{ "id": 4167637, "name": "LENNIE and BONNIE HAMBY, Plaintiffs v. PROFILE PRODUCTS, LLC, TERRA-MULCH PRODUCTS, LLC, ROY D. HOFFMAN, and ELECTRIC SERVICE GROUP, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hamby v. Profile Products, LLC", "decision_date": "2009-05-19", "docket_number": "No. COA08-942", "first_page": "99", "last_page": "115", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 99" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640284 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Council of Churches v. State, 120 N.C. App. 84, 92, 461 S.E.2d 354, 360 (1995), aff'd, 343 N.C. 117, 468 S.E.2d 58 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636401 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639662 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "233-34" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs could not complain that they had insufficient time to produce evidence where the trial court transformed defendants' Rule 12(b)(6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8914775 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84", "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs could not complain that they had insufficient time to produce evidence where the trial court transformed defendants' Rule 12(b)(6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571905, 8571842, 8571878, 8571771, 8571807 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0555-05", "/nc/306/0555-03", "/nc/306/0555-04", "/nc/306/0555-01", "/nc/306/0555-02" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524761 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "holding the trial court erred by granting summary judgment a short time after initial discovery requests, and the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant's promise to provide additional discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523404 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630-31", "parenthetical": "holding the trial court erred by granting summary judgment a short time after initial discovery requests, and the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant's promise to provide additional discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "stating that \"plaintiff did not have adequate time to develop his case\" where trial court granted summary judgment while plaintiff had pending discovery requests and had not been dilatory" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9192163 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "stating that \"plaintiff did not have adequate time to develop his case\" where trial court granted summary judgment while plaintiff had pending discovery requests and had not been dilatory" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798906 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914119 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155169 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Council of Churches v. State, 120 N.C. App. 84, 92, 461 S.E.2d 354, 360 (1995), aff'd, 343 N.C. 117, 468 S.E.2d 58 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220-21" }, { "page": "220-21", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court's grant of summary judgment before completion of discovery did not prejudice party opposing summary judgment because information sought by pending discovery requests emerged at the hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571908 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220009 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reversing directed verdict on Woodson claim for defendant-employer" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11362390 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reversing directed verdict on Woodson claim for defendant-employer" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916593 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519942 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248-49", "parenthetical": "quoting Dollar v. Tapp, 103 N.C. App. 162, 163-64, 404 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1991)" }, { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9366209 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "quoting Dollar v. Tapp, 103 N.C. App. 162, 163-64, 404 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1991)" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548756 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" }, { "page": "669", "parenthetical": "reinstating grant of summary judgment to municipal employer because plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to establish Woodson claim" }, { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491466 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557-58" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "573-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186665 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8234955 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749409 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "225, 231-32" }, { "page": "231-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "335, 345-46" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743751 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0630-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1346, "char_count": 37768, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.915134239341815e-08, "percentile": 0.5003552330657115 }, "sha256": "91fbf62df48809c71c6fe035e71ce90c59a6de317c3b4c87bf4cc99321f0eb7d", "simhash": "1:09284464344f1c64", "word_count": 5830 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "LENNIE and BONNIE HAMBY, Plaintiffs v. PROFILE PRODUCTS, LLC, TERRA-MULCH PRODUCTS, LLC, ROY D. HOFFMAN, and ELECTRIC SERVICE GROUP, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThis is the second appeal arising from an action brought by Plaintiffs Lennie and Bonnie Hamby against defendants Roy Hoffman; Terra-Mulch, L.L.C. (\u201cTerra-Mulch\u201d); Profile Products, L.L.C. (\u201cProfile\u201d); and Electric Service Group, Inc. (\u201cESG\u201d), for personal injuries sustained in a workplace accident. Though this matter has been the subject of opinions from this Court and the Supreme Court, to appreciate the procedural posture of this case, we first describe the roles of each of the parties involved in this litigation.