{ "id": 4168135, "name": "TIMOTHY DANIEL HEAD, Plaintiff v. SHELLY H. MOSIER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Head v. Mosier", "decision_date": "2009-06-02", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1132", "first_page": "328", "last_page": "339", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 328" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631155 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "citing Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 731, 541 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/593/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528011 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "602 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3797897 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955564 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798", "parenthetical": "finding no error when court did not allow expense deductions for utilities, phone, truck lease, insurance, home and truck maintenance, and personal property taxes claimed by self-employed musician/father" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527921 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "finding no error when court did not allow expense deductions for utilities, phone, truck lease, insurance, home and truck maintenance, and personal property taxes claimed by self-employed musician/father" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "finding no error when court disallowed bad debt and depreciation expenses claimed by Subchapter C corporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11219811 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "finding no error when court disallowed bad debt and depreciation expenses claimed by Subchapter C corporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11799982 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "quoting Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 708, 493 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1997)" }, { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "finding that when worksheet was not included, the appellate court was unable to determine with certainty the amount placed in defendant's gross income column" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9380241 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483", "parenthetical": "quoting Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 708, 493 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1997)" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11079435 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524379 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "quoting Davis v. Risley, 104 N.C. App. 798, 800, 411 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1991)" }, { "page": "222-23" }, { "page": "222-23" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222-23" }, { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "explaining if a trial court decides to deviate from the Guidelines, it then follows a four-step process to determine the child support amount and to enter written findings of fact" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471954 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "quoting Davis v. Risley, 104 N.C. App. 798, 800, 411 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1991)" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11218982 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding a change of circumstances warranting an increase in defendant's child support when plaintiff presented evidence satisfying the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption and defendant presented no evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867688, 867668, 867542, 867642, 867614 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding a change of circumstances warranting an increase in defendant's child support when plaintiff presented evidence satisfying the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption and defendant presented no evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0436-01", "/nc/344/0436-04", "/nc/344/0436-03", "/nc/344/0436-05", "/nc/344/0436-02" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "finding a change of circumstances warranting an increase in defendant's child support when plaintiff presented evidence satisfying the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption and defendant presented no evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919759 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763336, 4764105, 4762317, 4760943, 4767702 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0822-05", "/nc/309/0822-02", "/nc/309/0822-01", "/nc/309/0822-04", "/nc/309/0822-03" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526303 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8896673 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790083, 790182, 790069, 790070, 790172 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0359-05", "/nc/340/0359-02", "/nc/340/0359-01", "/nc/340/0359-03", "/nc/340/0359-04" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "535-36" }, { "page": "535-36" }, { "page": "535-36" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916361 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9443414 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917781 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356", "parenthetical": "citing Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 731, 541 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186228 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 874, "char_count": 27113, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3084518778921545e-07, "percentile": 0.6238618544942195 }, "sha256": "6b1be4e7904c8b0539da185b10b58475c11881fb07071c55b174f5eecbc38052", "simhash": "1:c782f32ca6aaa7d4", "word_count": 4369 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "TIMOTHY DANIEL HEAD, Plaintiff v. SHELLY H. MOSIER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nBackground\nTimothy Daniel Head (\u201cobligor\u201d) and Shelly H. Mosier (\u201cMosier\u201d) are the parents of two children, Charity Amanda Head, born 9 October 1998, and Joshua Aaron Head, born 14 August 1993. Both children are in the custody of Mosier and continue to be in need of child support. The trial court entered a child support order against obligor on 16 April 2004 nunc pro tunc to 6 February 2004, requiring him to pay child support in the monthly amount of $298.57 of which $20.00 per month was to be applied toward the arrearage. The Rutherford County Department of Social Services Child Support Enforcement Agency (\u201cCSEA\u201d) was allowed to intervene in an action to enforce this child support obligation. \u2022\nFollowing entry of the prior orders, Mosier had another child, who lives in her home and for whom she is responsible. Obligor is not the father of that child. Mosier stays home with the child, and the court imputed to her a minimum wage salary of $1,065.92 per month.\nOn 26 February 2008, the CSEA on Mosier\u2019s behalf (collectively, the \u201cmovants\u201d), brought a motion to modify obligor\u2019s child support based on a substantial change of circumstances and an increase in the calculation of child support over fifteen percent after three years.\nObligor appeared pro se at the 9 April 2008 hearing to contest the motion. At the hearing, the trial court allowed obligor to submit certain business deductions.\nIn its 15 April 2008 order, the court entered the following relevant findings of fact which are the subject of this appeal:\n5. The [obligor] since November 09, 2007 has been employed as a truck driver with Heartland Trucking Company on a full time basis five days a week. For the first 13 weeks of the year 2008 the obligor] was paid $13,072.52 in gross income. Based thereon the [obligor] is grossing $4,357 per month from this employment. The [obligor] contends that the IRS allows $40 per day as an income tax deduction without substantiation for job related expenses to be deducted from this income for income tax purposes, for which he claims a reduction for the calculation of his gross income for the calculation of child support. Assuming the [obligor] was entitled to a deduction for his employment related expenses for child support purposes, there would be required a showing of the actual expenses incurred. The IRS allowance at best is only an income tax deduction for which substantiation is not required, which is inapplicable to child support determinations. The only expense actually shown was $10 per day five days a week for showers and $25 per week for cell phone expenses. Hygiene expenses however are personal expenses for which all individuals incur and is not a proper deduction for the calculation of income. The cell phone expense would appear to be business related for both the trucking and locksmith business as hereinafter set out.\n6. The [obligor] is self employed as a locksmith for which he now works primarily on weekends, and was previously operating this business on a full time basis prior to his trucking employment. The only income over the last thirteen weeks from the business has been $246.50 or $82 per month. From this business the [obligor] continues to incur expenses such as phone service in the monthly amount of $120 per month, phone-book advertising in the monthly amount of $180 per month, and cell phone costs of $108 per month. No other valid business expenses have been shown. From this locksmith business the [obligor] is currently incurring a loss of $326 per month. ($82-$120-$180-108). The truck debt and other debt expenses would not be appropriate to reduce income for calculation of child support under the guidelines.\n7. The [obligor] currently has monthly gross income of $4,031 ($4,357-$326) for purposes of determining child support under the guidelines.\n8. Based on the guidelines the [obligor] should pay child support in the amount of $935.92 per month as calculated on the attached exhibit A.\nThe relevant conclusions thereupon included:\n2. There has been a substantial change in circumstances in that it has been more than three years since the calculation of the [obligor\u2019s] child support obligation and the current obligation is greater than fifteen percent (15%) of the prior obligation;\n3. The [obligor] should pay child support to the defendant based on the guidelines in the monthly amount of $935.92 beginning April 1, 2008; and\n4. Except as modified herein the court\u2019s prior order of November 29, 2005 should remain in full force and effect including the payment of an additional amount of $20 toward the arrearage.\nOn 25 April 2008, obligor filed a \u201cMotion for New Trial, Findings, and Conclusions of Law, and Move to Strike Order of April 15, 2008.\u201d On 28 May 2008, the trial court denied obligor\u2019s motion. Obligor appeals.\nIssues\nThe issues presented are whether, under the applicable North Carolina Child Support Guidelines (the \u201cGuidelines\u201d), the trial court improperly computed the obligor\u2019s child support obligation by: (I) failing to make any findings of changes in the needs of the minor children; (II) considering obligor\u2019s earning capacity without considering legitimate business expenses, or in the alternative, without finding obligor had deliberately depressed his income in bad faith, or had otherwise disregarded his child support obligations; (III) refusing to consider a requested deviation from the Guidelines and not following the required four-step process to determine the need to deviate; (IV) failing to separate its findings of fact and conclusions of law wh\u00e9n requested by obligor to facilitate meaningful appellate review; and (V) failing to follow case law, failing to make any findings on the issues raised, and thus issuing an improper order via errors in findings of fact numbered 5-8 and conclusions of law numbered 1-4.