{ "id": 4168582, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA BY AND THROUGH THE ALBEMARLE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, EX REL., SHAWN L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. ROBERT B. EASON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Albemarle Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Eason", "decision_date": "2009-07-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1432", "first_page": "138", "last_page": "145", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 138" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635086 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639899 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "quoting Craven Reg'l Med. Auth. v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 176 N.C. App. 46, 51, 625 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793091 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565105 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801-02", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Jones, 293 N.C. 413, 238 S.E.2d 482 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522212 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Jones, 293 N.C. 413, 238 S.E.2d 482 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 So. 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "year": 1894, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Fla. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Fla.", "case_ids": [ 1086604 ], "year": 1894, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/34/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 So. 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "year": 1892, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Fla. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Fla.", "case_ids": [ 1139342 ], "year": 1892, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/29/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 So. 2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11642092 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/72/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "744 So. 2d 1139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11559457 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1140", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/744/1139-01" ] }, { "cite": "Fla. Stat. \u00a7 117.05", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Fla. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "providing further that \"[a] notary public shall certify in the certificate of acknowledgment or jurat the type of identification, either based on personal knowledge or other form of identification, upon which the notary public is relying\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416-17", "parenthetical": "\"Verification by affidavit requires that the verification be 'sworn to before a notary public or other officer of the court authorized to administer oaths.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11709453 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199", "parenthetical": "\"Verification by affidavit requires that the verification be 'sworn to before a notary public or other officer of the court authorized to administer oaths.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-148", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "\"[BJecause the procedure set forth in the termination of parental rights provisions requires a verified petition, and verification is not defined in chapter 7A, the requirements for verification established in chapter 1A, Rule 11(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525216 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "\"[BJecause the procedure set forth in the termination of parental rights provisions requires a verified petition, and verification is not defined in chapter 7A, the requirements for verification established in chapter 1A, Rule 11(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798444 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "citing Welsher v. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 491 S.E.2d 661 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240208 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "citing Welsher v. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 491 S.E.2d 661 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300808 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374767 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "quoting Craven Reg'l Med. Auth. v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 176 N.C. App. 46, 51, 625 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436004 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0544-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 854, "char_count": 18940, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.437665670855714 }, "sha256": "241b217e4a01b462750f13a4fad9bf0841d45f9a53ffd6a9960f808833a4188b", "simhash": "1:2c69792fce4a50d6", "word_count": 3059 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA BY AND THROUGH THE ALBEMARLE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, EX REL., SHAWN L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. ROBERT B. EASON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nShawn L. Johnson and defendant, Robert B. Eason, were married to each other on 1 July 1998 in Virginia. Defendant thereafter adopted Ms. Johnson\u2019s son. The parties separated on 17 September 2001, and the marriage was declared void and was annulled in Virginia on 30 May 2002 on grounds that Ms. Johnson \u201chad not legally dissolved an earlier marriage.\u201d On 11 April 2007, Ms. Johnson, a resident of the State of Florida, signed a Uniform Support Petition seeking child support and medical insurance coverage for the child, C.L.E., as well as recovery of retroactive support owed to the State of Florida paid for the benefit of the child, from defendant, who was then a resident of the State of North Carolina. The petition was signed and dated by Florida-commissioned notary public D. Harrison, Commission No. DD509426, who affixed a State of Florida notary seal to the signed petition. The State of Florida initiated this civil action under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (\u201cUIFSA\u201d) by forwarding Ms. Johnson\u2019s petition to the State of North Carolina. The petition was filed in Camden County on 24 July 2007, along with a Child Support Enforcement Transmittal #1 Initial Request form and a ten-page General Testimony form, which was signed by Ms. Johnson and notarized in the same manner as the petition.