{ "id": 4167461, "name": "WANNETTA L. LANG, Plaintiff v. ANTONIO LANG, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Lang v. Lang", "decision_date": "2009-07-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1251", "first_page": "746", "last_page": "752", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 N.C. App. 746" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640577 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 S.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640797 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72", "parenthetical": "brackets in original omitted" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/659/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634491 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156933 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4157014 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353081 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709-10" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "\"While, admittedly, the trial court's findings of fact do not present a level of desired specificity, the court's factual findings were sufficient for our review, given the circumstances in the instant case.\"" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491698 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "478-79" }, { "page": "478-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 14028, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.263591273390867e-08, "percentile": 0.3865431922865001 }, "sha256": "960aee7a673b30ccaf9f9bf0b903dbb5f21a29070e446567ccbe41fedca8dbdf", "simhash": "1:23e3566a56c69ff6", "word_count": 2313 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:41.072184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JACKSON and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "WANNETTA L. LANG, Plaintiff v. ANTONIO LANG, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nThe issue in this case is whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were sufficient to support its legal conclusion that a child custody order should be modified because of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the minor child. We affirm.\nI. Background\nThe parties married on 14 February 1999. Jack, the only child of the marriage, was born 28 October 2000. The parties separated in April 2001 and subsequently divorced. The parties \u201cshare[d] joint legal custody of [Jack] with [p]laintiff having primary physical custody and the [defendant having secondary physical custody\u201d by order entered on 21 April 2004 in District Court, Guilford County. The parties agreed to minor changes in the custody arrangement in an order entered on 22 September 2006 (\u201cthe prior custody order\u201d).\nOn 1 April 2008 defendant moved to judicially modify the custody order. Defendant\u2019s motion alleged substantial changes in circumstances affecting the minor child including Jack\u2019s difficulty in school and plaintiff\u2019s inattention to Jack\u2019s medical needs. The motion requested that defendant be given primary custody of Jack.\nThe trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion on 13 May 2008. The trial court made findings, concluded that \u201cprimary physical custody of the child should be with [defendant\u201d and modified the custody order accordingly. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\n\u201c[A]n order of a court of this State for custody of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7(a) (2007). The steps in determining whether to modify a custody order are well established:\nIf. . . the trial court determines that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the child, the court must then examine whether a change in custody is in the child\u2019s best interests. If the trial court concludes that modification is in the child\u2019s best interests, only then may the court order a modification of the original custody order.\nShipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003).\nOn appellate review, an order modifying child support is to be construed broadly. Karger v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 703, 709-10, 622 S.E.2d 197, 202 (2005); see also Shipman, 357 N.C. at 479, 586 S.E.2d at 256 (\u201cWhile, admittedly, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact do not present a level of desired specificity, the court\u2019s factual findings were sufficient for our review, given the circumstances in the instant case.\u201d). The reviewing court \u201cevaluat[es] whether a trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, [and] must [also] determine if the trial court\u2019s factual findings support its conclusions of law.\u201d Shipman, 357 N.C. at 475, 586 S.E.2d at 254. \u201cWhen determining whether the findings [in an order modifying child custody] are adequate [to support its conclusions], this Court examines the entire order. The trial court is not constrained to using certain and specific buzz words or phrases in its order.\u201d Karger, 174 N.C. App. at 709, 622 S.E.2d at 202 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nIII. Findings of Fact\nThe trial court\u2019s material findings of fact are undisputed:\n8. Both parties have remarried. The Defendant married Rhonda Lang in October 2004. The plaintiff has 2 children ages 1 and 3 with her [current] husband. Plaintiff and her [current] husband separated in December, 2007 but are in counseling and are trying to work things out. The Defendant has no children other than [Jack].