{ "id": 4168718, "name": "ROBERT G. YUREK and Wife, SUSAN G. YUREK, Plaintiffs v. SARA PAGE SHAFFER and MATTHEW CHRISTIAN BOYD, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Yurek v. Shaffer", "decision_date": "2009-07-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1410", "first_page": "67", "last_page": "82", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 67" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633422 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "quoting Ales v. T.A. Loving Co., 163 N.C. App. 350, 352, 593 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551935 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9380204 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527612 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138562, 138309, 138442, 138542, 138332 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0572-05", "/nc/354/0572-02", "/nc/354/0572-01", "/nc/354/0572-04", "/nc/354/0572-03" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11439124 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568288 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575337 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "citing Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525643 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "citing Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155942, 1155884, 1155693, 1155859, 1155805 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0646-01", "/nc/351/0646-05", "/nc/351/0646-04", "/nc/351/0646-03", "/nc/351/0646-02" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165865 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241969 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683498 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526339 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537568, 2545262, 2542737, 2540051, 2539988 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0274-03", "/nc/328/0274-04", "/nc/328/0274-02", "/nc/328/0274-01", "/nc/328/0274-05" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" }, { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-08", "parenthetical": "quoting Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 191, 179 S.E.2d 697, 703, disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 274, 400 S.E.2d 461 (1991)" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526900 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "quoting Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 191, 179 S.E.2d 697, 703, disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 274, 400 S.E.2d 461 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615514 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710", "parenthetical": "citing King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549725 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "citing King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564391 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833", "parenthetical": "citing Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "citing Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548405 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "citing Hickory White Trucks, Inc. v. Greene, 34 N.C. App. 279, 237 S.E.2d 862 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241209 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "citing Hickory White Trucks, Inc. v. Greene, 34 N.C. App. 279, 237 S.E.2d 862 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441152 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747-48" }, { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138519 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193882 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-35", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139523 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" }, { "page": "83-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "holding that the ruling in Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997), required maternal grandmother seeking custody to allege facts sufficient to show that mother acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240842 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "holding that the ruling in Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997), required maternal grandmother seeking custody to allege facts sufficient to show that mother acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866", "parenthetical": "no subject matter jurisdiction because DSS lacked standing to petition" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917259 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59", "parenthetical": "no subject matter jurisdiction because DSS lacked standing to petition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169132 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "citing Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188012 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443", "parenthetical": "citing Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917729 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8319197 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "quoting Ales v. T.A. Loving Co., 163 N.C. App. 350, 352, 593 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659813, 1659846, 1659785, 1659834, 1659900 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0281-04", "/nc/348/0281-02", "/nc/348/0281-01", "/nc/348/0281-05", "/nc/348/0281-03" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "reversing