{ "id": 4168073, "name": "KARL E. TURNER and wife, BARBARA W. TURNER, ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF KERRY EDWARD TURNER, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF GREENVILLE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Turner v. City of Greenville", "decision_date": "2009-06-16", "docket_number": "No. COA08-630", "first_page": "562", "last_page": "569", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 562" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576097 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled in North Carolina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a reckless or dangerous manner.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135783 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled in North Carolina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a reckless or dangerous manner.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558733 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888444 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659878 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512760 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491680, 491908, 491631, 491892, 491541, 491830 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0457-02", "/nc/357/0457-03", "/nc/357/0457-05", "/nc/357/0457-06", "/nc/357/0457-04", "/nc/357/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190695 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2495648, 2499943, 2496788, 2493082, 2500123 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0634-02", "/nc/327/0634-03", "/nc/327/0634-04", "/nc/327/0634-05", "/nc/327/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524694 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "quoting Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 698, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990)" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143856 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "quoting Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 698, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990)" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220106, 220010, 220045, 219924, 220085 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0493-04", "/nc/355/0493-01", "/nc/355/0493-05", "/nc/355/0493-02", "/nc/355/0493-03" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "\"In a negligence action, a law enforcement officer is held to the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.\"" }, { "page": "172-73" }, { "page": "172-73", "parenthetical": "forecast of evidence sufficient to sustain negligent training and supervision claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436581 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "621-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0612-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 909, "char_count": 18330, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1304409532828687e-07, "percentile": 0.5756988148729907 }, "sha256": "bbaed1967445e75b1110128e8a0f26a4124bea3523c590bd0b12ae0f1866012a", "simhash": "1:f138f4e3a629fa17", "word_count": 2961 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "KARL E. TURNER and wife, BARBARA W. TURNER, ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF KERRY EDWARD TURNER, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF GREENVILLE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(d), a law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. In this appeal, Plaintiffs Karl and Barbara Turner argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Defendant City of Greenville on their claims arising from the shooting death of their son by police officers. Because the officers\u2019 actions were justified under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(d) (2007), we affirm summary judgment in favor of the City of Greenville.\nEarly on the morning of 26 January 2006, Plaintiffs called the Greenville Police Department to request assistance with their belligerent son, Kerry Edward Turner, who suffered from a bipolar disorder. Plaintiffs indicated to the responding officers, Chad Bowen and Selestine Smith, that they wanted to have their son taken for a psychiatric evaluation. Kerry voluntarily left the house with the officers, who drove him to the hospital where they left him for evaluation.\nAt the hospital, Kerry was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication and upon his release a short time later, he called his parents who refused to bring him back to their home. Kerry responded by making threats to them and indicating that he was on his way to their house. Plaintiffs again called the Greenville Police Department and were advised to contact the Magistrate\u2019s Office to obtain an involuntary commitment order. After trying unsuccessfully to get an involuntary commitment order for their son, Plaintiffs went to the Greenville Police Department and, on returning to the Magistrate\u2019s Office with Officer Bowen, obtained an involuntary commitment order from the Magistrate.\nPlaintiffs returned home and found Kerry waiting, appearing to be angry, and throwing objects at their car as they approached. Plaintiffs again called the Greenville Police Department. Officer Bowen responded and found Kerry visibly upset, screaming obscenities and throwing objects. Officer Bowen attempted to calm Kerry; however, he darted into the house and locked the door. Officer Bowen radioed the approaching officers that Kerry had barricaded himself inside the house.