\n9. . . . [Two clinical] evaluations concluded that the child has ADHD and that a trial run of medication would be appropriate to address the child\u2019s issues. Both evaluations have been provided to the child\u2019s counselor Ann Harrell who agrees with the diagnosis and treatment recommendations. The child\u2019s teacher, Suzanne Daly is aware of the diagnosis and also agrees with it.\n10. The Defendant has been more involved with the child\u2019s school and extracurricular activities. He goes to the child\u2019s class weekly and has attended most field trips. The child\u2019s 1st grade teacher Suzanne Daly, testified that the Defendant was very attentive to the child\u2019s progress and behavior in school.\n11. The Plaintiff has two other young children; works two jobs and is a single parent and appears to not have as much time to go to the child\u2019s school and attend extracurricular activities. The child\u2019s teacher confirmed that Plaintiff does call and write notes to her regularly, and Plaintiff is attempting to keep in close contact with the teacher.\n12. The Defendant has been more consistent in treating the child\u2019s various recurring medical conditions, such as eczema.\n13. The parties both acknowledge they have been advised that the child needs medication for ADHD at least on a trial basis. The Plaintiff opposes use of medication and Defendant supports its use under the advice and recommendations of the doctors who have evaluated the child. There has been a delay in use of medication due to Plaintiff\u2019s opposition.\nIV. Conclusions of Law\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court\u2019s findings were not sufficient to support its legal conclusions. Specifically, plaintiff argues the trial court erred (1) by failing to make any findings as to the circumstances existing when the prior custody order was entered, and (2) by \u201cfail[ing] to indicate the effect, if any, that the[] facts [it found] had on the welfare of the child.\u201d\nA. Circumstances at Entry of the Prior Custody Order\nThe trial court concluded:\nCircumstances have changed since the entry of the prior custody order in that the Defendant has become more involved and attentive to the child\u2019s education and other needs and the Plaintiff has become less able to give the child such attention.\nPlaintiff contends that this conclusion is not supported by the- trial court\u2019s findings because the order contained no findings as to the circumstances existing when the trial court entered the prior custody order in September 2006. We disagree.\nThe trial court\u2019s undisputed findings are that (1) plaintiff had given birth to a child who was one year old in May 2008, (2) plaintiff had separated from her husband in December 2007, (3) the child was in first grade in May 2008, and (4) the child had been diagnosed with and had treatment recommended for ADHD on 20 July 2007. It is clear that these four very significant events occurred subsequent to entry of the prior custody order.\nThese four findings are sufficient to show that the trial court properly considered only events which occurred after entry of the prior custody order when it concluded that there was a change of circumstances. The trial court did not need to use the specific words, for example, \u201cI find that in September 2006 the child had not yet been diagnosed with ADHD, but now he has.\u201d See Karger, 174 N.C. App. at 709, 622 S.E.2d at 202. This assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Welfare of the Minor Child\nThe trial court further concluded:\nIt is still in the best interest of the child that the parties share his joint legal custody but primary physical custody of the child should be with Defendant during the school years set forth below.\nPlaintiff argues that this conclusion is error because the trial court \u201cfailed to indicate the effect, if any, that the[] facts [it found] had on the welfare of the child.\u201d Plaintiff relies on Frey v. Best, where this Court vacated and remanded an order modifying child custody on the basis of insufficient factual findings regarding the effect of the change in circumstances on the children. 189 N.C. App. 622, 659 S.E.2d 60 (2008). Again, we disagree.\nWhere the \u201ceffects of the substantial changes in circumstances on the minor child . . . are self-evident,\u201d there is no need for evidence directly linking the change to the effect on the child. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478-79, 586 S.E.2d at 256. Furthermore, in Karger, the Court refused to \u201cconstrue the order as narrowly as [the] appellant suggest[ed,]\u201d 174 N.C. App. at 710, 622 S.E.2d at 202, and affirmed the order modifying child custody even though \u201cthe trial court did not use the exact phrase \u2018affecting the welfare of the child[,]\u2019 \u201d id. at 709, 622 S.E.2d at 202.\nIn Frey, the case relied on by plaintiff, the trial court modified a custody order to grant increased visitation based on bare evidence of changes in defendant\u2019s lifestyle and increase in the children\u2019s ages. Specifically, the trial court found that \u201cthere has been a substantial change in circumstances in that the husband no longer works on Friday nights and rents a three-bedroom townhouse instead of a one-bedroom apartment. The children are older now as they were only 6 months, 2 years and 4 years [old] when the parties separated.