trial court's denial of defendant's Rule 60(b" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656424 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" }, { "page": "664" }, { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "citing Coppley v. Coppley, 128 N.C. App. 658, 663, 496 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 281, 502 S.E.2d 846 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999281 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "citing Coppley v. Coppley, 128 N.C. App. 658, 663, 496 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 281, 502 S.E.2d 846 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0575-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1305, "char_count": 36065, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3244967537130453e-07, "percentile": 0.6275278983446525 }, "sha256": "e02004e7322dcef0fa1a5d3b8f745156a6342e5064eff87c35986469e1d88c62", "simhash": "1:1601d4ea12902e76", "word_count": 5942 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "ROBERT G. YUREK and Wife, SUSAN G. YUREK, Plaintiffs v. SARA PAGE SHAFFER and MATTHEW CHRISTIAN BOYD, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nDefendant-appellant Sara Page Shaffer (\u201cShaffer\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s 6 June 2008 denial of her Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a consent judgment entered 13 November 2006.\nShaffer and defendant Matthew Christian Boyd (\u201cBoyd\u201d) are the natural parents of the minor child J.C.B., who was bom on 26 May 2006. Shaffer, Boyd, and J.C.B. lived together in Person and Granville Counties from J.C.B.\u2019s birth until 18 August 2006. Shaffer, who was 19 years old at the time, was dealing with substance abuse issues and was on felony probation for breaking or entering and larceny. Boyd was only 15 years old. During this period, the Person County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) initiated an investigation with respect to J.C.B.\nOn 18 August 2006, J.C.B. went to live with Shaffer\u2019s parents, and continued living in their home until 1 November 2006. During that time, the Granville County DSS was managing the case and providing services to Shaffer, Boyd, and J.C.B. under the supervision of In Home Family Services agent Kay Putney (\u201cPutney\u201d). Putney went to Shaffer\u2019s parents\u2019 home to investigate and insure J.C.B.\u2019s safety. At some point in fall 2006, Shaffer\u2019s parents approached DSS and expressed their unwillingess to maintain full-time custody of J.C.B. Putney met with Shaffer and Boyd at Boyd\u2019s parents\u2019 home, and then, on 17 October 2006, met with all of the parties at the offices of the Granville County DSS to formulate an \u201cIn Home Family Services Agreement.\u201d The following parties were present at this meeting: Shaffer, Boyd, DSS Supervisor Jonathon Cloud, Foster Care Supervisor Shelia Smith, Shaffer\u2019s sister Doris Jacobs, Boyd\u2019s mother Joyce Boyd, and Boyd\u2019s sister and brother-in-law, Susan and Robert Yurek (\u201cplaintiffs\u201d).\nThe \u201cIn Home Family Services Agreement\u201d identified domestic violence and substance abuse as behaviors of concern and listed \u201cdecide whether to place [J.C.B.] in foster care or give custody to family members Robert and Susan Yurek\u201d as an activity of the meeting. A subsequent provision of the agreement provided that, if J.C.B.\u2019s safety could no longer be assured, \u201c[a] petition will be filed and the child will be placed in foster care.\u201d On 1 November 2006, the parties met in the law offices of Hopper, Hicks, & Wrenn, L.L.P., with attorney N. Kyle Hicks (\u201cHicks\u201d) to discuss the custody of J.C.B. Hicks was paid by and represented the interests of DSS, and also represented plaintiffs privately. Shaffer and Boyd were not represented by counsel at the time of this meeting.\nOn 13 November 2006, Shaffer, Boyd, and plaintiffs again met with Hicks and were presented with a complaint, summons, and consent judgment. Shaffer and Boyd signed the consent judgment without objection. That same day, plaintiffs filed a complaint for custody, alleging, inter alia, that \u201cplaintiff, Susan Yurek is Boyd\u2019s sister, and therefore is an aunt to [J.C.B].\u201d The complaint also alleged that \u201c[plaintiffs are fit and proper persons to have custody of the minor child and have discussed the same with [Boyd and Shaffer, who] have consented to the Plaintiffs having custody of the minor child.\u201d The consent judgment was entered in Granville County District Court on 1 December 2006 and provided in part:\n4. That [Boyd and Shaffer] are the biological parents of the minor child, [J.C.B.] born May 26, 2006.\n8. That the Plaintiffs are fit and proper persons to exercise the exclusive care, custody and control of the minor child, and that it is in the best interest of said minor child, and would best promote his general welfare, that his exclusive care, custody and control be granted to the Plaintiffs.\n9. That the minor child, [J.C.B.], born May 26, 2006, has resided with [Boyd and Shaffer] from his date of birth up to August 17, 2006 at which time the minor child resided with the maternal grandparents. The minor child began to reside with the Plaintiffs on November 1, 2006.