{ "id": 4169250, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEVALL DERAYLE DAVIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Davis", "decision_date": "2009-07-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1405", "first_page": "146", "last_page": "153", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 146" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635958 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "\"There was, however, no evidence as to [the property's] value or condition.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639659 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636793 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640844 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778-79" }, { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547075 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566310 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "holding that \"evidence tending to show that the victim owned two automobiles and that the 1975 Chrysler Cordoba was his favorite one of which he took especially good care, always keeping it parked under a shed\" was not evidence of the Cordoba's value" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733818 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-71.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "quotations, citations, and alteration omitted" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "611", "parenthetical": "\"[T]here is simply no evidence regarding the total value of the items contained in the trial court's charge.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11363671 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "quotations, citations, and alteration omitted" }, { "page": "717-18" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-60", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "759-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "\"Any contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743463 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8240023 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158620 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 775, "char_count": 18890, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0388440735123661e-07, "percentile": 0.5502278318156772 }, "sha256": "5d1868590eb5720da274bb35502d9f11547880421e926ddd3c84754b2c6ff8d2", "simhash": "1:8341fc7c4caf565a", "word_count": 3107 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEVALL DERAYLE DAVIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nLevall Derayle Davis (defendant) was convicted by a jury of felonious possession of stolen goods for possessing a DVD player belonging to Mr. Kevin Davis (Kevin). He was sentenced to six to eight months in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Defendant appeals his conviction. For the reasons stated below, we hold that defendant received a trial free from error.\nFACTS\nOn the morning of 18 July 2007, Kevin finished his shift at the KapStone Paper Mill in Roanoke Rapids and returned to his car, where he found his driver side window broken and his Panasonic \u201cmotorized, flipout, touchscreen unit [with] DVD capabilities\u201d missing from the \u201cmain dash.\u201d Kevin inspected his vehicle for other damage, called 911 to report the incident, gave his statement to the responding officer, and then drove home.\nAt home, Kevin explained to his wife, Angelica, what had happened to his car and the DVD player. Angelica suspected that someone would bring the DVD player deck to Supreme Audio/Video, the only Panasonic dealer in the Roanoke Rapids area and the dealer from which she and Kevin had purchased the DVD player, for repair. She phoned Mr. Devino Putney, Supreme Audio/Video\u2019s manager, and asked him to \u201ckeep his eye out\u201d for the missing player.\nKevin originally purchased the DVD player from Supreme Audio/Video for approximately $1,300.00. The player was actually part of a two-component system: A separate control module, or \u201cbrain,\u201d processes the sound and picture information received from the in-dash player. According to Kevin, \u201c[t]he [player] deck is actually useless without the control module,\u201d and can produce no sound or picture without its brain. At trial, Putney testified that the DVD player\u2019s brain is typically installed under or behind a vehicle\u2019s seats, and that without the brain, the player deck cannot function. Similarly, \u201c[t]here is pretty much nothing you can do with a brain unless you have an exact model [of player deck] that matches the brain.\u201d Putney also testified that Supreme Audio/Video sells that model for \u201caround $1,300 or $1,400.\u201d Kevin identified State\u2019s Exhibit 1 as \u201cthe deck part of the . . . DVD player that was stolen out of my car,\u201d in substantially the same condition as it was when Kevin bought it, but testified that the brain was not taken from under the passenger seat.\nSeveral days after 18 July 2007, Angelica was notified that someone had brought a Panasonic DVD player deck matching the description she had given to Supreme Audio/Video for repair. Detective Jeffrey Wayne Baggett of the Roanoke Rapids Police Department testified that he received a call from Angelica that her missing \u201cstereo\u201d had been brought to Supreme Audio/Video. Detective Baggett met Angelica at Supreme Audio/Video, where Detective Baggett identified Levall Davis as a possible suspect based on the name and cell phone number left with Supreme Audio/Video as contact information for the repair job. Detective Baggett also confirmed that the DVD player was the property of Kevin and Angelica by matching its serial number to the player\u2019s original packaging, produced by Angelica.