\nPlaintiff. Lennie Hamby (\u201cHamby\u201d) worked as a truck-dump operator for Terra-Mulch at its Conover, North Carolina plant. While descending an elevated platform to clear accumulated wood chips in an auger pit, he slipped and entangled his left leg in the augers, which failed to deactivate because the emergency switch was inoperable. The incident resulted in the amputation of his left leg above the knee. Lennie and Bonnie Hamby (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d) brought a civil action describing Terra-Mulch as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Profile; Profile as the alter ego of Terra-Mulch; Roy Hoffman as an Assistant Plant Manager for Terra-Mulch; and ESG as a corporation hired to perform electrical work at Terra-Mulch\u2019s Conover plant.\nPlaintiffs \u201callege that Profile and Terra-Mulch collectively failed to provide a safe work site for the inherently dangerous work Hamby performed and that they thus \u2018engaged in conduct which was grossly negligent, willful and wanton, and substantially certain to lead to death or serious injury ....\u2019\u201d Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 361 N.C. 630, 632, 652 S.E.2d 231, 233 (2007). Though Plaintiffs asserted joint claims against Profile and Terra-Mulch, Plaintiffs argued (and our Supreme Court so interpreted) that they were asserting a claim against Terra-Mulch pursuant to Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), and an ordinary negligence claim against Profile. Hamby, 361 N.C. at 634, 652 S.E.2d at 234. Plaintiffs also asserted a claim against Terra-Mulch\u2019s Assistant Plant Manager, Roy Hoffman, pursuant to Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), alleging that he \u201cengaged in misconduct which was willful and wanton.\u201d Finally, Plaintiffs alleged that. ESG negligently performed electrical work causing an emergency stop button to become inoperable, resulting in serious injury to Hamby.\nIn May 2005, all Defendants moved for summary judgment. On 1 June 2005, Plaintiffs moved to compel discovery, requesting relief pursuant to Rule 56 (f) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f). On 6 June 2005, without ruling on Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to Terra-Mulch and Hoffman, but denied summary judgment to Profile and ESG. Profile immediately appealed the denial of summary judgment to this Court, which in a divided opinion dismissed that appeal as interlocutory. Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 179 N.C. App. 151, 158, 632 S.E.2d 804, 809 (2006).\nBased on the dissenting opinion, Profile appealed as a matter of right to our Supreme Court, which found the denial of summary judgment to Profile immediately appealable. Hamby, 361 N.C. at 639, 652 S.E.2d at 237. To reach that result, the Supreme Court first agreed that Profile\u2019s appeal from the denial of summary judgment was interlocutory because the trial court\u2019s order \u201cdoes not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Id. at 633, 652 S.E.2d at 233 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court further noted that the trial court did not certify the matter for appeal under Rule 54(b); so, to merit review, the interlocutory order had to affect a substantial right. Id. at 634, 652 S.E.2d at 233-34. The Court next focused on Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations and evidence that \u201cProfile is [Terra-Mulch\u2019s] sole member[-manager],\u201d id. at 636-37, 652 S.E.2d at 235, and that under the pertinent statutes, \u201cwhen a member-manager is managing the LLC\u2019s business, its liability is inseparable from that of the LLC.\u201d Id. at 638, 652 S.E.2d at 236. Because Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations and forecast of evidence tended to show that Profile was conducting Terra-Mulch\u2019s business when Hamby was injured, the Supreme Court concluded that \u201cProfile\u2019s liability for actions taken while managing Terra-Mulch is inseparable from the liability of Terra-Mulch . ...\u201d Id. at 639, 652 S.E.2d at 237. It followed that the grant of .summary judgment to Terra-Mulch, while denying summary judgment to Profile, created the risk of inconsistent verdicts and made- the denial of summary judgment to Profile immediately appealable. Id. The Court further concluded that,\nthe trial court erred in denying Profile\u2019s motion for summary judgment because the denial was premised on Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion of a third-party ordinary negligence claim against Profile, a claim that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not bring against Profile. Therefore, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Profile.\nId.