{ "id": 4167793, "name": "PAUL CHRISTOPHER BLOW, Plaintiff v. DSM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., formerly CATALYTICA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., EASTERN OMNI CONSTRUCTORS, INC., THE GREENWOOD GROUP, INC. d/b/a MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Blow v. DSM Pharmaceuticals, Inc.", "decision_date": "2009-06-16", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1500", "first_page": "586", "last_page": "592", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 586" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642154 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638253, 12638254, 12638255, 12638256, 12638257, 12638258, 12638259, 12638260, 12638261, 12638262, 12638263, 12638264, 12638265, 12638266, 12638267, 12638268, 12638269, 12638270, 12638271, 12638272 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0083-11", "/se2d/643/0083-01", "/se2d/643/0083-02", "/se2d/643/0083-03", "/se2d/643/0083-04", "/se2d/643/0083-05", "/se2d/643/0083-06", "/se2d/643/0083-07", "/se2d/643/0083-08", "/se2d/643/0083-09", "/se2d/643/0083-10", "/se2d/643/0083-13", "/se2d/643/0083-12", "/se2d/643/0083-14", "/se2d/643/0083-15", "/se2d/643/0083-16", "/se2d/643/0083-17", "/se2d/643/0083-18", "/se2d/643/0083-19", "/se2d/643/0083-20" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916902 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "noting that the plaintiffs employer had no prior OSHA citations for safety violations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527914 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "noting that the plaintiffs employer had no prior OSHA citations for safety violations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795996 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162380 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919488 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "citing Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 712, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1985); Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227" }, { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491466 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "citing Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 712, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1985); Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121342 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170267 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "quoting Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440839 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "quoting Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511222 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468804 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 802, "char_count": 14825, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5256435662577652e-07, "percentile": 0.6701465992804986 }, "sha256": "68d989c891aaa315e9b0a7f4b1e3d20519acc17b79affb6ed234642819e927f9", "simhash": "1:4f1055b815ff2cd2", "word_count": 2348 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "PAUL CHRISTOPHER BLOW, Plaintiff v. DSM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., formerly CATALYTICA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., EASTERN OMNI CONSTRUCTORS, INC., THE GREENWOOD GROUP, INC. d/b/a MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nPaul Christopher Blow (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals the 16 March 2006 dismissal of his suit against DSM Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (\u201cdefendant\u201d). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nIn August 1999, plaintiff was a temporary employee of The Greenwood Group d/b/a Manpower Temporary Services (\u201cManpower\u201d) working as a chemical processor at defendant\u2019s plant. Defendant was a pharmaceuticals manufacturer or processor of chemicals for the production of pharmaceuticals. As part of its operations, defendant maintained and operated a Bulk Bromine Storage/Handling System (\u201cbromine system\u201d). Bromine is a highly toxic and lethal chemical element that defendant used to manufacture one of the pharmaceuticals it produced. Its transportation, storage, handling, and processing are highly regulated to protect workers and the general public from its hazardous properties.\nDue to minor leaks caused by vibrations, defendant and Eastern Omni Constructors, Inc. (\u201cEastern Omni\u201d) \u2014 its design consultants \u2014 decided to replace a section of transfer line with Multiflex hose rated at 625 pounds of pressure per square inch (\u201cpsi\u201d). However, what actually was installed was Ultraflex hose rated at 300 psi. An inspection of the bromine system by an independent chemical engineering consultant revealed that \u201ccertain features of the system must be considered hazardous at worst and probably poor practice at best.\u201d On 15 August 1999, the Ultraflex hose ruptured, releasing approximately 360 gallons of liquid bromine.\nPlaintiff arrived at work that evening approximately fifteen minutes after the bromine spill. There were no warnings of the danger posed by the bromine spill. As plaintiff approached the building where he would have changed into work-appropriate attire, he experienced difficulty breathing; burning sensations in his nose, throat and chest; and eye irritation. Upon entering the building, he experienced more difficulty breathing, burning sensations, and eye irritation. Plaintiff managed to exit the building and escaped the area with the assistance of a fellow employee. He was transported to Pitt County Memorial Hospital where he was hospitalized for two days due to exposure to bromine gas and vapors. Plaintiff alleges he suffered permanent injuries as a result of the exposure to bromine gas at defendant\u2019s plant.\nOn 5 September 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, Eastern Omni, and Manpower alleging gross negligence, negligence, and infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to Manpower.