\n10. That the Plaintiff, Robert Yurek, is employed and the Plaintiff, Susan Yurek, is a stay at home mother, and Plaintiffs have a home with sufficient space and provisions for the minor child, including the child\u2019s own bedroom, toys, clothing, food and all of the essential provisions for the minor child.\n11. That the Defendants are both currently unemployed and. are dealing with substance abuse issues in their own lives and not able at this time to provide for the care of the minor child.\n12. That the minor child was born out of wedlock and [Boyd] has not established paternity judicially or by affidavit filed in a central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services,' and the father has not legitimated the minor child pursuant to the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-10, or filed a Petition for that specific purpose, nor has the respondent father legitimated the minor child by marriage to the mother of the minor child.\n13. That [Boyd and Shaffer] have agreed to surrender custody of the minor child to Plaintiffs.\n14. That the parties have agreed that [Boyd and Shaffer] will have visitation with the minor child as may be agreed upon between them.\n15. That by their signature hereto [Boyd and Shaffer] have waived their rights to further answer or respond to the Complaint herein. In addition, [Boyd and Shaffer] have waived their right to be notified for hearing and consent to this Judgment being entered as soon as possible at any term of the District Court in Granville County by any District Court Judge of the 9th Judicial District.\nBased upon these and other findings of fact, the district court concluded as a matter of law that the parties were properly before the district court, and that facts existed justifying the district court to assume jurisdiction to determine the custody of J.C.B. pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-3. The district court further concluded that plaintiffs are fit and proper persons to exercise exclusive care, custody and control of J.C.B. and that \u201cit is in the best interest of [J.C.B.], . . . and would promote his general welfare for his exclusive care, custody and control to be granted to plaintiffs.\u201d The consent judgment was signed by plaintiffs, Shaffer, Boyd, and Hicks as counsel for plaintiffs.\nOn 10 May 2007, Shaffer filed a motion to vacate the consent judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules, of Civil Procedure, alleging that she was threatened with termination of her parental rights unless she signed the consent judgment, and that, because there were \u201cinsufficient findings of fact to support a divestiture of legal and physical custody\" from Shaffer and Boyd, the district court was without jurisdiction to enter the consent judgment. Shaffer asked the district court to find that the \u201cproceedings, procedures and representations made to the Defendant Shaffer constitute fundamental unfairness which violate her constitutionally guaranteed custodial rights as a biological mother, . . . substantive (and procedural) due process rights as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of North Carolina, . . . that Shaffer did not execute the consent judgment voluntarily, but under threat, coercion .and duress,\u201d and, accordingly, to vacate the consent judgment as void as a matter of law.\nOn 6 June .2008, the district court entered an order denying Shaffer\u2019s motion to set aside the consent judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). The district court found that the allegations contained in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and the findings of fact contained in the consent judgment filed 1 December 2006 were true and accurate, and thus adopted them for purposes of the order. The district court also made the following findings of fact:\n12. That [at the 17 October 2006 meeting between the parties,] the alternative given to [Shaffer] [sic] decide whether to place [J.C.B.] in foster care or give custody to [plaintiffs],\n13. That the matters of [Shaffer]\u2019s substance abuse and domestic violence was [sic] acknowledged by [Shaffer] and taken into consideration.\n14. That it was agreed by all parties present that it would be in the best interests of the minor child that custody be placed with the Plaintiffs,... rather than to begin a [DSS] Petition for Neglect and perhaps place [J.C.B.] in foster care.\n15. That [DSS] agreed to effect the transfer to [plaintiffs].\n16. That on the 1st day of November 2006, all parties met with and in the office of [Hicks], an attorney with 23 years of legal experience and a partner in the firm of Hopper, Hicks, & Wrenn, L.L.P.\n17. That [Hicks] was paid by and represented the interests of [DSS] with the knowledge and consent of [Shaffer and Boyd]. That the Complaint and the Consent Judgment both reflect that [Hicks] also represented [plaintiffs] privately.\n18. That neither [Shaffer or Boyd] was represented by counsel during either the investigatory process nor at any time during the legal proceeding.\n19. That no conflict existed between any of the parties and in [sic] [Hicks] at the date the above-entitled action was begun.\n20. That it was anticipated and expressed by the parties to [Shaffer and Boyd], that when issues of substance abuse and domestic violence and parental responsibility were resolved, that [Shaffer and Boyd] could petition for a change of custody.