\nShortly after the second officer, Cachelle L. Warmell, arrived on the scene, Kerry emerged from the front of the house holding what appeared to be a shotgun, but was later identified as a broken and inoperable .22 rifle. Officers Warmell and Bowen took cover and, after a short time, Kerry went back into the house without shots being fired. Believing, however, that Kerry was armed and dangerous, the officers called for the Emergency Response Team, which responds to high risk situations.\nThereafter, Barbara Turner and Lieutenant Susan Bass attempted unsuccessfully in multiple phone conversations to coax Kerry out of the house. Lieutenant Bass testified in her deposition that Kerry made statements such as, \u201cThe pigs are gonna have to kill me.\u201d\nWhile the Emergency Response Team positioned its personnel around the Turner home, Kerry suddenly exited from the side of the house'and got into a red SUV parked in the driveway. Some officers testified that it appeared as though Kerry threw a long black object into the vehicle. Emergency Response Team personnel approached and ordered Kerry to stop, but he started the vehicle and backed it out of the driveway in the direction of the officers at a high rate of acceleration. The Emergency Response Team personnel jumped out of the way and took cover, with one of them firing a shot that punctured the rear left tire of the vehicle.\nA pursuit followed that reached speeds of seventy to eighty miles per hour on city streets. Officers testified in their depositions that Kerry rammed or attempted to ram at least four police patrol cars, nearly collided with a school bus, veered over the center line multiple times, and nearly struck Officer Robert Jones as he attempted to lay spike strips.\nListening to reports of the chase on the radio, Sergeant David Johnson positioned his patrol car on Greenville Boulevard and prepared to lay his spike strips just as the red SUV turned onto Greenville Boulevard and proceeded in his direction. Sergeant Johnson was out of his patrol car and in the roadway when he observed Kerry approaching and making an alleged attempt at \u201cdeliberately striking [his] vehicle . . . .\u201d According to Sergeant Johnson, the red SUV \u201cskidded past,\u201d swerved into lanes of oncoming traffic, and entered a 180 degree spin, going up onto two wheels.\nUpon seeing this, Sergeant Johnson ran towards the red SUV, believing it would turn over and allow him to apprehend Kerry. But instead of turning over, the red SUV returned to all four wheels and wound up facing Sergeant Johnson as he stood in the open road. Thereafter, Kerry accelerated forward, making contact with a civilian\u2019s vehicle and pushing it backward some twenty-eight feet. Meanwhile, Officer Warmell\u2019s patrol car was just arriving on the scene as Kerry pushed and tried to swerve around the civilian vehicle. With its tires spinning and smoking, the red SUV became wedged between the civilian vehicle and Officer Warmell\u2019s patrol car, which \u201crocked back and forth.\u201d\nAt some point after the red SUV made contact with the civilian vehicle, Sergeant Johnson and Officer Keith Knox opened fire. Sergeant Johnson was positioned in the open roadway, somewhere near the front passenger-side of the red SUV. Officer Knox was in the rear seat on the driver\u2019s side of Officer Warmell\u2019s patrol car when he leaned out the window and opened fire. Multiple shots struck Kerry, causing his death.\nPlaintiffs sued the City of Greenville alleging negligence, assault and battery, and willful and wanton conduct. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the City of Greenville\u2019s motion for summary judgment on the defenses of federal qualified immunity and public officer\u2019s immunity. Plaintiffs appeal arguing that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Greenville. We disagree.\nSummary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). The nonmoving party is entitled to the most favorable view of the affidavits, pleadings and other materials and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Prior v. Pruett, 143 N.C. App. 612, 617, 550 S.E.2d 166, 170 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 493, 563 S.E.2d 572 (2002).\nThe general rule in North Carolina is that a municipality is \u201cimmune from torts committed by an employee carrying out a governmental function.\u201d Schmidt v. Breeden, 134 N.C. App. 248, 252, 517 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1999) (quoting Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 698, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990)). \u201cLaw enforcement operations\u201d are \u201cclearly governmental\u201d activities for which a municipality is generally immune. Id. at 253, 517 S.E.2d at 175. A municipality may, however, waive its governmental immunity to the extent it has purchased liability insurance. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-485(a) (2007) (\u201cAny city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance. . . . Immunity shall be waived only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract from tort liability.\u201d).\nSimilarly, \u201c[t]he public immunity doctrine protects public officials from individual liability for negligence in the performance of their governmental or discretionary duties.\u201d Campbell v. Anderson, 156 N.C. App. 371, 376, 576 S.E.2d 726, 730, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 457, 585 S.E.2d 385 (2003).