\nOn 4 November 2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) alleging (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff\u2019s claims were barred by the exclusivity of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d), and (2) plaintiff\u2019s allegations failed to state a claim falling outside the Act pursuant to Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), an exception to the Act\u2019s exclusivity. On 16 March 2006, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appealed.\nThis Court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s appeal as interlocutory on 17 April 2007. See Blow v. DSM Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 182 N.C. App. 765, 643 S.E.2d 83 (2007) (unpublished). On 5 September 2008, plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to Eastern- Omni. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court\u2019s final judgment.\nPlaintiff asserts two interrelated assignments of error: (1) that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint based upon a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We disagree.\nWe review a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. Hatcher v. Harrah\u2019s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 169 N.C. App. 151, 155, 610 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2005) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the de novo standard of review, \u201cthe court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court].\u201d In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. Part., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)).\nOn a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the standard of review is \u201cwhether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, \u00e1re sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u201d\nBlock v. County of Person, 141 N.C. App. 273, 277, 540 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2000) (quoting Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987)). A complaint is properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when (1) the complaint, on its face, reveals that no law supports the plaintiff\u2019s claim; (2) the complaint, on its face, reveals an absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) some fact disclosed in the complaint necessarily defeats the plaintiff\u2019s claim. Johnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C. App. 1, 4, 356 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1987).\nThe rights and remedies granted to an employee by the Act \u201cshall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of [an] injury or death.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1 (2007). In exchange for the \u201climited but assured benefits\u201d of the Act, \u201cthe employee is generally barred from suing the employer for potentially larger damages in civil negligence actions and is instead limited exclusively to those remedies set forth in the Act.\u201d Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 556, 597 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2003) (citing Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 712, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1985); Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227).\nHowever,\n[w]hen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the personal representative of the estate in case of death, may pursue a civil action against the employer. Such misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act.\nWoodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228. \u201cThis exception applies only in the most egregious cases of employer misconduct. Such circumstances exist where there is uncontroverted evidence of the employer\u2019s intentional misconduct and where such misconduct is substantially certain to lead to the employee\u2019s serious injury or death.\u201d Whitaker, 357 N.C. at 557, 597 S.E.2d at 668 (emphasis added). \u201cWe made it clear in [Woodson] that there had to be a higher degree of negligence than willful, wanton and reckless negligence as defined in Pleasant [v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985)]\u201d to maintain a claim in tort against an employer, when the parties are subject to the Act. Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 239, 424 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1993). \u201cThe elements of a Woodson claim are: (1) misconduct by the employer; (2) intentionally engaged in; (3) with the knowledge that the misconduct is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to an employee; and (4) that employee is injured as a consequence of the misconduct.\u201d Pasiva v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, 121 N.C. App. 656, 659, 468 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1996) (citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228).\nDue to the exclusivity of the Act, in order for plaintiff to succeed on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), plaintiff must have adequately pled a Woodson claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we address this aspect of plaintiff\u2019s appeal first.\nAlthough it may be possible to cobble together the necessary allegations for a Woodson claim from the complaint, essentially, plaintiff\u2019s claim is one for negligence which fails to rise to the level of a valid Woodson claim. In attempting to meet the required Woodson elements, the complaint alleges generally that (1) defendant failed to comply with governmental safety standards; (2) defendant acted wilfully, wantonly, with reckless disregard, and constructive intent; (3) defendant \u201cknew or should have known that it was foreseeable that if [it] failed to comply . . . there was a substantial certainty that a' catastrophic [bromine spill] would result in the serious bodily injury or death of its employees (including [plaintiff])];]\u201d and (4) plaintiff was seriously injured as a result.\nPlaintiff has failed to allege \u201ca higher degree of negligence than willful, wanton and reckless negligence as defined in Pleasant.\u201d See Pendergrass, 333 N.C. at 239, 424 S.E.2d at 395. \u201c[S]imply having knowledge of some possibility, or even probability, of injury or death is not the same as knowledge of a substantial certainty of injury or death.