{ "id": 4167934, "name": "SUSAN JONES, and THE NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, Plaintiffs v. THE GRAHAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Graham County Board of Education", "decision_date": "2009-06-02", "docket_number": "No. COA08-477", "first_page": "279", "last_page": "295", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 279" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 985", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12035616, 12035130, 12035173, 12035238, 12035561, 12035081, 12035342, 12034992, 12035285, 12035509, 12035449, 12035034, 12035391 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0985-13", "/us/506/0985-04", "/us/506/0985-05", "/us/506/0985-06", "/us/506/0985-12", "/us/506/0985-03", "/us/506/0985-08", "/us/506/0985-01", "/us/506/0985-07", "/us/506/0985-11", "/us/506/0985-10", "/us/506/0985-02", "/us/506/0985-09" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-230", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4703868 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "\"The withdrawal of a blood sample from a person is a search subject to protection by article I, section 20 of our constitution.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515352 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "\"The withdrawal of a blood sample from a person is a search subject to protection by article I, section 20 of our constitution.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 U.S. 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3903035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "Brandeis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "957", "parenthetical": "Brandeis, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/277/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8576529 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/185/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538002 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 18, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "140-41" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "884 F.2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11337230 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/884/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 709", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 646", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1564392 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 L. Ed. 2d 639", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12032926 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable . . . .\"" }, { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 L. Ed. 2d 685", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12032996 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "716", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959437 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" }, { "page": "741", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "732", "parenthetical": "\"[E]ven a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 868", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28251 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873", "parenthetical": "quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 741 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)" }, { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 741 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 305", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11651779 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "526" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505377 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "\"A search ... is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.\"" }, { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "\"A search ... is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 543", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178901 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" }, { "page": "1130" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 843", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1130 (1976)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1130 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 822", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254855 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829", "parenthetical": "citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)" }, { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 74", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181446 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "103" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659841 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" }, { "page": "648" }, { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" }, { "page": "692" }, { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132176 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150881 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497251, 2498471 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0558-01", "/nc/331/0558-02" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708418 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4681578 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984)" }, { "page": "132" }, { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132043 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984)" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "Martin, J., concurring" }, { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "Martin, J., concurring" }, { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "Martin, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491833 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "Martin, J., concurring" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696-97" }, { "page": "918-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685059 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that de novo review is ordinarily appropriate in cases where constitutional rights are implicated.