{ "id": 4167356, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE RASHAD MILLER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Miller", "decision_date": "2009-05-19", "docket_number": "No. COA08-650", "first_page": "78", "last_page": "99", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 78" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "459 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6468801, 6468547, 6469476, 6468967, 6469608, 6469353, 6468711, 6468624, 6468240, 6468465, 6469044, 6468343, 6469144, 6469246 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/1018-07", "/us/459/1018-04", "/us/459/1018-13", "/us/459/1018-08", "/us/459/1018-14", "/us/459/1018-12", "/us/459/1018-06", "/us/459/1018-05", "/us/459/1018-01", "/us/459/1018-03", "/us/459/1018-09", "/us/459/1018-02", "/us/459/1018-10", "/us/459/1018-11" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634040, 12634041, 12634042 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0854-01", "/se2d/619/0854-02", "/se2d/619/0854-03" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633129 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634083, 12634084, 12634085 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0196-01", "/se2d/620/0196-02", "/se2d/620/0196-03" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632964 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12643013, 12643014, 12643015 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0867-01", "/se2d/673/0867-02", "/se2d/673/0867-03" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12643012, 12643013, 12643014 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0866-04", "/se2d/673/0867-01", "/se2d/673/0867-02" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639710 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court concluded that this portion of Defendant's statement was not hearsay under Rule 801(c) because it was not offered for its truth. We review the trial court's determination de novo.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12001440, 12000708, 12001636, 12000837, 12000970, 12001711, 12001073, 12001394, 12001300, 12001559, 12000604, 12001500, 12001183 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0915-09", "/us/506/0915-02", "/us/506/0915-12", "/us/506/0915-03", "/us/506/0915-04", "/us/506/0915-13", "/us/506/0915-05", "/us/506/0915-08", "/us/506/0915-07", "/us/506/0915-11", "/us/506/0915-01", "/us/506/0915-10", "/us/506/0915-06" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271934 ], "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E. 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-74", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Dill, 184 N.C. 645, 650, 113 S.E. 609, 612 (1922)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654458 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Dill, 184 N.C. 645, 650, 113 S.E. 609, 612 (1922)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 F. 2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F. 2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F. 2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 854", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794241, 3795978, 3795640, 3794159, 3804820, 3803221, 3797622, 3804214, 3801560, 3797850, 3798013 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0854-03", "/nc/359/0854-06", "/nc/359/0854-05", "/nc/359/0854-11", "/nc/359/0854-09", "/nc/359/0854-08", "/nc/359/0854-07", "/nc/359/0854-01", "/nc/359/0854-04", "/nc/359/0854-02", "/nc/359/0854-10" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006213 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551263 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 1028", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 231489, 230913, 231364, 234554, 234438, 234126, 232495, 232878, 230190, 230450, 231636, 235834, 230556 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/1028-01", "/us/510/1028-11", "/us/510/1028-08", "/us/510/1028-06", "/us/510/1028-02", "/us/510/1028-13", "/us/510/1028-04", "/us/510/1028-10", "/us/510/1028-12", "/us/510/1028-05", "/us/510/1028-07", "/us/510/1028-03", "/us/510/1028-09" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6202354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545734 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124-25" }, { "page": "124-25" }, { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568158 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510-11" }, { "page": "510-11" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "657-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689817 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33, 37" }, { "page": "35" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132011, 132268, 131949, 132212, 132255 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0595-03", "/nc/350/0595-04", "/nc/350/0595-05", "/nc/350/0595-01", "/nc/350/0595-02" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11205060 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719603 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956397 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3797760, 3800637, 3793955, 3800560, 3793875, 3795348, 3794676, 3794260, 3803545, 3793693 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0856-05", "/nc/359/0856-04", "/nc/359/0856-07", "/nc/359/0856-08", "/nc/359/0856-02", "/nc/359/0856-10", "/nc/359/0856-01", "/nc/359/0856-09", "/nc/359/0856-06", "/nc/359/0856-03" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006375 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" }, { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220084 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "818" }, { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3799490 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8372039 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court concluded that this portion of Defendant's statement was not hearsay under Rule 801(c) because it was not offered for its truth. We review the trial court's determination de novo.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550903 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502533, 2498248, 2500400, 2499516, 2497727 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0290-01", "/nc/331/0290-04", "/nc/331/0290-05", "/nc/331/0290-02", "/nc/331/0290-03" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522544 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539893 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 L. Ed. 2d 1044", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 1020", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12095046, 12094727, 12094696, 12094666, 12094635, 12094927, 12094770, 12094866, 12094999, 12094651, 12094815 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/1020-11", "/us/384/1020-05", "/us/384/1020-04", "/us/384/1020-03", "/us/384/1020-01", "/us/384/1020-09", "/us/384/1020-06", "/us/384/1020-08", "/us/384/1020-10", "/us/384/1020-02", "/us/384/1020-07" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572632 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0277-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1547, "char_count": 51539, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6568523057058247e-07, "percentile": 0.6936566572027945 }, "sha256": "6a20bcbb27b66a133a6844e7241af658771dfacc7c736629abebf51d76cbad41", "simhash": "1:82f916be671d8fd8", "word_count": 8426 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE RASHAD MILLER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.