\nAfter the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, on 9 January and 3 March 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration regarding the granting of summary judgment in favor of Terra-Mulch, contending that,\nWhen the summary judgment arguments were heard . . ., the parties\u2019 arguments were premised on Profile\u2019s status as a separate legal entity apart from the employer, Terra-Mulch. As such, the misconduct on the part of Defendant Profile was not attributed to Defendant Terra-Mulch. The Supreme Court Opinion in this matter materially changed the substantive law governing issues involved in this case and compels a different result with respect to the summary judgment ruling in favor of Defendant Terra-Mulch. Under the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling, the actions, misconduct, and knowledge of Profile is properly attributable to Defendant Terra-Mulch.\nThe trial court denied Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Reconsideration on 8 May 2008 but certified \u201cthe judgment and all rulings in favor of Defendant Terra-Mulch Products, LLC\u201d to this Court for immediate review. Thereafter, Plaintiffs gave \u201cnotice of appeal from the following Orders, rulings, and actions of the trial court:\u201d\n(1) The Order by the Honorable Nathanial J. Poovey entered on 21 June 2005, granting Defendant Terra-Mulch Products, LLC\u2019s and Defendant Roy D. Hoffman\u2019s Motions for Summary Judgment;\n(2) The decision by the Honorable Nathanial J. Poovey to proceed with the hearing of Defendant Terra-Mulch Products, LLC\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment without addressing Plaintiff\u2019s pending Motion to Compel and request for relief pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure;\n(3) The Order of the Honorable Robert P. Johnston entered 27 July 2005, staying discovery pending Defendant Profile Products, LLC\u2019s appeal;\n(4) The decision by the Honorable Robert P. Johnston to proceed with the hearing of Defendant Profile Products, LLC\u2019s Motion to Stay without addressing Plaintiffs\u2019 pending Motion to Compel;\n(5) The 8 May 2008 Order by the Honorable Timothy L. Patti denying Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Reconsideration in Light of Subsequently-Decided Authority pursuant to N.C.R. Civ.P.60(b)(6); and\n(6) The decision of the Honorable Timothy L. Patti to proceed with the hearing of Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Reconsideration without addressing Plaintiffs\u2019 pending Motion to Compel and request for relief pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nPlaintiffs also filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking this Court to review the grant of summary judgment to Hoffman contemporaneously with the motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment to Terra-Mulch. Defendants Terra-Mulch and Hoffman opposed Plaintiffs\u2019 petition for writ of certiorari; Terra-Mulch also moved to dismiss this appeal.\nFrom the outset, we observe that our Supreme Court, in mandating the entry of summary judgment in favor of Profile, found it significant to note preliminarily \u201cthat plaintiffs did not cross-assign error to the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for Terra-Mulch on grounds that the exclusive remedy plaintiffs have against Terra-Mulch is under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d Id. at 634, 652 S.E.2d at 234. The Supreme Court pointed out that,\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint, amended three times, asserts all claims against Terra-Mulch and Profile jointly, and none of these claims allege ordinary negligence as to those defendants. Before the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court, plaintiffs have argued that Profile\u2019s liability is based on ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. The pivotal question presented by this case is whether, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are able to assert an ordinary negligence claim in civil court against Profile, the member-manager of the employer Terra-Mulch. To answer that question and, in so doing, determine whether the trial court\u2019s order creates the risk of inconsistent verdicts, we must decide whether Profile, like Terra-Mulch, is entitled to the protection of the exclusivity provision of Chapter 97.\nId.\nThe Court\u2019s statement that the Plaintiffs failed to \u201ccross-assign error to the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for Terra-Mulch on grounds that the exclusive remedy plaintiffs have against Terra-Mulch is under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act,\u201d when read alone, appears to indicate that the trial corut\u2019s order of summary judgment in favor of Terra-Mulch was a final order. However, in mandating that summary judgment be granted for Profile, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs could not establish a viable Woodson claim against Terra-Mulch. Instead, the Court held that \u201cthe trial court erred in denying Profile\u2019s motion for summary judgment because the denial was premised on Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion of a third-party ordinary negligence claim against Profile, a claim that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not bring against Profile.\u201d Id. at 639, 652 S.E.2d at 237. Thus, we now address the issues arising from the granting of summary judgment for Terra-Mulch.\nOn appeal, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by (I) granting summary judgment in favor of Terra-Mulch on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to establish a Woodson claim; (II) denying their motion to reconsider because our Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in this case changed the law regarding evidence that could be. attributed to Terra-Mulch at summary judgment; and (III) failing to consider discoverable evidence by not ruling on Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel discovery.