\nStandard of Review\n\u201c \u2018Child support orders entered by a trial court are accorded substantial deference by appellate courts and our review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d Mason v. Erwin, 157 N.C. App. 284, 287, 579 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2003) (citation omitted). To support a reversal, \u201can appellant must show that the trial court\u2019s actions were manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d State ex rel Godwin v. Williams, 163 N.C. App. 353, 356, 593 S.E.2d 123, 126 (2004) (citing Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 731, 541 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2001).\nDiscussion\nPreliminarily, we note that resolution of this appeal is determined under the 2006 version of the Guidelines, which were in effect at the time of the trial court\u2019s order. N.C. Child Support Guidelines 2009 Ann. R. N.C. 41 (\u201c2006 Guidelines\u201d).\nI.\nObligor first contends the trial court erred by failing to make any findings regarding any changes in the needs of the minor children. He submits that such findings would have allowed this court, on review, to weigh the children\u2019s needs against his ability to pay the amount of support ordered.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7(a) (2007) authorizes a North Carolina court to modify or vacate an order of a North Carolina court providing for the support of a minor child at any time upon motion in the cause by an interested party and showing of changed circumstances. Modification of an order requires a two-step process. McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 26, 453 S.E.2d 531, 536, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995); Trevillian v. Trevillian, 164 N.C. App. 223, 224, 595 S.E.2d 206, 207 (2004). First, a court must determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the date the existing child support order was entered. McGee, 118 N.C. App. at 26-27, 453 S.E.2d at 535-36; Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 128, 306 S.E.2d 540, 541-42, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983). The 2006 Guidelines provide:\nIn a proceeding to modify the amount of child support payable under a child support order that was entered at least three years before the pending motion to modify was filed, a difference of 15% or more between the amount of child support payable under the existing order and the amount of child support resulting from application of the guidelines based on the parents\u2019 current incomes and circumstances shall be presumed to constitute substantial change of circumstances warranting modification of the existing child support order.\n2006 Guidelines at 46. When the moving party has presented evidence that satisfies the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption,. they do not need to show a change of circumstances by other means. Garrison v. Connor, 122 N.C. App. 702, 706, 471 S.E.2d 644, 647, disc. review denied, 344 N.C. 436, 476 S.E.2d 116 (1996) (finding a change of circumstances warranting an increase in defendant\u2019s child support when plaintiff presented evidence satisfying the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption and defendant presented no evidence). The Court\u2019s \u201cdetermination of whether changed circumstances exist is a conclusion of law.\u201d Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. 285, 289, 515 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1999).\nUpon finding a substantial change in circumstances, the second step is for the court to enter a new child support order that modifies and supersedes the existing child support order. McGee, 118 N.C. App. at 26-27, 453 S.E.2d at 535-36. \u201cOnce a substantial change in circumstances has been shown by the party seeking modification, the trial court then \u2018proceeds to follow the Guidelines and to compute the appropriate amount of child support.\u2019 \u201d Beamer v. Beamer, 169 N.C. App. 594, 596, 610 S.E.2d 220, 222 (2005) (quoting Davis v. Risley, 104 N.C. App. 798, 800, 411 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1991)). \u201cChild support set in accordance with the Guidelines \u2018is conclusively presumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child and commensurate with the relative abilities of each parent to pay support.\u2019 \u201d Beamer, 169 N.C. App. at 596, 610 S.E.2d at 222-23 (quoting Buncombe County ex rel. Blair v. Jackson, 138 N.C. App. 284, 287, 531 S.E.2d 240, 243 (2000)); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) (2007). Absent a request by a party for deviation, when the court enters an order for child support determined pursuant to the Guidelines, specific findings regarding the child\u2019s reasonable needs and the parents\u2019 ability to provide support generally are not required. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. at 289, 515 S.E.2d at 237. Although the court need not \u201cmake specific, or evidentiary findings of fact reciting the child\u2019s past and present expenses,\u201d the court must make \u201cultimate\u201d findings of fact that will support the court\u2019s conclusion that there has been a substantial change of circumstances and that are necessary to resolve material disputes in the evidence. Id.