\nMaurice Rashad Miller (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from two 18 December 2007 judgments entered in accordance with jury verdicts finding him guilty of: one count of first degree murder based on the felony murder rule; one count of first degree burglary; and one count of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, specifically with a firearm. All three convictions were based on the theory of acting in concert. The trial court consolidated the first degree burglary and felony murder convictions and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole. The court arrested judgment for the attempted robbery with a firearm conviction.\nI. Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on the evening of 22 January 2006, LaKendra Grady (\u201cGrady\u201d), Rufus Bowser (\u201cBowser\u201d) and Darian Graham (\u201cGraham\u201d) were together at defendant\u2019s residence while he was at work. Of these three, only Bowser testified at trial, and he did so pursuant to a plea agreement. Bowser testified that he possessed a Tech-9 assault rifle (\u201cTech-9\u201d), Grady possessed a 9-millimeter handgun (\u201c9mm\u201d), and Graham possessed a .357 revolver (\u201c.357\u201d). He further stated that, prior to defendant\u2019s arrival, he, Grady, and Graham had spent two hours \u201cjust planning to rob somebody\u201d; however, they did not have anyone specific in mind.\nBowser testified that defendant arrived home around 10:30 p.m., at which point defendant sat at the kitchen table and talked with the others, and Bowser showed him his Tech-9. Bowser further stated that the three of them \u201cjust told [defendant] about the robbery,\u201d and defendant \u201cwas like, \u2018[a]ll right[,]\u2019 \u201d and came along with them. During cross-examination, Bowser stated that Grady and a man named \u201cD.J.\u201d planned the robbery and that D.J. suggested Pervis Owens (\u201cOwens\u201d) as a potential target. Bowser also testified that defendant was at work and was not present when Owens was selected as the target for the robbery.\nDefendant admitted he knew that Grady had plans to rob someone prior to leaving his residence with her, Bowser, and Graham, but stated that he \u201cdidn\u2019t know it was Pervis Owens.\u201d However, during an interview conducted by Detective Lee Odham (\u201cDetective Odham\u201d) and Detective William Young (\u201cDetective Young\u201d) at the Wilmington Police Department on 28 January 2006, defendant stated that Grady had come into his bedroom, along with Graham and Bowser, and told him about wanting to rob Owens because he had a lot of money. During the interview, Detective Odham asked defendant, \u201cYou went there with only the intent of robbing this guy. That was it?\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cYeah, but I really didn\u2019t even want to do that. But that\u2019s what, yeah, I guess you could say that, yeah. Detective Odham inquired further, \u201cAll you wanted to do was rob him. You didn\u2019t want to hurt him?\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cI didn\u2019t even want to rob him, but . . .\u201d at which point Detective Odham interrupted him. Detective Odham then said, \u201cBut you were there . . . .\u201d and defendant interrupted, stating \u201cyeah, to rob him[,]\u201d while nodding affirmatively.\nDefendant, Bowser, Graham, and Grady left defendant\u2019s residence in a car driven by Grady. Bowser testified that they drove around for several hours and did not talk about the robbery or have a plan. According to Bowser, during much of the time, Grady was making calls on her cell phone and eventually reached Owens. However, in his interview with Detectives Odham and Young, defendant stated that Grady talked about \u201chow she was going to do [the robbery]\u201d while she drove. Defendant also told police that originally the plan was for them to rob Owens at the door of his residence, but that he (defendant) told Grady that he did not like that plan and that she had to come up with a new one. Bowser testified that, while in the car, Grady had the 9mm, Graham had the .357, and he had the Tech-9.\nThe group arrived at Owens\u2019s house sometime in' the early morning of 23 January 2006, while it was still dark. Upon arrival, all four got out of the car. Grady told the others to wait five minutes and then to follow her into the house. She then proceeded to enter Owens\u2019s house. Bowser testified that, at this point, he still had the Tech-9 and Graham still had the .357, but that defendant, not Grady, had the 9mm.\nAccording to Bowser, Grady did not come back out of the house or give any kind of signal before he and defendant went into the house. During his interview with police, defendant stated that Grady came out of the house, made a noise, and told the others that the robbery would be easy because Owens was asleep. Bowser testified that he entered Owens\u2019s residence first, putting his shirt around his face in the process. He stated that defendant did the \u201c[s]ame thing\u201d and followed him inside. On cross-examination, defendant conceded that he had previously told the detectives that he covered his face with the hood of his sweatshirt as he entered Owens\u2019s house. Graham remained outside.\nAccording to Bowser, when he and defendant entered the house, Grady was not present, and Owehs was asleep in a reclinen Bowser pointed his gun at Owens, \u201cwalked up to him and told him to get up.\u201d His intention was to have Owens \u201cshow [him] where the money was at.\u201d Bowser stated that Owens jumped up from his chair and tackled him, but that he escaped from Owens and ran out the door. Bowser testified that after he left the house, he heard a gunshot. He stated that defendant left the house after him, but. that he \u201ccouldn\u2019t really see\u201d whether there was anything in defendant\u2019s hands at that time. Defendant told the detectives that he was inside near the front door and trying to make it back outside when he heard a gunshot behind him. He stated that he thought Grady was probably the one who shot Owens.\nAccording to Bowser, he, Graham, and defendant all ran to Graham\u2019s house and hid the three guns under a mattress. At this point, he noticed that defendant had the 9mm in his possession. On cross-examination, however, Bowser stated that he had previously told police that he had seen Grady with the 9mm the next day. Bowser also testified that, a few days after the incident, defendant told him, \u201c[I\u2019ve] got to live with killing somebody.\u201d\nOwens was found dead on his front lawn. His death was attributed to a single gunshot wound. The State\u2019s forensic scientist identified the bullet as a \u201c9-millimeter Luger\u201d.\nRose Samuel, Owens\u2019s neighbor, had a surveillance camera on her porch pointed towards the alley between the houses. This camera was recording at the time of the robbery and provided an audio account of some of the events that had occurred outside of Owens\u2019s residence. Through the assistance of witnesses, Detective Owens was able to identify Grady\u2019s voice on the tape. Subsequent to this, Detective Odham obtained a warrant for Grady\u2019s arrest for first degree murder.