{ "id": 4169359, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: D.L.H.", "name_abbreviation": "In re D.L.H.", "decision_date": "2009-07-21", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1019", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "297", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633572 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638336, 12638322, 12638323, 12638324, 12638325, 12638326, 12638327, 12638328, 12638329, 12638330, 12638331, 12638332, 12638333, 12638334, 12638335 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0269-15", "/se2d/644/0269-07", "/se2d/644/0269-01", "/se2d/644/0269-02", "/se2d/644/0269-03", "/se2d/644/0269-04", "/se2d/644/0269-05", "/se2d/644/0269-06", "/se2d/644/0269-08", "/se2d/644/0269-09", "/se2d/644/0269-10", "/se2d/644/0269-11", "/se2d/644/0269-12", "/se2d/644/0269-13", "/se2d/644/0269-14" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2506", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5309774 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793573 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835-36", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 1113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 1061", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9094209, 9093958, 9094023, 9093930, 9094190, 9094002, 9093919, 9093944, 9094137, 9093978, 9094076, 9094105, 9094047 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/1061-13", "/us/538/1061-04", "/us/538/1061-07", "/us/538/1061-02", "/us/538/1061-12", "/us/538/1061-06", "/us/538/1061-01", "/us/538/1061-03", "/us/538/1061-11", "/us/538/1061-05", "/us/538/1061-09", "/us/538/1061-10", "/us/538/1061-08" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "stating the intent of the legislature is first ascertained by the plain language of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659938 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "stating the intent of the legislature is first ascertained by the plain language of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "170-72" }, { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436444 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555196 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511298, 1511302, 1511117, 1511568, 1511191 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0297-05", "/nc/356/0297-02", "/nc/356/0297-01", "/nc/356/0297-04", "/nc/356/0297-03" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" }, { "page": "703-04", "parenthetical": "quotation and alterations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081755 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 L. Ed. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531938, 1532133, 1531912, 1532170, 1532010, 1532202, 1532021, 1531990, 1532122, 1532092, 1531806 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0929-02", "/us/442/0929-01", "/us/442/0929-10", "/us/442/0929-08", "/us/442/0929-11", "/us/442/0929-03", "/us/442/0929-04", "/us/442/0929-09", "/us/442/0929-05", "/us/442/0929-06", "/us/442/0929-07" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565310 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 850, "char_count": 27000, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13642590745638067 }, "sha256": "51181e07f376d66b184eeba8e179530924c615d17401fbb4fcb4083912652ea6", "simhash": "1:8afb506e7e7f0e50", "word_count": 4400 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: D.L.H." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nWhere juvenile was confined to a detention facility pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(20) on a Level 2 disposition, juvenile was entitled to receive credit for time served prior to the dispositional hearing. Where the trial court had previously found juvenile to be delinquent and juvenile subsequently admitted to probation violations, the trial court properly ordered juvenile into secure custody pending her dispositional hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(c). Upon being confined to secure custody, juvenile was entitled to a hearing to determine if continued custody was necessary pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b). The trial court had authority to impose confinement for up to twice the period authorized by statute for a Level 2 disposition and extend juvenile\u2019s probation for one year pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 -2508, -2510(c) and (e).\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nOn 28 June 2007, a juvenile petition was filed, which alleged that D.L.H. (\u201cjuvenile\u201d) had engaged in an affray in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33 on 21 May 2007. On 6 July 2007, juvenile admitted to the affray and was adjudicated delinquent by Judge McSwain in Guilford County District Court. Disposition was continued until 2 August 2007. Juvenile was to remain in the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center pending disposition. On 21 August 2007, Judge Burch entered a disposition order arising out of the 2 August 2007 hearing. Juvenile was placed on \u201cLevel 2 probation\u201d until 31 January 2008 under a number of terms and conditions. In addition, she was sentenced to fourteen days in the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center. This sentence was stayed upon the condition that juvenile cooperate and complete the terms of her probation. Juvenile was released from the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center to her mother\u2019s custody.