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135972 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that de novo review is ordinarily appropriate in cases where constitutional rights are implicated.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1600, "char_count": 38899, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.293637066849287e-08, "percentile": 0.4339364959115377 }, "sha256": "6ef10a63aeafffb2fd21e83e56651e58dac399f62f312d5d53680a5f535b94ee", "simhash": "1:485d5746674fa6de", "word_count": 6229 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "SUSAN JONES, and THE NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, Plaintiffs v. THE GRAHAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\n\u201cThe greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.\u2019\u2019\nThe Graham County Board of Education en\u00e1cted a policy mandating the random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of all Board employees. Plaintiffs brought suit contending that the policy violates the North Carolina Constitution\u2019s guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education. We reverse.\nI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nIn 2006, the Graham County Board of Education employed approximately 250 teachers, staff, and administrators to serve approximately 1,300 students in three public schools \u2014 a high school, a middle school, and an elementary school. All Board employees were subject to the Board\u2019s \u201cAlcohol/Drug-Free Workplace Policy\u201d which required all job applicants to pass \u201can alcohol or drug test\u201d as a condition of employment; required all employees to submit to \u201can alcohol or other drug test\u201d upon a supervisor\u2019s \u201creasonable cause\u201d to believe that the employee was using alcohol or illegal drugs, or abusing prescription drugs, in the workplace; and required \u201c[a]ny employee placed on the approved list to drive school system vehicles\u201d to submit to \u201crandom drug tests.\u201d Additionally, the policy mandated the suspension of any employee who, in a supervisor\u2019s opinion, was impaired by alcohol or drugs in the workplace.\nThe Board of Education enacted a new testing policy on 5 December 2006. Significantly, the new policy required all employees to submit to \u201cdrug or alcohol testing\u201d upon the policy\u2019s implementation and required all employees to submit to random, suspicionless testing thereafter. On 20 April 2007, Plaintiffs Susan Jones \u2014 a teacher at the County\u2019s high school \u2014 and The North Carolina Association of Educators \u2014 a statewide association of public school teachers, support personnel, and administrators to which approximately fifty Board of Education employees belonged \u2014 filed a complaint seeking to have the new policy declared violative of the North Carolina Constitution.\nThe Board of Education subsequently revised the new testing policy, answered the complaint, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Board attached a copy of the new policy, as revised (\u201cthe policy\u201d), to the answer. The policy states that\n[a]ll positions of employment within the Graham County School system, including but not limited to administrative, classified, non-classified, part time, full time, temporary, and permanent, shall be designated as safety sensitive positions due to the fact that these positions require work where an inattention to duty or error in judgment will have the potential for significant risk or harm to those entrusted to their care, and the possibility or probability of contact with students and the influence employees have could cause irreparable damage to the health and well being of the students.\nThe policy specifically defines the classes of employees subject to the policy as follows:\n1) athletic coaches[;]\n2) bookkeepers!;]\n3) cafeteria personnel!;]\n4) centralized administrative support personnel!;]\n5) centralized support personnel!;]\n6) custodians!;]\n7) directors and supervisors!;]\n8) extracurricular advisors!;]\n9) maintenance personnel!;]\n10) other instructional personnel!;]\n11) principals and assistant principals!;]\n12) school-based administrative support personnel!;]\n13) student support personnel!;]'\n14) superintendents];]\n15) teachers];]\n16) teacher assistants!;]\n17) transportation personnel excluding bus drivers who are covered separately!; and]\n18) substitute teachers].]\nUnder the policy, the Board of Education may perform \u201cdrug or alcohol testing\u201d in the following instances:\na. Of any employee who manifests \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d behavior....\nb. Of any employee who is involved in an accident that results or could result in the filing of a Workers\u2019 Compensation claim.\nc. On a random basis of any employee.\nd. Of any employee who is subject to drug or alcohol testing pursuant to federal or state rules, regulations or laws.\nThe policy defines \u201c[d]rug testing\u201d as \u201cthe scientific analysis of urine, blood, breath, saliva, hair, tissue, and other specimens of the human body for the purpose of detecting a drug or alcohol.