\nAfter questioning Grady, Detective Odham then spoke with Graham. Graham provided the detectives with the. 9mm that was purportedly used in the murder. After speaking with Graham, Detective Odham then contacted defendant to question him about the case. Either very late on 27 January or shortly after midnight on 28 January 2006, defendant, accompanied by his mother and step-father, went voluntarily to the Wilmington police station. Detective Odham did not place defendant under arrest at this time, and before he questioned defendant, Detective Odham read him his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and signed a written waiver form.\nAt trial, the jury was shown the DVD recording of defendant\u2019s 28 January 2006 interview, in which Detectives Odham and Young asked defendant numerous questions about his involvement in the events that transpired at Owens\u2019s house. Some of the detectives\u2019 questions contained statements incriminating defendant that were allegedly made by others, including Grady, Graham, Bowser, and defendant\u2019s sisters. With the exception of Bowser, none of the individuals to whom the statements were attributed testified at trial.\nAt trial, defendant testified on his on behalf. He stated that when he arrived at home on the evening of 22 January 2006, he could not see the three guns because Grady, Bowser and Graham were at the kitchen table and his view was blocked by a dividing wall. Defendant further testified that shortly after arriving at his residence, he went up to his bedroom to play computer games. He claimed he did not see a gun until Grady came into his room with the 9mm approximately thirty minutes later. He also denied any involvement in planning the robbery.\nDefendant testified that when he left the house with the others, he did not know that Owens was the intended target. He also claimed that he never held Grady\u2019s 9mm and did not touch any of the guns subsequent to getting into the car.\nAccording to defendant, when the group arrived at Owens\u2019s residence, they all got out of the car, and Grady said she would be back in five minutes. Defendant claimed that he then walked to a basketball park across the street to smoke a cigarette. He said that he saw Grady knock on the door and enter Owens\u2019s house, that he saw Owens, and that he was \u201cpretty sure\u201d that Owens saw him across the street.\nAfter five minutes had passed, Grady came out of the house and proceeded to have a conversation with Bowser and Graham. Defendant stated that he crossed the street to join them after they signaled for him. Defendant testified that he thought they were welcome in the house because the door was \u201cwide open.\u201d He also stated that he thought they were going inside so Grady could buy drugs. Defendant admitted that his hood was up when he went inside the house, but stated that it was already up because it was cold outside.\nAccording to defendant, when he entered the house, both Grady and Bowser were in the living room. Bowser had the Tech-9 and Grady had the 9mm. When Bowser woke up Owens, defendant ran to the door to leave the house but was unable to do so because the door was stuck. Defendant testified that he heard a gunshot behind him but did not see or know who shot Owens. Defendant also stated that he did not possess a weapon at Owens\u2019s house and that he did not place the 9mm under the mattress at Graham\u2019s house.\nOther facts necessary to the understanding of this case are set out in the opinion below.\nII. Analysis\nA. DVD Recording and Statements of Non-Testifying Others\nFirst, defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence the DVD recording of his 28 January 2006 police interview without redacting those questions posed to him by Detectives Odham and Young which contained statements attributed to non-testifying third parties. Defendant concedes that his answers to these questions are relevant, but contends that the statements attributed to non-testifying third parties, which were contained in the detectives\u2019 questions, should have been redacted before the DVD was presented to the jury. Specifically, he asserts that the detectives\u2019 questions that contained statements purportedly made by non-testifying others, including his co-defendants and his sisters, are both irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay, that lack any probative value aside from proving the truth of the matter asserted. Consequently, defendant contends that the admission of these questions violated the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and his state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation. In the alternative, defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not viewing the DVD prior to ruling on the admissibility of the objected to questions and/or that these questions should have been excluded pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2007) because whatever probative value the questions arguably had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As discussed infra, we disagree.\nWith regard to the DVD and its content, the trial judge ruled that: (1) the detectives\u2019 questions, and defendant\u2019s responses were relevant under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2007); (2) defendant\u2019s responses to the questions were admissible pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(d)(A) (2007) as \u201cadmission[s] by a party opponent\u201d; and (3) the out-of-court statements purportedly made by co-defendants and others that were contained in the detectives\u2019 questions were not hearsay, as they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to explain the officers\u2019 course of investigation and to show their effect on defendant. The court also found that redacting the detectives\u2019 questions would make defendant\u2019s answers to those questions unintelligible and confuse the jury and concluded that their prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh their probative value. Finally, the court gave a limiting instruction telling the jury not to consider the statements attributed to non-testifying third parties for the truth of the matter asserted.\nOn appeal, as he did below, defendant objects to eight specific portions of the detectives\u2019 questions, which he contends were erroneously admitted. These include purported statements made by: (1) defendant\u2019s sisters that he was downstairs at the kitchen table when Grady was talking about the robbery; (2) unidentified \u201cother people\u201d that defendant left the house on the night of the murder; (3) defendant\u2019s sisters that he was present in the house when others were talking about the robbery; (4) Grady and Graham that defendant was in the house when others were talking about the robbery; (5) unidentified \u201cpeople\u201d that defendant was at Owens\u2019s house on the night in question; (6) Grady that defendant, Bowser, and Graham were with her at Owens\u2019s house on the night in question; (7) Grady that she gave a gun to defendant; and (8) Graham that defendant p\u00falled a gun out as he ran into Owens\u2019s house and that defendant and Bowser put their \u201c \u2018hoodies up\u2019 \u201d before going inside the house.\ni. Relevance\nFirst, defendant contends that these questions should have been redacted because they are not relevant. This argument is without merit.\n\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having' any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401. \u201c[I]n criminal cases, every circumstance that is calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible.