{ "id": 4169390, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROY DEAN WORLEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Worley", "decision_date": "2009-07-21", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1532", "first_page": "329", "last_page": "339", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 329" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639848 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641913 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633154 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 960", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11803324, 11803268, 11803117, 11803598, 11803378, 11803827, 11803669, 11803157, 11803512, 11803196, 11803454 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0960-05", "/us/449/0960-04", "/us/449/0960-01", "/us/449/0960-09", "/us/449/0960-06", "/us/449/0960-11", "/us/449/0960-10", "/us/449/0960-02", "/us/449/0960-08", "/us/449/0960-03", "/us/449/0960-07" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560989 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 231, 266 S.E.2d 631, 636, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714446 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 231, 266 S.E.2d 631, 636, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149153 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. App. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155898 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794414 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 562, 614 S.E.2d 479, 484 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "weight": 16, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 562, 614 S.E.2d 479, 484 (2005)" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511311 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (internal citation omitted)" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149509 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (internal citation omitted)" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760004 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793217 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1003, "char_count": 26207, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1113789952947894e-07, "percentile": 0.5707830842647583 }, "sha256": "d0d9dd8dcc5c065026db2de9d31d59e4066a46c052c9cb008d5726bd4c6fedf5", "simhash": "1:6869f62070af4e7b", "word_count": 4360 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROY DEAN WORLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nRoy Dean Worley (Defendant) appeals from a judgment entered 8 July 2008 following his conviction for willfully failing to comply with the change of address requirements applicable to registered sex offenders in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11(a)(2) .that sentenced him to a term of 107 to 138 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenges to his conviction, we find no error.\nAt trial, the State presented evidence which tended to show that Defendant pled guilty to four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1. Judgment was entered against Defendant on the basis of these guilty pleas on 15 April 2006. Defendant was thereafter required to register as a sex offender pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a). According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a), \u201c[i]f a person required to register changes address, the person shall report in person and provide written notice of the new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\u201d\nDetective Courtney Mumm (Detective Mumm) of the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department oversaw the sex offender registration program in Buncombe County from the beginning of 2005 through February 2008. In 2004, Defendant received an address verification notice sent to him by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) at an address in the Lee Walker Heights Apartments in Asheville, North Carolina (Lee Walker Heights). Defendant returned the letter, indicating that he had moved to Candler Knob Road in Asheville, North . Carolina (Candler Knob), on 14 September 2004.\nOn 19 May 2005, Defendant submitted a notice of change of address indicating that he had moved back to Lee Walker Heights. At this time, Defendant lived with Laura Thomen (Thomen), despite the fact that Housing Authority rules and Thomen\u2019s lease prohibited registered sex offenders from residing there. As a result of this violation of the terms and conditions of her lease, Thomen and everyone living in her Lee Walker Height\u2019s apartment, including Defendant, were evicted.\nAfter Detective Mumm mentioned that Defendant was living with Thomen despite his status as a convicted sex offender, Cornelia Battle, the manager of Lee Walker Heights (Battle), called Thomen in for a conference and told her that her lease would be cancelled. A notice instructing Thomen to vacate the Lee Walker Heights apartment was sent in July. The Housing Authority obtained the issuance of a Magistrate\u2019s Summons against Thomen on 29 July 2005. The court date specified in the Magistrate\u2019s Summons was 11 August 2005. According to one of Battle\u2019s records dated 30 August 2005, Thomen left her key in the drop box on 10 August 2005. After the court date, the locks on Thomen\u2019s apartment were changed. Defendant stopped living in Lee Walker Heights after the Housing Authority changed the locks.\nThe SBI sent an address verification notice to Defendant at his-Lee Walker Heights address in 2005, but it was returned unclaimed. After becoming concerned that Defendant had left Lee Walker Heights without updating his address, Detective Mumm went to the Candler Knob address in an unsuccessful attempt to locate him. Detective Mumm had no contact with Defendant until he completed a change of address notice on 16 September 2005, in which Defendant stated that he had moved back to Candler Knob. On the form which he submitted to the Sheriff\u2019s Department at that time, Defendant stated that the effective date of his change of address was 16 September 2005.