{ "id": 4169266, "name": "BRIAN JAMES and JULIUS A. FULMORE, Plaintiffs v. JERRY BLEDSOE; WILLIAM EDWARD DAVIS HAMMER, Individually and as President of HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC.; JOHN HAMMER, Individually, as Secretary of HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC. and Editor-in-Chief of THE RHINOCEROS TIMES; and HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC. d/b/a THE RHINOCEROS TIMES, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "James v. Bledsoe", "decision_date": "2009-07-21", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1386", "first_page": "339", "last_page": "346", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 339" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/596/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631332, 12631399, 12631344, 12631345, 12631346 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/596/0813-01", "/se2d/598/0136-02", "/se2d/597/0132-02", "/se2d/597/0132-01", "/se2d/597/0133-02" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 754", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575547 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0754-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964)" }, { "page": "362, 363-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9379035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964)" }, { "page": "256, 258-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135616, 135649, 135948, 135763, 135735 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0371-05", "/nc/353/0371-03", "/nc/353/0371-01", "/nc/353/0371-02", "/nc/353/0371-04" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521977 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447-48" }, { "page": "447-48" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "581" }, { "page": "581" }, { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "580-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155801 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915690 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628180 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0052-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 739, "char_count": 17661, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.29634777934929796 }, "sha256": "9e95bd7f8497a6e2c67233ff8dd126422c7b8a910d559dad3fa7195856d4e5bd", "simhash": "1:09e2f474ac6f95d0", "word_count": 2678 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur." ], "parties": [ "BRIAN JAMES and JULIUS A. FULMORE, Plaintiffs v. JERRY BLEDSOE; WILLIAM EDWARD DAVIS HAMMER, Individually and as President of HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC.; JOHN HAMMER, Individually, as Secretary of HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC. and Editor-in-Chief of THE RHINOCEROS TIMES; and HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC. d/b/a THE RHINOCEROS TIMES, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nGreensboro police officers Brian James and Julius A. Fulmore (\u201cplaintiffs\u201d) appeal from the superior court\u2019s 1 August 2008 Order denying their 2 April 2008 Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from the following named defendants: investigative journalist Jerry, Bledsoe (\u201cBledsoe\u201d); president of Hammer Publications, Inc. and publisher of The Rhinoceros Times William Edward Davis Hammer (\u201cWilliam Hammer\u201d); secretary of Hammer Publications, Inc. and editor-in-chief of The Rhinoceros Times John Hammer (\u201cJohn Hammer\u201d); and Hammer Publications, Inc. d/b/a The Rhinoceros Times (\u201cHammer Publications\u201d). For the reasons stated, we dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nIn light of our disposition of this appeal, our recitation of the facts and procedural history of the case is abbreviated. On 19 November 2007, plaintiffs filed a Complaint against defendants alleging defamation and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs alleged that twenty-three false and defamatory statements about either or both plaintiffs were authored by defendant Bledsoe and published in The Rhinoceros Times in a series entitled \u201cCops in Black and White.\u201d Defendant Bledsoe\u2019s series began in late summer 2006 and has included more than fifty installments, although the twenty-three allegedly defamatory statements appear in only ten of those articles. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants \u201cformed a scheme\u201d in which defendants William Hammer and Hammer Publications knowingly published both defendant Bledsoe\u2019s \u201cCops in Black and White\u201d series and defendant John Hammer\u2019s editorial commentary on defendant Bledsoe\u2019s series, which were \u201crife with defamatory statements,\u201d in order to \u201cmake money,\u201d \u201cachieve improper and immoral results,\u201d and \u201cdeceive the citizens of Guilford County.\u201d\nDefendants filed their Answer to plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint on 18 January 2008 in which they asserted thirteen defenses. Plaintiffs sent each defendant a First Set of Interrogatories and Request For Production of Documents (\u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 First Interrogatories\u201d), in which plaintiffs sought, among other things, \u201c[a]ny and all documents and electronic data that relate to [p]laintiffs,\u201d and \u201c[a]ny and all documents and electronic data that relate to communications with individuals or entities that supplied information either\u201d \u201cto be used in\u201d or \u201cto lead to the discovery of information to be used in the Series and/or the Editorials.