\n21. That on the 13th of November, 2006 [Shaffer and Boyd] and the Plaintiffs prior to November 13, 2006, [sic] the parties again met at the office of [Hicks] and were presented with a Complaint, Summons, and Consent Judgment all of which were executed without objection and further that said Consent Judgment - \u201cwaived any further hearing and consented to the entry of the Judgment as soon as possible .... by any District Court Judge of the Ninth Judicial District.\u201d\n22. That [Putney] and [Hicks] reported that Plaintiffs\u2019 house was also visited by [Putney] on multiple occasions and the last one was when the file was closed in December, 2006 which was in the final report.\n23. That at the time of the Consent Judgment [Shaffer] was 20 years of age, competent, attending school making B\u2019s and C\u2019s, and was otherwise able to understand the consequences of her actions although she stated that she was impaired by the use of marijuana on the 13th day of November, 2006.\n24. That on the 13th day of November, 2006 it was in the best interests of the minor child that custody be placed with the Plaintiffs.\n(Emphasis in original.) Based upon these and other findings of fact, the district court made the following conclusions of law:\n1. That the Court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto and of the subject matter herein.\n2. That the Consent Judgment entered on the 13th day of November 2006 was freely and knowingly entered into by [Shaffer] and that no extraordinary circumstances existed to justify setting aside the Consent Judgment.\n3. That on the 13th day of November, 2006 it was in the best interests of the minor child that custody be placed with [plaintiffs].\nFrom this order, Shaffer now appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action because plaintiffs did not have standing; (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to find as fact that the 1 December 2006 consent judgment was a result of misconduct by Hicks; (3) Boyd, as a minor at the time of the consent judgment, was incapable of consenting to the judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.\nShaffer first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s finding and conclusion, in its order denying her motion for Rule 60(b) relief, that it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this action in entering the original consent judgment. As part of this argument, Shaffer contends that plaintiffs did not have standing to sue for custody of J.C.B. under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.1(a). We disagree.\nWhile the standard of appellate review of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is generally for an abuse of discretion, Barnes v. Wells, 165 N.C. App. 575, 580, 599 S.E.2d 585, 589 (2004) (citing Coppley v. Coppley, 128 N.C. App. 658, 663, 496 S.E.2d 611, 616, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 281, 502 S.E.2d 846 (1998)), \u201c \u2018whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which is reviewable on appeal de novo.\u2019 \u201d Childress v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 172 N.C. App. 166, 167, 615 S.E.2d 868, 869 (2005) (quoting Ales v. T.A. Loving Co., 163 N.C. App. 350, 352, 593 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2004)).\nSubject matter jurisdiction has been defined as a court\u2019s power to hear a specific type of action, and \u201cis conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.\u201d In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (citing Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987)). A lack of subject matter jurisdiction has been found where the petitioner lacked standing. See In re Miller, 162 N.C. App. 355, 358-59, 590 S.E.2d 864, 866 (2004) (no subject matter jurisdiction because DSS lacked standing to petition). Standing for an individual to bring an action for child custody is governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.1(a), which provides in pertinent part that \u201c[a]ny parent, relative, or other person . . . claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of such child . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.1(a) (2007). Although N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.1(a) broadly grants standing to any parent, relative, or person claiming the right to custody, when such actions are brought by a non-parent to obtain custody to the exclusion of a parent, our appellate courts have also required allegations of some act inconsistent with the parent\u2019s constitutionally protected status. See Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 362, 520 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1999) (holding that the ruling in Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997), required maternal grandmother seeking custody to allege facts sufficient to show that mother acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status). As our Supreme Court has explained, \u201c[a] natural parent\u2019s constitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his or her child is a counterpart of the parental responsibilities the parent has assumed and is based on a presumption that he or she will act in the best interest of the child.