\nOn 9 November 2007, a motion for review was filed alleging that juvenile had been suspended from school for fighting. A second motion alleged that juvenile violated the terms of her probation by repeated absences from school. On 3 December 2007, a hearing was held on these motions before Judge Alloway. The State dismissed the first motion, and juvenile admitted the allegations in the second motion. She was ordered to serve the fourteen days in the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center, which had been stayed by Judge Burch\u2019s order of 21 August 2007. Disposition was continued until 3 January 2008. This order was filed on 13 December 2007. On 3 January 2008, a hearing was held before Judge McSwain. He held that juvenile was delinquent and would benefit from probation. Disposition was continued to 31 January 2008. Pending disposition, juvenile was placed in the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center. This order was filed on 14 January 2008.\nOn 10 January 2008, juvenile filed a motion seeking her release from custody. The motion asserted that Judge McSwain was without authority to order juvenile to be held in the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center pending disposition. In the alternative, juvenile sought a secure custody hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906. On 29 January 2008, Judge Sizemore entered a written order stating that she was without authority to modify previous orders and continuing the motion for hearing by Judge McSwain. On 31 January 2008, juvenile appeared before Judge McSwain. A Level 2 disposition order was entered on 25 February 2008. Juvenile\u2019s probation was extended for twelve months through 31 January 2009. A fourteen-day sentence at the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center was stayed upon compliance with special and general conditions of probation. The matter was set for further review on 28 February 2008.\nOn 26 February 2008, juvenile appealed the order entered on 13 December 2007 by Judge Alloway; the order entered on 14 January 2008 by Judge McSwain; the order entered on 29 January 2008 by Judge Sizemore; and the order entered on 25 February 2008 by Judge McSwain.\nII. Mootness\nAs an initial matter, we must determine whether juvenile\u2019s assignments of error are moot and should be dismissed. Our Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[w]henever, during the course of litigation it develops . . . that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.\u201d In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979). However, there are long-standing exceptions to dismissals based upon the doctrine of mootness, including cases which are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review[.]\u201d Boney Publishers, Inc. v. Burlington City Council, 151 N.C. App. 651, 654, 566 S.E.2d 701, 703 (quotation omitted), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 297, 571 S.E.2d 221 (2002). For this particular exception to apply, two elements are required: \u201c(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.\u201d Id. at 654, 566 S.E.2d at 703-04 (quotation and alterations omitted).\nIn the instant case, juvenile\u2019s notice of appeal is dated 26 February 2008. Her appeal was calendared for hearing before this Court on 12 February 2009, approximately one year later. Juvenile concedes in her brief that this Court cannot give juvenile \u201cback the days she was wrongfully confined\u201d and we further note that the extension of juvenile\u2019s probation until 31 January 2009 has expired at this time. Therefore, our holding in this case would be moot as to juvenile. However, since the issues in this case concern the scope of statutory authority of the district court, we address the merits of juvenile\u2019s appeal as the matters in controversy are likely to recur. See In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 748-49 n.7, 407 S.E.2d 798, 801 n.7 (1991).\nIII. Credit for Time Served\nIn her first argument, juvenile contends that the trial court erred by failing to give her credit for the time she served in secure custody prior to her dispositional hearing. We agree.\nJuvenile argues that when she received the fourteen-day sentence in August 2007, she received no credit for the twenty-seven days that she spent in detention awaiting the dispositional hearing. When the fourteen-day sentence was activated in December 2007, she received no credit for time already served. In January 2008, she was held in detention pending a dispositional hearing for twenty-eight additional days. Defendant argues that she served sixty-nine days on a fourteen-day sentence, and that under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2508 and -2510, the maximum sentence she could have received for a Level 2 disposition was fourteen days.\nIn support of her contention, juvenile cites N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1, which provides:\nThe minimum and maximum term of a sentence shall be credited with and diminished by the total amount of time a defendant has spent, committed to or in confinement in any State or local correctional, mental or other institution as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence. The credit provided shall be calculated from the date custody under the charge commenced and shall include credit for all time spent in custody pending trial, trial de novo, appeal, retrial, or pending parole, probation, or post-release supervision revocation hearing: Provided, however, the credit available herein shall not include any time that is credited on the term of a previously imposed sentence to which a defendant is subject.