\u201d\nThe policy states that \u201c[t]he collection site is Graham County Schools\u201d and that \u201c[t]he procedures for random selection of employees and the procedures for collection shall be the procedures adopted by the Board of Education as set forth in the random procedure and the collection procedure utilized by Keystone Laboratories!,]\u201d a testing facility located in Asheville. While the policy does not particularly prescribe the specific \u201cspecimens\u201d an employee is required to submit, Keystone Laboratories\u2019 collection procedure only details the collection of employees\u2019 urine. Under the collection procedure, employees are required to \u201cgo into the toilet area and void into [a] container.\u201d The collection method \u201cdoes not involve the direct visual observation of employees while providing a urine sample, unless extraordinary circumstances exist as stated in paragraph twelve ... of the procedure.\u201d Paragraph twelve provides, in part, as follows:\nFor walk-in specimens (those collected in the laboratory), consider an out of range temperature [of the specimen] as reasonable evidence of adulteration or substitution, and collect another specimen under direct observation by a same-gender laboratory employee.\nAn \u201cout of range temperature\u201d of a specimen collected \u201cin the laboratory\u201d is the only circumstance under which an employee may be directly observed passing urine. Neither the policy nor the collection procedure identify either the entity responsible for collecting employees\u2019 specimens or the entity responsible for transporting specimens to Keystone Laboratories.\nThe policy does not detail the \u201cscientific analysis\u201d that Keystone Laboratories will perform on submitted specimens. The policy does not indicate to whom Keystone Laboratories will submit test results. The Graham County Schools superintendent, however, is required to file all test results in a \u201clocked file cabinet[.]\u201d The policy provides that\n[a]ny employee who is found through drug or alcohol testing to have in his or her body a detectable amount of an illegal drug or of alcohol will result in a letter of reprimand being placed in the personnel file and the employee will be offered a one-time opportunity to enter and successfully complete a rehabilitation program that has been approved by the Graham County Board of Education.\nIn the event of a positive test, an employee can submit \u201cthe written test result\u201d to an \u201cindependent medical review officer\u201d and can obtain and independently test \u201cthe remaining portion of the urine specimen that yielded the positive result.\u201d The policy also provides that\n[a]n applicant or employee whose drug or alcohol test reported positive will be offered the opportunity of a meeting to offer an explanation. The purpose of the meeting will be to determine if there is any reason that a positive finding could have resulted from some cause other than drug or alcohol use. Graham County Board of Education, through its health and/or human resource officials, will judge whether an offered explanation merits further inquiry.\nThe policy states that test results will not be reported to law enforcement \u201cunless otherwise required by law[.]\u201d\nAt the 7 August 2007 Civil Session of Graham County Superior Court, the trial court conducted a hearing on (1) Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary and declaratory judgment, (2) the Board\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and (3) the Board\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The evidence before the trial court included the deposition testimony and affidavit of the school system\u2019s superintendent, the deposition testimony of two of the school system\u2019s principals, and the deposition testimony and affidavits of the individual Board members: William Jackie Adams, Mitchell E. Colvard, Ricky Kyle Davis, Pamela Carringer Moody, and Lois Ann Pressley.\nMr. Colvard, the Board\u2019s chairman, testified that he does not believe that drug testing constitutes either a search of a person or an invasion of privacy. Mr. Colvard further testified \u2014 as did every other Board member \u2014 that there was no evidence that any student had ever been injured or put at risk of being injured by an employee whose body contained \u201ca detectable amount of an illegal drug or of alcohol[.]\u201d It is undisputed that there was no evidence of a drug \u201cproblem\u201d among Board employees. As to why the Board enacted the policy, Ms. Moody testified as follows:\nQ. . . . Okay. Explain to me, if you can, if there\u2019s been no student in the 30-plus years that you\u2019ve been associated with the school system who\u2019s been impacted by \u2014 harmed in anyway [sic] by an employee using drugs or alcohol, and you\u2019ve had one employee other than a bus driver failing a mandatory test, one employee identified in the last 20 years, prior to two weeks ago, as having drugs on campus, what is the problem among the school system staff that you\u2019re trying to address?\nA. As I stated earlier, that this county is becoming aware more than ever of the issue of drugs in our county. I could bring you papers [sic] after paper after paper, and it is all people I know that I went to school with, a lot of them, graduated with, some of them high honors, they\u2019re \u2014 that are behind bars as we speak.\n[Q.] Yes, ma\u2019am. For the record, your counsel will know what I mean by this. But I\u2019m going to move to strike your last answer, because I don\u2019t think it was responsive to the question I asked you. Let me ask you the question again, okay?\nQ. ... What problem \u2014 identified problem with your staff is this policy going to address that the prior policy did not address?\nA. \u2022 Our\u2014\nQ. Or are you\u2014\nA. \u2014problem?\nQ. \u2014or are you trying to preempt a potential problem?\nA. The first part is a question. If I understand, let me see. All we did to change our policy was to classify the employees. The policy didn\u2019t change; it just classified the employees that are subject to random drug testing.