\nIn his own testimony, Defendant acknowledged that he had been convicted of a reportable offense in Haywood County and that he understood that he was required to register as a sex offender. After being placed on the registry, Defendant has changed his address ten or fifteen times. Defendant admitted knowing that, when he moved, he had ten days within which to notify the Sheriff\u2019s Department of his new address.\nDefendant stated that after leaving Lee Walker Heights, he went back to Candler Knob. He then moved from Candler Knob to Kenilworth. Defendant testified that he had been homeless for three and one-half years, that he stayed in a van that resembled a camper, and that Detective Mumm was not able to locate him at Candler Knob because he was staying in the camper rather than the house.\nDefendant went to the Sheriffs Department after he left Lee Walker Heights and changed his address to Candler Knob. At that time, Defendant did not talk to Detective Mumm; instead, he filled out some paperwork and gave it to the officer at the front desk, who said that the paperwork would be given to Detective Mumm. Although Defendant did not give a specific date when he went to the Sheriffs Department, he testified that he might have gone on 16 September 2005.\nOn 19 October 2005, a warrant charging Defendant with failure to notify the Sheriffs Department of his change of address was issued. On 7 August 2006, the Buncombe County grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with failing to provide written notice of his change of address within the required ten day period. On 8 July 2008, a jury convicted Defendant of failing to comply with the sex offender registration law. On the same date, the trial court entered judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of 107 to 138 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nI: Motions to Dismiss\nDefendant initially contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all evidence. We disagree.\nWhen ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the trial court must consider the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor. State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 28-29, 460 S.E.2d 163, 168 (1995). \u201cThe State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and inference to be drawn from the evidence, and any contradictions and discrepancies are to be resolved in favor of the State.\u201d State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983). The only issue before the trial court in such instances is \u201c \u2018whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491, 493, 666 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2008) (quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (internal citation omitted)). \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d Turnage, 362 N.C. at 493, 666 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Crawford, 344 N.C. at 73, 472 S.E.2d at 925). As long as the evidence permits a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s guilt, a motion to dismiss is properly denied even though the evidence also \u201cpermits a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s innocence.\u201d State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2002).\nThe North Carolina Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs require every individual who has been convicted of a reportable offense as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4), a category which includes offenses against minors and \u201csexually violent offenses,\u201d to register as a convicted sex offender with the sheriff of the county in which the person resides. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a). According to the relevant statutory provisions, the sheriff in each of North Carolina\u2019s one hundred counties is required to obtain certain information from registering sex offenders, including the individual\u2019s full name, physical description, current photograph, fingerprints, driver\u2019s license number, home address, and the \u201ctype of offense for which the person was convicted, the date of conviction, and the sentence imposed.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(b). \u201cIf a person required to register changes address, the person shall report in person and provide written notice of the new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a).\nThe General Assembly has imposed criminal penalties upon individuals who are required to register and fail to either register or take some other action required by law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11. More particularly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11 provides that:\n(a) A person required by this Article to register who willfully does any of the following is guilty of a Class F felony:\n(2) Fails to notify the last registering sheriff of a change of address as required by this Article.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11. \u201cThe crime of failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11(a) is a strict liability offense.\u201d State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 328, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citing State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 562, 614 S.E.2d 479, 484 (2005)). A conviction for violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that: \u201c(1) the defendant is \u2018a person required ... to register,\u2019 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11(a); (2) the defendant \u2018change[s]\u2019 his or her \u2018address,\u2019 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11(a)(2); and (3) the defendant \u2018[flails to notify the last registering sheriff of [the] change of address,\u2019 . . . \u2018not later than the tenth day after the change,\u2019 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a).