{ "id": 4168874, "name": "LAUREN B. BATLLE f/k/a LAUREN B. SABATES, Plaintiff v. ARTURO SABATES, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sabates v. Sabates", "decision_date": "2009-08-04", "docket_number": "No. COA08-860", "first_page": "407", "last_page": "427", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 407" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638603, 12638604, 12638605 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0766-01", "/se2d/645/0766-02", "/se2d/645/0766-03" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636991 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642474 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "quoting Dodd v. Steele, 114 N.C. App. 632, 635, 442 S.E.2d 363, 365, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 691, 448 S.E.2d 521 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/671/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641511 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635568, 12635569, 12635570 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0382-01", "/se2d/628/0382-02", "/se2d/628/0382-03" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796224, 3794728, 3789546, 3790060, 3791954, 3795378, 3787092, 3792987 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0290-01", "/nc/360/0290-03", "/nc/360/0290-04", "/nc/360/0290-02", "/nc/360/0290-06", "/nc/360/0290-05", "/nc/360/0290-07", "/nc/360/0290-08" ] }, { "cite": "618 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633891 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/618/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636049 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639037, 12639038 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0204-01", "/se2d/648/0204-02" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637142 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641750 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court reviews the trial court's action in granting sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, including dismissal of claims, for abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637293, 12637294, 12637295 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0538-01", "/se2d/637/0538-02", "/se2d/637/0538-03" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635826 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639467, 12639468 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Gallbronner v. Mason, 101 N.C. App. 362, 366, 399 S.E.2d 139, 141, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 268, 407 S.E.2d 835 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0812-01", "/se2d/650/0812-02" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638436 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139682, 139683, 139342, 139478, 139550 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0283-04", "/nc/346/0283-01", "/nc/346/0283-03", "/nc/346/0283-02", "/nc/346/0283-05" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11870466 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491774 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11920279 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3737632, 3745508, 3738951, 3747377, 3744440 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0351-04", "/nc/361/0351-01", "/nc/361/0351-05", "/nc/361/0351-02", "/nc/361/0351-03" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8239378 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549352, 2550922, 2550897, 2550744, 2552156 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0691-03", "/nc/337/0691-05", "/nc/337/0691-04", "/nc/337/0691-02", "/nc/337/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527893 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164530 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "quoting Dodd v. Steele, 114 N.C. App. 632, 635, 442 S.E.2d 363, 365, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 691, 448 S.E.2d 521 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496763 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is plain that a trial judge's discretionary order pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571152 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is plain that a trial judge's discretionary order pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860-61", "parenthetical": "emphasizing that requests for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), are reviewed under an abuse of discretion rather than a de novo standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132071 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626", "parenthetical": "emphasizing that requests for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), are reviewed under an abuse of discretion rather than a de novo standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing In re Buck, 350 N.C. 621, 626, 516 S.E.2d 858, 860-61 (1999) (emphasizing that requests for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), are reviewed under an abuse of discretion rather than a de novo standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing In re Buck, 350 N.C. 621, 626, 516 S.E.2d 858, 860-61 (1999) (emphasizing that requests for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), are reviewed under an abuse of discretion rather than a de novo standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159894 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353302 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795905 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "stating that \"Rule 37 does not require the [movant] to show that it was prejudiced by the [nonmovant's] actions in order to obtain sanctions for abuse of discovery\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11356431 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291", "parenthetical": "stating that \"Rule 37 does not require the [movant] to show that it was prejudiced by the [nonmovant's] actions in order to obtain sanctions for abuse of discovery\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798896, 798810, 798767, 798951 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0305-03", "/nc/343/0305-02", "/nc/343/0305-01", "/nc/343/0305-04" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917325 