\n\u25a0 Q. And my question again is, what problem did the board identify with the staff under the existing policy that required the change to the new policy?\nA. I feel like that it \u2014 it was just better clarification with the employees, themself [sic], who does this include. Because previously, it was just bus drivers and people who are custodians.\nMr. Adams testified as follows:\nQ. What issue were you, as a board member, trying to address by broadening the definition of safety sensitive to include everybody?\nA. Just to make the Graham County Schools a safer place for the student [sic] and the employees.\nQ. Okay, and my question is, how was it unsafe prior to your changing the policy? What evidence was there \u2014 I mean, what\u2014 that\u2019s what I meant by what problem you were addressing. If there was no evidence of any student ever being harmed up to that point and other than ... two people\u2019s rumors no other information about drug use by staff, what issue were you addressing by broadening the definition?\nA. Well, it\u2019s the safety-sensitive positions \u2014 it would be hard to determine, you know, to me, and if \u2014 in my opinion, they\u2019re all safety-sensitive positions at school: teacher, bus driver, whatever position you hold.\nSo I don\u2019t \u2014 I don\u2019t know that they [sic] were a problem \u2014 is a reason that we changed the policy to all safety sensitive, you know, I just \u2014 I don\u2019t. . .\nQ. So you were not trying to \u2014 you were not trying to address an actual problem at that point?\nA. No.\nMs. Pressley testified as follows:\nQ. Okay. Can you tell me in your view why the prior policy needed to be changed?\nA. To keep the kids \u2014 to keep the kids safe and make sure they [sic] ain\u2019t nobody on drugs.\nMr. Crisp, the only Board member to vote against the policy, testified that the Board never discussed whether there were any safety concerns or safety issues related to employee drug use.\nThe school system\u2019s superintendent testified in his deposition that the old policy was effective in dealing with drug and alcohol issues among Board employees. The superintendent stated in his affidavit, however, as follows:\n7. As to each employment category, the safety issues relevant to children are as follows:\na. High-Level of Direct Student Contact. Several categories have extensive, repeated, and daily contact with students. These employees supervise students and/or have the opportunity for direct physical contact with students. These categories include:\ni. Athletic coaches, bookkeepers, cafeteria personnel, custodians, extracurricular advisors, maintenance personnel, other instructional personnel, principals, assistant principals, school-based administrative support personnel, student support personnel, teachers, teacher assistants, and substitute teachers.\nb. Intermittent Contact with Students: The remaining categories of employees oversee the instruction program of the school system and have the opportunity for significant contact with students. In addition to activities within the schools such as teacher observations, these employees may also serve in direct supervisory roles for extracurricular activities and school-approved field trips. These categories include:\ni. Centralized administrative support personnel, centralized support personnel, directors, supervisors, and superintendents.\nc. Access to Hazardous Substances and Dangerous Equipment: Due to the nature of the school environment all employees have some access to hazardous substances and/or dangerous equipment. The categories of employees with direct ac-. cess to such substances or materials as part of their direct job duties include:\ni. Athletic coaches, cafeteria personnel, custodians, maintenance personnel, science/chemistry teachers and teacher assistants, transportation personnel (e.g. mechanics, bus attendants, etc.) and vocational teachers and teacher assistants (e.g. auto mechanics, construction technology, child care, and home economics).\n8. Finally, it is also important to note a pre-school is housed in the central office and the central office shares a parking lot with the elementary school. Thus, every employee of the Graham County schools is in the position to have significant contact with students in some manner during the normal workday.\nOn 18 January 2008, the trial court granted the Board\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied \u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 [sic] Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment[.]\u201d In an amended order entered 6 February 2008, the trial court granted the Board\u2019s motion for summary judgment, denied the Board\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and denied Plaintiffs\u2019 motions for summary and declaratory judgment. From the amended order, Plaintiffs appeal.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nA party against whom a declaratory judgment is sought may move, at any time, for a summary judgment in his favor. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(b) (2007). A trial court must grant summary judgment \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019\u2019N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008); see also Piedmont Triad Reg\u2019l Water Auth. v. Sumner Hills, Inc., 353 N.C. 343, 348, 543 S.E.2d 844, 848 (2001) (\u201cIt is well settled that de novo review is ordinarily appropriate in cases where constitutional rights are implicated.\u201d) (citing State v. Rogers, 352 N.C. 119, 124, 529 S.E.2d 671, 674-75 (2000); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918-19 (1996)).