\u201d Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983). However, the Court continued,\nthe parent may no longer enjoy a paramount status if his or her conduct is inconsistent with this presumption or if he or she fails to shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a child. If a natural parent\u2019s conduct has not been inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status, application of the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard in a custody dispute with a nonparent would offend the Due Process Clause. However, conduct inconsistent with the parent\u2019s protected status, which need not rise to the statutory level warranting termination of parental rights, would result in application of the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d test without offending the Due Process Clause. Unfitness, neglect, and abandonment clearly constitute conduct inconsistent with the protected status parents may enjoy. Other types of conduct, which must be viewed on a case-by-case basis, can also rise to this level so as to be inconsistent with the protected status of natural parents. Where such conduct is properly found by the trier of fact, based on evidence in the record, custody should be determined by the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d test mandated by statute.\nId. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534-35 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court later held that \u201ca trial court\u2019s determination that a parent\u2019s conduct is inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 63, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603 (1982)).\nIn Cantrell v. Wishon, 141 N.C. App. 340, 540 S.E.2d 804 (2000), this Court was presented with a set of facts similar to those in the case at bar. A mother signed a document stating she wanted plaintiffs, the paternal aunt and uncle of her minor children, to act as the children\u2019s parents, and then voluntarily left the children with the plaintiffs while she underwent drug rehabilitation treatment. Id. at 341, 540 S.E.2d at 805. After five months of infrequent visits from the mother, the plaintiffs sued for custody of the children. Id. We indicated that plaintiffs had standing to bring a suit for custody, but ultimately remanded to the trial court for findings as to whether mother had acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status. Id. at 344, 540 S.E.2d 806. Our opinion discussed the Price court\u2019s treatment of the issue:\nIn determining whether the mother acted inconsistently with her protected status, the Court considered a number of other issues: Whether her relinquishment of custody was intended to be temporary or permanent; whether her behavior had created the family unit that existed between the plaintiff and the child; and the degree of custodial, personal and financial contact between her and her child.\nCantrell, 141 N.C. App. at 343, 540 S.E.2d at 806 (2000) (citing Price, 346 N.C. at 83-84, 484 S.E.2d at 537).\nHere, Shaffer first argues in her brief that the father of a child born out of wedlock is considered an \u201cother person\u201d under the statute, and, by extension, the relatives of such a father should also be considered \u201cother persons.\u201d However, at oral argument, Shaffer\u2019s attorney admitted to this Court that plaintiffs in this case qualify as \u201crelatives\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.1(a). Furthermore, we note that neither Shaffer nor Boyd has disputed plaintiffs\u2019 status as biological relatives of J.C.B. until this appeal. A \u201crelative\u201d has been defined as a \u201cperson connected with another by blood or affinity; a person who is kin with another.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1315 (7th ed. 2004). Under this plain meaning, the meaning which all parties have apparently assigned to the term as utilized in the statute, we conclude that plaintiffs properly filed a claim for custody of J.C.B. as relatives under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.1(a).\nAs to Shaffer\u2019s constitutionally protected status, we first note that plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for custody alleged that both Shaffer and Boyd were, at the time of the complaint, unemployed, dealing with substance abuse issues, and not able to provide for the care of J.C.B. We also note that, under the factors considered by the Price Court and noted by this Court in Cantrell, a natural parent\u2019s execution of a valid consent judgment granting exclusive care, custody, and control of a child to a nonparent, may be a factor upon which the trial court could base a conclusion that a parent has acted inconsistently with his or her constitutionally protected status. See Cantrell, 141 N.C. App. at 343, 540 S.E.2d at 806. Though Shaffer disputes the validity of the consent judgment, the findings contained in the trial court\u2019s consent judgment and in its order denying Shaffer\u2019s Rule 60(b) motion, which appear well supported by our review of the record, demonstrate that Shaffer, prior to execution of the consent judgment, invariably acted in a manner inconsistent with her paramount interest in the custody, care, and control of J.C.B. Notably, at the time of the \u201cIn Home Family Agreement,\u201d Shaffer acknowledged substance abuse and domestic violence issues and voluntarily agreed that it was in the best interests of J.C.B. to be placed with plaintiffs. Furthermore, Shaffer voluntarily consented to J.C.B.\u2019s placement with other parties-first with Boyd\u2019s parents, and then with plaintiffs \u2014 and Shaffer has produced no evidence that she had a substantial degree of personal, financial, or custodial contact with J.C.B. after these placements.