\nI.\nPlaintiffs first contend that the-trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Terra-Mulch on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to establish a Woodson claim; and thus, their exclusive remedy was under the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act. We uphold the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Terra-Mulch.\n\u201cSummary judgment is proper \u2018if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Draughon v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 212, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2001)), aff\u2019d per curiam, 358 N.C. 381, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004). \u201cA defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by \u2018(1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff\u2019s case is nonexistent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citations omitted). \u201cWhen considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573-74, 669 S.E.2d 572; 576 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThe burden of establishing a Woodson claim is akin to a showing of culpability required to establish an intentional tort:\n[W]hen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the personal representative of the estate in case of death, may pursue a civil action against the employer. Such misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the [Worker\u2019s Compensation] Act.\nWoodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 340-41, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (1991). \u201cThe elements of a Woodson claim are: (1) misconduct by the employer; (2) intentionally engaged in; (3) with the knowledge that the misconduct is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to an employee; and (4) that employee is injured as a consequence of the misconduct.\u201d Pastva v. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc., 121 N.C. App. 656, 659, 468 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1996) (citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228). \u201cSuch circumstances exist where there is uncontroverted evidence of the employer\u2019s intentional misconduct and where such misconduct is substantially certain to lead to the employee\u2019s serious injury or death.\u201d Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 557, 597 S.E.2d 665, 668 (2003). Woodson created \u201ca narrow exception to the exclusivity provisions of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act,\u201d applicable \u201conly in the most egregious cases of employer misconduct.\u201d Id.\nWoodson\u2019s facts are unquestionably the benchmark for a plaintiff seeking to escape the exclusivity provision of this State\u2019s Worker\u2019s Compensation Act.\nIn Woodson, the defendant-employer\u2019s president was on the job site and observed first-hand the obvious hazards of the deep trench in which he directed the decedent-employee to work. Knowing that safety regulations and common trade practice mandated the use of precautionary shoring, the defendant-employer\u2019s president nonetheless disregarded all safety measures and intentionally placed his employee into a hazardous situation in which experts concluded that only one outcome was substantially certain to follow: an injurious, if not fatal, cave-in of the trench.\nWhitaker, 357 N.C. at 557-58, 597 S.E.2d at 668 (citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 335, 345-46, 407 S.E.2d at 225, 231-32).\nIn sharp contrast to Woodson\u2019s singular circumstances, in this case, Plaintiffs relied on the following forecast of evidence at summary judgment: deposition testimony of employees acknowledging injuries and dangerous conditions at Terra-Mulch\u2019s Conover plant; an affidavit from a certified safety professional opining that documented OSHA violations at Terra-Mulch\u2019s Conover plant created \u201can extremely dangerous\u201d work environment and made it \u201cvirtually inevitable that an employee would be killed or seriously injured\u201d; Hoffman\u2019s agreement during his deposition that conditions documented by the Risk Assessment Report indicated a \u201cvirtual inevitability that somebody would be seriously injured unless safety changes were implemented\u201d; and post-incident OSHA citations for safety violations at the Conover plant, including the lack of a stairway from the loading dock to the truck-dump operator platform and inadequate guarding. There was also evidence that it was customary for workers to complete their tasks in a manner that exposed them to the safety violations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Terra-Mulch despite Plaintiffs\u2019 pending discovery requests. We agree that Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence was insufficient.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence in this case is not unlike the plaintiff-employee\u2019s insufficient allegations in Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993). In Pendergrass, the plaintiff-employee asserted Pleasant claims against his co-employee-defendants and a Woodson claim against his employer-defendant. Id. at 237, 424 S.E.2d at 394. The plaintiff-employee alleged that the co-employee and employer defendants proximately caused his injuries because they were \u201cgrossly and wantonly negligent\u201d in designing and permitting the use of a machine with inadequate guards in violation of OSHA standards, and further directing him to work at the inadequately guarded machine. Id. at 238, 424 S.E.2d at 394. The Court held that the plaintiff-employee did not state a Pleasant claim because, while the co-employee-defendants \u201cmay have known certain dangerous parts of the machine were unguarded when they instructed [the plaintiff-employee] to work at the machine, we do not believe this supports an inference that they intended that [the plaintiff-employee] be injured or that they were manifestly indifferent to the consequences of his doing so.