\nHI. ANALYSIS\nWe first address Plaintiffs\u2019 contention that the policy violates Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides as follows:\nGeneral warrants, whereby any officer or other person may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.\nN.C. Const, art. I, sec. 20. Plaintiffs assert that \u201c[o]n its face, the... policy violates the prohibition against general warrants[,]\u201d and that the policy violates Article I, Section 20\u2019s guarantee against unreasonable searches conducted by the government.\nA. General Warrants\nWe are inclined to agree that the policy violates the prohibition against general warrants. See In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 297, 582 S.E.2d 255, 266 (2003) (Martin, J., concurring) (\u201c[P]ermitting government actors \u2018to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed\u2019... is tantamount to issuing a general warrant expressly prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution.\u201d) (quoting N.C. Const, art. I, sec. 20). However, because we hold, for the reasons set forth below, that the Board\u2019s policy violates Article I, Section 20\u2019s guarantee against unreasonable searches, we do not- reach the question of whether the policy violates the prohibition against general warrants.\nB. Reasonableness\nThe language of Article I, Section 20 \u201c \u2018differs markedly from the language of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.\u2019 \u201d State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999) (quoting State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984)); see also Corum v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (\u201cOur Constitution is more detailed and specific than the federal Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens.\u201d) (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983); Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr., Dusting Off Our State Constitution, 33 State Bar Quarterly, No. 2 6-8 (1986)), reh\u2019g denied, 331 N.C. 558, 418 S.E.2d 664, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992). Nevertheless, Article I, Section 20 provides protection \u201csimilar\u201d to the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008); Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 293, 582 S.E.2d at 264 (Martin, J., concurring), and it is well-settled that both Article I, Section 20 and the Fourth Amendment prohibit the government from conducting \u201cunreasonable\u201d searches. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 701; Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 292, 582 S.E.2d at 264 (Martin, J., concurring); McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636, 517 S.E.2d at 132. Whether a search is unreasonable, and therefore prohibited by Article I, Section 20, and the proper tests to be used in resolving that issue \u201c \u2018are questions which can only be answered with finality by [the North Carolina Supreme Court].\u2019 \u201d McClendon, 350 N.C. at 635, 517 S.E.2d at 132 (quoting Arrington, 311 N.C. at 643, 319 S.E.2d at 260).\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that we may not construe provisions of the North Carolina Constitution as according lesser rights than are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 475, 515 S.E.2d 675, 692 (1999); State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 648, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1998); Carter, 322 N.C. at 713, 370 S.E.2d at 555. As explained by the Supreme Court in Virmani,\n\u201cbecause the United States Constitution is binding on the states, the rights it guarantees must be applied to every citizen by the courts of North Carolina, so no citizen will be \u2018accorded lesser rights\u2019 no matter how we construe the state constitution. For all practical purposes, therefore, the only significant issue for this Court when interpreting a provision of our state Constitution paralleling a provision of the United States Constitution will always be whether the state Constitution guarantees additional rights to the citizen above and beyond those guaranteed by the parallel federal provision. In this respect, the United States Constitution provides a constitutional floor of fundamental rights guaranteed all citizens of the United States, while the state constitutions frequently give citizens of individual states basic rights in addition to those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.\u201d\nVirmani, 350 N.C. at 475, 515 S.E.2d at 692 (quoting Jackson, 348 N.C. at 648, 503 S.E.2d at 103). Accordingly, we first determine whether the policy violates the Fourth Amendment; if so, the policy also violates Article I, Section 20. See id.; Carter, 322 N.C. at 714, 370 S.E.2d at 556 (\u201c[A]n individual\u2019s constitutional rights' under the Constitution of North Carolina must receive at least the same protection as such rights are accorded under the Federal Constitution.\u201d) (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980)). If we determine that the policy does not violate the Fourth Amendment, we may then proceed to determine whether Article I, Section 20 provides \u201c \u2018basic rights in addition to those guaranteed by the [Fourth Amendment].\u2019 \u201d Virmani, 350 N.C. at 475, 515 S.E.2d at 692 (quoting Jackson, 348 N.C. at 648, 503 S.E.2d at 103).\nThe reasonableness of a governmental search is generally determined \u201cby balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual\u2019s privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\u201d Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735, 743 (2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)). But \u201c \u2018some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.