\u201d After the court granted defendants\u2019 Motion for Extension of Time to answer Plaintiffs\u2019 First Interrogatories, each defendant sent plaintiffs their Answers to Plaintiffs\u2019 First Interrogatories.\nOn 17 March 2008, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel sent letters to each defendant asserting that defendants\u2019 Answers to Plaintiffs\u2019 First Interrogatories were \u201ctotally and completely inadequate\u201d and \u201ccompletely non-responsive,\u201d and stated, \u201c[w]ith respect to the document production, the documents produced in no way satisfy the requests for production served upon [defendants].\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel demanded that defendants supplement their responses to Plaintiffs\u2019 First Interrogatories by 24 March 2008. On 2 April 2008, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Defendants, in which they prayed for defendants \u201cto answer and fully respond to [plaintiffs\u2019 discovery requests without objections.\u201d Before plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel was heard, each defendant sent plaintiffs their Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs\u2019 First Interrogatories.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel was heard on 19 May 2008 and 11 June 2008. In its Order entered on 1 August 2008, the trial court concluded that \u201cdefendants shall supplement within 30 days of the entry of this Order their Answers to plaintiffs\u2019 [First Interrogatories] by lifting their objection as to their fact checking procedures in general, and in particular as to the specific allegations of alleged defamation in paragraph 12 of their Complaint.\u201d The court further concluded that \u201cdefendants shall supplement their Answers and disclose all intercourse of any type between Mr. Bledsoe and either of the Hammers as to how the Series came about.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel was denied. Plaintiffs timely appealed from the trial court\u2019s order.\nPlaintiffs concede that the trial court\u2019s 1 August 2008 Order is interlocutory. An appeal from an interlocutory order \u201cwill be dismissed unless the order affects some substantial right and will work injury to the appellant if not corrected before appeal from the final judgment.\u201d Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1949). \u201cGenerally, an order compelling discovery is not immediately appealable.\u201d Doe 1 v. Swannanoa Valley Youth Dev. Ctr., 163 N.C. App. 136, 138, 592 S.E.2d 715, 717 (citing Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 163, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999)), disc. review and supersedeas denied, 358 N.C. 376, 596 S.E.2d 813 (2004). However, an interlocutory order denying discovery has been held to affect a substantial right when: (A) \u201c \u2018a party asserts a statutory privilege which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion of such privilege is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial,\u2019 \u201d id. (quoting Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 166, 522 S.E.2d at 581), or (B) \u201cthe desired discovery would not have delayed trial or have caused the opposing party any unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense, and if the information desired is highly material to a determination of the critical question to be resolved in the case.\u201d Dworsky v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 447-48, 271 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1980). Plaintiffs contend the trial court\u2019s interlocutory order denying their Motion to Compel discovery affects a substantial right based on (A) defendants\u2019 assertion of the statutory privilege under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-53.11, and (B) the rule of Dworsky v. Travelers Insurance Co. We disagree.\nA.\nIn its 1 August 2008 Order, the trial court found that defendants asserted a qualified privilege under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-53.11 and concluded that \u201cN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-53.11 applies and that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their need for the information pursuant to the requirements of this statute; therefore, defendants\u2019 objections are sustained, and plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel is denied.\u201d On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court\u2019s recognition of defendants\u2019 assertion of this statutory privilege entitles plaintiffs to immediate appellate review of the trial court\u2019s interlocutory order. To support their contention, plaintiffs rely on the following cases: Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 522 S.E.2d 577 (1999); Evans v. United Services Automobile Ass\u2019n, 142 N.C. App. 18, 541 S.E.2d 782, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810 (2001); and Miles v. Martin, 147 N.C. App. 255, 555 S.E.2d 361 (2001) (citing Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964)).\nPlaintiffs first cite Sharpe\u2019s oft-repeated rule that, when \u201ca party asserts a statutory privilege which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion of such privilege is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, the challenged order affects a substantial right.\u201d Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 166, 522 S.E.2d at 581. Contrary to plaintiffs\u2019 assertions, however, we conclude that Sharpe does not mandate appellate review of an interlocutory order upholding a statutory privilege asserted by a party from whom discovery is sought.