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3747397, 3746860, 3747087, 3738736, 3735633, 3742938 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0425-01", "/nc/361/0425-06", "/nc/361/0425-02", "/nc/361/0425-03", "/nc/361/0425-05", "/nc/361/0425-04" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8241537 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160114 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his Court reviews the trial court's action in granting sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, including dismissal of claims, for abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550852 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[sanctions under Rule 37 are within the sound discretion of the trial court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916211 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[sanctions under Rule 37 are within the sound discretion of the trial court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563189, 8563227, 8563133, 8563166, 8563103 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0233-04", "/nc/285/0233-05", "/nc/285/0233-02", "/nc/285/0233-03", "/nc/285/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554692 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158-59" }, { "page": "158-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176-77" }, { "page": "176-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543978, 2540654, 2540017, 2538132, 2539772 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0093-01", "/nc/328/0093-02", "/nc/328/0093-04", "/nc/328/0093-03", "/nc/328/0093-05" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "stating that Rule 37 does not require the movant to show that it was prejudiced by the nonmovant's actions in order to obtain sanctions for abuse of discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867591 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915008 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3736640 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302349 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "734" }, { "page": "734" }, { "page": "735" }, { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646421 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358586 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555208, 2555276, 2555647, 2553460, 2555999 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0268-05", "/nc/329/0268-04", "/nc/329/0268-03", "/nc/329/0268-01", "/nc/329/0268-02" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527724 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3735681, 3741259, 3742865, 3744569, 3742523 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Gallbronner v. Mason, 101 N.C. App. 362, 366, 399 S.E.2d 139, 141, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 268, 407 S.E.2d 835 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0569-02", "/nc/361/0569-04", "/nc/361/0569-01", "/nc/361/0569-05", "/nc/361/0569-03" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8204095 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469-70" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523671 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710288 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0187-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1377, "char_count": 50299, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.990295883420281e-07, "percentile": 0.7416866774858303 }, "sha256": "9b243f43f806090bc59fb2bb731643c56ce9628774c8b8723c82fff149dca0fe", "simhash": "1:abaa5a6e7efa4c72", "word_count": 8296 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Martin and Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr. concur." ], "parties": [ "LAUREN B. BATLLE f/k/a LAUREN B. SABATES, Plaintiff v. ARTURO SABATES, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nLauren B. Battle (Plaintiff) appeals from an order entered 21 September 2007 dismissing her amended complaint with prejudice and ordering her to pay attorneys\u2019 fees as a result of her failure to provide discovery in a timely manner. Plaintiff also appeals from an order entered 11 December 2007 denying Plaintiff\u2019s motions for relief from the 21 September 2007 order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60; granting Defendant\u2019s motions to strike and for sanctions; and ordering Plaintiff to pay attorneys\u2019 fees. After consideration of Plaintiff\u2019s challenges to the validity of the 21 September 2007 and 11 December 2007 orders, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.\nPlaintiff and Arturo Sabates (Defendant) were married on 7 February 1986. Plaintiff and Defendant had a son (the child), who was born on 15 June 1988. Plaintiff and Defendant separated on 5 February 1990 and subsequently entered into a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement.\nAccording to the parties\u2019 separation agreement, Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff $2,800.00 per month in child support for twenty-four months and, thereafter, to pay Plaintiff no less than 17% of his gross monthly income for the same purpose. Defendant also agreed that his child support payments to Plaintiff would \u201cat no time be less than Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00)\u201d per month. The separation agreement also required Defendant to pay \u201creasonable and necessary medical, hospital, surgical, drug and dental expenses incurred for\u201d the child \u201cupon receipt of statements therefore.\u201d\nOn 4 April 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant. With leave of court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on 11 September 2006 in which she sought damages for Defendant\u2019s alleged breach of the separation agreement. On 25 September 2006, Defendant filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaims in which he denied certain allegations in the amended complaint, denied liability to Plaintiff on the ground of antecedent material breach and certain other affirmative defenses (including an allegation that the child had attained the age of majority), and counterclaimed against Plaintiff on the basis of an alleged breach of the separation agreement by Plaintiff and for overpayments allegedly made by Defendant to Plaintiff. On 19 October 2006, Plaintiff filed an amended reply in which she denied the material allegations of Defendant\u2019s counterclaims and asserted certain affirmative defenses.