\u2019 \u201d Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 261 n.4 (2006) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1130 (1976)); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 340 (2000) (\u201cA search ... is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.\u201d) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1997)). The Fourth Amendment, however, \u201c \u2018imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion.\u2019 \u201d Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 744 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1130). \u201c \u2018[I]n certain limited circumstances, the Government\u2019s need to discover... latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting . . . searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 704); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 664 (\u201cIn limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.\u201d). Thus, a suspicionless search may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where \u201c \u2018special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 717 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 741 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).\nWhere the government alleges \u201cspecial needs\u201d in justification of a suspicionless search, \u201ccourts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties.\u201d Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 523 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 668, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685). An important consideration in conducting the inquiry is whether there is \u201cany indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment\u2019s\u201d usual requirement of individualized suspicion. Id. at 319, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 526. The purpose of the inquiry is \u201cto determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.\u201d Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639). Conducting the inquiry, the United States Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless searches in the following instances: (1) drug testing of students seeking to participate in competitive extracurricular activities, Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735, Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); (2) searches of probationers, Griffin, 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709; (3) drug testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents, Skinner, 489 U.S. 602,103 L. Ed. 2d 639; (4) drug testing of United States customs officials seeking promotion to certain sensitive positions, Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685; and (5) searches of government employees\u2019 offices by the employer, O\u2019Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1987).\nWe begin our inquiry by attempting to examine the intrusiveness of the proposed testing procedure. It appears from the evidence in the record that the Board will only perform a scientific analysis of employees\u2019 urine. However, the policy itself does' not specify the \u201cbodily specimen\u201d employees will be required to produce. On the contrary, a plain reading of the policy reveals that the Board \u201cmay perform\u201d a \u201cscientific analysis of [employees\u2019] urine, blood, breath, saliva, hair, tissue, and other specimens of the human body for the purpose of detecting a drug or alcohol.\u201d We acknowledge that Keystone Laboratories\u2019 collection procedure only details the collection of employees\u2019 urine and that the policy in one instance suggests that employees will only be required to produce urine. Nevertheless, assuming the Board only tests employees\u2019 urine, we emphasize that the policy provides that \u201c[a]ny employee who is found through drug or alcohol testing to have in his or her body a detectable amount of an illegal drug or of alcohol\u2019\u2019 will be suspended. (Emphasis added.) Although a litany of other provisions in the policy bear directly on the intrusiveness of the testing procedure, we find it unnecessary to venture beyond this provision to state that the policy is remarkably intrusive.\nWe next consider whether Board employees have a reduced expectation of privacy by virtue of their employment in a public school system. Public employees may have reduced expectations of privacy if their employment carries with it safety concerns for which the employees are heavily regulated. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 666. By way of illustration, chemical weapons plant employees are heavily regulated for safety. Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). There is no evidence in the record before us, however, that any of the Board\u2019s employees are regulated/or safety. We question whether the Board could produce such evidence. The Board errantly relies on the premise that \u201cFourth Amendment rights ... are different in public schools than elsewhere; the \u2018reasonableness\u2019 inquiry cannot disregard the schools\u2019 custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.\u201d Vemonia, 515 U.S. at 656, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 576. The Board, however, fails to account for the explicit teaching of the Supreme Court that because \u201cthe nature of [the schools\u2019 power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, [the schools\u2019 power] permit[s] a degree of supervision and control [over schoolchildren] that could not be exercised over free adults.\u201d Id. at 655, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 576. We are unable to conclude from this record that any of the Board\u2019s employees have a reduced expectation of privacy by virtue of their employment in a public school system.