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact are sufficient to support a conclusion that Shaffer\u2019s conduct was inconsistent with her protected interest in the custody of J.C.B. Moreover, the evidence of record constitutes clear and convincing proof that Shaffer\u2019s conduct was inconsistent with her right to custody of the child. As such, the trial court did not err in applying the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard, determining that J.C.B.\u2019s interests were best served by maintaining his primary physical custody with plaintiffs, and entering the consent judgment. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nShaffer contends, however, that we should not consider her execution of the consent judgment and she assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion to set it aside. Shaffer alleges that because she was young, unrepresented by counsel, and allegedly under the influence of marijuana at the time she signed the consent judgment, she was particularly vulnerable to the undue influence of Hicks and DSS, and that Hicks\u2019s communications with Shaffer leading up to her execution of the consent judgment amounted to improper misconduct. Accordingly, Shaffer contends, the district court\u2019s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion was manifestly unsupported by reason. We disagree.\nShaffer relies on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(3), which provides in pertinent part:\nOn motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:\n(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b) (2007) (emphasis added). We review the denial of a motion pursuant to Rule 60 for an abuse of discretion. Ollo v. Mills, 136 N.C. App. 618, 625, 525 S.E.2d 213, 217 (2000) (citing Hickory White Trucks, Inc. v. Greene, 34 N.C. App. 279, 237 S.E.2d 862 (1977)). \u201cA trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citing Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980)). \u201cA ruling committed to a trial court\u2019s discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Id.\nA consent judgment has been defined by this Court as \u201cthe contract of the parties entered upon the records of a court of competent jurisdiction with its sanction and approval.\u201d Blankenship v. Price, 27 N.C. App. 20, 22, 217 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1975) (citing King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945)). Because a consent judgment incorporates the bargained agreement of the parties, such a judgment may be attacked only on limited grounds: \u201cit cannot be changed without the consent of the parties or set aside except upon proper allegation and proof that consent was not in fact given or that it was obtained by fraud or mutual mistake, the burden being upon the party attacking the judgment.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nThis Court has held that, under Rule 60(b), duress or undue influence used to secure execution of a consent order may amount to misconduct justifying relief from the order. Coppley, 128 N.C. App. at 664, 496 S.E.2d at 618 (reversing trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a consent judgment obtained when defendant was under the influence of prescription medication and emotionally distraught after plaintiff\u2019s threats to expose her extramarital affair in court and in front of their children). \u201c \u2018Duress is the result of coercion.\u2019 \u201d Stegall v. Stegall, 100 N.C. App. 398, 401, 397 S.E.2d 306, 307-08 (1990) (quoting Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 191, 179 S.E.2d 697, 703, disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 274, 400 S.E.2d 461 (1991)). \u201c \u2018Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under . circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Link, 278 N.C. at 194, 179 S.E.2d at 705). \u201cFactors relevant in determining whether a victim\u2019s will was actually overcome\u201d are as follows:\n[T]he age, physical and mental condition of the victim, whether the victim had independent advice, whether the transaction was fair, whether there was independent consideration for the transaction, the relationship of the victim and alleged perpetrator, the value of the item transferred compared with the total wealth of the victim, whether the perpetrator actively sought the transfer and whether the victim was in distress or an emergency situation.\nId. at 401-02, 397 S.E.2d at 308.(quoting Curl v. Key, 64 N.C. App. 139, 142, 306 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1983), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 311 N.C. 259, 316 S.E.2d 272 (1984)). \u201cIn the instance where the court cannot find sufficient threat to constitute duress, it may still find the presence of undue influence,\u201d Coppley, 128 N.C. App. at 664, 496 S.E.2d at 617, which has been defined as \u201c \u2018the exercise of an improper influence over the mind and will of another to such an extent that his professed act is not that of a free agent, but in reality is the act of the third person who procured the result.\u2019 \u201d Stephenson v. Warren, 136 N.C. App. 768, 772, 525 S.E.2d 809, 812 (quoting Lee v. Ledbetter, 229 N.C. 330, 332, 49 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1948)), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 646, 543 S.E.2d 883 (2000).