\u201d State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 286-87, 141 S.E.2d 506, 513 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1020, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1966). \u201cIn order to be relevant, . . . evidence need not bear directly on the question in issue if it is helpful to understand the conduct of the parties, their motives, or if it reasonably allows the jury to draw an inference as to a disputed fact.\u201d State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 356, 402 S.E.2d 600, 611 (1991). \u201cThe value of the evidence need only be slight.\u201d Id. at 355, 402 S.E.2d at 610. In addition, the Supreme Court of North Carolina \u201chas held that out-of-court statements offered to explain the conduct of a witness are relevant and admissible.\u201d Id. at 356, 402 S.E.2d at 611. \u201c[E]ven though a trial court\u2019s rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, such rulings are given great deference on appeal.\u201d State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 290, 416 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915, 121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992).\nHere, the detectives\u2019 questions were relevant. Their content made facts of consequence to this case more probable or less probable than they would be otherwise. The questions and their answers were relevant to facts under dispute. In addition, here, the questions gave context to defendant\u2019s responses. As discussed infra, during the course of questioning, defendant eventually conceded to the truth of many of the statements relayed to him via the detectives\u2019 questions. The circumstances under which these concessions were made were relevant to understanding the concessions themselves and therefore to the subject matter of the case. At other times, after being confronted with the purported statements of others via the detectives\u2019 questions, defendant changed his story substantially. In these instances, the questions were also relevant to explain and provide context to defendant\u2019s subsequent conduct of changing his story. In sum, the detectives\u2019 questions were clearly relevant.\nii. Hearsay\nHearsay is defined as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c). \u201cHowever, out-of-court statements offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not considered hearsay.\u201d State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 409, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998). The Supreme Court of North Carolina \u201chas held that statements of one person to another to explain subsequent actions taken by the person to whom the statement was made are admissible as nonhearsay evidence.\u201d Id. (citing State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 282, 389 S.E.2d 48, 56 (1990)). \u201cThe reason such statements are admissible is not that they fall under an exception to the rule, but that they simply are not hearsay [because] they do not come within the above legal definition of the term.\u201d Long v. Paving Co., 47 N.C. App. 564, 569, 268 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1980). The Confrontation Clause \u201cdoes not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 197-98 n.9 (2004). Our standard of review on this issue is de novo. See State v. Hazelwood, 187 N.C. App. 94, 98, 652 S.E.2d 63, 66 (2007) (\u201cThe trial court concluded that this portion of Defendant\u2019s statement was not hearsay under Rule 801(c) because it was not offered for its truth. We review the trial court\u2019s determination de novo.\u201d), cert. denied, 363 N.C. 133, 673 S.E.2d 867 (2009).\nHere, the trial court relied on State v. Chapman in ruling that the questions containing statements attributed to non-testifying third parties were admissible because they were not offered for their truth. 359 N.C. 328, 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005).\nIn Chapman, a testifying detective was permitted to read to the jury a statement made by the defendant during his police interview, which stated, inter alia, that \u201c \u2018[a]round noon, somebody called [the house where the defendant was at] and said they were going to kill whoever was in the house over [the victim\u2019s] death. [Defendant] then left and went to [Lee] Green\u2019s house.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 355, 611 S.E.2d at 815. The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that the \u201cwords of the unidentified caller contained within defendant\u2019s statement to [the detective] [were] not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Id., 611 S.E.2d at 816. Specifically, the \u201c[e]vidence of the phone call was admitted to show [the] defendant\u2019s response to receiving the call, not to prove that the caller would actually harm the people in [the] house.\u201d Id. Thus, that Court held that \u201cthe phone call was admissible to explain [the] defendant\u2019s subsequent conduct in leaving [the] house.\u201d Id.\nAlso, in Chapman, the trial court admitted the same detective\u2019s testimony regarding the contents of an interview in which the detective used the statements of others to elicit a response from a witness (\u201cGreen\u201d) who was with the defendant both at the time the murder occurred as well as when the aforementioned phone call was received. When Green was confronted with the purported statements of others during his second police interview, including that \u201c \u2018there were statements made\u2019 \u201d that Green was \u201c \u2018aware of the shooting that occurred\u2019 \u201d, Green \u201c \u2018broke down\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018told law enforcement a different story.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 359-60, 611 S.E.2d at 818. The Court held that the testimony regarding what others said was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, \u201cthe central purpose . . . was to show Green\u2019s response to being caught in a lie during his second police interview.\u201d Id at 360, 611 S.E.2d at 818.\nThe Chapman case is applicable to the case sub judice. Here, the purported statements of co-defendants and others that were contained in the detectives\u2019 questions were not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein but to show the effect they had on defendant and his response. When the detectives confronted defendant with the aforementioned statements they allegedly received from others, defendant changed his story significantly. Indeed, when the detectives began questioning him, he denied all knowledge of the events that occurred at Owens\u2019s house and stated that he did not leave his residence on the night in question. However, upon being confronted with statements from others that implicated him, defendant admitted his presence at the scene, knowing about the plan to rob Owens, and that he went to Owens\u2019s house with the intent to rob him. In fact, each time defendant was confronted with statements of others, he changed his story a little bit more.