January 2008 interlocutory Order. Accordingly, we grant defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nNevertheless, this Court may issue a writ of certiorari \u201cwhen no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). Having determined that the State has no right of appeal from the superior court\u2019s 15 January 2008 interlocutory Order, in light of the substantial questions at issue here, we exercise our discretion to grant the State\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari.\nOn 4 December 2003, Governor Michael F. Easley signed Executive Order No. 54, entitled \u201cGovernor\u2019s Task Force on Driving While Impaired,\u201d which provided for the reestablishment of a task force to serve as an ad hoc committee of the Governor\u2019s Highway Safety Commission. Exec. Order No. 54, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 893-95. The preamble of the Executive Order provided the following rationale for the reestablishment of the Task Force:\nWHEREAS, the operation of motor vehicles on our highways by persons while impaired constitutes a serious threat to the health and safety of our citizens; and\nWHEREAS, a large portion of the fatal crashes on our highways are alcohol related; and the \u201cBooze It and Lose It\u201d program has made driving while impaired a major area of emphasis; and\nWHEREAS, the State of North Carolina must consider strong measures designed to deter and prevent the operation of motor vehicles by persons while impaired ....\nId. at 893. The Task Force \u2014 ordered to be composed of at most thirty-five members, including representatives of law enforcement, the Judicial Branch, and the General Assembly \u2014 was charged with the following responsibilities:\n(a) Review the General Statutes of North Carolina applicable to driving while impaired;\n(b) Review proposals in other states designed to deter driving while impaired;\n(c) Consider legislative proposals to the North Carolina General Assembly; [and]\n(d) Recommend actions to reduce driving while impaired ....\nId. at 893-94. The Task Force was further directed to present the Governor with a final report, at which time the Task Force would be dissolved. See id. at 894. This Executive Order was amended on 16 April 2004 by Executive Order No. 57, which allowed the Governor to designate three co-chairs of the Task Force; however, the underlying rationale and the responsibilities identified in Executive Order No. 54 remained unchanged. See Exec. Order No. 57, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 900-02.\nIn furtherance of its \u201cpurpose ... to make recommendations regarding how North Carolina\u2019s DWI system can be improved,\u201d and in keeping with the State\u2019s \u201chistory of being tough on impaired driving\u201d \u201cwith the aim of reducing impaired driving,\u201d the Task Force proposed \u201csolutions [to] specifically address the DWI arrest and all activities leading up to adjudication.\u201d See Governor\u2019s Task Force on Driving While Impaired, Final Report to Governor Michael F. Easley 7, 20 (Jan. 14, 2005) (hereinafter \u201cDWI Final Report\u201d). Among these solutions was its recommendation that \u201c[a] specific procedure should be developed to prevent dismissals related to delays in processing and by the defendant\u2019s lack of access to witnesses.\u201d See DWI Final Report at 21.\nHouse Bill 1048, which later became Session Law 2006-253, was introduced and filed on 31 March 2005 with the short title \u201cGovernor\u2019s DWI Task Force Recommendations\u201d during the 2005-2006 Session of the North Carolina General Assembly. As ratified and later signed into law on 21 August 2006, the \u201cMotor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006\u201d enumerated ten objectives said to address its purpose to establish \u201cmeasures designed to improve the safety of the motoring public of North Carolina.\u201d See Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006, ch. 253, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178.\nIn furtherance of the Act\u2019s objective to provide \u201cprocedures for investigating, arresting, charging, and judicial processing of impaired driving offenses,\u201d the General Assembly added Article 2D, entitled \u201cImplied-Consent Offense Procedures,\u201d to the \u201cMotor Vehicles\u201d chapter of the General Statutes. See id. at 1178, 1180-83. Within this Article, a draft of which appeared in the Final Report prepared by the Governor\u2019s Task Force on Driving While Impaired, see DWI Final Report at 60-63, the General Assembly codified N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6 and 20-38.7.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6, entitled \u201cMotions and district court procedure,\u201d provides:\n(a) The defendant may move to suppress evidence or dismiss charges only prior to trial, except the defendant may move to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all of the evidence without prior notice. If, during the course of the trial, the defendant discovers facts not previously known, a motion to suppress or dismiss may be made during the trial.\n(b) Upon a motion to suppress or dismiss the charges, other than at the close of the State\u2019s evidence or at the close of all the evidence, the State shall be granted reasonable time to procure witnesses or evidence and to conduct research required to defend against the motion.\n(c) The judge shall summarily grant the motion to suppress evidence if the State stipulates that the evidence sought to be suppressed will not be offered in evidence in any criminal action or proceeding against the defendant.\n(d) The judge may summarily deny the motion to suppress evidence if the defendant failed to make the motion pretrial when all material facts were known to the defendant.\n(e) If the motion is not determined summarily, the judge shall make the determination after a hearing and finding of facts. Testimony at the hearing shall be under oath.\n(f) The judge shall set forth in writing the findings of fact and conclusions of law and preliminarily indicate whether the motion should be granted or denied. If the judge preliminarily indicates the motion should be granted, the judge shall not enter a final judgment on the motion until after the State has appealed to superior court or has indicated it does not intend to appeal.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6. At the time defendant was alleged to have committed his offense, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7, entitled \u201cAppeal to superior court,\u201d provided as follows:\n(a) The State may appeal to superior court any district court preliminary determination granting a motion to suppress or dismiss. If there is a dispute about the findings of fact, the superior court shall not be bound by the findings of the district court but shall determine the matter de novo. Any further appeal shall be governed by Article 90 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.\n(b) The defendant may not appeal a denial of a pretrial motion to suppress or to dismiss but may appeal upon conviction as provided by law.\n(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 15A-1431, for any implied-consent offense that is first tried in district court and that is appealed to superior court by the defendant for a trial de novo as a result of a conviction, the sentence imposed by the district court is vacated upon giving notice of appeal. The case shall only be remanded back to district court with the consent of the prosecutor and the superior court. When an appeal is withdrawn or a case is remanded back to district court, the district court shall hold a new sentencing hearing and shall consider any new convictions and, if the defendant has any pending charges of offenses involving impaired driving, shall delay sentencing in the remanded case until all cases are resolved.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7 (Supp. 2006) (amended 2007 and 2008). The Article further provides that all \u201ctrial procedures\u201d set forth therein\u2014 which include the procedures established by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6 and 20-38.7 \u2014 \u201cshall apply to any implied-consent offense litigated in the District Court Division.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.1 (2007).