{ "id": 4169175, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD ANDERSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Anderson", "decision_date": "2009-07-07", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1523", "first_page": "201", "last_page": "205", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 201" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167386 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same crime" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same crime" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491484 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(2b)" }, { "page": "(4)(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167386 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0461-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 390, "char_count": 8900, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.437666443101509 }, "sha256": "083f15aba8afde45075e5f36bda2ea6bfd5a8f53013fb8847eaa8a3e76516e87", "simhash": "1:450e80186200a2e4", "word_count": 1409 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JACKSON and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD ANDERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nDefendant pled guilty to two counts of felony indecent liberties with a child, two counts of felony crimes against nature, and one count of first-degree sexual exploitation of a minor in Wilkes County in December of 1994. Defendant completed his sentence for those crimes. On 3 October 2007, Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor sexual battery, which occurred in Haywood County on 13 September 2007. The trial court ordered Defendant to be subjected to life-time satellite-based monitoring pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(1) on 31 July 2008. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant contends in his first argument that the trial court erred by finding Defendant was subject to lifetime satellite-based monitoring when Defendant had not been advised, prior to his 1994 guilty plea in Wilkes County to various felon offenses, including first-degree sexual exploitation, and his 2007 guilty plea in Haywood County to misdemeanor sexual battery, that lifetime satellite-based monitoring might be imposed as a result of his pleas. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a) states in relevant part:\nThe Department of Correction shall establish a sex offender monitoring program that uses a continuous satellite-based monitoring system and shall create guidelines to govern the program. The program shall be designed to monitor two categories of offenders as follows:\n(1) Any offender who is convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by G.S. 14-208.6(4) and who is required to register under Part 3 of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes because the defendant is classified as a sexually violent predator, is a recidivist, or was convicted of an aggravated offense as those terms are defined in G.S. 14-208.6.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a) (2007).\nThe trial court found that Defendant was convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4), and that Defendant was required to register under Part 3 of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes because defendant was a recidivist. At the hearing, Defendant admitted that the statute as written applied to him and subjected him to lifetime satellite-based monitoring.\nFirst, Defendant did not object at trial to the imposition of lifetime satellite-based monitoring based upon an argument that he had not been informed prior to his guilty plea that he might be subject to lifetime satellite-based monitoring based upon his plea. Defendant\u2019s failure to object at the hearing subjects this argument to dismissal. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1); State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 525, 591 S.E.2d 846, 857 (2003). Further, this issue was recently decided against Defendant by this Court in State v. Bare, 197 N.C. App. 461, 478, -S.E.2d -, - (2009). This argument is without merit.\nIn Defendant\u2019s second argument, he contends that the trial court erred in enrolling him in lifetime satellite-based monitoring because the statute imposing monitoring \u201cis void for vagueness and violates [Defendant\u2019s] due process rights guaranteed by the United States and North Carolina constitutions.\u201d We disagree.\nThe crux of Defendant\u2019s argument is that \u201cthe statute does not define whether the trial court was required to find that [Defendant] was a recidivist based on a preponderance of the evidence, based on clear and cogent evidence, based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or based on some other standard.\u201d Defendant contends the lack of a defined standard could lead to defendants being subjected to lifetime satellite-based monitoring under different standards.\nAt the hearing, Defendant did not object upon the grounds that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(1) was void for vagueness. Both the State and the trial court stated that Defendant was a recidivist, and the trial court stated it found that Defendant was a recidivist based upon prior convictions. Defendant responded:\nYour Honor, he would object to Your Honor finding that [Defendant was subject to satellite-based monitoring]. I can\u2019t deny that the statute does read the way it does, and it seems to contemplate placing him on the satellite monitoring. He would raise issues of due process, equal protection, and ex post facto violations; also pointing out that the triggering conviction of this time, even though it\u2019s reportable, is a misdemeanor, the sexual battery, Your Honor.