\nIn Sharpe, the plaintiff initiated a medical malpractice action against the defendants for personal injuries, and served a notice of deposition upon the defendant-hospital in which the plaintiff requested that the defendant-hospital \u201cproduce \u2018[a]ll documents related to all complaints and incident reports\u2019 and \u2018[a]ll minutes of any meeting or hearing of the Board of Trustees\u2019 relating to Dr. Worland.\u201d Id. at 160, 522 S.E.2d at 578 (alterations in original). The defendant-hospital moved for a protective order, asserting that \u201ccertain documents pertaining to Dr. Worland\u2019s participation . . . were privileged and, therefore, protected from disclosure.\u201d Id. at 160-61, 522 S.E.2d at 578. The trial court denied the motion for a protective order and ordered the defendant-hospital to produce all documents concerning defendant Worland\u2019s participation. Id. at 161, 522 S.E.2d at 578. The defendants appealed from the trial court\u2019s denial of their motion. See id.\nIn addressing the issue of whether the denial of the defendant-hospital\u2019s motion for a protective order affected a substantial right, the Court wrote: It \u201csuffices to observe that, if the [defendant-h]ospital is required to disclose the very documents that it alleges are protected from disclosure by the statutory privilege, then a right materially affecting those interests which a [person] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law \u2014 a substantial right \u2014 is affected.\u201d Id. at 164, 522 S.E.2d at 580 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the Court recognized that a party asserting a privilege which it \u201cis entitled to have preserved and protected by law\u201d will lose that right if the trial court\u2019s order requiring that it disclose the documents it alleges are protected \u201cis not reviewed before entry of a final judgment.\u201d Id. at 164-65, 522 S.E.2d at 580-81. Thus, Sharpe gives no support to plaintiffs\u2019 contention in the present case that the trial court\u2019s recognition of defendants\u2019 assertion of a statutory privilege affects a substantial right of plaintiffs.\nSimilarly, in Evans, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for breach of contract, bad faith, and unfair and deceptive trade practices, and sought to obtain a complete copy of the defendants\u2019 claims file relating to \u201cthe incident in question, including copies of reports generated as the result of defendants\u2019 investigation, legal opinions obtained by defendants from both in-house and private counsel, and the substance of discussions among defendants\u2019 personnel (including their attorneys) who participated in the decision to deny coverage to the plaintiff.\u201d Evans, 142 N.C. App. at 22, 541 S.E.2d at 785. The defendants declined to produce those documents which they alleged were protected by the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 22-23, 541 S.E.2d at 785. The plaintiff moved to compel discovery of the material the defendants alleged was privileged. See id. at 23, 541 S.E.2d at 785. The trial court partially granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel, and the parties appealed. See id.\n\u201cPlaintiff movefd] to dismiss defendants\u2019 appeal as interlocutory, while defendants argue[d] that, because the trial court\u2019s orders require [d] that they produce material protected by the attorney-client privilege, their appeal involve[d] a substantial right.\u201d Id. at 23, 541 S.E.2d at 786. This Court stated that it \u201cagree[d] with defendants\u2019 contention,\u201d and found that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s order affects a substantial right of defendants under the holding of our Supreme Court in Sharpe.\u201d Id. at 23-24, 541 S.E.2d at 786 (emphasis added). In other words, this Court decided to hear the appeal in Evans because the party asserting the protection of the privilege sought to have the issue heard before having to disclose the information it sought to protect.\nBecause the appeals heard in Miles and Lockwood likewise arose from circumstances similar to those described above in Sharpe and Evans \u2014 in which the appellate court granted immediate review to the party asserting a statutory privilege after the trial court entered an interlocutory order compelling discovery against the party who asserted such a privilege, see Miles, 147 N.C. App. at 256, 258-59, 555 S.E.2d at 362, 363-64 (allowing immediate appellate review for defendant asserting attorney-client privilege after the trial court\u2019s interlocutory order granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel production of defendant\u2019s client/investor documents); Lockwood, 261 N.C. at 755-57, 136 S.E.2d at 68-69 (allowing immediate appellate review for plaintiff asserting physician-patient privilege after the trial court\u2019s interlocutory order granted defendants\u2019 motion to compel plaintiff\u2019s psychiatrist to submit to a deposition regarding plaintiff\u2019s medical treatment history), we conclude that the cases upon which plaintiffs rely are distinguishable from the present case. Since plaintiffs have provided no legal argument supporting their contention that the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel based on defendants\u2019 assertion of a statutory privilege affects a substantial right of plaintiffs and requires immediate appellate review, we conclude that plaintiffs\u2019 appeal is not properly before this Court on this ground.\nB.