\nAccordingly, based on the plain language of these statutes,- when a district court enters a preliminary determination pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f) indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress evidence or dismiss charges made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a), the State may appeal to superior court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a). On such an appeal, the district court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on the superior court and should be presumed to be supported by competent evidence unless there is a \u201cdispute about the findings of fact,\u201d in which case the matter must be reviewed by the superior court de novo. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.7(a). After considering a matter properly before it according to the appropriate standard of review, the superior court must then enter an order remanding the matter to the district court with instructions to finally grant or deny the defendant\u2019s pretrial motion, since the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f) indicates that the General Assembly intended the district court should enter the final judgment on a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2058.6(f) (providing that the district 'court \u201cjudge shall not enter a final judgment on the motion until after the State has appealed to superior court or has indicated it does not intend to appeal\u201d).\nIn the present case, in its 15 January 2008 Order, the Mecklenburg County Superior Court concluded that \u201cthe statutes allowing the State to appeal the [district [c]ourt determination on [defendant's motion to dismiss based on a lack of probable cause\u201d \u201care in fact unconstitutional\u201d on the following grounds:\na. First, the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, \u00a7 19 of the North Carolina Constitution in that they create a class of defendants separate from any other type of defendant and violate the defendant\u2019s fundamental rights; and,\nb. Second, the statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, \u00a7 19 of the North Carolina Constitution in that they give one party, the State of North Carolina, an advantage of immediate appeal over another party, in this instance, the Defendant, before a final judgment is entered; and,\nc. Third, pursuant to State of North Carolina v. Michael Lee Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 615 S.E.2d 688 (2005), and Article I, \u00a7 3 and Article IV, \u00a7 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court maintains exclusive authority to make rules of practice and procedure for the General Court of Justice; and,\nd. Fourth, that Article I, \u00a7 3 and Article IV, \u00a7 1 of the Constitution of North Carolina prohibits the North Carolina General Assembly from changing the jurisdiction of the District Court; and,\nf. Fifth, that pursuant to Article I, \u00a7 3 and Article IV, \u00a7 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, the District Court maintains exclusive original jurisdiction of this matter absent specific amendments to the North Carolina Constitution or provisions adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina; and,\ng. Sixth, that the statutes violate the Former Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.\nBased on defendant\u2019s arguments at the superior court\u2019s hearing on his pretrial motion, we conclude that the only challenged statutory provisions in the present case are the following: N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a), which required defendant to submit his motion pretrial; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(f), which required the district court to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on defendant\u2019s pretrial motion and restrained the district court from entering a final judgment granting defendant\u2019s motion until after the State had the opportunity to appeal to superior court; and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a), which allowed the State to appeal to superior court from the district court\u2019s Preliminary Finding indicating that it would grant defendant\u2019s pretrial motion. Accordingly, we limit our review to address the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a).\nBecause the Constitution \u201cis a restriction of powers, and those powers not surrendered are reserved to the people to be exercised by their representatives in the General Assembly, so long as an act is not forbidden, the wisdom and expediency of the enactment is a legislative, not a judicial, decision.\u201d Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 510, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1993) (citing Wayne Cty. Citizens Ass\u2019n v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311 (1991)); see also State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 696, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (1960) (\u201cThe legislative department is the judge, within reasonable limits, of what the public welfare requires, and the wisdom of its enactments is not the concern of the courts. As to whether an act is good or bad law, wise or unwise, is a question for the Legislature and not for the courts \u2014 it is a political question.\u201d). \u201cTherefore, the judicial duty of passing upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is one of great gravity and delicacy. This Court presumes that any act promulgated by the General Assembly is constitutional and resolves all doubt in favor of its constitutionality.\u201d Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ., 110 N.C. App. at 511, 430 S.E.2d at 684.\n\u201cIn challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of proof is on the challenger, and the statute must be upheld unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground.\u201d Id. Accordingly, reviewing courts \u201care mandated to construe any legislative enactment so as to save its constitutionality, if possible, and to avoid a strict interpretation that will result in an absurd and unconstitutional result.\u201d Cooke v. Futrell, 37 N.C. App. 441, 444, 246 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1978) (citation omitted).\nWith these as our guiding principles, we now turn to the parties\u2019 arguments.\nI.\nThe State first contends the superior court erred by relying on State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 615 S.E.2d 688 (2005), to support its conclusions that the General Assembly violated Article I, \u00a7 3 and Article IV, \u00a7 1 of the North Carolina Constitution by enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), and that the Constitution \u201cprohibits the North Carolina General Assembly from changing the jurisdiction of the District Court\u201d absent a constitutional amendment authorizing it to do so.\nThe General Assembly is empowered to \u201cprescribe the jurisdiction and powers of the District Courts,\u2019\u2019 .see N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 12, cl. 4, and, \u201cwithin constitutional limitations,\u201d to \u201ccircumscribe\u201d the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts. See N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 12, cl. 3 (\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by the General Assembly, the Superior Court shall have original general jurisdiction throughout the State.\u201d) (emphasis added); Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941) (\u201cThe Legislature, within constitutional limitations, can fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.\u201d).\nAdditionally, while the Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division,\u201d it also provides that the General Assembly \u201cmay make rules of procedure and practice for the Superior Court and District Court Divisions.\u201d See N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 13, cl. 2. The Constitution further provides that the General Assembly may delegate its authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Superior and District Court Divisions to the Supreme Court and, if it does so, \u201cthe General Assembly may, nevertheless, alter, amend, or repeal any rule of procedure or practice adopted by the Supreme Court for the Superior Court or District Court Divisions.\u201d See id.