\nIn the instant case, the court concluded that there had been a substantial change in circumstances based on it being more than three years since the calculation of obligor\u2019s child support obligation and the current obligation calculation being greater than fifteen percent of the prior obligation calculation. See McGee, 118 N.C. App. at 26-27, 453 S.E.2d at 535-36. Based on the Guidelines, the court found and concluded obligor should pay $935.92 in monthly child support. We presume this finding to be an amount that will meet the reasonable needs of the children and commensurate with the relative abilities of each parent to pay support. See Beamer, 169 N.C. App. at 596, 610 S.E.2d at 222-23. Because we see nothing in the record indicating obligor requested a deviation, the court\u2019s order for child support determined pursuant to the Guidelines did not require any specific findings regarding the child\u2019s reasonable needs and the parents\u2019 ability to provide support. See Brooker, 133 N.C. App. at 289, 515 S.E.2d at 237. We hold therefore that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not making findings regarding changes in the needs of the minor children or by failing to weigh the children\u2019s needs against obligor\u2019s ability to pay the amount of support. Obligor\u2019s assignment of error number 1 is overruled.\nII.\nObligor next contends the trial court erred by considering obligor\u2019s earning capacity without considering legitimate business expenses, or in the alternative, without finding obligor had deliberately depressed his income in bad faith, or had otherwise disregarded his child support obligations. Obligor specifically contends it was error for the trial court to label certain business expenses \u201cinvalid\u201d instead of setting forth \u201cunderstandable\u201d reasons as to why such expenses were not accepted and that his \u201cordinary and necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation\u201d should have been subtracted from his gross receipts.\nWhen determining a parent\u2019s child support obligation under the Guidelines, a court must determine each parent\u2019s gross income. 2006 Guidelines. A parent\u2019s child support obligation should be based on the parent\u2019s \u201c \u2018actual income at the time the order is made.\u2019 \u201d Hodges v. Hodges, 147 N.C. App. 478, 483, 556 S.E.2d 7, 10 (2001) (quoting Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 708, 493 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1997)). Next, the court must determine allowable deductions from a parent\u2019s gross income to get his or her adjusted gross income. 2006 Guidelines. A parent\u2019s presumptive child support obligation is based primarily on his or her adjusted gross income. To calculate gross income derived from self-employment, ordinary and necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation are subtracted from gross receipts. 2006 Guidelines. A court in its discretion may disallow business expense deductions for a home office or personal vehicle, bad debts, depreciation, and repayment of principal on a business loan if it determines that the expenses are inappropriate for the purpose of determining gross income under the Guidelines. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 395, 515 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1999) (finding no error when court disallowed bad debt and depreciation expenses claimed by Subchapter C corporation); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 107 N.C. App. 695, 700, 421 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1992) (finding no error when court did not allow expense deductions for utilities, phone, truck lease, insurance, home and truck maintenance, and personal property taxes claimed by self-employed musician/father).\nIn the instant case, the trial court in findings of fact 5-7 considered obligor\u2019s gross'income and expenses. In finding 5 the court made findings regarding obligor\u2019s employment and gross income, stated that allowable deductions would require \u201ca showing of the actual expenses incurred,\u201d noted the inapplicability of an Internal Revenue Service allowance, and explained that hygiene expenses \u201care personal expenses for which all individuals incur and [are] not a proper deduction for the calculation of income.\u201d The court allowed cell phone expenses as business related expenses. The court in finding 6 calculated obligor\u2019s income from his locksmith business; noted phone, cell phone, and Phonebook advertising expenses; and noted \u201c[n]o other valid business expenses have been shown.\u201d The court further noted that \u201ctruck debt and other debt expenses would not be appropriate to reduce income for calculation of child support under the guidelines.\u201d In finding 7, from obligor\u2019s $4,357 monthly gross income the court deducted a total of $326 in monthly business expenses to determine obligor\u2019s monthly income of $4,031 for calculating the child support obligations under the Guidelines. Based on the court\u2019s findings, we discern no abuse of discretion and overrule obligor\u2019s assignment of error number 2.\nIII.\nObligor next contends the trial court erred by \u201crefusing to consider a requested deviation from the guidelines\u201d and \u201cnot following the required 4 step process to determine the need to deviate.\u201d Obligor specifically contends the trial court erred by \u201cnot making any determinations as to [his] ability to pay four times [his] previous amount of child support.\u201d\nAs stated in section I, supra, once the substantial change in circumstances is shown, the appropriate amount of support is calculated pursuant to the Guidelines. See Beamer, 169 N.C. App. at 596, 610 S.E.2d at 222. This amount is conclusively presumed to meet the reasonable needs of the child and to be commensurate with each parent\u2019s relative ability to pay support. Id. at 596, 610 S.E.2d at 222-23.