\u201d Whitaker, 357 N.C. at 558, 597 S.E.2d at 669. As was true in Whitaker, \u201c[t]he facts of this case involve defective equipment and human error that amount to an accident rather than intentional misconduct.\u201d Id.\nThe bromine system began operating in July 1998. The Ultraflex hose that ruptured was installed in November 1998. The consultant prepared his report in April 1999. The objectives of the report were to bring problems in the bromine system to defendant\u2019s attention \u201cand to recommend modifications to reduce the hazards\u201d posed by those problems. The report failed to inform defendant that a catastrophic bromine spill was substantially certain to occur as a result of the Ultraflex hose, or any other of the problem components of the bromine system.\nWith respect to the transfer lines for which the Ultraflex hose was used, the report noted that failure \u201ccan create catastrophic [bromine] emission.\u201d There was a \u201cpotential\u201d of fatigue failure and \u201cwater hammer\u201d impact. Although the excessive size and weakness of the transfer lines posed a \u201cserious hazard,\u201d the consultant did not recommend immediate replacement to a safer material; he recommended that all new transfer line installations be to the safer material, while only replacing older lines \u201cas opportunities permit\u201d or \u201cas maintenance costs or failures justify.\u201d These statements are not sufficient to put defendant on notice of an impending catastrophic bromine spill.\nSoon after the incident, The North Carolina Department of Labor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health conducted an investigation, finding thirty-one state and federal safety and health violations, including, but not limited to, failure to have adequate emergency action plans, failure to have complete process safety information, and failure to have an adequate process hazard analysis. It found twenty-four \u201cserious\u201d violations and seven \u201cunclassified\u201d violations; not one of the violations was deemed to be \u201cwillful\u201d or a \u201crepeat\u201d violation. The North Carolina Division of Air Quality also conducted an investigation after the incident. It found, inter alia, that process safety information was incomplete, process hazard analysis was incomplete, mechanical integrity was inadequate, and emergency response was inadequate.\nIn Edwards v. GE Lighting Sys., Inc., 193 N.C. App. 578, 668 S.E.2d 114 (2008), the evidence tended to show that the defendant company did not adequately maintain its equipment; however, this Court noted that \u201ceven a \u2018knowing failure to provide adequate safety equipment in violation of OSHA regulations [does] not give rise to liability under . . . Woodson . . .\u2019 \u201d Id. at 584, 668 S.E.2d at 118 (quoting Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 112, 463 S.E.2d 206, 212 (1995)) (alterations in original) (additional citations omitted). This Court also recognized that \u201c[u]nlike the employer in Woodson, who had received four citations for violating safety procedures in the six and a half years preceding the incident, [the defendant company] had never been cited by OSHA prior to the accident\u201d for the problems giving rise to the employee\u2019s death. Id. See also Vaughan v. J. P. Taylor Co., 114 N.C. App. 651, 654, 442 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1994) (noting that the plaintiffs employer had no prior OSHA citations for safety violations). Finally, this Court noted that although the plaintiff contended that the defendant company \u201ccould have done more to ensure its workers\u2019 safety, \u2018the evidence does not show that [the employer] engaged in misconduct knowing it was substantially certain to cause death or serious injury.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Jones v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 591, 595, 463 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1995)) (alterations in original).\nSimilarly, defendant in the case sub judice had not been cited for violations of the bromine system prior to the spill. Although it failed to adequately construct and maintain the bromine system, and failed to implement appropriate safety procedures, defendant did not \u201cengage [] in misconduct knowing it was substantially certain to cause death or serious injury,\u201d as required to support a Woodson claim. See Jones v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 591, 595, 463 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1995).\nBecause plaintiff failed to adequately plead a Woodson claim, the trial court did not err in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Absent a proper Woodson claim, the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claim, because the Act provides an exclusive remedy for injured workers. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McDonald Law Offices, P.C., by Demyra R. McDonald, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, L.L.P., by Mark A. Ash and J. Mitchell Armbruster, for defendant- \u25a0 appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAUL CHRISTOPHER BLOW, Plaintiff v. DSM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., formerly CATALYTICA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., EASTERN OMNI CONSTRUCTORS, INC., THE GREENWOOD GROUP, INC. d/b/a MANPOWER TEMPORARY SERVICES, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1500\n(Filed 16 June 2009)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 workplace accident \u2014 Woodson claim \u2014 not adequately pled\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in a workplace negligence action. Plaintiff did not adequately plead a Woodson claim falling outside the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an order entered 16 March 2006 by Judge Jack W. Jenkins in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 May 2009.\nMcDonald Law Offices, P.C., by Demyra R. McDonald, for plaintiff-appellant.\nSmith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jemigan, L.L.P., by Mark A. Ash and J. Mitchell Armbruster, for defendant- \u25a0 appellee." }, "file_name": "0586-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 622 }