\nIn this jurisdiction an official may be held liable when he acts maliciously or corruptly, when he acts beyond the scope of his duties, or when he fails to act at all. As long as a public official lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is protected from liability.\nBailey v. State, 330 N.C. 227, 245, 412 S.E.2d 295, 306 (1991), disavowed on other grounds, 348 N.C. 130, 500 S.E.2d 54 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, \u201c[a]ctions that are malicious, corrupt, or outside of the scope of official duties will pierce the cloak of official immunity . . . .\u201d Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 42, 476 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1996) (citations omitted).\nMoreover, th\u00e9 General Assembly has prescribed circumstances under which an officer\u2019s use of deadly physical force is justified. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401 states in relevant part:\nA law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person . . . only when it is or appears to be reasonably necessary thereby . . . [t]o defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force .... Nothing in this subdivision constitutes justification for willful, malicious or criminally negligent conduct by any person which injures or endangers any person or property, nor shall it be construed to excuse or justify the use of unreasonable or excessive force.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(d)(2) (2007). This portion of the statute \u201cwas designed solely to codify and clarify those situations in which a police officer may use deadly force without fear of incurring criminal or civil liability.\u201d State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 501, 231 S.E.2d 833, 846 (1977).\nPreliminarily, we note that Plaintiffs sued only the City of Greenville. However, the allegations in Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint essentially seek to impute the individual officers\u2019 conduct to the City of Greenville under the respondeat superior doctrine. We find several bases to affirm the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for the City of Greenville.\nFirst, the record on appeal shows that the officers\u2019 conduct was objectively reasonable, or justified, under section 15A-401(d)(2). Kerry\u2019s disregard for officers\u2019 commands, his driving recklessly through city streets, and his collisions with civilian and officers\u2019 vehicles could have caused the officers to reasonably believe they faced an imminent risk of deadly physical force. See State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 164, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2000) (\u201cIt is well settled in North Carolina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a reckless or dangerous manner.\u201d).\nThe comment to section 15A-401 notes that a law enforcement officer \u201cis permitted [to use deadly force] only in the defense situation or when necessary to prevent the risk of death or serious physical injury to others, made manifest by the- use of a deadly weapon or other conduct or means . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(d)(2) cmt.(d) (2007). Sergeant Johnson and Officer Knox were faced with that situation here because the red SUV \u2014 used as a deadly weapon under North Carolina law because Kerry drove it recklessly \u2014 was lodged between Officer Warmell\u2019s patrol car and a civilian vehicle. Moreover, Sergeant Johnson and Officer Knox were aware that Kerry had led officers on a pursuit and exhibited threatening behavior before the pursuit began. Sergeant Johnson stood in the open road in a position of vulnerability while or immediately before the fatal shots were fired. Under these circumstances, we hold that Officer Knox and Sergeant Johnson could have reasonably believed that Kerry posed an imminent threat to themselves and nearby civilians, and that they were justified in using deadly physical force under section 15A-401(d)(2). This basis alone is sufficient to affirm the court\u2019s grant of summary judgment.\nNonetheless, we further note that the City of Greenville is immune from liability for the torts of any of its police officers\u2019 legitimate law enforcement activities unless it waived its governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-485(a) (2007); Schmidt, 134 N.C. App. at 252, 517 S.E.2d at 174. Here, Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the City of Greenville had a liability insurance policy in effect on the date of the shooting, but the City of Greenville denied that allegation in its Answer and no affirmative proof of insurance coverage appears in the record.\nMoreover, \u201c[wjithout a[n] underlying negligence charge against [the officers], a claim of negligence against the [municipality] can not be supported.\u201d Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 622, 550 S.E.2d at 172-73 (citing Johnson v. Lamb, 273 N.C. 701, 707, 161 S.E.2d 131, 137 (1968)). To remove the officers\u2019 \u201ccloak of official immunity\u201d in this case, Plaintiffs were required to show \u201c[a]ctions that [were] malicious, corrupt, or outside of the scope of official duties . . . .\u201d Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 42, 476 S.E.2d at 421.