\u201d 189 N.C. App. at 638, 659 S.E.2d at 72 (brackets in original omitted). On appeal, this Court determined that the trial \u201ccourt\u2019s conclusion that there had been a substantial change in circumstances regarding husband\u2019s \u2018custodial time\u2019 is not supported by findings of fact which indicate that those changes affected the welfare of the parties\u2019 minor children.\u201d Id. Accordingly, this Court vacated and remanded the order for further findings and conclusions. 189 N.C. App. at 638-39, 659 S.E.2d at 72.\nIn contrast, in Karger the trial court found facts related to the defendant\u2019s current lifestyle, \u201cthen found that the child\u2019s grades had suffered, thus providing the nexus between the substantial change in circumstances and the affect on the child\u2019s welfare. The findings go on to describe the stable environment plaintiff can now provide.\u201d 174 N.C. App. at 709, 622 S.E.2d at 202. This Court concluded \u201cthat the findings of fact and conclusions of law support the trial court\u2019s order\u201d and affirmed. Id. at 709, 622 S.E.2d at 202.\nWe conclude the case sub judice is more apposite to Shipman and Karger than to Frey. In the case sub judice, the trial court found that (1) the child needed ADHD medication and defendant was willing to provide it; (2) defendant was \u201cvery attentive to the child\u2019s progress and behavior in school[,]\u201d while the mother was less attentive; and (3) \u201c[d]efendant ha[d] been more consistent in treating the child\u2019s various recurring medical conditions [.]\u201d These findings are very different from the findings in Frey which addressed only lifestyle changes for the husband and the obvious fact that the children\u2019s ages had increased. Instead, the effect of these factual circumstances on the child is self-evident, like Shipman. 357 N.C. at 478-79, 586 S.E.2d at 256. Further, the trial court\u2019s consideration of the effect of the changes in circumstances on the child is implicit in these three findings in the context of the whole order as in Karger. 174 N.C. App. at 709, 622 S.E.2d at 202. Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.\nV. Conclusion\nThe trial court properly concluded that a change in circumstances had occurred since entry of the prior custody order. Further, the trial court, properly considered the effect of the change in circumstances on the minor child. Accordingly, the order modifying child custody is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JACKSON and STEPHENS concur.\n. A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the minor child.\n. The parties do not dispute that the order of September 2006 is the relevant order from which a change in circumstances must be measured.\n. Plaintiff assigned error to one finding of fact which was immaterial to the questions presented, then abandoned that assignment of error by failing to bring it forward in her brief. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are \u201cconclusively established.\u201d Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 68, 657 S.E.2d 724, 726 (2008).", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kathryn S. Lindley, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Cynthia A. Hatfield, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WANNETTA L. LANG, Plaintiff v. ANTONIO LANG, Defendant\nNo. COA08-1251\n(Filed 7 July 2009)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 child custody\u2014 change in circumstances\nThe trial court did not err in a child custody case by concluding a change in circumstances had occurred since entry of the prior custody order even though plaintiff mother alleges the trial court failed to make any findings as to the circumstances existing when the prior order was entered because: (I) the trial court\u2019s undisputed findings noted four very significant events that occurred subsequent to entry of the prior custody order including that plaintiff had given birth to a child who was one year old in May 2008, plaintiff had separated from her second husband in December 2007, the child was in first grade in May 2008, and the child had been diagnosed with and had treatment recommended for ADHD on 20 July 2007; and (2) the four findings were sufficient to show that the trial court properly considered only events which occurred after entry of the prior custody order when it concluded that there was a change of circumstances.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 child custody\u2014 effect of change in circumstances on child\nThe trial court in a child custody case sufficiently considered the effect of the change in circumstances on the minor child because: (1) when the effects of the substantial changes in circumstances on the minor child are self-evident, there is no need for evidence directly linking the change to the effect on the child; and (2) the trial court\u2019s consideration of the effect of the changes in circumstances on the child is implicit in its three findings that the child needed ADHD medication and defendant father was willing to provide it, defendant was very attentive to the child\u2019s progress and behavior in school while the mother was less attentive, and defendant had been more consistent in treating the child\u2019s various recurring medical conditions.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 22 May 2008 by Judge Lillian Jordan in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 March 2009.\nKathryn S. Lindley, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCynthia A. Hatfield, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0746-01", "first_page_order": 776, "last_page_order": 782 }