\nFinally, the record in the case at bar is wholly devoid of any evidence that the Board\u2019s prior policy was in any way insufficient to satisfy the Board\u2019s stated needs. The Board acknowledges that there is no evidence in the record of any drug problem among its employees. There is also a complete want of evidence that any student or employee has ever been harmed because of the presence of \u201ca detectable amount of an illegal drug or of alcohol\u201d in an employee\u2019s body. We agree that the Board need not wait for a student or employee to be harmed before implementing a preventative policy. However, the evidence completely fails to establish the existence of a \u201cconcrete\u201d problem which the policy is designed to prevent. The need to promote an anti-drug message is \u201csymbolic, not \u2018special,\u2019 as that term draws meaning from [the decisions of the United States Supreme Court].\u201d Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 528.\nConsidering and balancing all the circumstances, we conclude that the employees\u2019 acknowledged privacy interests outweigh the Board\u2019s interest in conducting random, suspicionless testing. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 732 (\u201c[E]ven a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy.\u201d) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). Accordingly, we hold that the policy violates Article I, Section 20\u2019s guarantee against unreasonable searches.\nC. Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority\nWe reject the Board\u2019s assertion that \u201cample guidance to uphold the Board\u2019s drug testing policy\u201d can be found in Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, 111 N.C. App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137 (1993), disc. review improvidently allowed and appeal dismissed, 336 N.C. 304, 442 S.E.2d 320 (1994) (per curiam). The plaintiff in Boesche was an airport maintenance mechanic whose job duties generally consisted of \u201cperforming preventative maintenance and repairs on airport terminal [HVAC] systems, but plaintiff also had security clearance to drive a motor vehicle 10 M.P.H. in a designated area on the apron of the flight area in order to get access to the systems located on the outside of the building.\u201d Id. at 154, 432 S.E.2d at 141. Without expressing that the plaintiff was suspected of any individuahzed wrongdoing, the defendants asked the plaintiff to submit to a urine drug test. Id. at 150, 432 S.E.2d at 138. The defendants told the plaintiff that the test was required \u201cpursuant to a Federal Aviation Administration directive requiring that all employees who drive a motor vehicle in the airside of the airport must be tested.\u201d Id. The plaintiff refused to submit to the test, was fired, and subsequently filed a complaint alleging\nthat the actions of the defendants violated his rights to be free from illegal searches and invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 20, 35 and 36 of the North Carolina Constitution; his rights to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1, 19, 35 and 36 of the North Carolina Constitution; his right not to be discharged from employment in bad faith or for reasons contravening public policy under the common law of North Carolina; and for the common law tort of intentional/neghgent infliction of emotional distress.\nId. at 151, 432 S.E.2d at 139. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motion. Id.\nOn appeal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia,\nthat the trial court committed reversible error in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s constitutional claims against defendant\u2019s [sic] random drug testing procedure policy that afforded plaintiff no prior notice of testing or test procedure, that included no guarantee of confidentiality of test results or immunity from criminal prosecution in the case of a positive result, and that led to plaintiff\u2019s termination with no opportunity for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.\nId. at 155, 432 S.E.2d at 141. The plaintiff additionally argued that he was not subject to random drug testing because he was neither \u201c(1) a sensitive public employee because of either safety or security reasons or (2) an individual suspected of drug use.\u201d Id. Citing Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, this Court stated that random drug testing of public employees is permissible \u201cwhere the individual tested was engaged in activity which involved either public safety or safety concerns for others because it was a legitimate governmental interest.\u201d Ill N.C. App. at 153-54, 432 S.E.2d at 140. We emphasized that \u201c \u2018there must be a showing by the employer that the employees required to undergo such testing have responsibilities or duties which are connected to the safety concerns of others.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 154, 432 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52, 56 (W.Va. 1990)). Applying those standards to the facts of that case, this Court stated that \u201cthe record showed that plaintiff was in a position in which public safety or the safety of others was an overriding concemf,]\u201d and this Court found \u201cthat plaintiff, if drug impaired while operating a motor vehicle on the apron of the flight area, could increase the risk of harm to others.\u201d Id. at 154, 432 S.E.2d at 140-41. In affirming the trial court, we held that the \u201cplaintiff was indeed a sensitive public employee because of safety concems[]\u201d and that the plaintiff was \u201csubject to random drug testing as a legitimate governmental interest.\u201d Id. at 155, 432 S.E.2d at 141.