\u201d Abshire, 363 N.C. at 324, - S.E.2d at -.\n\u201c[T]he statute describes a change of address as a discrete event and not as a nebulous process.\u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 329, - S.E.2d at -. Although \u201c[t]he word \u2018address\u2019 is not explicitly defined by statute,\u201d \u201cthe Legislature is,\u201d in such instances, \u201cpresumed to have used the words of a statute to convey their natural and ordinary meaning.\u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 329, - S.E.2d at - (citing Perkins v. Ark. Trucking Servs., Inc., 351 N.C. 634, 638, 528 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted)). \u201cTo whatever degree the meaning of address may be ambiguous,\u201d courts must \u201crefer to the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in order to derive an appropriate interpretation.\u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 330, - S.E.2d at - (quotation omitted). \u201c \u2018The best indicia of [the legislature\u2019s] intent are the language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u2019 \u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 330, - S.E.2d at \u2014 (quoting Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Town of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980) (citations omitted)).\nThe purpose of the sex offender registration program is \u201cto assist law enforcement agencies and the public in knowing the whereabouts of sex offenders and in locating them when necessary.\u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 330, - S.E.2d at -. The Supreme Court rejected this Court\u2019s description of a registered sex offender\u2019s address as \u201ca place where a registrant resides and where that registrant receives mail or other communication,\u201d State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. App. 322, 330, 666 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2008), rev. - N.C. -, - S.E.2d - (2009), since such an \u201cinterpretation . . . would thwart the intent of the legislature\u201d by allowing a sex offender \u201cto actually live at a location other than where he or she was registered and not be required to notify the sheriff of that new address as long as he or she continued to receive United States Postal Service mail at the registered address.\u201d According to the Supreme Court, such a definition would \u201cenable sex offenders to elude accountability from law enforcement and . . . expose the public to an unacceptable level of risk.\u201d Abshire, 363 N.C. at 330, - S.E.2d at -. For that reason, the Supreme Court has concluded that the term \u201caddress\u201d as used in the sex offender registration statutes should be understood as \u201cdescribing or indicating the location where someone lives.\u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 331, \u2014 S.E.2d at -. As a result, \u201ca sex offender\u2019s address indicates his or her residence, meaning the actual place of abode where he or she lives, whether permanent or temporary.\u201d Id., 363 N.C. at 331, - S.E.2d at -.\nIn this case, Deputy Clerk of Superior Court Elizabeth Whittenberger testified at trial that judgment was entered against Defendant on 15 April 1996 based on his plea of guilty to four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1. Thus, the undisputed record evidence clearly establishes that Defendant was subject to the registration regimen set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a). For that reason, the only two issues that were in dispute at trial were whether Defendant had changed \u201cthe actual place of abode where he or she lives, whether permanent or temporary,\u201d and, if so, whether he gave proper notice to the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department within ten days of any such change of address.\nBattle testified' that she hand wrote a statement on 30 August 2005 indicating that Thomen left her keys in the drop box and vacated her apartment at Lee Walker Heights on 10 August 2005 as a result of her eviction, which stemmed from a breach of her lease resulting from her decision to allow Defendant, a registered sex offender, to live there. Despite the fact that Thomen returned her keys, the locks on the doors to her apartment were changed because \u201csometimes\u201d evicted residents \u201ccome back[.]\u201d When asked whether Defendant \u201cstopped living there\u201d after the Housing Authority obtained a judgment against Thomen on 11 August 2005, Battle responded, \u201c[h]e had to because we changed the locks.\u201d Detective Mumm testified that Defendant completed a change of address form indicating that he had moved from Lee Walker Heights to Candler Knob on 16 September 2005. After receiving notice of Thomen\u2019s eviction, Mumm had attempted to \u201cascertain whether the defendant still lived\u201d at Lee Walker Heights and did not see him there. When she asked the apartment manager whether Thomen and her roommates still lived in the apartment, the manager answered, \u201c[n]o, she had been evicted.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he moved out of Lee Walker Heights in late July or early August and that he knew that he only had ten days to notify the Sheriff\u2019s Department of his move. However, Defendant admitted that \u201cI have a tendency to forget sometimes[.]\u201d Defendant described himself as a \u201cdrifter\u201d and attested that \u201cit\u2019s [sometimes] difficult for the Sheriff\u2019s Office to keep up\u201d with him. Defendant testified that he went to the Sheriff\u2019s Department and said, \u201cI\u2019m here to register.