\nA court in its discretion may deviate from the Guidelines. To deviate from the Guidelines, a court may make its own motion if it makes required findings, 2006 Guidelines; see Pataky v. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. 289, 296, 585 S.E.2d 404, 409 (2003), aff\u2019d, disc. review improvidently allowed, 359 N.C. 65, 602 S.E.2d 360 (2004); a party may request deviation in an original pleading; or a party may request deviation by motion, with at least ten days\u2019 written notice. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.5(d)(l) (2007); Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 624, 400 S.E.2d 736, 740 (1991).\nWhether the court enters a child support order determined under the Guidelines or deviates from the Guidelines, a copy of the worksheet used to detem\u00fane a parent\u2019s presumptive child support obligation should be attached to the child support order, incorporated by reference in the child support order, or included in the case record. An appellant should include the Guidelines worksheet in the record on appeal. Hodges, 147 N.C. App. at 483, 556 S.E.2d at 10 (finding that when worksheet was not included, the appellate court was unable to determine with certainty the amount placed in defendant\u2019s gross income column).\nIn the instant case, the CSEA filed the motion to modify child support on Mosier\u2019s behalf based on the original order being three years old or older and on a deviation of fifteen percent or more between the amount of the existing order and the amount of child support resulting from application of the Guidelines. Thus, the movants met the presumption of a \u201csubstantial change of circumstances\u201d that warranted modification. See McGee, 118 N.C. App. at 26, 453 S.E.2d at 536. The court\u2019s duty was then to go to the second step of applying the Guidelines. See id. Other than obligor\u2019s assignment of error and brief arguing that the court \u201crefus[ed] to consider a requested deviation from the guidelines,\u201d we see nothing in the record indicating obligor filed a countermotion or timely requested the court\u2019s deviation from the Guidelines. We also see nothing in the record indicating obligor offered evidence in court to support such a deviation.\nAlthough obligor also references a \u201crequired 4 step process to determine the need to deviate,\u201d the four-step process is for determining a child support amount and is applied only after a trial court decides to deviate. See Beamer, 169 N.C. App. at 597, 610 S.E.2d at 223 (explaining if a trial court decides to deviate from the Guidelines, it then follows a four-step process to determine the child support amount and to enter written findings of fact). Thus, the trial court was not required to deviate from the Guidelines, nor was it obligated to apply a four-step process, take any evidence, make any findings of fact, or enter any conclusions of law relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and the relative ability of each parent to pay or provide support in setting the amount of support. See Hodges, 147 N.C. App. at 482, 556 S.E.2d at 10; Beamer, 169 N.C. App. at 597, 610 S.E.2d at 223. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Guidelines, and we overrule obligor\u2019s third assignment of error.\nIV.\nObligor next contends the trial court erred by \u201cnot separating its findings of fact and conclusions of law when requested by [obligor] to facilitate a meaningful [appellate] review.\u201d Specifically, obligor contends the court should have made findings about the \u201cexpenses deductibility,\u201d his \u201cability to pay and the needs of the children,\u201d and which expenses were \u201cvalid.\u201d On these issues, he argues the trial court\u2019s order was \u201cvague\u201d and \u201cbrief.\u201d\n' As noted supra in issue II, the court in findings 5-7 assessed obligor\u2019s income and expenses. The court\u2019s conclusions of law were based on the findings of fact. In conclusion of law number 2, the court stated that there had been a \u201csubstantial change in circumstances in that it has been more than three years since the calculation of [obligor\u2019s] child support obligation and the current obligation is greater than fifteen percent (15%) of the prior obligation.\u201d This satisfied the \u201cultimate\u201d finding requisite of Brooker. See Brooker, 133 N.C. App. at 289, 515 S.E.2d at 237. The court further stated that the payment calculation was based on the Guidelines, and that the prior order remained in effect, excepting the modifications. We hold that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficiently separate for meaningful appellate review and therefore overrule obligor\u2019s assignment of error 4.\nV.\nFinally, obligor contends the trial court \u201cfail[ed] to follow established case law,\u201d \u201cfailed to make any findings on the issues raised,\u201d and issued an \u201cimproper\u201d order based on errors in findings of fact numbered 5-8 and conclusions of law numbered 1-4. This argument is substantively indistinguishable from that found in issue IV; accordingly, we overrule obligor\u2019s assignment of error 5.\nConclusion\nMovants here presented evidence satisfying the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption, and obligor presented no counter-motion or request to deviate. The trial court properly entered findings of fact that support the conclusions of law, which in turn support the judgment in favor of movants. We therefore hold that under the Guidelines as revised in 2006, movants have shown a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in obligor\u2019s child support obligation. The order of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur.\n. The parties in the instant case have been identified differently in various case headings and orders. The case heading on appeal lists Timothy Daniel Head as plaintiff and Shelly Conner Head as defendant; the Motion to Modify Support Order underlying the appeal identifies Rutherford County on behalf of Shelly H. Mosier as plaintiff and Timothy D. Head as defendant; the heading of the order in response to that motion lists Timothy D. Head as plaintiff arid Shelly H. Mosier as defendant, but the text of the order refers to Timothy D. Head as both plaintiff and defendant; the Motion for New Trial, Findings, and Conclusions of Law, and Move to Strike Order of April 15, 2008 lists Timothy Daniel Head as plaintiff and Shelly Mosier as defendant; and the responsive order lists Rutherford County on behalf of Shelly H. Mosier as plaintiff and Timothy D. Head as defendant. For clarity, we refer herein to Timothy D. Head as obligor.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy Daniel Head, pro se, plaintiff appellant.", "King Law Offices, PLLC, by Brian W. King, for Rutherford County Department of Social Services, petitioner appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TIMOTHY DANIEL HEAD, Plaintiff v. SHELLY H. MOSIER, Defendant\nNo. COA08-1132\n(Filed 2 June 2009)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 modification \u2014 fifteen percent presumption\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a child support modification case by failing to make any findings regarding any changes in the needs of the minor children because: (1) the 2006 Child Support Guidelines provided that when the moving party has presented evidence that satisfied the requirements of the fifteen percent presumption, they do not need to show a change of circumstances by other means; (2) the trial court concluded that there had been a substantial change in circumstances based on it being more than three years since the calculation of obligor\u2019s child support obligation and the current obligation calculation being greater than fifteen percent of the prior obligation calculation; and (3) nothing in the record indicated obligor requested a deviation, and thus the court\u2019s order for child support determined by the Guidelines did not require any specific findings regarding the children\u2019s reasonable needs and the obligor\u2019s ability to provide support.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 modification\u2014 earning capacity \u2014 legitimate business expenses \u2014 depression of income in bad faith\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a child support modification case by considering obligor\u2019s earning capacity allegedly without considering legitimate business expenses, or in the alternative, without finding obligor had deliberately depressed his income in bad faith or had otherwise disregarded his child support obligations because the trial court in findings of fact 5-7 properly considered obligor\u2019s gross income and expenses.\n3. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 modification \u2014 deviation \u2014 4-step process\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a child support modification case by refusing to consider a requested deviation from the 2006 Child Support Guidelines and not following the required 4-step process to determine the need to deviate because: (1) once the substantial change in circumstances is shown, the appropriate amount of support is calculated by the guidelines, and this amount is conclusively presumed to meet the reasonable needs of the child and to be commensurate with each parent\u2019s relative ability to pay support; (2) the Child Support Enforcement Agency filed the motion to modify child support on the mother\u2019s behalf based on the original order being three years old or older and on a deviation of fifteen percent or more between the amount of the existing order and the amount of child support resulting from application of the Guidelines, thus meeting the presumption of a substantial change of circumstances warranting modification; (3) nothing in the record indicated that obligor filed a countermotion or timely requested the court\u2019s deviation from the guidelines, nor did obligor offer evidence in court to support such a deviation; and (4) the four-step process referenced by obligor is for determining a child support amount and is applied only after a trial court decides to deviate.\n4. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 modification\u2014 separation of findings of fact and conclusions of law\nThe findings of fact and conclusions of law in a child support modification case were sufficiently separate for meaningful appellate review.\n5. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 modification\u2014 sufficiency of findings of fact and conclusions of law\nAlthough obligor contends the trial court erred in a child support modification case by failing to make any findings on the issues and allegedly issued an improper order based on erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law, this argument was dismissed because it was substantively indistinguishable from an issue already overruled by the Court of Appeals.\nAppeal by plaintiff from orders entered 15 April 2008 and 28 May 2008 by Judge J. Thomas Davis in Rutherford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 March 2009.\nTimothy Daniel Head, pro se, plaintiff appellant.\nKing Law Offices, PLLC, by Brian W. King, for Rutherford County Department of Social Services, petitioner appellees." }, "file_name": "0328-01", "first_page_order": 358, "last_page_order": 369 }