\nIn reviewing the statute as it\u2019s laid out, it does appear that as it\u2019s written right now that it would, Your Honor.\nDefendant later added: \u201cI don\u2019t believe I made a claim of double jeopardy in that. For the recidivist conditions, it does not require any testing or anything; it\u2019s based solely on prior convictions.\u201d \u201c \u2018Recidivist\u2019 means a person who has a prior conviction for an offense that is described in G.S. 14-208.6(4).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(2b) (2007). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4)(a) (2007) includes in relevant part: \u201cA final conviction for an offense against a minor[.]\u201d\nIt is clear that Defendant was not making any argument at the hearing that the definition of recidivist, or the standard by which recidivism must be proved, was unconstitutionally vague. The only mention of \u201crecidivist\u201d was in Defendant\u2019s double jeopardy argument, which seems to have been that finding recidivism based solely on prior convictions, not upon some undefined evaluation of Defendant\u2019s likelihood of re-offending, violated double jeopardy.\nIn fact, Defendant admitted that his conduct constituted recidivist behavior as defined by the statute. Having admitted at the hearing that he was a recidivist as defined under the statute, Defendant may not now argue before this Court that the provisions for determining recidivism are unconstitutionally vague. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1); Valentine, 357 N.C. at 525, 591 S.E.2d at 857. This argument is dismissed.\nIn Defendant\u2019s third argument, he contends that the trial court erred in ordering that Defendant \u201cbe punished further for the crimes for which he had already been sentenced in violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy.\u201d We disagree.\nThis Court has already held that the provisions of the satellite-based monitoring program are civil in nature, not punitive. Bare, 197 N.C. App. at 467, - S.E.2d at -. As this Court has held that satellite-based monitoring does not constitute a punishment, it cannot constitute a violation of Defendant\u2019s right to be free from double jeopardy. See State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451, 340 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986) (double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same crime). This argument is without merit.\nNo error.\nJudges JACKSON and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.", "Charlotte Gail Blake for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD ANDERSON\nNo. COA08-1523\n(Filed 7 July 2009)\n1. Sexual Offenses\u2014 satellite-based monitoring \u2014 applicability \u2014 effect of guilty pleas \u2014 failure to object at trial\nThe trial court did not err in a felony indecent liberties with a child, felony crimes against nature, and first-degree sexual exploitation of a minor case by finding defendant was subject to lifetime satellite-based monitoring even though defendant contends he had not been advised prior to his 1994 guilty plea in Wilkes County to various felony offenses that monitoring might be imposed as a result of his pleas because: (1) defendant admitted at the hearing that the statute as written applied to him and subjected him to lifetime satellite-based monitoring; (2) defendant did not object at trial on this basis subjecting the argument to dismissal; and (3) this issue was decided against defendant in State v. Bare, 197 N.C. App. 461 (2009).\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 due process \u2014 satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders \u2014 vagueness\nThe trial court did not err by enrolling defendant in lifetime satellite-based monitoring even though defendant contends that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(1) is void for vagueness and violated defendant\u2019s due process rights guaranteed by the United States and North Carolina Constitutions because: (1) at the hearing, defendant did not object upon the grounds that the statute was void for vagueness; and (2) defendant admitted that his conduct constituted recidivist behavior as defined by the statute, and thus he cannot now argue that the provisions for determining recidivism are unconstitutionally vague.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 double jeopardy \u2014 satellite-based monitoring \u2014 civil instead of punitive intent\nThe Court of Appeals has already concluded that the provisions of the satellite-based monitoring program for sex offenders is civil in nature instead of punitive, and thus it cannot constitute a violation of defendant\u2019s right to be free from double jeopardy.\nAppeal by Defendant from order entered 31 July 2008 by Judge Henry E. Frye, Jr. in Superior Court, Wilkes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 May 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.\nCharlotte Gail Blake for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0201-01", "first_page_order": 227, "last_page_order": 231 }