\nWe are wholly unconvinced by the Board of Education\u2019s argument that Boesche is \u201cdispositive\u201d in the case at bar. In stating that the Boesche plaintiff was in a position \u201cin which public safety or the safety of others was an overriding concern,\u201d this Court merely held that the defendants had made the showing required- by Skinner that the plaintiff had \u201cduties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.\u201d Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 667. This Court did not hold that any public employee who, \u201cif drug impaired . . ., could increase the risk of harm to others\u201d was subject to urine drug testing. Rather, the Court held that the plaintiff, \u201cif drug impaired while operating a motor vehicle on the apron of the flight area, could increase the risk of harm to others.\u201d 111 N.C. App. at 154, 432 S.E.2d at 141 (emphasis added).\nThe holding in Boesche was limited to the specific facts of that case. In the case before us, there is absolutely no evidence in the record which in any way equates the safety concerns inherent in the driving of a motor vehicle on the apron of an airport\u2019s flight area with the safety concerns inherent in the job. duties of any Board employee. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that any Board employee whose body contains \u201ca detectable amount of an illegal drug or of alcohol\u201d increases the risk of harm to anyone. For these reasons, Boesche is not dispositive in the case at bar.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nLest the American people, and the people of North Carolina in particular, forget the foundational importance of the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, we should recall that the cherished liberties enjoyed in our brief historical moment have been inherited by this generation only because they have been nurtured and protected by earlier generations of Americans so driven in their pursuit of liberty that life itself was not too great a cost to purchase liberty for themselves and their posterity.\nState v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 259, 658 S.E.2d 643, 652-53 (Brady, J., dissenting), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008). We are cognizant of the fact that the policy was enacted by the duly elected representatives of the people of Graham County. Moreover, the evidence in the record establishes that the policy had ample support by Board employees. Nevertheless, in our view, the policy violates Plaintiffs\u2019 rights under Article I, Section 20 to be free from unreasonable searches. Constitutional rights are not lightly cast aside. The trial court\u2019s order is reversed.\nREVERSED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge WYNN concur.\n. Nat\u2019l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 716 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 72 L. Ed. 944, 957 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).\n. The parties rightly agree that the policy implicates Article I, Section 20\u2019s guarantee against unreasonable searches conducted by the government. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 660 (1989) (\u201c[T]he collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable . . . .\u201d); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 714, 370 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1988) (\u201cThe withdrawal of a blood sample from a person is a search subject to protection by article I, section 20 of our constitution.\u201d) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 342 S.E.2d 789 (1986)).\n. Although Plaintiffs do not assert that the policy violates any statutory provision, we note that our General Assembly has mandated \u201cthat employers who test employees for controlled substances shall use reliable and minimally invasive examinations and screenings and be afforded the opportunity to select from a range of cost-effective and advanced drug testing technologies.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-230 (2007). Accordingly, the General Assembly has established \u201cprocedural and other requirements for the administration of controlled substance examinations.\u201d Id.\n. Because of this holding, we do not determine whether the policy violates Article I, Section 19.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tin, Fulton, Walker & Owen, by S. Luke Largess, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.", "Roberts & Stevens, P.A., by K. Dean Shatley, II, and Christopher Z. Campbell, for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SUSAN JONES, and THE NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, Plaintiffs v. THE GRAHAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant\nNo. COA08-477\n(Filed 2 June 2009)\nConstitutional Law\u2014 random drug testing \u2014 school employees\u2014 unreasonable search\nA school board policy mandating random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing for all employees violated plaintiffs\u2019 right be free from unreasonable searches under Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution, and the trial court order granting the board\u2019s motion for summary judgment was reversed. The employees\u2019 acknowledged privacy interests outweigh the board\u2019s interest in conducting random, suspicionless testing.\nAppeal by Plaintiffs from amended order entered 6 February 2008 by Judge James U. Downs in Graham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 December 2008.\nTin, Fulton, Walker & Owen, by S. Luke Largess, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.\nRoberts & Stevens, P.A., by K. Dean Shatley, II, and Christopher Z. Campbell, for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0279-01", "first_page_order": 309, "last_page_order": 325 }