\nIn Tutt, the threshold issue before this Court was whether the General Assembly unconstitutionally contravened the Supreme Court\u2019s \u201cexclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division\u201d when it amended Rule 103 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. See id.) Tutt, 171 N.C. App. at 520-21, 615 S.E.2d at 690-91. As amended by the Legislature, Rule 103 \u201cpermitted] appellate review of an evidentiary ruling even [when] the party fail[ed] to object at trial as required by [Appellate Rule] 10(b)(1).\u201d See Tutt, 171 N.C. App. at 518-19, 615 S.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added). In other words, the General Assembly\u2019s statutory amendment to Rule 103 was \u201cin direct conflict with Rule 10(b)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted by our case law on point.\u201d Id. at 521, 615 S.E.2d at 690. Although this Court ultimately decided to hear the matter by exercising its discretion pursuant to Appellate Rule 2, see id. at 524, 615 S.E.2d at 693, we determined that the General Assembly was seeking \u201cto make a rule of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division that lies within the exclusive authority of our Supreme Court.\u201d Id. at 521, 615 S.E.2d at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, this Court held that, \u201cto the extent that [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) is inconsistent with [Appellate Rule] 10(b)(1), it must fail.\u201d Id. at 524, 615 S.E.2d at 692-93.\nHowever, Tutt is distinguishable from the present case because, as we determined above, the procedures of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) do not apply to the Appellate Division. Instead, by enacting these provisions, the General Assembly created rules which affect the procedure and practice of the Superior and District Court Divisions only, as it is constitutionally permitted to do pursuant to Article IV, \u00a7 13, Clause 2 of the North Carolina Constitution. Therefore, we hold the superior court erred by concluding in its 15 January 2008 Order that Tutt controlled in this matter.\nBecause the General Assembly is constitutionally authorized to create rules of procedure and practice for the Superior and District Courts, to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers of the District Courts, and to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, we further hold a constitutional amendment is not required for the General Assembly to promulgate a rule of procedure and practice pertaining exclusively to the Superior and District Courts. The superior court\u2019s ruling to the contrary was in error.\nWe note that defendant argues in his brief that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) violate the separation of powers doctrine of the North Carolina Constitution. The Separation of Powers Clause of the North Carolina Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 6. However, the trial court did not conclude that the challenged statutory provisions violated this constitutional provision, and defendant failed to cross-assign as error the trial court\u2019s failure to do so. Nevertheless, even had the issue properly been before us, we discern no usurpation of the judicial power of the State by the Legislature in the enactment of these statutory provisions.\nII.\nThe State next contends, and we agree, the superior court erred by concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) violate the Former Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.\n\u201cTwo bases exist in North Carolina for the defense of former jeopardy: the state Constitution and the federal Constitution.\u201d State v. Brunson, 327 N.C. 244, 247, 393 S.E.2d 860, 863 (1990), aff'g, State v. Brunson, 96 N.C. App. 347, 351, 385 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1989). While \u201c[t]he North Carolina Constitution does not specifically recognize former jeopardy as a defense, . . . [our Supreme] Court has interpreted the language of the law of the land clause of our state Constitution as guaranteeing the common law doctrine of former jeopardy.\u201d Id. Further, \u201c[i]t is well settled that a state cannot establish laws, rules, or procedures that would deprive a defendant of his federally guaranteed freedom from former jeopardy.\u201d Id.\n\u201cThe Double Jeopardy Clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.\u201d State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451, 340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986). \u201cIt is a fundamental and sacred principle of the common law, deeply imbedded in our criminal jurisprudence, that no person can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense.\u201d State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 449, 80 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1954). This principle of double jeopardy, or former jeopardy, \u201cbenefits the individual defendants by providing repose; by eliminating unwarranted embarrassment, expense, and anxiety; and by limiting the potential for government harassment.\u201d Brunson, 327 N.C. at 249, 393 S.E.2d at 864. \u201cIt benefits the government by guaranteeing finality to decisions of a court and of the appellate system, thus promoting public confidence in and stability of the legal, system. The objective is to allow the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict a defendant in a fair trial.\u201d Id.\n\u201cThe rule in North Carolina is that in nonjury trials, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence or testimony.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). In other words, \u201cuntil a defendant is \u2018put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge,\u2019 jeopardy does not attach.\u201d Brunson, 96 N.C. App. at 351, 385 S.E.2d at 544 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543, 553 (1971)). This rule \u201creflects an attempt to connect the consequences of jeopardy (that is, the risk of conviction) with that element which could result in conviction (the introduction of evidence).\u201d Brunson, 327 N.C. at 250, 393 S.E.2d at 865. Accordingly, for nonjury trials in district court where the court presides both as trier of fact and as judge, \u201cthe potential for conviction exists [only] when evidence or testimony against a defendant is presented to and accepted ... by the district court [as the trier of fact] for an adjudication of [the] defendant's] guilt.\u201d State v. Ward, 127 N.C. App. 115, 121, 487 S.E.2d 798, 802 (1997) (citation omitted). Conversely, when the court is \u201cpresented\u201d with evidence or testimony for its consideration of a pretrial motion on a question of law, jeopardy has not yet attached to the proceeding.\nThe General Assembly, by enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a), has required that a defendant charged with an implied-consent offense move to suppress evidence or dismiss charges in district court \u201conly prior to trial\u201d and, when not determined summarily, such a motion must be decided only after a hearing by the district court judge. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6(a), (e) (emphasis added). Thus, at the time a defendant\u2019s pretrial motions to suppress or dismiss are made, heard, and decided by the district court, the defendant has not yet been \u201cput to trial before the trier of fact,\u201d and, so, jeopardy has not yet attached to the proceedings. See Brunson, 96 N.C. App. at 351, 385 S.E.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we hold the State\u2019s right to appeal a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress or dismiss made in accordance with N.C.G-S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) does not deprive defendants charged with implied-consent offenses of their guaranteed freedom from former jeopardy.\nMoreover, in State v. Morgan, 189 N.C. App. 716, 660 S.E.2d 545, supersedeas and disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 686, 671 S.E.2d 329 (2008), this Court wrote: \u201cFinally, we observe in passing that, as the law now stands in North Carolina [after the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6 and 20-38.7], . . . [t]he General Assembly has seen fit to ensure that evidentiary questions in district court are now decided prior to the point at which jeopardy would attach to a DWI defendant.