\u201d Id. at 238, 424 S.E.2d at 394. Nor were the plaintiff-employee\u2019s allegations sufficient to meet \u201cthe higher level of negligence as defined in Woodson of substantial certainty of injury.\u201d Id. at 239-40, 424 S.E.2d at 395.\nSimilar to the plaintiff-employee\u2019s allegations in Pendergrass, Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence here shows that Hamby was injured by Terra-Mulch\u2019s inadequately guarded machinery \u2014 the rotating augers \u2014 in violation of OSHA standards. Our Supreme Court, however, found this circumstance insufficient to establish a Woodson claim, even when coupled with an allegation that supervisors specifically directed the employee to work in the face of the hazard. Id. at 235, 424 S.E.2d at 393. Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations and forecast of evidence in this case did not demonstrate that Hamby was specifically instructed to descend from the truck-dump operator platform in the manner that exposed him to the hazardous augers, or that Terra-Mulch was otherwise \u201csubstantially certain\u201d he would be seriously injured. But cf. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 346, 407 S.E.2d at 231-32 (\u201c[The employer\u2019s president\u2019s] knowledge and prior disregard of dangers associated with trenching; his presence at the site and opportunity to observe the hazards; his direction to proceed without the required safety procedures; [and evidence showing the trench\u2019s inherent danger] . . . converge to make plaintiff\u2019s evidentiary forecast sufficient to survive [the employer]\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\u201d). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence at summary judgment was insufficient to establish their Woodson claim against Terra-Mulch.\nII.\nNext, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by denying their motion to reconsider its grant of summary judgment for Terra-Mulch because the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion changed the applicable law. Plaintiffs seek relief under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) contending that the Supreme Court\u2019s holding that Profile\u2019s knowledge and misconduct can be imputed to Terra-Mulch changed the governing law that was applied in the summary judgment hearing, at which Profile and Terra-Mulch were treated as separate entities. We hold that the trial court was within its discretion to deny Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to reconsider.\nPlaintiffs argue that in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion, the trial court should further consider their evidence against Profile \u2014 a Risk Assessment Report prepared prior to Hamby\u2019s injury \u2014 as being attributable to Terra-Mulch. The Risk Assessment Report memorializes a risk control consultant\u2019s safety inspection of Terra-Mulch\u2019s Conover plant on 7 February 2002 for purposes of insuring the plant. The consultant generally found safety conditions at the Conover Terra-Mulch plant unsatisfactory, and also made the following specific findings, which Plaintiffs deem particularly relevant to their Woodson claim:\n[The Conover Terra-Mulch plant] has all the red flags of an uncontrolled high hazard account. High risk operation with frequency, severity and catastrophic worker compensation exposures, new management (acting plant manager and most experience on site manager has been there less than a year) (sic), high turn over, low paying jobs, basic OSHA controls not in place, no safety program, no accountabilities, no safety culture. Corporate pressure is work 24/7 and get production out.\nBasically no [risk management programs] in place. There may be a sign here and there; safety glasses are worn and emergency exit maps, but that is it.\nPhysical Exposures \u2014 Machinery (caught in/amputations); Exposure: High; Control: Needs Improvement; Comments: Choppers, chippers & augers needs improvement. There are some jury-rigged interlock controls but I would want to rely on them if I fell onto a conveyor and was moving toward a chipper, (sic)\nWorker\u2019s Compensation Comments: No foreign travel or aircraft. The acct has a turnover rate of between 30 and 70 employees a month. Most of these are temps but they also loose (sic) permanent employees each year (not sure how many, contact would not say). This provides a situation where employees are never really informally trained on jobs and we don\u2019t know the losses that have occurred to the temp. The acct keeps their OSHA log on their employees only and tell me the Temp agency takes care of the temps. The account has not addressed their basic OSHA requirements and basically I was told production is the only real concern. . . . The only accountability is budgetary and production.\nThis is the poorest worker\u2019s comp account I have seen in a long time. Without very strong guidance and leadership from the corporate office, it will never change (and based on used (sic) of temps and turnover, I don\u2019t think it will change even with corporate guidance). My opinion is that we should not insure this account.\nLikelihood of Compliance: My contact stated the emphasis is production. Also he feels that the turn over is so great, why train, people who ar\u00e9 gone tomorrow. . . . Right now this location is overwhelmed and corporate just isn\u2019t providing guidance. . . .