\u201d An officer \u201cgave him a piece of paper to change my address from Lee Walker to Candler Knob[,]\u201d and Defendant submitted the form. The form was dated 16 September 2005. When asked whether the \u201cmeeting at the Sheriffs Office ... happened [in] mid September 2005[,]\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cI\u2019m not sure, but I think it is, yes.\u201d\nIn seeking to overturn his conviction on appeal, Defendant argues that he had not established a new \u201caddress\u201d after leaving Lee Walker Heights until the date upon which he submitted his notice of change of address to the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department despite the fact that he had been evicted from Lee Walker Heights more than a month earlier. In essence, Defendant appears to argue that no change of address has occurred until he had obtained a new permanent residence or abode. In order to provide a factual predicate for this argument, Defendant testified that, after leaving Lee Walker Heights:\nWell, I went back to Candler Knob, and I moved from Candler Knob to 41 Kenilworth, and when they come (sic) to check on me I wasn\u2019t there at the time because I move around a lot. I have a lot of friends that I stay with off and on. I have been homeless for about three and a half years. I stayed in the van the biggest part of the day time. I didn\u2019t stay in the house, but I stayed in the van that was like a camper, and I came to town a lot. I rode the bus a lot into town back and forth, and that\u2019s why they couldn\u2019t keep up with me. I\u2019m a hard person \u2014 I\u2019m a drifter, you know as they say, but drifting from one town to the next, you know, one address to the next, you know. ...\nAs we understand his testimony, Defendant\u2019s van was located at the Candler Knob address, which he gave as his new address in his 16 September 2005 filing with the Sheriff\u2019s Department after he left Lee Walker Heights. After careful consideration, we do not find Defendant\u2019s argument persuasive.\nAt an absolute minimum, the record contains evidence tending to show that Defendant left Lee Walker Heights on or before 10 August 2005 and failed to report a new address until 16 September 2005. According to his own testimony, Defendant claims that, like many individuals, he traveled from place to place within his hometown. In addition, Defendant stated that he spent nights at the homes of friends and may have even traveled to different towns. Even so, there is substantial evidence tending to show that Defendant \u201creside [d]\u201d at Candler Knob after he left Lee Walker Heights. Defendant himself stated that after he left Lee Walker Heights, \u201c[w]ell, I went back to Candler Knob .... I stayed in the van the biggest part of the day time. I didn\u2019t stay in the house, but I stayed in the van that was like a camperf.]\u201d When taken in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence is, if believed, sufficient to establish that Defendant changed his \u201cactual place of abode where he or she lives, whether permanent or temporary,\u201d Abshire, 363 N.C. at 331, - S.E.2d at -, from Lee Walker Heights to Candler Knob by no later than 10 August 2005 and that he failed to report his new address to the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department until 16 September 2005. As a result, we believe that the record contains evidence tending to show both that Defendant changed his \u201caddress,\u201d as that term is used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2), and that he failed to notify the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department of this development within ten days after it occurred.\nDefendant\u2019s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11 (a) (2) rests on the apparent assumption that individuals with no permanent abode are not required to provide change of address information until such time as they obtain a new permanent residence. The reference in the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Abshire, 363 N.C. 331, - S.E.2d -, to a \u201ctemporary\u201d residence coupled with the factual analysis in the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, confirms that the sex offender registration statutes operate on the premise that everyone does, at all times, have an \u201caddress\u201d of some sort, even if it is a homeless shelter, a location under a bridge or some similar place. In the event that we were to accept the argument that \u201cdrifters\u201d such as Defendant have no \u201caddress\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11 (a)(2), then such individuals would be effectively immune from the registration requirements found in current law as long as they continued to \u201cdrift.\u201d The adoption of such an understanding of the relevant statutory provisions would completely thwart the efforts of \u201claw enforcement agencies and the public [to] know the whereabouts of sex offenders and [to] locate them if necessary.\u201d Abshire, 363 N.C. at 330, - S.E.2d at -. Thus, we reject Defendant\u2019s contention that there are occasionally times when a registered sex offender lacks a reportable \u201caddress\u201d for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2).\nAs a result, since Defendant did not intend to return, nor was it possible for him to return, to Lee Walker Heights, his \u201caddress\u201d as defined in Abshire undoubtedly \u201cchange[d]\u201d following Thomens\u2019 eviction. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence in the record tending to show that Defendant changed his \u201caddress\u201d from Lee Walker Heights to Candler Knob more than ten days prior to 16 September 2005. At an absolute minimum, Defendant had a \u201cplace of abode\u201d of some nature after his departure from Lee Walker Heights on or before 10 August 2005 which was not reported to the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department on or before 20 August 2005. Thus, we conclude there was ample record support for the jury\u2019s verdict convicting Defendant of failing to provide timely notice of his change of address in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11 (a)(2). For that reason, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nII: Void for Vagueness Challenge to Change of Address Statutes\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by not declaring N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2) unconstitutionally void for vagueness given the absence of a statutory definition of \u201caddress\u201d or \u201cchange of address\u201d that suffices to provide adequate guidance to someone in Defendant\u2019s unique situation. We note that Defendant did not raise his void for vagueness challenge to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2) before the trial court. As a result, we need not consider Defendant\u2019s constitutional arguments on the merits and decline to do so. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); see also State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 18, 653 S.E.2d 126, 137 (2007); State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 321-22, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988). This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges McGEE and JACKSON concur.\n. Although Defendant\u2019s brief and the judgment and commitment entered against Defendant indicate that Defendant was also convicted of having attained the status of an habitual felon, no verdict sheet reflecting the jury\u2019s determination of Defendant\u2019s habitual felon status was included in the record on appeal.\n. Effective 1 December 2008, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a) requires a sex offender to \u201creport in person and provide written notice of the new address not later than the third business day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\u201d However, at the time of Defendant\u2019s conviction, the statute prior to the 1 May 2009 amendment applied.\n. Lee Walker Heights is a public housing facility operated by the Asheville Housing Authority (Housing Authority).\n. Although Defendant\u2019s trial counsel sought and obtained the entry of two orders requiring that Defendant be examined for the purpose of determining his competence to stand trial, both examinations resulted in determinations that Defendant was, in fact, competent.\n. As noted above, Defendant was evidently convicted of having attained habitual felon status as well.\n. According to well-established North Carolina law, if a defendant \u201cintroduces evidence\u201d after the denial of a motion to dismiss made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, \u201che thereby waives [the] motion . . . made prior to the introduction of his evidence and cannot urge such prior motion as ground for appeal.\u201d State v. Bruce, 315 N.C. 273, 280, 337 S.E.2d 510, 515 (1985) (quoting State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 231, 266 S.E.2d 631, 636, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980)). As a result of the fact that Defendant offered evidence following the denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the correctness of the trial court\u2019s decision to deny that motion is not properly before us. For that reason, the discussion in the body of this opinion focuses on Defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erroneously denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence.\n. The essential argument advanced on appeal in Abshire was that, since the defendant continued to receive mail at the residence of her boyfriend\u2019s father and returned there periodically, the fact that she had been staying temporarily at her parent\u2019s residence while she got \u201cher emotions together\u201d did not constitute a change of address for purposes of the sex offender registration statutes. By concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable inference \u201cthat defendant was indicating a change in her actual place of abode, even for just a temporary period,\u201d and that this evidence sufficed to support a conviction, Abshire, 363 N.C. at 333, - S.E.2d at -, the Supreme Court necessarily rejected the basic thrust of Defendant\u2019s argument on appeal.\n. Thus, even if Defendant moved from Lee Walker Heights to Laural Knob and stayed there less than ten days before moving to Kenilworth, he was still required to have provided address information of some nature by no later than 20 August 2005, a legal obligation which he totally failed to honor.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Ammons Gilchrist, for the State.", "Daniel J. Clifton, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROY DEAN WORLEY\nNo. COA08-1532\n(Filed 21 July 2009)\n1. Sexual Offenders\u2014 registration \u2014 change of address\u2014 homeless individuals\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of failure to comply with sex offender registration change of address requirements. Although defendant\u2019s contention rests on the apparent assumption that individuals with no permanent abode are not required to provide change of address information until they obtain a new permanent address, the registration statutes operate on the premise that everyone does at all times have an address of some sort, even if it is a homeless shelter, a location under a bridge or some similar place.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 constitutional arguments \u2014 not raised below \u2014 not considered\nConstitutional arguments that sexual offender registration statutes were void for vagueness that were not raised at trial were not considered on appeal.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 8 July 2008 by Judge J. Marlene Hyatt in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 May 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Ammons Gilchrist, for the State.\nDaniel J. Clifton, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0329-01", "first_page_order": 355, "last_page_order": 365 }