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1 (2007). We note that there is not a similar statute found within the Juvenile Code. However, the application of this statute in the context of juvenile proceedings was addressed in the case of In re Allison, 143 N.C. App. 586, 547 S.E.2d 169 (2001) and in the unpublished decision of In re R.T.L., 183 N.C. App. 299, 644 S.E.2d 269 (2007) (unpublished).\nIn In re Allison, the juvenile was committed to a residential training school facility for an indefinite term, not to exceed 450 days. She was subsequently released from the training school without having served the entire term, but with conditions. She immediately violated those conditions and the trial court placed her in detention pending the procurement of a placement in an inpatient treatment facility. Ultimately, such a placement could not be procured, and the juvenile was recommitted to the Division of Youth Services \u201cto finish the commitment term of an indefinite term not to exceed 450 days . . . .\u201d In re Allison, 143 N.C. App. at 590, 547 S.E.2d at 172. In the meantime, the juvenile had committed additional delinquent acts, for which the trial court committed her to training school for a minimum of six months. Id. at 588-90, 547 S.E.2d at 170-72.\nOn appeal, the juvenile first argued that she had received punishments greater than an adult would have received for a similar offense. This argument was rejected by this Court, holding \u201cthere exists a rational basis for the legislature\u2019s disparate treatment of adults and children, and that G.S. \u00a7 7B-2513(a) was not unconstitutionally applied to [the juvenile] ... in derogation of her equal protection rights.\u201d Id. at 596, 547 S.E.2d at 175 (citations omitted).\nThe juvenile further argued that she was not given credit for time served. We rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the language of the first commitment, \u201cto finish the commitment term[,]\u201d expressly gave juvenile credit for time served pending her dispositional hearing. Second, the credit was not applicable to the second commitment under the terms of the last sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1: \u201cProvided, however, the credit available herein shall not include any time that is credited on the term of a previously imposed sentence to which a defendant is subject.\u201d Id. at 600, 547 S.E.2d at 177.\nIn In re R.L.T., this Court held that the juvenile was \u201centitled to a sentencing credit for the number of days he spent in detention prior to the adjudicatory hearing.\u201d In re R.L.T., No. COA06-1089, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1025, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (citing In re Allison, 143 N.C. App. at 586, 547 S.E.2d at 169).\nIn re Allison expressly holds that the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1 are applicable to juvenile commitments. We are unable to distinguish the instant case from In re Allison, and under the case of In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989), we are bound by that holding. It was error for the trial court not to give credit to juvenile in this case for time spent in detention towards her fourteen-day sentence.\nIV. Secure Custody Pending Disposition\nIn her second argument, juvenile contends that the trial court erred by ordering her into secure custody after her admission of probation violations because under the facts of this case, detention was not authorized pending disposition. We disagree.\nJuvenile contends that this issue is controlled by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(d), and in the alternative \u00a7 7B-1903(b). Subsection (d) provides that \u201c[t]he court may order secure custody for a juvenile who is alleged, to have violated the conditions of the juvenile\u2019s probation or post-release supervision, but only if the juvenile is alleged to have committed acts that damage property or injure persons.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(d) (2007) (emphasis added). By its express language, this provision is only applicable while the allegations of a violation are pending. See State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 34, 497 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1998) (stating the intent of the legislature is first ascertained by the plain language of the statute), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1061, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1999).\nIn the instant case, juvenile was ordered into secure custody after her admission of the violations at an adjudication hearing. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(d) is inapplicable to this case.\nBased upon the same reasoning, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(b) is not applicable to this case. That subsection provides \u201c[w]hen a request is made for secure custody, the court may order secure custody only where the court finds there is a reasonable factual basis to believe that the juvenile committed the offense as alleged in the petition . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(b) (2007) (emphasis added). This provision, by its express terms, applies prior to a determination as to whether the juvenile committed the acts alleged in the petition, and not where there has been an admission and adjudication of the conduct.\nThis issue is controlled by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(c), which provides that \u201c[w]hen a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent, the court may order secure custody pending the dispositional hearing or pending placement of the juvenile pursuant to G.S. 7B-2506.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(c) (2007). In this case, juvenile was adjudicated as delinquent on 17 July 2007 by Judge McSwain. On 3 December 2007, juvenile admitted she violated the terms of her probation by repeatedly being absent from school. Judge Alloway activated juvenile\u2019s suspended fourteen-day sentence, which had previously been stayed and continued further disposition until 3 January 2008 in order for Judge McSwain to determine whether there were \u201cany other conditions that he want[ed] imposed on her.\u201d\nOn 3 January 2008, Judge McSwain continued the dispositional hearing until 31 January 2008 and placed juvenile at the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center until that time. We note Judge McSwain continued the dispositional hearing because it was necessary for the court counselor and juvenile\u2019s mother to determine whether out-of-home placement was appropriate for juvenile, which was permissible pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2406. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2406 (2007) (providing that a trial court may continue a hearing \u201cfor as long as is reasonably required to receive additional evidence, reports, or assessments that the court has requested, or other information needed in the best interests of the juvenile and to allow for a reasonable time for the parties to conduct expeditious discovery.\u201d).\nBecause juvenile had previously been adjudicated as delinquent, admitted to subsequent probation violations, and the trial court had good cause to continue the dispositional hearing, the trial court properly ordered juvenile be confined to secure custody pending disposition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(c). This assignment of error is without merit.\nV. Authority to Modify Secure Custody\nIn her third argument, juvenile contends that the trial court erred by refusing to consider her pending motion for release from secure custody. We agree.\nOn 10 January 2008, juvenile filed a motion seeking her release from custody and asserted that Judge McSwain was without authority to order juvenile to be held in the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center pending disposition. In the alternative, juvenile sought a secure custody hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b). Following a hearing on 11 January 2008, Judge Sizemore entered an order on 29 January 2008, concluding that:\n1. The undersigned judge does not have authority to modify the orders entered by Judge Alloway and Judge McSwain.\n2. Any request to modify the secure custody prior to the hearing date of January 31, 2008 should be brought before Judge McSwain.\nAs set forth in Section IV of this opinion, juvenile\u2019s first contention within her motion to release is without merit. We now turn to whether juvenile was entitled to a secure custody hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b).\nWhether the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b) apply to the imposition of secure custody pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(c) is an issue of first impression. \u201cThe cardinal principle of statutory construction is to discern the intent of the legislature. In discerning the intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari mate ria should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible.\u201d State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 835-36, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Further, \u201c[a]ll parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole, and every part thereof must be given effect if this can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.\u201d State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (citation omitted).\nBoth N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1903 and -1906 appear in Article 19 entitled \u201cTemporary Custody; Secure and Nonsecure Custody; Custody Hearings\u201d in Division 2 of Chapter 7B of the Juvenile Code. As stated above, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903 sets forth the criteria that must be met in order for a trial court to impose secure or non-secure custody. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b) (2007) provides, in relevant part, that \u201c[a]s long as the juvenile remains in secure or nonsecure custody, further hearings to determine the need for continued secure custody shall be held at intervals of no more than 10 calendar days.\u201d (Emphasis added). Further, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(e) (2007) provides that \u201c[t]he court shall be bound by criteria set forth in G.S. 7B-1903 in determining whether continued custody is warranted.