\nFollowing the inspection, the safety consultant sent a letter, containing specific safety recommendations reflecting the unsatisfactory conditions, to Jim Cebulski, Profile\u2019s Vice President and Controller.\nRule 60(b)(6) authorizes a trial court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment for \u201c[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) (2007). Accordingly, \u201cthe Rule has been described as a \u2018grand reservoir of equitable power\u2019 by which a court may grant relief from a judgment .whenever extraordinary circumstances exist and there is a showing that justice demands it.\u201d Barnes v. Taylor, 148 N.C. App. 397, 400, 559 S.E.2d 246, 248-49 (2002) (quoting Dollar v. Tapp, 103 N.C. App. 162, 163-64, 404 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1991)). Rule 60(b)(6) is properly employed to revisit a judgment affected by a subsequent change in the law. See id,.; McNeil v. Hicks, 119 N.C. App. 579, 580-81, 459 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1995). However, this Court reviews a trial court\u2019s decision whether to grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) for an abuse of discretion. Barnes, 148 N.C. App. at 399, 559 S.E.2d at 248.\nHere, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s denial of Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to reconsider because their forecast of evidence is insufficient to establish a Woodson claim even when the Risk Assessment Report is attributed to Terra-Mulch. First, we deem it significant that the trial court heard evidence and arguments on all Defendants\u2019 summary judgment motions in the same hearing. We also observe that Plaintiffs in fact attributed the Risk Assessment Report to Terra-Mulch, with the same level of detail with which they cite the Report to this Court in this appeal, in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, even if we assume, as Plaintiffs contend, that the trial court did not consider the Risk Assessment Report for its probative value against Terra-Mulch, we hold that the consideration of the additional evidence would still not establish a prima facie Woodson claim against Terra-Mulch.\nTo reiterate, \u201c[t]he elements of a Woodson claim are: (1) misconduct by the employer; (2) intentionally engaged in; (3) with the knowledge that the misconduct is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to an employee; and (4) that employee is injured as a consequence of the misconduct.\u201d Pastva, 121 N.C. App. at 659, 468 S.E.2d at 494. Here, even though evidence in the record raises the suspicion that conditions at the Conover Terra-Mulch plant failed to comply with OSHA mandates, the evidence hardly shows that Terra-Mulch\u2019s noncompliance or other actions or omissions were substantially certain to cause serious injury or death. See Whitaker, 357 N.C. at 558, 597 S.E.2d at 669 (reinstating grant of summary judgment to municipal employer because plaintiff\u2019s evidence was insufficient to establish Woodson claim); see also Maraman v. Cooper Steel Fabricators, 146 N.C. App. 613, 555 S.E.2d 309 (2001) (reversing directed verdict on Woodson claim for defendant-employer), rev\u2019d in part, 355 N.C. 482, 562 S.E.2d 420 (2002) (per curiam). Rather, the most favorable view of Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence demonstrates that the auger pit was inadequately guarded prior to Hamby\u2019s injury, in violation of OSHA regulations; the Risk Assessment Report tends to show that Terra-Mulch was aware of the inadequately guarded augers before Hamby was injured. As in Pendergrass, the Risk Assessment Report, even when cumulated with Plaintiffs\u2019 original forecast of evidence, does not sufficiently show that Terra-Mulch was substantially certain that serious injury or death would result. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiffs\u2019 contention that the trial court erred by denying their motion to reconsider.\nIII.\nIn their final argument, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Terra-Mulch before ruling on their outstanding motion to compel discovery.\nAfter Terra-Mulch moved for summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery against Profile and Terra-Mulch. The motion specifically requested an order compelling discovery pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2), and stated further: \u201cAdditionally and out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiffs request relief pursuant to Rule 56(f) . . . insofar as [Profile and Terra-Mulch] are refusing to produce materials which would bolster Plaintiffs\u2019 opposition to [Profile\u2019s and Terjra-Mulch\u2019s] motion for summary judgment.\u201d The motion identified \u201cinformation regarding other workplace injuries, workplace safety and OSHA compliance issues, and documents related to investigation of workplace safety incidents,\u201d including Reports of Injury.\nThe trial court heard all pending motions, including Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel and outstanding summary judgment motions, in a single hearing that occurred on 6 and 8 June 2005. At the hearing, the trial court heard argument from all counsel regarding the evidence and claims, and subsequently the court requested argument on Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel. Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel identified the Reports of Injury as the most important information sought in their motion to compel. Ultimately, after further argument on the discovery issue from counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants, the following exchange occurred:\n[Terra-Mulch\u2019s counsel]: There\u2019s nothing that they\u2019ve asked for that would have any effect upon our argument as stated in our brief. If you\u2019ll look at them, nothing they\u2019re asking for has anything to do with it.