\nDetective Baggett prepared a photo line-up, from which Putney identified defendant as the man who brought the DVD player to Supreme Audio/Video for repair. Baggett called the phone number left at Supreme Audio/Video, but could not verily that the person who answered was defendant. However, on 5 September 2007, defendant went to the police station, gave a statement regarding the DVD player, and signed a Miranda waiver form. At trial, Putney confirmed that defendant was the man who brought the DVD player to Supreme Audio/Video to be repaired, and that State\u2019s Exhibit 1 was the DVD player that defendant had brought to the shop. On his own behalf, defendant testified that he had purchased the DVD player for $100.00 from an unidentified man outside of a store in Weldon, but that defendant did not believe that he was purchasing a stolen DVD player. Defendant believed that the DVD player was worth $300.00.\nFollowing the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that there was \u201cnot evidence before the [c]ourt that [would] sustain the charges when looked at in the light most favorable to the State . . . .\u201d The trial court denied that motion. There is no renewed motion to dismiss following the close of all evidence recorded in the transcript. However, defense counsel signed an affidavit certifying that he made such a motion in an untranscribed bench conference at the close of all evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of felonious possession of stolen goods and the trial court imposed a sentence of a minimum term of six months and a maximum term of eight months in prison. Defendant appeals.\nARGUMENTS\nI. Issue Not Properly Preserved for Appeal\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence the charge of felonious possession of stolen property. We first address the State\u2019s contention that defendant\u2019s assignment of error should be overruled because this issue was not preserved for appeal.\nNorth Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(3) gives specific instructions for preserving questions involving sufficiency of the evidence:\nA defendant in a criminal case may not assign as error the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the crime charged unless he moves to dismiss the action... at trial. If a defendant makes such a motion . . . [and] then introduces evidence, his motion for dismissal ... made at the close of State\u2019s evidence is waived. Such a waiver precludes the defendant from urging the denial of such motion as a ground for appeal.\nA defendant may make a motion to dismiss the action ... at the conclusion of all the evidence, irrespective of whether he made an earlier such motion. . . . However, if a defendant fails to move to dismiss the action ... at the close of all the evidence, he may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the crime charged.\nN.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3) (2008). Rule 10(b)(1) further requires that the complaining party \u201cobtain a ruling upon the . . . motion\u201d in order to preserve the issue for appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (2008).\nRule 10(b) \u201cis not simply a technical rule of procedure\u201d and \u201ca party\u2019s failure to properly preserve an issue for appellate review ordinarily justifies the appellate court\u2019s refusal to consider the issue on appeal.\u201d Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 195-96, 657 S.E.2d 361, 363-64 (2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, this Court\u2019s \u201cimperative to correct fundamental error . . . may necessitate appellate review of the merits despite the occurrence of default.\u201d Id. at 196, 657 S.E.2d at 364. Our Supreme Court elaborated upon our discretion to review for error issues not properly preserved for appeal:\nRule 2 permits the appellate courts to excuse a party\u2019s default . . . when necessary to prevent manifest injustice to a party .... Rule 2, however, must be invoked cautiously, and we reaffirm . . . the exceptional circumstances which allow the appellate courts to take this extraordinary step.\nId. at 196, 657 S.E.2d at 364 (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, we have invoked Rule 2 to review the merits of an appeal where the defendant failed to renew his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, in violation of N.C.R. App. P 10(b)(3). See, e.g., State v. Batchelor, 190 N.C. App. 369, 378, 660 S.E.2d 158, 164 (2008) (\u201cIf we do not review the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence in the present case, [the defendant would remain imprisoned for a crime that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a result would be manifestly unjust and we are therefore compelled to invoke Rule 2[.]\u201d); State v. Denny, 179 N.C. App. 822, 824, 635 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2006), aff\u2019d, in part and rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 361 N.C. 662, 652 S.E.2d 212 (2007).