\nPlaintiffs also seek immediate appellate review of the trial court\u2019s interlocutory order based on their contention that the court\u2019s denial of their Motion to Compel affects a substantial right under the rule in Dworsky v. Travelers Insurance Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 271 S.E.2d 522 (1980). Again, we disagree.\nAs mentioned above, in Dworsky, this Court stated that an interlocutory order denying discovery affects a substantial right which would be lost if the ruling were not reviewed before final judgment (1) \u201cif the information desired is highly material to a determination of the critical question to be resolved in the case,\u201d and (2) if \u201cthe desired discovery would not have delayed trial or have caused the opposing party any unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.\u201d Dworsky, 49 N.C. App. at 447-48, 271 S.E.2d at 523.\nPlaintiffs contend the information desired is \u201chighly material\u201d because \u201c[t]he requested discovery goes to the critical issue of [defendant] Bledsoe\u2019s knowledge of the truth or falsity of the statements he published.\u201d Plaintiffs assert that they \u201cproduced evidence at the hearing that [defendants] (or some of them) knew or should have known that some statements in the articles were false, [and that] therefore, a review of the notes and recordings is highly material to a determination of whether [defendants] published false statements with actual malice.\u201d In support of this assertion, plaintiffs direct this Court\u2019s attention to portions of the transcript from the 11 June 2008 hearing on plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel, which contain the testimony of two witnesses \u2014 Mr. Coman and Mr. Jones. However, it is not apparent from these excerpts that defendants \u201cknew or should have known that some statements in the articles were false.\u201d\nIn the transcript pages referenced by plaintiffs, Mr. Coman testified that defendant Bledsoe said that David Wray had \u201cbeen treated wrong, and [that defendant Bledsoe was] going to do everything [he could] to help restore David Wray\u2019s good name.\u201d Mr. Coman also testified that defendant Bledsoe \u201cdidn\u2019t think much of Mitch Johnson\u201d and \u201choped that the outcome of the , articles would be that Mitch Johnson would ultimately get fired.\u201d Mr. Jones testified that he spoke with defendant Bledsoe \u201cto tell him about some folks that [Mr. Jones] thought would have had a different opinion about [plaintiff] Fulmore,\u201d (emphasis added), but that defendant Bledsoe did not contact some of the persons to whom Mr. Jones referred him. Nonetheless, plaintiffs have not shown by these excerpts that defendant Bledsoe\u2019s notes and recordings are \u201chighly material to a determination of whether [defendants] published false statements with actual malice.\u201d Rather, \u201cthe record in the instant case offers [this Court] no clue as to what relevant and material information, if indeed there is any, is sought.\u201d See Dworsky, 49 N.C. App. at 448, 271 S.E.2d at 524. Accordingly, even though some relevant and material evidence might be contained in the requested notes and recordings, plaintiffs are \u201cnot entitled to a fishing expedition to locate it.\u201d See id. Therefore, because \u201cplaintiffs have not shown that the information sought is so crucial to the outcome of this case that it would deprive them of a substantial right and thus justify an immediate appeal,\u201d see id., plaintiffs\u2019 appeal from the trial court\u2019s interlocutory 1 August 2008 Order denying plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Compel is dismissed.\nDismissed.\nJudges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Forman Rossabi Black, P.A., by Amiel J. Rossabi, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.P., by Seth R. Cohen, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIAN JAMES and JULIUS A. FULMORE, Plaintiffs v. JERRY BLEDSOE; WILLIAM EDWARD DAVIS HAMMER, Individually and as President of HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC.; JOHN HAMMER, Individually, as Secretary of HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC. and Editor-in-Chief of THE RHINOCEROS TIMES; and HAMMER PUBLICATIONS, INC. d/b/a THE RHINOCEROS TIMES, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1386\n(Filed 21 July 2009)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 interlocutory \u2014 denial of motion to compel discovery \u2014 substantial right not affected\nAn appeal from the denial of a motion to compel, discovery was dismissed as interlocutory even though plaintiffs argued that a substantial right was affected through defendants\u2019 assertion of a statutory privilege and the highly material nature of the information being sought. Plaintiffs provided no legal argument for the contention that plaintiffs\u2019 substantial right was affected by defendants\u2019 assertion of a statutory privilege, and even though some relevant and material evidence might be contained in the requested notes and recordings, plaintiffs are not entitled to a fishing expedition to locate it.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 1 August 2008 by Judge Vance Bradford Long in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 June 2009.\nForman Rossabi Black, P.A., by Amiel J. Rossabi, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nSmith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.P., by Seth R. Cohen, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0339-01", "first_page_order": 365, "last_page_order": 372 }