\nThe Court: I haven\u2019t heard anything either, but, obviously, depending on how I rule on those other motions, it might take care of the motion to compel or a motion for protective order.\n[Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel]: Judge, as we stated in our brief, we think, based on the prior safety audit and the testimony of Mr. Hoffman that an injury, serious injury, was virtually inevitable, we think we meet the Woodson standard. I filed \u2014 I have filed a motion to compel and noticed their motion for protective order out of an abundance of caution to make sure I don\u2019t have to defend a motion without having documents that will bolster my case, but I think we have sufficient evidence in the record now to defeat the pending motions for summary judgment, but if there\u2019s any doubt with the Court, then I think I\u2019m entitled to those documents, because I think they might further bolster our case.\nThe remaining argument went to the merits of the pending motions for summary judgment with no further mention from either side of the discovery issues.\nIt is ordinarily error for a trial court to rule on a summary judgment motion without addressing a pending motion to compel discovery that \u201cmight lead to the production of evidence relevant to the motion . . . and the party seeking discovery has not been dilatory in doing so.\u201d Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 512, 256 S.E.2d 216, 220-21 (1979). However, the court \u201cis not barred in every case from granting summary judgment before discovery is completed.\u201d Patrick v. Wake Cty. Dep\u2019t of Pluman Servs., 188 N.C. App. 592, 597, 655 S.E.2d 920, 924 (2008) (quoting N.C. Council of Churches v. State, 120 N.C. App. 84, 92, 461 S.E.2d 354, 360 (1995), aff\u2019d, 343 N.C. 117, 468 S.E.2d 58 (1996)). A trial court\u2019s granting summary judgment before discovery is complete may not be reversible error if the party opposing summary judgment is not prejudiced. See Conover, 297 N.C. at 512-13, 256 S.E.2d at 220-21 (holding that trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment before completion of discovery did not prejudice party opposing summary judgment because information sought by pending discovery requests emerged at the hearing). But see Ussery v. Taylor, 156 N.C. App. 684, 686, 577 S.E.2d 159, 161 (2003) (stating that \u201cplaintiff did not have adequate time to develop his case\u201d where trial court granted summary judgment while plaintiff had pending discovery requests and had not been dilatory); Burge v. Integon Gen. Ins. Co., 104 N.C. App. 628, 630-31, 410 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1991) (holding the trial court erred by granting summary judgment a short time after initial discovery requests, and the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the defendant\u2019s promise to provide additional discovery). Moreover, this Court has stated that, generally, \u201cmotions for summary judgment should not be decided until all parties are prepared to present their contentions on all the issues raised and determinable under Rule 56.\u201d Am. Travel Corp. v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Tr. Co., 57 N.C. App. 437, 441, 291 S.E.2d 892, 895, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 555, 294 S.E.2d 369 (1982).\nPlaintiffs here argue the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without compelling production of Reports of Injury that allegedly would have \u201cbolstered\u201d their opposition to summary judgment. Plaintiffs characterized, at the summary judgment hearing and in their brief before this Court, the Reports of Injury as \u201cbolstering\u201d their opposition to summary judgment because they acknowledge receiving OSHA logs documenting the same injuries as the unproduced Reports of Injury. They also contend the Reports of Injury \u201ccould have proven the total number of workplace injuries at the [Conover Terra-Mulch] plant\u201d and \u201cthe occurrence of similar incidents.\u201d Before this Court, Plaintiffs depict the OSHA logs as insufficient because they \u201ccontain only the vaguest description of an injury such as \u2018left eye\u2019 or \u2018mashed left thumb.\u2019 \u201d\nIn contrast, Plaintiffs\u2019 position before the trial court was that they produced sufficient evidence to establish their Woodson claim against Terra-Mulch without the Reports of Injury, and their motion to compel was a mere \u201cabundance of caution\u201d \u2014 a figurative \u201cjust-in-case\u201d the trial court finds our evidence insufficient. Consistently with that position, Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel spent the remainder of the summary judgment hearing, on 8 June 2005, arguing the merits of the pending claims with no further insistence upon obtaining any additional discovery. Plaintiffs may not now argue the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Terra-Mulch before ruling on their motion to compel when Plaintiffs manifestly acquiesced in that course of events at the summary judgment hearing. Cf. Belcher v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 162 N.C. App. 80, 84, 590 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2004) (holding that plaintiffs could not complain that they had insufficient time to produce evidence where the trial court transformed defendants\u2019 Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs \u201cfully participated in the hearing\u201d and did not request a continuance at the hearing).