\nIn this case, although defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of State\u2019s evidence appears in the record, the transcript does not reflect that defendant\u2019s trial counsel renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence, as required by Rule 10(b)(3). The record on appeal, as approved by the State, contains an affidavit from defendant\u2019s trial counsel that a renewed motion to dismiss was made during an unrecorded bench conference at the close of all evidence, but does not contain the trial court\u2019s ruling on the renewed motion to dismiss, as required by Rule 10(b)(1). Accordingly, this issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.\nNevertheless, we examine the circumstances surrounding the case at hand to determine whether defendant\u2019s appeal merits substantive review. See Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 196, 657 S.E.2d at 364. Although he did not preserve the court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s renewed motion to dismiss, trial counsel did renew defendant\u2019s motion at the close of all evidence as required by Rule 10(b)(3). Moreover, if the State did not produce sufficient evidence to support its case against defendant, then defendant \u201cwould remain imprisoned for a crime that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Batchelor, 190 N.C. App. at -, 660 S.E.2d at 164. Considering these circumstances, to dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal would work \u201cmanifest injustice,\u201d and we therefore invoke Rule 2 to reach its merits.\nII. Motion to Dismiss\nDefendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felonious possession of stolen goods. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court set forth the standard for when a trial court should properly deny a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence:\n[T]he trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.... Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference and intendment that can be drawn therefrom. Any contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.\nState v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992) (citations omitted). Under this standard, we affirm the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence \u201c[i]f the record discloses substantial evidence of each essential element constituting the offense for which the accused was tried . . . .\u201d State v. Alford, 329 N.C. 755, 759-60, 407 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1991) (citations omitted).\nA defendant may be found guilty of felonious possession of stolen property where the State proves (1) defendant was in possession of personal property, (2) valued at greater than $1,000.00, (3) which has been stolen, (4) with the possessor knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen, and (5) with the possessor acting with dishonesty.\nState v. Parker, 146 N.C. App. 715, 717, 555 S.E.2d 609, 610 (2001) (quotations, citations, and alteration omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-71.1, 14-72(a) (2007). Here, defendant contends that the State failed to present substantial evidence to establish the $1,000.00 value element of felonious possession of stolen property, but does not challenge the State\u2019s evidence of the other elements of the crime. Thus, we examine only whether the State\u2019s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, could support the conclusion that the stolen property defendant possessed was valued at greater than $1,000.00. See Alford, 329 N.C. at 759-60, 407 S.E.2d at 522.\n\u201cThe fair market value of stolen property at the time of the theft must exceed the sum of [$1,000.00] for the possession to be felonious.\u201d State v. Holland, 318 N.C. 602, 610, 350 S.E.2d 56, 61 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987). Stolen property\u2019s fair market value is the item\u2019s \u201creasonable selling price [] at the time and place of the theft, and in the condition in which it was when [stolen].\u201d State v. Dees, 14 N.C. App. 110, 112, 187 S.E.2d 433, 435 (1972) (quotations and citation omitted). The State is not required to produce \u201cdirect evidence of. . . value\u201d to support the conclusion that the stolen property was worth over $1,000.00, provided that the jury is not left to \u201cspeculate as to the value\u201d of the item. Holland, 318 N.C. at 610, 350 S.E.2d at 61.\nIn the present case, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant possessed a Panasonic DVD player that was stolen from Kevin\u2019s vehicle; that Kevin had purchased the DVD player for over $1,300.00; and that the DVD player in defendant\u2019s possession was in substantially the same condition as when Kevin purchased it. (T pp. 26, 72, 74, 80.) Furthermore, Putney confirmed that Supreme Audio/Video, the only Panasonic dealer around Roanoke Rapids, currently sells the same DVD player system for over $1,300.00. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the \u201creasonable selling price\u201d of the Panasonic DVD player \u2014 in Roanoke Rapids, at the time it was stolen from Kevin\u2019s vehicle, and in like-new condition \u2014 was over $1,300.00. Dees, 14 N.C. App. at 112, 187 S.E.2d at 435. Therefore, the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the $1,000.00 fair market value statutory minimum and to support a felonious possession of stolen goods conviction.