\u201d Morgan, 189 N.C. App. at 722, 660 S.E.2d at 549 (emphasis added). We recognize that these statutes were \u201cnot in force at the time\u201d the Morgan case went to trial and that dicta is not controlling. See id. at 723 n.3, 660 S.E.2d at 549-50 n.3. Nonetheless, the Morgan Court\u2019s suggestion supports our conclusion that the General Assembly\u2019s requirement that defendants move to suppress evidence or dismiss charges pretrial before jeopardy attaches precludes these statutory provisions from encroaching on the \u201cconstitutional protections afforded by the prohibitions against double jeopardy.\u201d See State v. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547, 551-, 445 S.E.2d 610, 613, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 805, 449 S.E.2d 751 (1994).\nFurther, the United States Supreme Court has held \u201cthat \u2018a judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.\u2019 \u201d Morgan, 189 N.C. App. at 720, 660 S.E.2d at 548 (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 116, 120 (1986)). Accordingly, \u201c[a]fter such a judgment has been entered, \u2018the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the prosecution not only when it might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate into further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Smalis, 476 U.S. at 142, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 120).\nIn the present case, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) expressly excepts from its pretrial motion requirement any motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) (\u201cThe defendant may move to suppress evidence or dismiss charges only prior to trial, except the defendant may move to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all of the evidence without prior notice.\u201d). Nonetheless, we underscore that any motions to dismiss for insufficient evidence made by a defendant charged with an implied-consent offense and determined in favor of the defendant by the district court are not appealable by the State to the superior court pursuant to these statutes, since \u201cthe State may not appeal such a judgment when \u2018it is plain that the District Court . . . evaluated the Government\u2019s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.\u2019 \u201d Morgan, 189 N.C. App. at 720, 660 S.E.2d at 548 (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642, 651 (1977)).\nFinally, we recognize that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) do not expressly preclude the State from appealing motions to suppress or dismiss made by defendants during trial based on newly discovered facts. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) (\u201cIf, during the course of the trial, the defendant discovers facts not previously known, a motion to suppress or dismiss may be made during the trial.\u201d). Since statutes authorizing an appeal by the State in a criminal case must be strictly construed, see Harrell, 279 N.C. at 466-67, 183 S.E.2d at 640, we also hold, by enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), the General Assembly has granted the State a right of appeal to superior court only from a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress evidence or dismiss charges on an implied-consent offense which (1) is made and decided in district court at a time before jeopardy has attached to the proceedings, i.e., before the district court sits as the trier of fact to adjudicate the defendant\u2019s guilt, and (2) is \u201centirely unrelated to the sufficiency of evidence as to any element of the offense or to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\u201d See Priddy, 115 N.C. App. at 551, 445 S.E.2d at 613. In other words, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) should not be construed to grant the State a right of appeal to superior court when the district court grants a defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence or dismiss charges during trial based on \u201cfacts not previously known\u201d which are only discovered by defendant \u201cduring the course of the trial.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6(a). Rather, based on the recommendations in the Final Report of the Governor\u2019s Task Force on Driving While Impaired, see DWI Final Report at 21, as well as the enabling legislation of Article 2D derived therefrom, see Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006, ch. 253, \u00a7 5, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178, 1180-83, it is our opinion that the General Assembly intended the pretrial motions to suppress evidence or dismiss charges made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) to address only procedural matters including, but not limited to, delays in the processing of a defendant, limitations imposed on a defendant\u2019s access to witnesses, and challenges to the results of a breathalyzer.\nAccordingly, since \u201c[wjhether a statute survives a double jeopardy constitutional analysis . . . depend[s] on . . . what the statute accomplishes in reality,\u201d State v. Wood, 185 N.C. App. 227, 237, 647 S.E.2d 679, 687 (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 703, 655 S.E.2d 402 (2007), we hold the superior court erred by concluding that the challenged provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6 and 20-38.7 violate the Former Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.\nIII.\nThe State next contends, and we agree, the superior court erred by concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and of the North Carolina Constitution \u201cin that they give one party, the State of North Carolina, an advantage of immediate appeal over another party, in this instance, the [defendant, before a final judgment is entered.\u201d\n\u201cOur courts have long held that [t]he law of the land clause has the same meaning as due process of law under the Federal Constitution.\u201d State v. Guice, 141 N.C. App. 177, 186, 541 S.E.2d 474, 480 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review allowed for limited purpose and supersedeas denied, 353 N.C. 731, 551 S.E.2d 112 (2001), modified and aff\u2019d on remand, 151 N.C. App. 293, 564 S.E.2d 925 (2002). Due process \u201cprovides two types of protection for individuals against improper governmental action. Substantive due process protection prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience, or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\u201d State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491, 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cProcedural due process protection ensures that when government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process review, that action is implemented in a fair manner.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\u201cSubstantive due process is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.\u201d State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 371, 211 S.E.2d 320, 323, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002, 45 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1975). Thus, \u201c[s]ubstantive due process may be characterized as a standard of reasonableness, and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.\u201d Guice, 141 N.C. App. at 188, 541 S.E.2d at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 497, 178 S.E.2d 449, 457 (1971) (\u201cThe police power of the State extends to all the compelling needs of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Likewise, the liberty protected by the Due Process and Law of the Land Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions extends to all fundamental rights of the individual.\u201d).\n\u201cThe fundamental premise of procedural due process protection is notice and the opportunity to be heard.\u201d Peace v. Emp. Sec. Comm\u2019n of N.C., 349 N.C. 315, 322, 507 S.E.2d 272, 278 (1998) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503 (1985)). \u201cMoreover, the opportunity to be heard must be \u2018at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66 (1965)).\n\u201cIn order to determine whether a law violates substantive due process, we must first determine whether the right infringed upon is a fundamental right.