\nOn 25 July 2007, defendant was served with the petition and a summons for a proceeding brought by the State of North Carolina for relator Ms. Johnson (\u201cplaintiff\u2019). On 24 September 2007, defendant filed a pleading entitled Motion to Dismiss; Answer; Affirmative Defenses. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was based \u201con the grounds that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . based upon the notary public\u2019s allegedly improper acknowledgment of relator\u2019s signature on the petition and as to the form of the petition.\u201d After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, determining that \u201c[t]he petition received into evidence as plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 1, as well as the notary public\u2019s acknowledgment affixed thereto, substantially conforms with the forms mandated by federal law.\u201d The court granted plaintiff\u2019s request for child support, medical insurance coverage, and reimbursement of retroactive support owed to the State of Florida, and ordered that income withholding be instituted against defendant. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal to this Court from the district court\u2019s order.\n\u201cChild support orders are accorded substantial deference by appellate courts and we must limit our review to a \u2018determination oil whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d Hendricks v. Sanks, 143 N.C. App. 544, 548, 545 S.E.2d 779, 781 (2001) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). However, in the present case, defendant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined that plaintiff\u2019s support petition was properly verified in accordance with the statutory requirements of Chapter 52C of the North Carolina General Statutes. Accordingly, \u201c[w]here a party asserts an error of law occurred, we apply a de novo standard of review.\u201d State ex rel. Lively v. Berry, 187 N.C. App. 459, 462, 653 S.E.2d 192, 194 (2007) (quoting Craven Reg\u2019l Med. Auth. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health & Hum. Servs., 176 N.C. App. 46, 51, 625 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2006)).\n\u201cOur General Assembly enacted UIFSA to provide a uniform method for handling interstate child support obligations.\u201d Reid v. Dixon, 136 N.C. App. 438, 439, 524 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2000) (citing Welsher v. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 491 S.E.2d 661 (1997)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-9-901 (2007) (providing that UIFSA, codified in Chapter 52C, \u201cshall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Chapter among states enacting it\u201d).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 52C-3-310(a) provides, in part, that \u201c[a] petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support order or to determine parentage in a proceeding under [UIFSA] must verify the petition.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-3-310(a) (2007) (emphasis added). In the present case, the parties agree that the petition at issue included the following: (1) the signature of Ms. Johnson, dated 11 April 2007, below a statement that read, \u201cUnder penalties of perjury, all information and facts stated in this Petition are true to the best of my knowledge and belief\u2019; and (2) the signature of a Florida-commissioned notary public, dated 11 April 2007, next to a statement that read, \u201cSworn to and Signed Before Me,\u201d accompanied by the State of Florida\u2019s notary seal, which included the notary public\u2019s printed name, commission number, and the expiration date of said commission. However, defendant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the Florida- commissioned notary public did not notarize plaintiff\u2019s petition in accordance with Florida law. Thus, defendant contends plaintiff\u2019s petition was not properly verified and so deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter.\nChapter 52C does not set forth the procedures with which a petitioner must comply to verify his or her petition in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 52C-3-310 in a UIFSA proceeding. Therefore, in the absence of any such specific requirements, in order to determine whether plaintiffs petition was verified in this case, we apply the requirements for verification established by Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-148. Cf. In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 287, 426 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1993) (\u201c[BJecause the procedure set forth in the termination of parental rights provisions requires a verified petition, and verification is not defined in chapter 7A, the requirements for verification established in chapter 1A, Rule 11(b) should determine whether the pleading has been properly verified.\u201d).\n\u201cExcept when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a) (2007). However, if a rule or statute requires that a pleading be verified, Rule 11(b) requires that such a pleading \u201cshall state in substance that the contents of the pleading verified are true to the knowledge of the person making the verification, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be true,\u201d and requires that such a verification \u201cshall be by affidavit of the party.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(b). Additionally, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-148 provides:\nAny officer competent to take the acknowledgment of deeds, and any judge or clerk of the General Court of Justice, notary public, in or out of the State, or magistrate, is competent to take affidavits for the verification of pleadings, in any court or county in the State, and for general purposes.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-148 (2007) (emphasis added); see also Rockingham Cty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 126 N.C. App. 197, 199, 484 S.E.2d 415, 416-17 (1997) (\u201cVerification by affidavit requires that the verification be \u2018sworn to before a notary public or other officer of the court authorized to administer oaths.