\nFurthermore, in the recorded interview defendant essentially admitted to the truth of every out-of-court statement with one exception. Specifically, defendant never admitted that he had a gun during the robbery. However, while defendant never admitted to possessing a gun at the scene, he did change his story significantly regarding the weapons when confronted with the questions containing the purported statements of Grady and Graham. Originally, defendant stated that only Grady possessed a firearm; however, upon being confronted with statements allegedly made by Grady and Graham that he did have a firearm, he changed his story to say that all of his co-defendants had firearms, but that he did not. In other words, here, the detectives\u2019 questions containing these purported statements had an immediately noticeable effect on defendant as the listener and caused him to change his story in such a way that his later statements became mutually exclusive of substantial parts of his earlier statements. Because defendant changed his story as a result of these out-of-court statements, it can be properly said that these questions were admitted to show their effect on defendant, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Moreover, given that defendant was convicted under the theory of acting in concert, defendant did not need to possess a gun in order to be found guilty of the charges for which he was accused, since he admitted that he knew that his co-defendants did have firearms.\nDefendant relies extensively on State v. Canady to argue that the out-of-court statements constituted hearsay and were not admissible for any valid non-hearsay purpose. 355 N.C. 242, 559 S.E.2d 762 (2002). In that case, along with a series of other errors, the trial court admitted a detective\u2019s testimony regarding what a prison inmate told him another inmate said about certain murders that the detective was investigating and about the defendant\u2019s role in them. Id. at 246, 559 S.E.2d at 764. The State argued that the detective\u2019s testimony as to what he heard from the inmate served \u201cto show the [detective\u2019s] conduct after he received the information\u201d and therefore, was not hearsay. Id. The trial court also instructed the jury to not consider the out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted. Id.\nHowever, Canady is distinguishable from the instant case. There, the Supreme Court of North Carolina essentially found that the State\u2019s proffered purpose for using this testimony, i.e., to explain the detective\u2019s \u201csubsequent actions\u201d, did not reflect the actual use of the statements made by the State at trial:\n[T]he State\u2019s closing argument confirms that the State did not use [the detective\u2019s] statement merely as an explanation of subsequent actions. Instead, the State relied on [the detective\u2019s] testimony as substantive evidence of the details of the murders and to imply [the] defendant had given a detailed confession of his alleged crimes. By using [the detective\u2019s] testimony in this manner, the State undoubtedly sought to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Accordingly, the testimony at issue was inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, despite the trial court\u2019s provision of a limiting instruction, we hold [the detective\u2019s] testimony went so far beyond the confines of this instruction that the jury could not reasonably have restricted its attention to any nonhearsay elements in [the detective\u2019s] testimony.\nId. at 249, 559 S.E.2d at 766. In fact, the prosecutor in that case based his central theory of the case on the out-of-court statements and cited facts from those statements in closing argument. Here, the prosecution did not use the out-of-court statements to build its case, nor did it reference them in closing argument. Rather, the State offered these statements for a valid nonhearsay purpose and used them for that same purpose.\nIn sum, the questions containing alleged statements of non-testifying individuals were admissible so that the jury could understand the circumstances in which the defendant was caught in a lie, changed his story, and made significant admissions of fact, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Because this \u201cevidence [was] admitted for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, the protection afforded by the Confrontation Clause against testimonial statements is not at issue\u201d here, and the admission of these questions did not violate defendant\u2019s state and federal confrontation rights. State v. Walker, 170 N.C. App. 632, 635, 613 S.E.2d 330, 333, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196 (2005). Accordingly, we overrule these assignments of error.\niii. Failure to Exercise Discretion and Rule 403\nDefendant next argues that the trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 by: (1) completely failing to exercise its discretion because it did not view the DVD before ruling on its admissibility; and (2) refusing to redact the aforementioned questions. These arguments are without merit.\nRelevant \u201cevidence may [still] be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403: \u201cWhether to exclude relevant evidence under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 is in the trial court\u2019s discretion; we review the trial court\u2019s decision for an abuse of that discretion.\u201d State v. Sims, 161 N.C. App. 183, 190, 588 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2003). \u201cA trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only Upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985). \u201cIn determining whether to exclude evidence on the grounds of undue prejudice, the trial court should consider \u2018the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.\u2019 \u201d Reis v. Hoots, 131 N.C. App. 721, 727, 509 S.E.2d 198, 203 (1998) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee\u2019s note), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537 S.E.2d 481 (1999).\n[Where] the trial judge [gives] a limiting instruction with regard to the evidence in dispute, it follows that he recognized the potential for prejudice and exercised his discretion in permitting its introduction. This Court will not intervene where the trial court properly appraises the probative and prejudicial values of evidence under Rule 403.\nId.\nIn support of his argument that the trial court completely failed to exercise its discretion, defendant principally relies on State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985) and State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 272 S.E.2d 123 (1980). However, these cases are inapposite to the instant case. In both Ashe and Lang, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed whether the respective trial judges had failed to exercise their discretion by denying a jury request to review the testimony of an alibi witness when said request was made subsequent to the respective juries retiring for deliberation. Ashe, 314 N.C. at 33, 37, 331 S.E.2d at 656; Lang, 301 N.C. at 510-11, 272 S.E.2d at 124-25. In both cases, the Court concluded that the respective trial judges\u2019 responses indicated that they erroneously believed that they did not have the discretion to grant the juries\u2019 requests and thus erroneously failed to exercise their discretion. Ashe, 314 N.C. at 35, 331 S.E.2d at 656-57; Lang, 301 N.C. at 510-11, 272 S.E.2d at 124-25. Further, the respective errors were prejudicial because they implicated the only defense raised by the respective defendants, i.e., an alibi. Ashe, 314 N.C. at 37, 331 S.E.2d at 657-58; Lang, 301 N.C. at 511, 272 S.E.2d at 125.