\nMoreover, the trial court was required to give Plaintiffs, as the nonmoving party, the most favorable view of the evidence at summary judgment. Jones, 362 N.C. at 573-74, 669 S.E.2d at 576. Considering Plaintiffs\u2019 acknowledgment that the OSHA logs document most, if not all, of the same injuries documented by the Reports of Injury, we cannot conclude that any additional information in the Reports of Injury would have produced a different outcome. Nor are we moved by Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that any additional information in the Reports of Injury regarding \u201cthe total number of workplace injuries\u201d or \u201cthe occurrence of similar incidents\u201d would have assisted them any more than the OSHA logs in establishing their Woodson claim. Again, Plaintiffs were entitled to the most favorable view of the evidence in the OSHA logs, which show injuries over the span of at least three years at the Conover Terra-Mulch plant, including, by Plaintiffs\u2019 own admission, \u201cnumerous incidents that appear to be the same type injury as Hamby suffered . . . .\u201d Thus, the OSHA logs, when viewed most favorably to Plaintiffs, sufficed to show the record of previous injuries at the Conover Terra-Mulch plant, and the similarity of those injuries to Hamby\u2019s.\nAccordingly, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s granting summary judgment to Terra-Mulch while discovery requests were pending because: Plaintiffs expressed a preparedness to oppose summary judgment without the Reports of Injury; argued the merits of the summary judgment motions without requesting further discovery; did not object during the trial court\u2019s rulings; and the OSHA logs, when viewed most favorably to Plaintiffs, provided a sufficient forecast of any additional evidence Plaintiffs allege to exist in the Reports of Injury. Indeed, our Supreme Court in Whitaker emphasized that Woodson \u201crepresents a narrow holding in a fact-specific case.\u201d Id. at 557, 597 S.E.2d at 668. Here, as in the majority of Woodson cases, Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence is insufficient even if Terra-Mulch had pre-incident knowledge of the Risk Assessment Report and the unproduced Reports of Injury.\nIn sum, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to reconsider; deny Plaintiffs\u2019 petition for writ of certiorari; and deny Terra-Mulch\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur.\n. The Court conspicuously noted that Plaintiffs \u201cdid not cross-assign error to the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for Terra-Mulch on grounds that the exclusive remedy plaintiffs have against Terra-Mulch is under the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act.\u201d Hamby, 361 N.C. at 634, 652 S.E.2d at 234.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jones Martin Parris & Tessener Law Offices, P.L.L. C, by John Alan Jones & G. Christopher Olson, for plaintiffs.", "Forman Rossabi Black, P.A., by Amiel J. Rossabi & William F. Patterson, Jr., for defendant Terra-Mulch Products, LLC." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LENNIE and BONNIE HAMBY, Plaintiffs v. PROFILE PRODUCTS, LLC, TERRA-MULCH PRODUCTS, LLC, ROY D. HOFFMAN, and ELECTRIC SERVICE GROUP, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA08-942\n(Filed 19 May 2009)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 workplace injury \u2014 Woodson claim \u2014 evidence\u2014OSHA violations \u2014 not sufficient\nPlaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence at summary judgment was insufficient to establish a Woodson claim against Terra-Mulch. Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast showed that Hamby was injured by Terra-Mulch\u2019s inadequately guarded machinery in violation of OSHA standards, but did not demonstrate that Hamby was specifically instructed to descend from a truck-dump operator platform in a manner that exposed him to the hazardous augers or that Terra-Mulch was otherwise substantially certain he would be seriously injured.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 workplace injury \u2014 Woodson claim \u2014 risk assessment \u2014 evidence not sufficient\nIn a personal injury case arising from a workplace accident, on remand after an appellate determination that defendant Profiles\u2019s knowledge and misconduct can be attributed to defendant Terra-Mulch, the trial did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment for Terra-Mulch. Defendant\u2019s forecast of evidence was not sufficient to establish a Woodson claim even with a Risk Assessment Report by a consultant being attributed to Terra-Mulch.\n3. Civil Procedure\u2014 summary judgment ruling \u2014 discovery not complete \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant Terra-Mulch before ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 outstanding discovery motion. Plaintiffs may not argue on appeal that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Terra-Mulch before ruling on their motion to compel when plaintiffs manifestly acquiesced to that course of events at the summary judgment hearing. Moreover, it cannot be concluded that the additional information would have produced a different outcome.\nAppeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 8 May 2008 by Judge Timothy L. Patti in Superior Court, Caldwell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2009.\nJones Martin Parris & Tessener Law Offices, P.L.L. C, by John Alan Jones & G. Christopher Olson, for plaintiffs.\nForman Rossabi Black, P.A., by Amiel J. Rossabi & William F. Patterson, Jr., for defendant Terra-Mulch Products, LLC." }, "file_name": "0099-01", "first_page_order": 129, "last_page_order": 145 }