\u2019 \u201d) (citing 1 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure \u00a7 11-7, at 196 (2d ed. 1995)).\nMoreover, while the General Assembly has expressly provided that pleadings may be verified by notaries public from other jurisdictions, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-148, it has further provided that a notarial act \u201cperformed in another jurisdiction in compliance with the laws of that jurisdiction is valid to the same extent as if it had been performed by a notary commissioned under [our Notary Public Act] if... performed by... any person authorized to perform notarial acts in that jurisdiction.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 10B-20(f) (2007) (emphasis added). Accordingly, since a petition \u2014 which serves as the pleading\u2014 in a UIFSA proceeding must be verified, and since such a petition may be verified by a notary public from another state, we must now determine whether the petition filed by plaintiff in the present case was notarized by the Florida-commissioned notary public in compliance with the laws of the State of Florida.\nAccording to Florida law, \u201c[w]hen notarizing a signature, a notary public shall complete a jurat or notarial certificate ... of acknowledgment\u201d which \u201cshall contain the following elements:\u201d\n(a) The venue stating the location of the notarization in the format, \u201cState of Florida, County of_.\u201d\n(b) The type of notarial act performed, an oath or an acknowledgment, evidenced by the words \u201csworn\u201d or \u201cacknowledged.\u201d\n(c) That the signer personally appeared before the notary public at the time of the notarization.\n(d) The exact date of the notarial act.\n(e) The name of the person whose signature is being notarized. It is presumed, absent such specific notation by the notary public, that notarization is to all signatures. \u2022\n(f) The specific type of identification the notary public is relying upon in identifying the signer, either based on personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence specified in subsection (5).\n(g) The notary\u2019s official signature.\n(h) The notary\u2019s name, typed, printed, or stamped below the signature.\n(i) The notary\u2019s official seal affixed below or to either side of the notary\u2019s signature.\nFla. Stat. \u00a7 117.05(4) (2008). Subsection (5) of F.S. \u00a7 117.05, which is referenced in subsection (4)(f) above, additionally provides that \u201c[a] notary public may not notarize a signature on a document unless he or she personally knows, or has satisfactory evidence, that the person whose signature is to be notarized is the individual who is described in and who is executing the instrument.\u201d Fla. Stat. \u00a7 117.05(5) (providing further that \u201c[a] notary public shall certify in the certificate of acknowledgment or jurat the type of identification, either based on personal knowledge or other form of identification, upon which the notary public is relying\u201d) (emphasis added).\nIn the present case, when the Florida-commissioned notary public notarized Ms. Johnson\u2019s support petition, the notary failed to indicate on the jurat of the petition the type of identification upon which he relied to identify Ms. Johnson, in contravention of the express language of F.S. \u00a7 117.05(4)(f). Moreover, defendant directs this Court\u2019s attention to a 1973 Opinion from the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Florida that cites the then-elements of notarization, codified at the time in F.S. \u00a7\u00a7 117.07(1), (2), and 117.09(1) \u2014 which required that there \u201cmust be reasonable proof of the identity of the person whose signature is being notarized\u201d but did not require, as F.S. \u00a7 117.05 does now, that the type of proof upon which the notary relies must be indicated on the jurat \u2014 and concludes: \u201cUnder these statutory provisions, I am of the opinion that notarization of a document cannot reach completion until a notary public has complied with the aforesaid statutory requirements.\u201d Elements of Act of Notarization\u2014Duties Related Thereto, Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. No. 073-185 (May 24, 1973) (internal quotation marks omitted) (responding to the question, \u201cWhen a notary public watches an individual sign a document and the document is held by a person other than the notary public until a later date, at which time the notary affixes his signature, stamp, and seal upon said document, when does a notarization occur . . . ?\u201d). However, we are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s argument that the Florida-commissioned notary public\u2019s failure to indicate on the jurat of the petition the type of identification upon which he relied to identify Ms. Johnson at the time she signed the petition, standing alone, required the district court to conclude that \u201cthe verification [of plaintiff\u2019s support petition] was therefore void for failing to comply with Florida law.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn the present case, there is no dispute that the notary public properly identified Ms. Johnson at the time that she signed the support petition. In fact, the documents before us indicate that D. Harrison, who notarized both Ms. Johnson\u2019s petition and the ten-page General Testimony form referenced therein, is. also the agency representative for the Escambia County Child Support Enforcement Office who assisted Ms. Johnson with completing the support petition and the thirteen pages of accompanying documents that were forwarded to this State to initiate UIFSA proceedings. There is also no dispute that Ms. Johnson was present at the time the petition was notarized. But cf. Griem v. Zabala, 744 So. 2d 1139, 1140, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2442, D2443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam) (concluding that there was \u201cinsufficient evidence to support a finding that the Zabalas had a valid deed\u201d because \u201cthe notary testified at trial that she had never met the Griems prior to trial nor were they in her presence when she notarized the deed\u201d). Moreover, defendant does not allege fraud or injury as a result of the notary\u2019s omission. Instead, defendant asserts only that the notarization is void because the notary public failed to amend the pre-printed jurat of the Uniform Support Petition to reflect the type of identification upon which he relied to verify Ms. Johnson\u2019s identity.