\nOn 31 October 2006, Defendant served interrogatories, a request for admissions, and a request for production of documents on Plaintiff. On 2 November 2006, Plaintiff sought and obtained an extension of time to answer Defendant\u2019s discovery requests until 2 January 2007. On 10 May 2007, counsel for Defendant communicated with counsel for Plaintiff for the purpose of noting that over four months had passed since Plaintiff\u2019s extension of time had expired, indicating that Defendant \u201canticipated receiving responses to all of the discovery served upon [Plaintiff] by the close of business on\u201d 17 May 2007, and stating that, if no responses were received by that date, Defendant would \u201cpursue the remedies available . . . for [Plaintiff\u2019s] failure to respond.\u201d\nOn 25 May 2007, Defendant filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37 on the grounds that, \u201c[a]s of this date, Plaintiff has filed no responses to any of Defendant\u2019s discovery requests.\u201d As a result, Defendant requested the court to \u201cstrike Plaintiff\u2019s pleadings, dismiss her suit with prejudice,\u201d \u201center judgment on behalf of Defendant,\u201d and \u201caward fees and expenses to Defendant.\u201d On 4 September 2007, the day upon which Defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions was scheduled for hearing, Plaintiff served responses to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests.\nOn 21 September 2007, the trial court entered an order sanctioning Plaintiff for failing to respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests in which the trial court found as a fact that:\n9.Plaintiff failed to respond on January 2, 2007.\n10. After January 2, 2007, Plaintiff failed to respond to the outstanding discovery requests and made no motion to the court for additional time to respond.\n11. On May 10, 2007, Defendant\u2019s counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff through counsel reminding her that the discovery had been due for quite some time, and requested that Plaintiff serve her responses by the close of business on Thursday, May 17, 2007. The letter was served as a \u201cgood faith effort pursuant to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil [Procedure to resolve the issue of outstanding discovery with [Plaintiff\u2019s counsel] prior to pursuing relief from the court.\u201d\n12. Plaintiff ignored the deadline of May 17, 2007.\n13. On [25 May 2007], Defendant filed and served on Plaintiff his motion pursuant to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same date, a Notice of Hearing was filed and served on counsel for Plaintiff, setting the hearing for September 4, 2007 at 10:00 a.m.\n14. As of the filing of the Motion, Plaintiff had not responded in any fashion to the discovery requests served upon her in October 2006.\n17. As of the date of the hearing on September 4, 2007, Plaintiff had not served any responses to any of the discovery.\n18. During Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s argument in court on September 4, he served Defendant\u2019s counsel with a written response to discovery and attached documentation. Counsel for Defendant did not have an opportunity to review the untimely written responses or documentation during the hearing and the Court makes no findings with respect to the sufficiency of the responses or documentation.\n20. Plaintiff had no legitimate excuse or justification for failing to respond to discovery Plaintiff had for ten (10) months prior to the hearing.\n22. The Court has considered lesser discovery sanctions, and dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit with prejudice is the only just and appropriate sanction in view of the totality of the circumstances of the case[.] . . .\n23. Defendant made his motion in good faith, and after making efforts to resolve this discovery issue with Plaintiff through counsel.\nBased on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that:\n2. The Court has considered lesser sanctions than dismissal of Plaintiffs lawsuit with prejudice. Lesser sanctions would be unjust and inappropriate in view of the totality of the circumstances of the case, which demonstrate the severity of the disobedience of Plaintiff in refusing to make discovery in a lawsuit she instituted, her unjustified noncompliance with the mandatory North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and untimely response on the day of the hearing.\n3. Rule 37(b)(2)(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal of an action with prejudice for failure to comply with responding to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests, and dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint and all claims thereto, with prejudice, is the appropriate sanction in this case.\nAs a result, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint with prejudice and awarded Defendant $4,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses.\nOn 5 October 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 to amend the judgment and a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b) for relief from judgment or order. Plaintiff alleged in her motion that the order dismissing her complaint was \u201ctoo severe\u201d and unjustified \u201cunder the circumstances.\u201d Plaintiff contended that she was entitled to \u201crelief from the judgment\u201d due to insufficient evidence pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), and because the judgment was contrary to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(9). Plaintiff also contended that she was entitled to an amendment of the judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(e). Finally, Plaintiff alleged that \u201cshe [was] entitled to relief from judgment or [o]rder\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b), on the grounds of \u201cmistake; inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect\u201d and for \u201cany other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.