\u201d\nApplying the rules of statutory construction and construing the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1903, -1906(b) and (e) in para materia, we hold that a juvenile confined to secure custody pending disposition or placement is entitled to a hearing at intervals of no more than 10 calendar days to determine whether continued secure custody is warranted.\nBecause N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903 provides for secure custody during both pre-adjudication and post-adjudication, pending disposition, there is no reason that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b) hearings should be limited to pre-adjudication confinement. The trial court erred by failing to entertain juvenile\u2019s 11 January 2008 motion to review the order of secure custody under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b).\nVI. Reinstatement of Confinement and Extension of Probation\nIn her fourth argument, juvenile contends that the trial court had no authority to \u201creinstate[] a sentence already served and extendf] her probation\u201d at the 31 January 2008 hearing. Juvenile also contends the trial court erred when it failed to enter the \u201cstatutorily-mandated findings of fact\u201d to support the extension of her probation. We disagree.\nIf the trial court finds, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the juvenile has violated his or her probation, the trial court may (1) continue the original conditions of probation, (2) modify the conditions of probation, or (3) order a new disposition at the next higher level. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(e) (2007). \u201cA court shall not order a Level 3 disposition for violation of the conditions of probation by a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for an offense classified as minor under G.S. 7B-2508.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(f) (2007).\nIn the instant case, the offenses that constituted violations of juvenile\u2019s probation were minor and could not be the basis for a Level 3 disposition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(f). The trial court could either continue the original conditions of probation or modify those conditions. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(e) allows the trial court to impose an order of confinement for up to twice the amount of time authorized by statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(20) (2007) allows the trial court to order a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent to be confined in an approved juvenile detention facility for a term of up to 14 24-hour periods. See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2508(d) (2007) (providing that \u201ca Level 2 disposition... shall provide for at least one of the intermediate dispositions authorized in subdivisions (13) through (23) of G.S. 7B-2506.\u201d). Reading N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(e) in conjunction with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2506 and -2508, we hold the trial court can impose up to and no more than twenty-eight days confinement in an approved juvenile detention facility for a Level 2 disposition. Therefore, the trial court was authorized to activate juvenile\u2019s suspended fourteen-day sentence in the 2 August 2007 order and impose an additional suspended fourteen-day period of confinement based on her admitted probation violation at the 3 December hearing, for a total of twenty-eight days confinement. However, based upon the facts of this case and our holding in Section I of this opinion, juvenile was entitled to credit for time served in detention prior to the dispositional hearing.\nFurther, a trial court has the discretion to impose any of the alternative dispositions contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2506(1)-(23) in addition-to the twenty-eight day confinement permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2506(20) and -2510(e), including placing the juvenile on probation under the supervision of a juvenile court counselor. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2508(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(8).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(c) (2007) provides that prior to the expiration of an order of probation, a trial court is permitted to extend a juvenile\u2019s probation for an additional period of one year after a hearing, \u201cif the court finds that the extension is necessary to protect the community or to safeguard the welfare of the juvenile.\u201d\nIn the order filed 25 February 2008, the trial court made sixteen findings of fact, which detailed juvenile\u2019s adjudicatory and dispositional history. The trial court found the following: (1) juvenile was repeatedly absent from school; (2) juvenile\u2019s mother informed the court that juvenile \u201ccomes and goes as she pleases\u201d and \u201cignores curfews!;]\u201d (3) on 3 January 2008 juvenile\u2019s mother was not willing to have juvenile placed at home; (4) the court counselor saw juvenile become disrespectful to the school resource officer; and (5) juvenile received fifteen risk points on the Risk and Needs Assessment. The trial court concluded that \u201cjuvenile will benefit from being extended on probation under the supervision of the Court\u201d and it \u201cwould be in the best interest of the juvenile for Step By Step to be involved with the family.