\u201d Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam\u2019rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 535, 571 S.E.2d 52, 59 (2002) (citing Clark v. Sanger Clinic, P.A., 142 N.C. App. 350, 542 S.E.2d 668, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 450, 548 S.E.2d 524 (2001)). \u201cIf the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis wherein the party seeking to apply the law must demonstrate that it serves a compelling state interest.\u201d Id. at 535-36, 571 S.E.2d at 59. \u201cIf the right infringed upon is not fundamental in the constitutional sense, the party seeking to apply it need only meet the traditional test of establishing that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.\u201d Id. at 536, 571 S.E.2d at 59.\nDefendant first argues that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) infringes on the right of a person charged with an implied-consent offense in district court to exercise his or her fundamental right to a fair trial, since it requires that such defendants move to suppress evidence' or dismiss charges pretrial without the benefit of any statutory right to pretrial discovery. We disagree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has recognized that the fundamental right to a fair trial is \u201cthe most fundamental of all freedoms.\u201d See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 549, reh\u2019g denied, 382 U.S. 875, 15 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1965); see also State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 616, 419 S.E.2d 557, 564 (1992) (recognizing that a criminal defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial is \u201cfundamental\u201d), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 136 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1996). \u201c[T]he fundamental conception of a fair trial includes many of the specific provisions of the Sixth Amendment, such as the right to have the proceedings open to the public, the right to notice of specific charges, the right to confrontation, . . . the right to counsel,\u201d the right to be tried before impartial jurors, and the right to the presumption of innocence. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 560, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 560; see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888, 923 (1991) (right to be tried before impartial jurors); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 130 (right to the presumption of innocence), reh\u2019g denied, 426 U.S. 954, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1194 (1976).\n\u201c[T]he purpose of discovery under our [General Statutes is to protect the defendant from unfair surprise by the introduction of evidence he cannot anticipate.\u201d State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 202, 394 S.E.2d 158, 162 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (1991). At present, \u201c[i]n North Carolina, no statutory right to discovery exists for criminal cases originating in district court.\u201d State v. Cornett, 177 N.C. App. 452, 455, 629 S.E.2d 857, 859, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 172, 640 S.E.2d 56 (2006). \u201cFurthermore, it is well-established that there is no Constitutional right to discovery other than to exculpatory evidence.\u201d Id. at 456, 629 S.E.2d at 859.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) expressly provides that, \u201c[i]f, during the course of the trial, the defendant discovers facts not previously known, a motion to suppress or dismiss may be made during the trial.\" N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) (emphasis added). In other words, defendants charged with implied-consent offenses in district court are permitted to make motions to suppress or dismiss during trial if information not known to them prior to trial is first discovered only during the course of the trial. Thus, although, unlike other defendants appearing in district court, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) generally requires defendants charged with implied-consent offenses to make motions to suppress evidence or dismiss charges prior to trial, the express language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) also protects defendants against any disadvantage they could suffer as a result of the absence of a statutory right to discovery in district court, since any \u201cunfair surprise\u201d that might arise from the discovery of \u201cfacts not previously known\u201d to a defendant is tempered by allowing defendants to make motions to suppress or dismiss during the course of the trial on the basis of newly discovered facts. Therefore, we conclude that the pretrial motion requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) does not infringe on the fundamental right to a fair trial of defendants charged with implied-consent offenses appearing in district court.\nDefendant also asserts that, since N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(f) and 20-38.7(a) do not specify a period of time by which the State must appeal from a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to dismiss or suppress made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a), these provisions necessarily infringe on the fundamental right to a speedy trial of those defendants charged with implied-consent offenses appearing in district court. Again, we disagree.\n\u201cThe fundamental law of the State secures to every person formally accused of crime the right to a speedy and impartial trial, as does the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution . . . .\u201d State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 269, 167 S.E.2d 274, 277-78 (1969). \u201cThe guarantee of a speedy trial is designed to protect a defendant from the dangers inherent in a prosecution which has been negligently or arbitrarily delayed by the State: prolonged imprisonment, anxiety and public distrust engendered by untried accusations of crime, lost evidence and witnesses, and impaired memories.\u201d Id. at 269, 167 S.E.2d at 278. \u201cUndue delay cannot be categorically defined in terms of days,' months, or even years; the circumstances of each particular case determine whether a speedy trial has been afforded.\u201d Id. \u201cFour interrelated factors bear upon the question: the length of the delay, the cause of the delay, waiver by the defendant, and prejudice to the defendant.\u201d Id. \u201cThe burden is on an accused who asserts the denial of his right to a speedy trial to show that the delay was due to the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.\u201d Id.\nWhen the State appeals from a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress evidence or dismiss charges made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a), such an appeal is authorized pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a), which does not specify a time by which the State must appeal. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the absence of a specified time for the State to appeal a district court\u2019s preliminary determination pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) necessitates a conclusion by this Court that the challenged provisions of these statutes, as written, infringe on a defendant\u2019s fundamental right to a speedy trial. Instead, this Court has recognized that, \u201c[i]n the absence of a statute or rule of court prescribing the time for taking and perfecting an appeal, an appeal must be taken and perfected within a reasonable time:\u201d Teen Challenge Training Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjust, of Moore Cty., 90 N.C. App. 452, 454, 368 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1988) (citing 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error \u00a7 428 (1957)). \u201c \u2018What is a reasonable time must, in all cases, depend upon the circumstances.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting White Oak Props., Inc. v. Town of Carrboro, 313 N.C. 306, 311, 327 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1985)).