\u201d Although Plaintiff admitted in her motion \u201cthat she did not produce the responses ... in a timely fashion,\u201d she contended that \u201cshe never refused to respond to the discovery requests;\u201d that the \u201cfact that she prepared\u201d draft responses was \u201cindicative of her intent'to respond;\u201d and that the discovery requests were not \u201cfair\u201d and \u201cwere overly broad, called for documents and information outside the scope of the instant action,\u201d and \u201ccould only have been intended to harass the plaintiffs and delay the proceedings.\u201d As a result, Plaintiff contended that the trial court should have considered the discovery produced at the hearing \u201cto be in substantial compliance with the discovery requests, and allowed this case to proceed[.]\u201d\nAn affidavit reiterating the contentions advanced in Plaintiff\u2019s motion and alleging that the discovery \u201crequests were intended solely for the purpose of harassment and delay\u201d and \u201cincluded requests for information which was beyond the statutorily prescribed period of recovery\u201d was attached to Plaintiff\u2019s motion. In this affidavit, Plaintiff also stated that she \u201cwas extremely busy at the time\u201d that she received the discovery requests, \u201cdid not have access to [her] records because we had moved from our home,\u201d and \u201ccould not respond to the requests in a timely manner.\u201d\nOn 21 November 2007, Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(1), because it was improperly verified; contained \u201cincompetent conclusions not grounded in fact or truth;\u201d attempted \u201cto present arguments not made to the Court at the September 4, 2007 hearing;\u201d and contained \u201cinsufficient defenses that fail to support her Rule 59/60 Motion.\u201d Defendant also claimed that he was \u201centitled to sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 against Plaintiff for her filing of a Motion[.]\u201d\nOn 26 November 2007, the pending motions came on for hearing before the trial court. On 11 December 2007, the trial court entered an order finding that: (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 \u201cis inapplicable to this case\u201d; (2) \u201c[t]here are no grounds to grant Plaintiff relief . . . under N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(a), 60(b), or any subpart thereof\u2019; (3) Plaintiff\u2019s motion \u201cis not well-grounded in law or in fact\u201d; (4) the \u201cAffidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Motions\u201d was not properly verified and was defective; and (5) Defendant was entitled to an award of attorneys\u2019 fees. As a result, the trial court denied Plaintiff\u2019s motions for relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60; struck Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit; and awarded attorneys\u2019 fees to Defendant.\nOn 16 January 2008, Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from: (1) the trial court\u2019s 21 September 2007 order dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice and awarding attorneys\u2019 fees and (2) the trial court\u2019s 11 December 2007 order denying Plaintiff\u2019s motions for relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60; striking Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit; and awarding attorneys\u2019 fees. On 10 December 2008, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s appeal on the grounds that Plaintiff\u2019s motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60, was insufficient and did not, for that reason, suffice to toll the thirty day period within which Plaintiff was entitled to note an appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders.\nI: Timeliness of Plaintiff\u2019s Appeal\nA party to a civil action must file and serve a notice of appeal \u201cwithin 30 days after entry of judgment[.]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(1). \u201cFailure to give timely notice of appeal ... is jurisdictional, and an untimely attempt to appeal must be dismissed.\u201d Booth v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 308 N.C. 187, 189, 301 S.E.2d 98, 99-100 (1983).\n[I]f a timely motion is made by any party for relief under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 30-day period for taking appeal is tolled as to all parties until entry of an order disposing of the motion and then runs as to each party from the date of entry of the order[.]\nN.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(3); see also Middleton v. Middleton, 98 N.C. App. 217, 220, 390 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1990). As a result, the timeliness of Plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the 21 September 2007 order hinges upon whether Plaintiff\u2019s 5 October 2007 motion sufficiently invoked the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59.\nIn analyzing the sufficiency of a motion made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59, one should keep in mind that a \u201cfailure to give the number of the rule under which a motion is made is not necessarily fatal, [if] the grounds for the motion and the relief sought [is] consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure.\u2019 \u201d N.C. Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 183 N.C. App. 466, 469-70, 645 S.E.2d 105, 108 (2007), dis. review denied, 361 N.C. 569, 650 S.E.2d 812 (2007) (quoting Gallbronner v. Mason, 101 N.C. App. 362, 366, 399 S.E.2d 139, 141, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 268, 407 S.E.2d 835 (1991)). As long as \u201cthe face of the motion reveal[s], and the Clerk and the parties clearly understand], the relief sought and the grounds asserted\u201d and as long as an opponent is not prejudiced, a motion complies with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1). In re Estate of English, 83 N.C. App. 359, 363, 350 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1986). In other words, \u201cto satisfy the requirements of Rule 7(b)(1),\u201d the motion \u201cmust supply information revealing the basis of the motion.\u201d Smith, 125 N.C. App. at 606, 481 S.E.2d at 417. However, while a \u201crequest that the trial court reconsider its earlier decision granting the sanction\u201d \u201cmay properly be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion,\u201d a motion made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59, \u201ccannot be used as a means to reargue matters already argued or to put forward arguments which were not made but could have been made.