\nDefendant contends, however, that the State\u2019s evidence does not show that the DVD player was worth over $1,000.00 because the player deck defendant possessed was not functional without its brain, which remained in Kevin\u2019s vehicle. This argument fails. The State did not have to prove that a DVD player without its brain was worth over $1,000.00, as long as the State provided some evidentiary basis that placed the jury\u2019s determination of its value beyond \u201cspeculation].\u201d Holland, 318 N.C. at 610, 350 S.E.2d at 61. Here, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the value of the DVD player deck defendant possessed was worth over $1,000.00 based on Putney\u2019s testimony that the entire system retails in his store for over $1,300.00.\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the State produced no direct evidence of the value of a non-functional DVD player misinterprets Holland, 318 N.C. at 610, 350 S.E.2d at 61, and this Court\u2019s holdings in In re J.H., 177 N.C. App. 776, 778-79, 630 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2006), and Parker, 146 N.C. App. at 717-18, 555 S.E.2d at 611. In those cases, the State produced no evidence at all of the value of the stolen property. Holland, 318 N.C. at 610, 350 S.E.2d at 61 (holding that \u201cevidence tending to show that the victim owned two automobiles and that the 1975 Chrysler Cordoba was his favorite one of which he took especially good care, always keeping it parked under a shed\u201d was not evidence of the Cordoba\u2019s value); In re J.H., 177 N.C. App. at 778, 630 S.E.2d at 459 (\u201cThere was, however, no evidence as to [the property\u2019s] value or condition.\u201d); Parker, 146 N.C. App. at 718, 555 S.E.2d at 611 (\u201c[T]here is simply no evidence regarding the total value of the items contained in the trial court\u2019s charge.\u201d).\nIn this case, both Kevin and Putney testified that the DVD player system had a retail value of over $1,300.00, and Kevin testified that the player was still in like-new condition after it was stolen. The issue of whether the DVD player as defendant possessed it, without its critical brain module, was nonetheless worth more than $1,000.00 was- properly before the jury for resolution. See Olson, 330 N.C. at 564, 411 S.E.2d at 595 (\u201cAny contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.\u201d) (citation omitted).\nViewed in the light most favorable to the State, the State\u2019s evidence did not, as defendant argues, \u201cconfirm[] the worthless value of the DVD player\u201d without its control module. Rather, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the DVD player was worth $1,300.00 and was merely missing a necessary component, similar to a car missing its engine or a watch missing its batteries. Thus, the jury did not \u201cspeculate as to the value\u201d of the DVD player, but merely reached a different conclusion than that advanced by defendant. Holland, 318 N.C. at 610, 350 S.E.2d at 61. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.\nIII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant also raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon trial counsel\u2019s failure to move to dismiss in open court, thereby failing to record the motion and ruling to preserve, the issue for appeal. Because we exercise our discretion .to review the merits of defendant\u2019s appeal pursuant to Rule 2, we do not address defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.\nWe hold that defendant received a trial free from error.\nNo error.\nJudges STROUD and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Lotta A. Crabtree, for the State.", "Gilda C. Rodriguez for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEVALL DERAYLE DAVIS\nNo. COA08-1405\n(Filed 7 July 2009)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to renew motion of dismiss\nThe issue of whether defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence should have been granted was not properly preserved for appeal where the transcript does not reflect a renewed motion at the close of the evidence, the record includes an affidavit from defendant\u2019s attorney that the motion was made at an unrecorded bench conference, but the record did not contain the trial court\u2019s ruling. Nevertheless, the issue was considered pursuant to Rule 2 because trial counsel did renew the motion, and if the State did not produce sufficient evidence to support its case, then defendant would be imprisoned for a crime the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt.\n2. Possession of Stolen Property\u2014 value of property \u2014 portion of DVD system\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of felonious possession of stolen property for insufficient evidence where the issue was whether the stolen DVD player met the $1,000 threshold, there was evidence that the unit sold for over $1,300 new, it was in substantially the same condition as when purchased, and, although only part of the system was stolen, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the value of the player deck defendant possessed was worth over $1,000.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 August 2008 by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Halifax County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Lotta A. Crabtree, for the State.\nGilda C. Rodriguez for defendant." }, "file_name": "0146-01", "first_page_order": 172, "last_page_order": 179 }