\nDefendant has not presented, nor have we found, any Florida case stating that a notarization which fails to indicate the information required by F.S. \u00a7 117.05(4)(f) will render such a notarization void when (1) there are no allegations of fraud or injury as a result of the clerical omission and (2) the evidence in the record suggests that the notary public properly complied with all other statutory requirements in Chapter 117 of the Florida Statutes, and we decline to make such a determination. Cf. House of Lyons, Inc. v. Marcus, 72 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1954) (per curiam) (\u201c \u2018Clerical errors will not be permitted to defeat acknowledgments [for deeds and other instruments that must be acknowledged or proven so that they may be recorded] when they, considered either alone or in connection with the instrument acknowledged, and viewed in the light of the statute controlling them, fairly show a substantial compliance with the statute.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Summer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179, 180, 10 So. 562, 562 (Fla. 1892)); Cleland v. Long, 34 Fla. 353, 357, 16 So. 272, 273 (Fla. 1894). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on the court\u2019s determination that plaintiff\u2019s petition was verified, and we overrule this assignment of error. Our holding renders it unnecessary to address defendant\u2019s contention that a failure to properly verify a UIFSA petition deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to establish or modify a support order or to determine parentage in a proceeding under Chapter 52C. Accordingly, we dismiss this assignment of error.\nIn his remaining assignments of error, defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) admitting Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibit 3 \u2014 defendant\u2019s employer verification letter, which is said to have been submitted for the purpose of establishing defendant\u2019s monthly gross income for use in the calculation of his child support obligation \u2014 because \u201cthe State failed to establish the identity of the alleged person who signed the document (employer or employer designee?)\u201d; and (2) admitting Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibit 1 \u2014 plaintiff\u2019s support petition \u2014 because the \u201cactual Exhibit entered into evidence\u201d was \u201ca one[-]page document consisting of the first page of the child support enforcement transmittal request with a file stamp, from the Camden County Clerk\u2019s Office\u201d which \u201cha[d] no signature, [wa]s not verified and d[id] not provide the proper information for the trial court to make a ruling concerning child support.\u201d\nAccording to the hearing transcript in the record, defendant objected to Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibit 3 on the grounds that it was \u201cunverified hearsay,\u201d stating: \u201cThere\u2019s no notary. It\u2019s not verified. It\u2019s not given under oath. It\u2019s simply a letter. And that, from every way you look at it, is obviously hearsay. So I would object.\u201d Additionally, defendant objected to Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibit 1 on the grounds that \u201cno foundation [had been] laid for that whatsoever.\u201d In other words, defendant requests that this Court review the trial court\u2019s decisions to admit Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibits 1 and 3 on grounds other than those he raised before the trial court. Since \u201c[a] specific objection, if overruled, will be effective only to the extent of the ground specified,\u201d Santora, McKay & Ranieri v. Franklin, 79 N.C. App. 585, 589, 339 S.E.2d 799, 801-02 (1986) (citing State v. Jones, 293 N.C. 413, 238 S.E.2d 482 (1977)), and since defendant\u2019s objections at trial \u201cin no way supported [his] assignments] of error on appeal\u201d with respect to the admissibility of Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibits 1 and 3, see State v. Francis, 341 N.C. 156, 160, 459 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1995), we conclude that defendant has not properly preserved his remaining assignments of error for appellate review. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d). Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Gerald K. Robbins, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Frank R Hiner, IV, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA BY AND THROUGH THE ALBEMARLE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, EX REL., SHAWN L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. ROBERT B. EASON, Defendant\nNo. COA08-1432\n(Filed 7 July 2009)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 Florida support petition \u2014 notarization\nThe trial court did not err when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a child support petition from Florida based on its determination that plaintiffs petition was verified. Although defendant asserts that the Florida notarization of the petition was void because it did not reflect the type of identification relied upon to verify plaintiffs identity, no Florida case was found stating that a notarization was void for failing to indicate this information when there are no allegations of fraud or injury and all other statutory requirements were met.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 grounds not raised at trial\nAssignments of error concerning a Florida child support petition were not preserved for appeal where defendant requested that the appellate court review the trial court\u2019s decisions on grounds other than those he raised before the trial court.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 2 July 2008 by Judge Eula E. Reid in Camden County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 April 2009.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Gerald K. Robbins, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nFrank R Hiner, IV, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0138-01", "first_page_order": 164, "last_page_order": 171 }