\nAccordingly, we conclude that the General Assembly\u2019s decision to refrain from establishing a time by which the State must give notice of appeal from a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) will require an examination of \u201cthe circumstances of each particular case\u201d in which a defendant alleges that the State acted in violation of his or her fundamental right to a speedy trial by subjecting that defendant to undue delay. See Johnson, 275 N.C. at 269, 167 S.E.2d at 278. Thus, we conclude that the State\u2019s appeal from a district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) on an implied-consent offense charge does not infringe on a defendant\u2019s fundamental right to a speedy trial.\nTherefore, since N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) do not infringe on the fundamental rights to a fair and speedy trial of those persons charged with implied-consent offenses in district court, we need only determine whether the challenged statutory provisions are \u201crationally related to a legitimate state interest.\u201d Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App. 592, 598, 306 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1983) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 99 L. Ed. 563, reh\u2019g denied, 349 U.S. 925, 99 L. Ed. 1256 (1955)).\n\u201cA single standard\u201d has traditionally determined \u201cwhether legislation constitutes an improper exercise of the police power so as to violate the \u2018law of the land\u2019 clause: the law must have a rational, real and substantial relation to a valid governmental objective (i.e., the protection of the public health, morals, order, safety, or general welfare).\u201d Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow Cty., 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369-70 (1986), aff\u2019d, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987). \u201cThe inquiry is thus two-fold: (1) Does the [statute] have a legitimate objective? and (2) If so, are the means chosen to implement that objective reasonable?\u201d Id. at 352, 350 S.E.2d at 370. Nonetheless, \u201c[e]ven if the legislation is seriously flawed and results] in substantial inequality, it will be upheld if it is reasonably related to a permissible state objective.\u201d Clark, 142 N.C. App. at 358, 542 S.E.2d at 674 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nThe enabling legislation of the challenged statutory provisions at issue in the present case arose from the Governor\u2019s Task Force on Driving While Impaired \u2014 composed of members of the Bar, the Judicial Branch, law enforcement, and the General Assembly \u2014 which was responsible for reviewing the General Statues applicable to driving while impaired, reviewing proposals in other states \u201cdesigned to deter driving while impaired,\u201d and recommending \u201cactions to reduce driving while impaired.\u201d See Exec. Order No. 54, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 893-94. In its January 2005 Final Report, the Task Force recognized that, although \u201c[n]o other criminal charge is subject to th[e] rule\u201d that \u201ca substantial delay in processing a person charged with DWI justifies a dismissal,\u201d \u201cunder the Constitution, DWI cases are different\u201d and, so, delays in the post-arrest processing of persons charged with an implied-consent offense can result in dismissals. See DWI Final Report at 22. Thus, the Task Force suggested that \u201c[a] specific procedure should be developed [for implied-consent offense cases] to prevent dismissals related to delays in processing and by the defendant\u2019s lack of access to witnesses.\u201d See id. at 21. Consequently, the enabling legislation that added Article 2D to Chapter 20 of the General Statutes, which includes N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), specified that one of its objectives was to provide \u201cprocedures for investigating, arresting, charging, and judicial processing of impaired driving offenses\u201d as \u201cmeasures designed to improve the safety of the motoring public of North Carolina.\u201d See Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006, ch. 253, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178, 1180-83.\nAccordingly, we find that the Legislature determined from the facts before it that the pretrial procedures codified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) would serve as a means to improve the safety of the motoring public of North Carolina. Since \u201cany act promulgated by the General Assembly is [presumed to be] constitutional and ... all doubt [m\u00fast be resolved] in favor of its constitutionality,\u201d see Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ., 110 N.C. App. at 511, 430 S.E.2d at 684, we conclude that the challenged legislation is not \u201cunreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and . . . [is] substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.\u201d See Joyner, 286 N.C. at 371, 211 S.E.2d at 323. Therefore, we hold N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) do not violate substantive due process.\nDefendant challenges the statutory provisions as violative of procedural due process based on the General Assembly\u2019s mandate that district courts must first enter preliminary determinations when inclined to rule favorably on a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion made in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a). However, since we have held the challenged statutory provisions do not violate substantive due process, we find no basis upon which the challenged statutory provisions can violate the right to procedural due process of a defendant subject to these procedures. Therefore, we hold the superior court erred when it concluded that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and of the North Carolina Constitution.\nIV.\nFinally, the State contends, and we agree, the superior court erred by concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f); and 20-38.7(a) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and of the North Carolina Constitution.\n\u201cThe Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbid North Carolina from denying any person the equal protection of the laws,\u201d Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 675, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130, 151 L. Ed. 2d 972 (2002), and require that \u201call persons similarly situated be treated alike.\u201d See Richardson v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 345 N.C. 128, 134, 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996).\n\u201cOur [state] courts use the same test as federal courts in evaluating the constitutionality of challenged classifications under an equal protection analysis.\u201d Id. When evaluating a challenged classification, \u201c[t]he court must first determine which of several tiers of scrutiny should be utilized. Then it must determine whether the [statute] meets the relevant standard of review.\u201d Rowe, 353 N.C. at 675, 549 S.E.2d at 207.\n\u201cStrict scrutiny applies when a [statute] classifies persons on the basis of certain designated suspect characteristics or when it infringes on the ability of some persons to exercise a fundamental right.\u201d Id.; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534, 541-42 (1971) (stating that classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin \u201care inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny\u201d). \u201cOther classifications, including gender and illegitimacy, trigger intermediate scrutiny, which requires the [S]tate to prove that the [statute] is substantially related to an important government interest.\u201d Rowe, 353 N.C. at 675, 549 S.E.2d at 207. \u201cIf a [statute] draws any other classification, it receives only rational-basis scrutiny, and the party challenging the [statute] must show that it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest. If the party cannot so prove, the [statute] is valid.\u201d Id.\nHowever, \u201c[a] statute is not subject to the [E]qual [Protection [C]lause of the [Fourteenth [A]mendment of the United States Constitution or [A]rticle I \u00a7 19 of the North Carolina Constitution unless it creates a classification between different groups of people.