\nNeither Ashe nor Lang stand for the proposition that a trial court\u2019s decision to not physically view evidence before admitting it constitutes an absolute failure to exercise discretion. Furthermore, we believe that a close review of the record indicates that the trial court did exercise its discretion here by questioning the parties regarding the content of the recorded statements and the objections to that content. Specifically, the court asked both parties to provide a forecast of what was contained in the DVD and made its ruling based on said forecasts. Defendant does not assert that the forecasts were inaccurate, and our review of the transcript and the DVD lead us to conclude that said forecasts were accurate. Furthermore, given that the trial court gave \u201ca limiting instruction with regard to the evidence in dispute, it follows that he recognized the potential for prejudice and exercised his discretion in permitting its introduction.\u201d Reis, 131 N.C. App. at 727, 509 S.E.2d at 203. Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.\nNext, defendant argues the trial court should have redacted the questions containing purported statements made by non-testifying witnesses because any probative value \u201cwas vastly outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect\u201d and violated Rule 403. Based on the record here, we disagree.\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court heard counsels\u2019 respective arguments on the possible probative and prejudicial effect of the content of the DVD, took relevant case law into consideration, listened to counsels\u2019 respective forecasts as to what was contained in the DVD, and determined that redacting the detectives\u2019 questions from the DVD would serve to confuse the jury The court also instructed the jury as follows:\nThe Court did review the last portion of this exhibit, State\u2019s Exhibit 67, which had been identified as a copy of the DVD or interrogation of the defendant.... I want to give you an instruction about that. That is the statements of the officer in this interrogation that [Graham] or [Grady] or [Bowser] or others said things about what happened on January 23, 2006, or said things about what the defendant did, those statements are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted within those statements. They are offered for a limited purpose, that is as statements by the officer or officers to invite a response by the defendant and to explain the officer\u2019s conduct and the defendant\u2019s conduct during the investigation. To the extent they do so, you may consider them but may not consider them for the truth as they are not offered or received in evidence for that purpose[.]\nCourts \u201cpresume \u2018that jurors . . . attend closely the particular language of the trial court\u2019s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.\u2019 \u201d State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 618, 430 S.E.2d 188, 208 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 360 n.9 (1985)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 126 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1993). We believe this instruction is sufficiently clear as to how the jury was to treat the statements attributed to non-testifying third parties that were contained in the detectives\u2019 questions, and defendant did not object to this instruction or its content. Furthermore, the questions to which defendant objected comprised but a small portion, (less than one minute total), of defendant\u2019s approximately one-hour interview. The vast majority of them were posed at the beginning of the interview and resulted in defendant changing his original story substantially. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the trial court\u2019s decision not to redact the questions was \u201c \u2018manifestly unsupported by reason.\u2019 \u201d State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503, 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)).\nWhile we believe that publishing the recorded interview to the jury did not constitute error here, we nevertheless encourage trial courts to review the content of recorded interviews before publishing them to the jury to ensure that all out-of-court statements contained therein are either admissible for a valid nonhearsay purpose or as an exception to the hearsay rule in order to safeguard against an end-run around the evidentiary and constitutional proscriptions against the admission of hearsay. Further, we would like to remind trial courts that the questions police pose during suspect interviews may contain false accusations, inherently unreliable, unconfirmed or false statements, and inflammatory remarks that constitute legitimate points of inquiry during a police investigation, but that would otherwise be inadmissible in open court. As such, the wholesale publication of a recording of a police interview to the jury, especially law enforcement\u2019s investigatory questions, might very well violate the proscriptions against admitting hearsay or Rule 403. In such instances, trial courts would need to redact or exclude the problematic portions of law enforcement\u2019s investigatory questions/statements.\nB. Plain Error and Jury Instructions\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s \u201cinstructions on acting in concert in conjunction with attempted armed robbery, [first degree] burglary, and felony murder were prejudicially confusing, ambiguous, and incorrect as a matter of law because they permitted the jury to convict [him] of [these respective crimes based] upon a factually and legally impossible state of facts.\u201d We disagree.\nDefendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial. Jury instructions to which a defendant did not object are reviewed for plain error. State v. Goforth, 170 N.C. App. 584, 587, 614 S.E.2d 313, 315, cert. denied, 359 N.C. 854, 619 S.E.2d 854 (2005).\n\u201c[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,\u2019 or \u2018where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,\u2019 or the error \u2018 \u201cresulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial\u201d \u2019 or where the error is such as to \u2018seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings\u2019 or where it can be fairly said \u2018the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u2019 \u201d\nState v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F. 2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)). \u201cThe adoption of the \u2018plain error\u2019 rule does not mean that every failure to give a proper instruction mandates reversal regardless of the defendant\u2019s failure to object at trial.\u201d Id. \u201cIndeed, . . . \u2018[i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Id at 660-61, 300 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203, 212 (1977)).\nFurthermore, even if an instruction does contain technical errors,\na charge [to the jury] shall be considered as a whole in the same connected way in which it was given, and on the presumption that the jury did not overlook any portion of it, and, when so taken, it \u201cfairly and correctly presents the law, it will afford no ground for reversing the judgment, even if an isolated expression should be found technically inaccurate.\u201d\nState v. Valley, 187 N.C. 571, 572, 122 S.E. 373, 373-74 (1924) (quoting State v. Dill, 184 N.C. 645, 650, 113 S.E. 609, 612 (1922)).