\nThe most favorable view of Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence showed: Officers Bowen and Smith were aware that Kerry suffered from a bipolar disorder when they escorted and left him at the hospital on the morning of 26 January 2006; Officer Bowen assisted Plaintiffs in obtaining an involuntary commitment order for Kerry from a magistrate; Officers Bowen and Warmell observed Kerry emerge from Plaintiffs\u2019 house holding what appeared to be a shotgun, forcing them to take cover; the Emergency Response Team was unable to prevent Kerry from leaving Plaintiffs\u2019 residence in the red SUV despite shooting out its left rear tire; a pursuit ensued during which the red SUV made contact with several police vehicles, one civilian vehicle, and nearly missed striking at least two officers; Sergeant Johnson stood in the open road somewhere to the front-passenger side of the red SUV on Greenville Boulevard; and Sergeant Johnson and Officer Knox fatally shot Kerry at some point immediately before or while the red SUV was lodged between the civilian vehicle and Officer Warmell\u2019s patrol car.\nOur review of Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence and the entire record does not reveal any action by any involved officer that was \u201cmalicious, corrupt, or outside of the scope of official duties.\u201d Id. Indeed, many of the involved officers either personally observed, or learned by communication, certain of Kerry\u2019s actions that were unlawful and personally threatening. Because the involved officers knew that Kerry was behaving unlawfully, and in a manner that posed danger to himself, the officers, and other persons, the officers acted reasonably by pursuing and attempting to apprehend him. See Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 620, 550 S.E.2d at 172 (\u201cIn a negligence action, a law enforcement officer is held to the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.\u201d) (citations omitted).\nNor do we find evidence that Sergeant Johnson or Officer Knox acted maliciously, corruptly, or outside the scope of their official duties when they fired the fatal shots. Plaintiffs produced no evidence that Sergeant Johnson and Officer Knox acted with any malice, ill will, or any motivation other than preserving the safety of the surrounding officers and civilians. Considering that Kerry had evaded law enforcement in a pursuit on city streets, and the red SUV was in a position that threatened the safety of officers (one of whom stood in the open road) and at least one civilian in an adjacent vehicle, we conclude that Sergeant Johnson and Officer Knox acted without malice or corruption within the scope of their official duties.\nAccordingly, we hold that the officers involved in this case would be entitled to public officer\u2019s immunity based on Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence, which includes no proof of malicious, corrupt or ultra vires conduct by the officers. Because a negligence claim against the officers would not survive on Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence, \u201ca claim of negligence against the [municipality] can not be supported.\u201d Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 622, 550 S.E.2d at 172-73.\nIn sum, we uphold the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Greenville.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(d)(2)a (2007).\n. The Complaint includes one bare allegation that could arguably support the City of Greenville\u2019s liability by direct negligence. The Complaint states: \u201cThe City of Greenville by and through its officers and supervisors have failed to adequately train the members of the Greenville Police Department....\u201d However, the Complaint alleges no specific acts or omissions that might constitute such a failure to adequately train, Plaintiffs\u2019 forecast of evidence before the trial court did not substantiate this allegation, the trial court\u2019s judgment does not address this theory of liability, and Plaintiffs have not argued this theory on appeal. Therefore, this theory of the City of Greenville\u2019s liability is not properly before us. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (2007); Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 621-22, 550 S.E.2d at 172-73 (forecast of evidence sufficient to sustain negligent training and supervision claim).", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert D. Rouse, III, for plaintiffs.", "Troutman Sanders LLP, by Gary S. Parsons and D. Kyle Deak, and Assistant City Attorney William J. Little, III, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KARL E. TURNER and wife, BARBARA W. TURNER, ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF KERRY EDWARD TURNER, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF GREENVILLE, Defendant\nNo. COA08-630\n(Filed 16 June 2009)\nPolice Officers\u2014 shooting after car chase \u2014 claim against city\u2014 public officer\u2019s immunity \u2014 summary judgment\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for the City of Greenville on claims arising from the shooting death of plaintiffs\u2019 son by police officers after a car chase. The officers who were involved knew that the decedent was behaving unlawfully and in a manner that posed a danger to himself, officers, and other people, and the officers acted reasonably by pursing and attempting to apprehend decedent. The officers would be entitled to public officer\u2019s immunity, and a claim against the city cannot be supported. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-401(d)(2). '\nAppeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 19 March 2008 by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2009.\nRobert D. Rouse, III, for plaintiffs.\nTroutman Sanders LLP, by Gary S. Parsons and D. Kyle Deak, and Assistant City Attorney William J. Little, III, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0562-01", "first_page_order": 592, "last_page_order": 599 }