\u201d State v. Howren, 312 N.C. 454, 457, 323 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1984) (emphasis added). In the present case, no classification between different groups has been created. See id. Instead, pursuant to Article 2D of the General Statutes, all defendants charged with an implied-consent offense appearing in district court will be subject to the same procedural requirements established by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), as well as the other statutory provisions in the Article. Defendant makes the unsupported assertion that the classification created by the enactment of Article 2D which violates equal protection is one where defendants charged with an implied-consent offense appearing in district court are subject to different pretrial procedures than all oth\u00e9r defendants charged with any other misdemeanor offenses appearing in district court. Nevertheless, since the Article \u201capplie[s] uniformly to all members of the public and does not discriminate against any group,\u201d see id. at 458, 323 S.E.2d at 338, we conclude that \u201c[t]his classification is not of the type that can be considered a denial of equal protection.\u201d See State v. Garvick, 98 N.C. App. 556, 564, 392 S.E.2d 115, 119-20, aff\u2019d per curiam, 327 N.C. 627, 398 S.E.2d 330 (1990).\nStill, even assuming, arguendo, that Article 2D does create a classification subject to an equal protection analysis, the challenged statutory provisions neither classify persons on the basis of any designated \u201csuspect\u201d characteristics nor, as we concluded in section III above, infringe on any fundamental rights of the persons subject to these procedures. Accordingly, to determine whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), under this \u201cclassification,\u201d would violate equal protection, we would need only to determine whether the challenged statutory provisions \u201cbear[] some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate interest of [the] government.\u201d See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 135, 478 S.E.2d at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nAs we concluded in section III above, it is our opinion that the Legislature\u2019s objective to improve the safety of the motoring public of North Carolina is a legitimate objective and the procedures established by the challenged provisions of these statutes are rationally related to that objective. See Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006, ch. 253, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178; see also Clark, 142 N.C. App. at 358, 542 S.E.2d at 674 (concluding that, when \u201c[t]he statute at issue . . . neither burdens a suspect class, nor affects a fundamental right[, it] . . . need only satisfy the rational basis level of scrutiny to withstand both the due process and equal protection challenges\u201d) (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a) do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or of the North Carolina Constitution.\nV.\n\u201cWhen a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court must determine whether the State has presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator.\u201d State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the trial court \u201cis to consider all of the evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State,\u201d see State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1982) (emphasis added), and must consider that evidence \u201cin the light most favorable to the State.\u201d See id. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 652. \u201c[T]he State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d Id. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 653. Additionally, a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence cannot be made pretrial, because only those \u201cdefense[s], objection[s], or request[s] which [are] capable of being determined without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion,\u201d see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-952 (2007), and a court can only consider a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence after the State has had an opportunity to present all of its evidence to the trier of fact during trial.\nIn the present case, the district court entered a \u201cPreliminary Finding Granting Pretrial Motion to Dismiss,\u201d (emphasis added), in which it concluded that the arresting officer \u201cdid not possess probable cause to arrest and charge [defendant with Driving While Impaired.\u201d Additionally, both parties characterize defendant\u2019s pretrial motion in district court as one to dismiss, not suppress, for lack of probable cause to arrest. However, the copy of defendant\u2019s 2 January 2007 citation included in the record before this Court contains a handwritten notation in the section designated \u201cCourt Use Only\u201d stating, \u201cPretrial Motion to Suppress Granted.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nA trial court\u2019s decision to grant a pretrial motion to suppress evidence \u201cdoes not mandate a pretrial dismissal of the underlying indictments\u201d because \u201c[t]he district attorney may elect to dismiss or proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence and attempt to establish a prima facie case.\u201d See State v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 706, 649 S.E.2d 646, 650, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 89, 656 S.E.2d 281 (2007). Nevertheless, after concluding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant, the district court decided that it would dismiss the driving while impaired charge against defendant. Consequently, this Court must infer that the district court not only considered whether the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant but, further, preliminarily determined that there was insufficient evidence for the State to proceed against defendant on the charge of driving while impaired.\nSince there is no indication in the record that the State had the opportunity to present all of its evidence prior to the district court\u2019s preliminary determination indicating that it would dismiss the charge against defendant, we believe the superior court erred when it concluded that \u201cit appears the [district [c]ourt\u2019s Conclusions of Law granting the motion to dismiss are based upon the Findings of Fact that are cited in [the court\u2019s] Order.\u201d Accordingly, we remand this matter to the superior court with instructions to remand the case to the district court to enter a preliminary order indicating its ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of his 2 January 2007 arrest for lack of probable cause. If the district court preliminarily allows defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the State may choose to appeal to the superior court from the district court\u2019s preliminary determination that it would grant defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a). However, only after the State has had an opportunity to establish a prima facie case on the charge in the district court may a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence be made by defendant and considered by the district court, unless the State elects to dismiss the charge against defendant.\nFinally, we realize that under our interpretation of the scheme established by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), no statutory right of appeal by the State to the Appellate Division exists from a district court\u2019s final order granting a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress evidence, even though the General Assembly has conferred upon the State a statutory right of appeal to the Appellate Division from a superior court\u2019s order granting a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(c). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(c) (2007) (\u201cAn order by the superior court granting a motion to suppress prior to trial is appealable to the appellate division of the General Court of Justice prior to trial upon certificate by the prosecutor to the judge who granted the motion that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is essential to the case.