\nFirst of all, we note that, although Shaffer\u2019s drug abuse problems have been well-documented in the record, Shaffer has failed to provide any evidence, other than her bare allegations, that she was under the influence of any drug or other mind-altering substance on the date she signed the consent judgment. We also note that, when acting as the finder.of fact, the trial court has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and determine their credibility, the weight to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In re Whisnant, 71 N.C. App. 439, 441, 322 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1984) (citing Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968)). Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u201care conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.\u201d Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975).\n\u201c[T]here is no prohibition generally on [an attorney] communicating directly with an adverse party who is not represented by counsel.\u201d Ethics Op. RPC 15, N.C. State Bar Lawyers\u2019 Handbook 2008, at 170 (October 24, 1986) (discussing whether an attorney may contact an unrepresented adverse party and make a demand or propose a settlement). Although Rule 4.3(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from giving legal advice to an unrepresented adverse party, see N.C. Rev. R. Prof\u2019l. Conduct R. 4.3(a), 2009 Ann. R. N.C. 818, we find no evidence in the record indicating that Hicks gave Shaffer any legal advice or attempted to influence her decision in any way. Here, Shaffer does not point to any false statement made by Hicks to Shaffer or the trial court leading up to the consent judgment. Furthermore, though Hicks alleges she was unduly influenced by Putney\u2019s statement, \u201cNo, you don\u2019t need [a lawyer]. You just need to sign all this,\u201d we note that the context of this statement belies this allegation. The statement occurred after several meetings where Shaffer had participated in discussions regarding J.C.B.\u2019s placement with plaintiffs and in response to Shaffer\u2019s question, \u201cAre y\u2019all sure I don\u2019t need a lawyer?\u201d The record also reveals that approximately thirteen days passed between the last of these meetings and Shaffer\u2019s execution of the consent judgment, but she made no effort during this time to seek legal advice.\nAlthough Shaffer testified at the Rule 60(b) motion hearing that her understanding of the legal consequences of the consent judgment was initially limited, the record reveals, and the trial court found, that at the time of the consent judgment, Shaffer was twenty years old, enrolled in community college, and had previously interacted with DSS several times. Shaffer\u2019s testimony also indicated that, at the time of the consent judgment, she made a rational determination that placing J.C.B. with someone else while she was \u201cgetting sober\u201d was in J.C.B.\u2019s best interest, and that she understood that \u201cwhenever I got myself back together and I wanted [J.C.B.] to come home, I just had to go to the court and petition the court to get him back.\u201d Clearly, Shaffer\u2019s -will was not \u201cactually overcome,\u201d there is little evidence to support a claim of undue influence, and our review of the record reveals no \u201cegregious scheme of directly subverting the judicial process.\u201d Henderson v. Wachovia Bank, 145 N.C. App. 621, 628, 551 S.E.2d 464, 469 (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. rev. denied, 354 N.C. 572, 558 S.E.2d 869 (2001). The trial court did not act arbitrarily in determining that Shaffer failed to show she was under duress or undue influence when she executed the consent judgment. Because Shaffer has not met her burden of showing that the trial court\u2019s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion was manifestly unsupported by reason, this assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, Shaffer argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter or approve the consent judgment because Boyd was a minor, was not appointed a guardian ad litem, was not represented by any other type of guardian or by counsel, and therefore was incapable of consenting to the judgment as a matter of law.\nA consent judgment is a bargained-for agreement, Stevenson v. Stevenson, 100 N.C. App. 750, 752, 398 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1990), and in North Carolina, \u201cagreements or contracts, except for those dealing with necessities and those authorized by statute, \u2018are voidable at the election of the infant and may be disaffirmed by the infant during minority or within a reasonable time of reaching majority.\u2019 \u201d Creech v. Melnick, 147 N.C. App. 471, 476, 556 S.E.2d 587, 591 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc., v. Smith, 48 N.C. App. 580, 582, 269 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1980)). A third party thus has no standing to challenge the validity of a consent judgment entered into by a minor.\nHere, Shaffer and Boyd signed the consent judgment separately. Shaffer, though a party to the consent judgment, does not have standing to challenge Boyd\u2019s capacity to consent to the judgment. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James T. Duckworth, III for defendant-appellant Shaffer.", "Michael P. Burnette for plaintiff-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT G. YUREK and Wife, SUSAN G. YUREK, Plaintiffs v. SARA PAGE SHAFFER and MATTHEW CHRISTIAN BOYD, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1410\n(Filed 7 July 2009)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 child custody\u2014 nonparents \u2014 consent judgment \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court did not err in a child custody case involving a child born out of wedlock by denying defendant mother\u2019s motion for N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b) relief from a consent judgment, by concluding that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action when entering the original consent judgment, and by determining that the minor child\u2019s interests were best served by maintaining his primary physical custody with plaintiffs because: (1) defendant admitted during oral arguments that plaintiffs, the father\u2019s sister and brother-in-law, qualified as \u201crelatives\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.1(a) who are permitted to bring a child custody action; (2) regarding defendant\u2019s constitutionally protected status as a parent, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for custody alleged that both she and the fifteen-year-old father were, at the time of the complaint, unemployed, dealing with substance abuse issues, and not able to provide for the care of the minor child; (3) a natural parent\u2019s execution of a valid consent judgment granting exclusive care, custody, and control of a child to a non-parent may be a factor upon which the trial court could base a conclusion that a parent has acted inconsistently with his or her constitutionally protected status; and (4) the evidence constituted clear and convincing proof that defendant\u2019s conduct was inconsistent with her right to custody of the child, including that defendant at the time of the \u201cIn Home Family Agreement\u201d acknowledged substance abuse and domestic violence issues and voluntarily agreed that it was in the best interests of the minor child to be placed with plaintiffs; defendant voluntarily consented to the minor child\u2019s placement with other parties including first with the father\u2019s parents and then with plaintiffs; and defendant failed to produce evidence that she had a substantial degree of personal, financial, or custodial contact with the minor child after these placements.\n2. Judgments\u2014 consent judgment \u2014 failure to show duress or undue influence\nThe trial court did not act arbitrarily in a child custody case by determining that defendant mother failed to show she was under duress or undue influence when she executed a consent judgment because: (1) although defendant\u2019s drug abuse problems were well-documented in the record, she failed to provide any evidence, other than her bare allegations, that she was under the influence of any drug or other mind-altering substance on the date she signed the consent judgment; (2) although Rule 4.3 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from giving legal advice to an unrepresented adverse party, there was no evidence in the record indicating that the attorney for DSS and plaintiffs gave defendant any legal advice or attempted to influence her decision in any way; (3) approximately thirteen days passed between the last of the meetings regarding the minor child\u2019s placement and defendant\u2019s execution of the consent judgment, but she made no effort during this time to seek legal advice despite her contention that she was unduly influenced by plaintiff\u2019s statement that she did not need a lawyer; (4) although defendant testified at the Rule 60(b) motion hearing that her understanding of the legal consequences of the consent judgment was initially limited, the record revealed, and the trial court found, that at the time of the consent judgment, defendant was twenty years old, enrolled in community college, and had previously interacted with DSS several times; and (5) defendant\u2019s testimony also indicated that at the time of the consent judgment, she made a rational determination that placing the minor child with someone else while she was \u201cgetting sober\u201d was in the child\u2019s best interest, and that she understood that whenever she got herself back together and wanted the child to come home, defendant just had to go to the court and petition the court to get him back.\n3. Judgments\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 third party cannot challenge validity of consent judgment entered into by minor\nAlthough defendant mother contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter or approve a consent judgment in a child custody case since defendant father was a minor, was not appointed a guardian ad litem, was not represented by any other type of guardian or by counsel, and thus was incapable of consenting to the judgment as a matter of law, a third party has no standing to challenge the validity of a consent judgment entered into by a minor. Defendants signed the consent judgment separately, and although the mother was a party to the consent judgment, she does not have standing to challenge the father\u2019s capacity to consent to the judgment.\nAppeal by defendants from judgment entered 6 June 2008 by Judge Charles W. Wilkinson, Jr. in Granville County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 April 2009.\nJames T. Duckworth, III for defendant-appellant Shaffer.\nMichael P. Burnette for plaintiff-appellees." }, "file_name": "0067-01", "first_page_order": 93, "last_page_order": 108 }