\ni. Attempted Robbery with a Firearm\nDefendant argues that the trial court committed plain error because its instructions on attempted robbery with a firearm and acting in concert essentially informed the jury that it could convict him of attempted robbery with a firearm based on his shared purpose or intent to commit an attempt rather than a shared purpose or intent to commit the completed substantive offense. We disagree.\nDefendant concedes that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the intent element of robbery with a firearm. After instructing the jury on the requisite elements for robbery with a firearm, the trial court then proceeded to give the following instruction on acting in concert:\nNow for a person to be guilty of a crime it is not necessary that he personally do all of the acts pecessary to constitute the crime. If two or more persons join in a common purpose to com-it robbery with a firearm, each of them if actually or constructively present is guilty of that crime if the other person commits the crime and also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose to commit robbery with a firearm or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.\nWith regard to the intent element of attempted robbery with a firearm the trial court stated:\nNow, attempted robbery with a firearm is attempting to rob another by endangering or threatening him with a firearm. For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove . . . that the defendant intended to rob a person, that is to take and carry away personal property from that person or in his presence without his consent knowing that he, the defendant, was not entitled to take it, intending to deprive that person of its use permanently. ... The instructions I have given you previously concerning acting in concert with another person or persons are equally applicable here and you should consider them here.\n(Emphasis added). The trial court further instructed:\nSo if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date, the defendant acting by himself or acting together with another person or persons intended to rob a person, and that in furtherance of this intent, he possessed a firearm which he used in such a manner as to endanger or threaten the life of that person and if this was an act designed to bring about the robbery and which in the ordinary course of things would have resulted in robbery had it not been stopped or thwarted, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of attempted robbery with a firearm.\n(Emphasis added). The italicized portions of these instructions are clear that in order to find defendant guilty of attempted robbery with a firearm, the jury had to find that he \u201cintended to rob a person\u201d. In other words, the court instructed the jury that it had to find that defendant had the intent to commit the completed substantive offense, not merely the intent to commit an attempt. Furthermore, the italicized portion of the latter instruction is clear that the only real difference between robbery with a firearm and attempted robbery with a firearm is that with the former, a defendant, or someone with whom he is acting in concert, is successful in taking and carrying away the victim\u2019s property, but with the latter he is not. Accordingly, we do not believe the court committed error, much less plain error, in instructing the jury on attempted robbery with a firearm and the theory of acting in concert.\nii. First Degree Burglary\nDefendant also contends that the trial court \u201ccommitted a similar error in instructing on first-degree burglary and its lesser included offenses.\u201d As discussed infra, while we believe that some of the instructions on first degree burglary were a bit confusing and technically incorrect, we do not believe they rise to the level of plain error. The trial judge instructed the jury on first degree burglary as follows:' \u201cThe defendant has been charged with first degree burglary, which is breaking and entering the occupied dwelling of another without his consent in. the nighttime with the intent to commit robbery or attempted robbery.\u201d (Emphasis added). Later, in instructing the jury on the intent element, the court stated that the jury had to find that .\u201cat the time of the breaking and entering, the defendant intended to commit robbery with a firearm or attempted robbery with a firearm or common law robbery or attempted common law robbery.\u201d (Emphasis added). Finally, in instructing the jury on acting in concert and first degree burglary, the court stated:\nSo if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that... defendant acting either by himself or acting together with another person or other persons broke into and entered an occupied dwelling house without the tenant\u2019s consent during the nighttime and at that time intended to commit robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm or common law robbery or attempted common law robbery, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of first degree burglary.\n(Emphasis added). The italicized portions of these instructions do appear to inform the jury that it could convict defendant based on his intent to commit an attempt. However, the trial court also specifically referred the jury back to its previous instructions on, inter alia, the elements of attempted armed robbery and attempted common law robbery: \u201cThe instructions I have given you previously about the definition and the elements of the offense of robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, common law robbery, and attempted common law robbery are equally applicable here and you are directed to consider those instructions here.\u201d Both the instructions on attempted robbery with a firearm and attempted common law robbery were correct. The instructions on the intent element of those crimes make it clear that defendant must have \u201cintended to rob a person\u201d by using a firearm or \u201cintended to commit common law robbery\u201d for him to be convicted of first degree burglary.\nHere, the instructions, when taken as a whole, are sufficiently clear to inform the jury that in order to find defendant guilty of first degree burglary, defendant actually had to have the intent to commit the completed crime, not merely the intent to commit an attempt, and that the difference between the completed crimes of robbery with a firearm and common law robbery and the crimes of attempted robbery with a firearm and attempted common law robbery, is a defendant\u2019s success or lack thereof in obtaining the property. Hence, although the instruction on first degree burglary does contain technically confusing and erroneous language, we find that on the whole, the instructions fairly and correctly presented the law and do not rise to the level of plain error.\niii. Felony Murder\nDefendant also argues that the instructions on acting in concert in connection with felony murder were erroneous. The trial court gave the jury the following instruction on acting in concert in the context of felony murder:\nNow for a person to be guilty of a crime it is not necessary that he personally do all of the acts necessary to constitute the crime. If two or more persons join in a common purpose to commit first degree murder based on the felony murder rule, each of them if actively or constructively present is guilty of that crime if the other person commits the crime and also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of a common purpose to commit first degree murder based, on the felony murder rule or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.