\u201d The trial court extended juvenile\u2019s probation for a period of one year and imposed several special terms and conditions. We hold the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are sufficient to support the extension of juvenile\u2019s probation.\nJuvenile\u2019s remaining assignment of error brought forward in the record on appeal, but not argued in her brief, is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2008).\nVII. Conclusion\nWhen a juvenile has been previously adjudicated delinquent and admits violations of his or her probation at an adjudication hearing, the juvenile may be ordered into secure custody pending disposition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1903(c). When a trial court orders a juvenile into secure custody pending disposition, the juvenile is entitled to a hearing at intervals of no more than 10 calendar days to determine whether continued secure custody is warranted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1906(b). Credit for time served in secure custody pending disposition should be applied to the sentence imposed at the juvenile\u2019s dispositional hearing.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2506, -2508, and -2510(e), the trial court can impose up to twenty-eight days confinement in an approved juvenile detention facility for a Level 2 disposition. If the trial court finds that the extension of a juvenile\u2019s probationary period is necessary to protect the community or to safeguard the welfare of the juvenile, the trial court is permitted to extend the probation for an additional period of one year after a hearing.\nAFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.\nJudges GEER and STEPHENS concur.\n. Juvenile is referring to the 25 February 2008 order, in which the trial court imposed an additional 14-day suspended sentence and extended her probation for one. year, after she had served the fourteen-day sentence that was suspended pursuant to the trial court\u2019s 21 August 2007 order.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Janette Soles Nelson, for the State.", "Leslie C. Rawls, for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: D.L.H.\nNo. COA08-1019\n(Filed 21 July 2009)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 mootness \u2014 juvenile confinement and probation \u2014 expiration of time \u2014 authority of district court \u2014 issue likely to recur\nAn appeal in a juvenile delinquency proceeding was not dismissed as moot, even though the juvenile\u2019s probation had expired, where the issues concerned the scope of the statutory authority of the district court and were likely to recur.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 predispositional confinement \u2014 credit for time served\nThe trial court erred in a juvenile proceeding by not giving the juvenile credit for time served in secure custody before her dis-positional hearing, so that she served 69 days on a 14-day sentence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-196.1 is applicable to juvenile commitments.\n3. Juveniles\u2014 secure custody \u2014 applicable statute\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1903(c) applied to authorize secure custody of a juvenile where the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent, admitted to subsequent probation violations, and the trial court had go\u00f3d cause to continue the dispositional hearing. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1903(b) and (d) apply only while the allegations of a violation are pending and not where there has been an admission and adjudication of the conduct.\n4. Juveniles\u2014 secure custody \u2014 hearings at intervals\nA juvenile confined to secure custody pending disposition or placement is entitled to a hearing at intervals of no more than 10 calendar days to determine whether continued secure custody is warranted. The trial court here failed to entertain the juvenile\u2019s motion for review of a secure custody order.\n5. Juveniles\u2014 confinement \u2014 Level 2 disposition \u2014 28 days\n. The trial court can impose up to and no more than 28 days confinement in an approved juvenile detention facility for a Level 2 disposition under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2510(e), 7B-2506 and 7B-2508, read in pan materia, and the trial court was authorized to activate this juvenile\u2019s suspended 14-day sentence and impose an additional suspended 14-day confinement based on her admitted probation violation, with credit for time served. Furthermore, a trial court has the discretion to impose any of the alternative dispositions in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2506(1)-(23) in addition to the 28 day confinement.\n6. Juveniles\u2014 probation \u2014 extension\u2014findings\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact were sufficient to support the extension of a juvenile\u2019s probation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2510(c).\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 13 December 2007, 14 January 2008, 29 January 2008, and 25 February 2008 by Judges Sherry F. Alloway, Polly D. Sizemore, and Lawrence C. McSwain in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2009.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Janette Soles Nelson, for the State.\nLeslie C. Rawls, for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 312, "last_page_order": 323 }