\u201d). Since we have already determined that a superior court must remand a matter heard pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) to district court for a final entry of judgment on a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion, we further recognize that the State will not be able to appeal to the Appellate Division pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(c) if the superior court determines that a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress should be granted. Moreover, as we indicated at the outset of this opinion, the State has a right of appeal to the superior court from a district court\u2019s final dismissal of criminal charges against a defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(a)(l), and the State has aright of appeal to the Appellate Division from a superior court\u2019s order affirming a district court\u2019s dismissal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e). While we are unable to determine whether this seeming incongruity was intentional, or the inadvertent result of hasty draftsmanship of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a), (f), and 20-38.7(a), the wisdom of the General Assembly\u2019s legislative enactments is not a proper concern of the courts. See Warren, 252 N.C. at 696, 114 S.E.2d at 666.\nReversed and Remanded.\nJudges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur.\n. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7 has been amended twice since the date defendant was alleged to have committed the offense in the present case. See Act of Aug. 7, 2008, ch. 187, \u00a7 10, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 780; Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 493, \u00a7 9, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1497. However, these amendments relate exclusively to a defendant\u2019s right of appeal, which is not at issue in the present case.\n. The superior court did not include a Conclusion of Law \u201ce\u201d in its 15 January 2008 Order.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Sebastian Kielmanovich, Assistant Attorney General, and, William B. Crumpler, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Ham/pson, and Law Offices of Bush & Powers, by Bill Powers, for defendant-appellee.", "Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Thomas K. Maher, and The Ward Law Firm, P.A., by David J. Ward, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE BROOKS FOWLER, Dependant\nNo. COA08-652\n(Filed 19 May 2009)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 criminal case \u2014 appeal by State\u2014 remand from superior to district court\nThe Court of Appeals granted certiorari for the State to appeal an interlocutory superior court order concluding that certain impaired driving statutes were unconstitutional.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 criminal case \u2014 appeal by State\u2014 impaired driving dismissal\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7(a) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e), read in pari materia, did not authorize the State to appeal a superior court order holding certain impaired driving statutes unconstitutional and remanding the matter to district court\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 North Carolina constitution \u2014 impaired driving procedures \u2014 authority of courts not violated\nIn a case involving the constitutionality of certain impaired driving statutes, the trial court erred by concluding that the matter was controlled by State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, and that the legislature violated the Supreme Court\u2019s authority for the handling of impaired driving cases. The procedures at issue here did not apply to the Appellate Division, unlike the evidentiary rules involved in Tutt.\n4. Constitutional Law\u2014 North Carolina constitution \u2014 court rules \u2014 impaired driving \u2014 authority of legislature\nThe General Assembly is constitutionally authorized to create rules of procedure and practice for the superior and district courts, and to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers of the superior courts, and a constitutional amendment was not required for the General Assembly to promulgate a rule of procedure and practice concerning impaired driving cases pertaining exclusively to superior and district courts.\n5. Constitutional Law\u2014 separation of powers \u2014 impaired driving procedures \u2014 not properly raised \u2014 not violated\nThe trial court did not conclude that challenged provisions of impaired driving procedures in the courts violated separation of powers. Even if the issue had been properly raised on appeal, no usurpation of judicial power was discerned.\n6. Constitutional Law\u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 pretrial motion and evidence \u2014 no attachment of jeopardy\nIn an action involving required pretrial motions for implied consent offenses and the State\u2019s right to appeal, the superior court erred by concluding that portions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6 and .7 violate the Former Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. In North Carolina nonjury trials, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence or testimony, and does not attach when the court is presented with evidence or testimony for a pretrial motion on a question of law.\n7. Constitutional Law\u2014 fair trial \u2014 implied consent offenses \u2014 required pretrial motions\nThe requirement in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.6(a) that defendants charged with implied consent offenses in district court make pretrial motions to dismiss or suppress evidence did not infringe on the right to a fair trial, even though those defendants do not have the benefit of pretrial discovery. The statute allows defendants to make motions to dismiss or suppress during trial when there are newly discovered facts.\n8. Constitutional Law\u2014 speedy trial \u2014 implied consent offenses \u2014 district court preliminary determination \u2014 State\u2019s appeal to district court\nDefendants charged with implied consent offenses in district court are not deprived of the right to a speedy trial by the absence of a specified time for the State\u2019s appeal from the district court\u2019s preliminary determination that it would grant a pretrial motion to dismiss or suppress. The General Assembly\u2019s decision to refrain from establishing a time for the State to give a notice of appeal will require an examination of the circumstances of each particular case.\n9.Constitutional Law\u2014 Due Process \u2014 implied consent offenses \u2014 pretrial motion requirements\nThe trial court erred by holding that the pretrial motion requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a),(f) and 20-38.7(a) violate Due Process. The Legislature determined from the facts before it that the pretrial procedures in the challenged statutes would serve as a means to improve the safety of the motoring public in North Carolina, and the legislation was reasonably related to the valid objective sought to be obtained. Furthermore, there was no procedural due process violation.\n10. Constitutional Law\u2014 Equal Protection \u2014 implied consent offenses \u2014 required pretrial motions\nThe trial court erred by concluding that the pretrial motion requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-38.6(a),(f) and 20-38.7(a) for implied consent offenses in district court violate equal protection. All defendants charged with an implied consent offense appearing in district court are subject to the same procedural requirements and the challenged provisions had a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate interest of the government.\n11. Motor Vehicles\u2014 impaired driving \u2014 motion to suppress\u2014 district court preliminary determination\nA preliminary determination that the district court would dismiss an impaired driving charge for lack of probable cause was remanded for a preliminary order indicating the district court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of his arrest.\nAppeal by the State from order entered 15 January 2008 by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2009.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Sebastian Kielmanovich, Assistant Attorney General, and, William B. Crumpler, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nWyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Ham/pson, and Law Offices of Bush & Powers, by Bill Powers, for defendant-appellee.\nCenter for Death Penalty Litigation, by Thomas K. Maher, and The Ward Law Firm, P.A., by David J. Ward, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 31, "last_page_order": 60 }