\n(Emphasis added). Defendant correctly points out that this instruction is technically erroneous, as \u201cfirst degree murder based on the felony murder rule\u201d is not one of the underlying felonies that supports first degree felony murder. However, the trial court\u2019s later instructions served to eliminate all possibility of error or confusion. The trial court instructed the jury that robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, common law robbery, attempted common law robbery, first degree burglary, or second degree burglary were the possible underlying felonies upon which a felony murder conviction could be predicated. Although the trial court did make an inadvertent misstatement which seemed to indicate \u201cfirst degree murder based on the felony murder rule\u201d could also serve as an underlying felony upon which a conviction of felony murder could be based, the court\u2019s subsequent instructions were sufficiently clear that it was not. Moreover, the verdict sheets provided to the jury clearly and correctly stated the underlying felonies that could support a conviction for felony murder. As such, we do not believe the trial court\u2019s initial misstatement rises to the level of plain error.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn sum, after careful review of defendant\u2019s arguments in this case, we find no error.\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and ERVIN concur.\n. At the time of the robbery, Bowser was fourteen years old. He testified that he received a plea agreement for second degree murder and armed robbery. On cross-examination, Bowser admitted that he knew this agreement eliminated the possibility of a life sentence.\n. As discussed infra, the State presented to the jury a DVD recording of this interview, which began either \u201cvery late\u201d in the evening on 27 January or shortly after midnight on 28 January 2006. No transcription of the interview was prepared or included in the record. Nevertheless, the DVD is included in the record and is properly before us. We have reviewed the DVD in its entirety and include some of its pertinent content herein.\n. One sister was referred to as \u201cNay Nay\u201d; the other was referred to as \u201cDee-dee\u201d. (Phonetic spellings).\n. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in its instructio\u00f1s on acting in concert with respect to attempted common-law robbery, second degree burglary, and felonious breaking or entering. However, defendant was not convicted of these offenses; thus, it is unclear how these instructions, even if erroneous, could have prejudiced him.\n. We note that this instruction is nearly a verbatim statement of N.C.P.I.- \u2014 Crim. 202.10 (June 2006). The only significant difference is that, here, the instruction refers to the specific crime of robbery with a firearm.\n. The trial court instructed the jury that to find defendant guilty of attempted common law robbery, the State had to prove \u201cdefendant intended to commit common law robbery . . . [and] \u00e1t the time the defendant had this intent, he performed an act which was calculated and designed to bring about common law robbery, but which fell short of the completed offense and which came so close to bringing it about that in the ordinary and likely course of things, he would have completed that crime had he not been stopped or prevented from completing his apparent course of action.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Joan M. Cunningham, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MAURICE RASHAD MILLER\nNo. COA08-650\n(Filed 19 May 2009)\n1. Evidence\u2014 relevance \u2014 interrogation of defendant \u2014 detectives\u2019 questions \u2014 third-party statements embedded\nQuestions from detectives to defendant that included statements attributed to nontestifying third parties were relevant to facts in dispute and gave context to defendant\u2019s responses.\n2. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 interrogation of defendant \u2014 detectives\u2019 questions \u2014 third-party statements embedded\nQuestions from detectives to defendant that included statements attributed to nontestifying third parties were not hearsay where they were offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but so that the jury could understand the circumstances in which, defendant was caught in a lie, changed his story, and made significant admissions of fact.\n3. Evidence\u2014 ruling on admissibility \u2014 recording not seen\u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not fail to exercise its discretion in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 by not viewing a recording of defendant\u2019s interrogation before ruling on whether certain portions should be redacted where the court asked the parties to provide a forecast of what was in the DVD, made its ruling based on the forecasts, and gave a limiting instruction on the disputed evidence. Moreover, the cases cited do not stand for the proposition that a trial court\u2019s decision to not physically view evidence before admitting it constitutes an absolute failure to exercise discretion.\n4. Evidence\u2014 recording of interrogation \u2014 request to redact refused \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution for murder and other offenses by not redacting portions of a recording of defendant\u2019s interrogation where the court heard counsels\u2019 arguments, took relevant case law into consideration, listened to counsels\u2019 forecast of what was contained in the DVD, and determined that redacting the questions in issue would confuse the jury. The court gave a limiting instruction, and the challenged evidence constituted a small portion of the interview.\n5. Robbery\u2014 instructions \u2014 attempt\u2014intent to commit completed offense\nThere was no plain error in instructions on attempted robbery with a firearm and acting in concert where the court was clear that the jury had to find the intent by defendant to commit the completed substantive offense.\n6. Robbery\u2014 instructions \u2014 attempted robbery \u2014 intent to commit substantive crime \u2014 no plain error\nThe difference between an attempted robbery and a robbery is defendant\u2019s success or failure in obtaining the property, and instructions on first-degree burglary and its lesser-included offenses, taken as a whole, were sufficiently clear to inform the jury that defendant had to have the intent to commit a robbery and not merely the intent to commit an attempt.\n7. Homicide\u2014 felony murder \u2014 instructions\u2014no plain error\nThere was no plain error in an instruction on felony murder where the court\u2019s initial instruction was technically erroneous, but the court\u2019s latter instructions served to eliminate all possibility of error or confusion. Moreover, the jury verdict sheets clearly and correctly stated the underlying felonies that could support a conviction for felony murder.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 18 December 2007 by Judge Jerry Cash Martin in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2009.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Joan M. Cunningham, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0078-01", "first_page_order": 108, "last_page_order": 129 }