\u201d Smith, 125 N.C. App. at 606, 481 S.E.2d at 417 (1997). Thus, in order to properly address the issues raised by Defendant\u2019s dismissal motion, we must examine the allegations in Plaintiff\u2019s motion to ascertain whether Plaintiff stated a valid basis for seeking to obtain relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59.\nIn her 5 October 2007 motion, Plaintiff alleged that:\n... she is entitled to . .. relief from the judgment based upon the following grounds:\na. [P]ursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is contrary to law and Rule 59(a)(9)____\nc. The Plaintiff... also contends that she is entitled to an amendment of the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).\nd. In addition, the Plaintiff . . . believes that she is entitled to relief from judgment or [o]rder pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect[.]\nIn support of Plaintiff\u2019s . . . contentions that she is entitled to relief from this Court\u2019s Order, she respectfully shows as follows: ...\nd. The [discovery] requests were extremely demanding and unreasonable in scope[,] and Plaintiff contends the sheer breadth of the requests made collecting the documents extremely difficult and the timely production impossible.\nAlthough the Plaintiff . . . admits that she did not produce the responses to Request for Production, Interrogatories and Request for Admissions in a timely fashion, she also contends that she never refused to respond to the discovery requests and [the] fact that she prepared draft[] [responses] to the Interrogatories [] [is] indicative of her intent to respond. Plaintiff considered the requests to not be fair, that they were overly broad, called for documents and information outside of the scope of the instant action, and could only have been intended to harass [Plaintiff] and delay the proceedings. Further, the documents and responses were produced at the hearing on this matter and this Court should have considered said production to be in substantial compliance with the discovery requests, and allowed this case to proceed on the issue of whether ... Defendant... breached his obligation for child support pursuant to the parties\u2019 Separation Agreement. The \u201cdeath penalty\u201d approach was too severe under the circumstances of this case and a lesser sanction would have been appropriate in this matter.\nAs stated at the hearing, the Defendant . . . has known about the Separation Agreement and the Plaintiff\u2019s . . . right to pursue his failure to provide income documents for a recalculation for child support purposes since 1992, and he has not been prejudiced by the Plaintiff\u2019s . . . delay in getting the discovery responses to him.\nHer neglect in this matter was excusable and due to the nature of the issue in controversy, should not cause the dismissal of her case. . . .\nAlthough Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of her motion, the trial court struck it on the grounds that it was \u201cnot properly verified.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit stated, in pertinent part, that:\n[Plaintiff believed] [t]he requests were intended solely for the purpose of harassment and delay. The discovery included requests for information which was beyond the statutorily prescribed period of recovery. I was extremely busy at the time, did not have access to my records because we had moved from our home, and therefore could not respond to the requests in a timely manner. I did, however, attempt to respond to the interrogatories,' however, my attorney thought them incomplete and sent them back to me for revisions.... Mr. Sabates has not been prejudiced by my delay. This Honorable Court\u2019s Order, however, precludes me from seeking not only child support for the eleven month period that Mr. Sabates failed to make any support payments, but also for the underpayments for the time period of 10 years prior to the filing of my suit.\nAfter careful consideration, we conclude that Plaintiff\u2019s motion was sufficient to toll the thirty day period for noting an appeal from the trial court\u2019s 21 September 2007 order set out in N.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(1).\n\u201cRule 59(e) governs motions to alter or amend a judgment, and such motions are limited to the grounds listed in Rule 59(a).\u201d Alliance for Transp. Reform, 183 N.C. App. at 469, 645 S.E.2d at 108 (2007). According to Plaintiff, her motion represented a proper effort to obtain relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), which provides for granting relief from a judgment based on \u201c[insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is contrary to law,\u201d and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(9), which provides for granting relief for \u201c[a]ny other reason heretofore recognized as grounds for [a] new trial,\u201d including whether the judgment from which the moving party seeks relief was contrary to \u201cthe greater weight of the evidence.\u201d Seaman v. McQueen, 51 N.C. App. 500, 505, 277 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1981). As a result, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a), provides ample basis for a party to seek relief on the basis that the trial court misapprehended the relevant facts or on the basis that the trial court misapprehended or misapplied the applicable law.\nIn determining whether Plaintiff adequately challenged the sufficiency of the trial court\u2019s order granting Defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions, we must start by examining N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(d), which states, in pertinent part, that:\nIf a party . . . fails ... to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, . . . the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under subdivisions a, b, and c of subsection (b)(2) of this rule.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)c, one of the options available to a trial court for addressing violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 LA-1, Rule 37(d), is the entry of an order \u201cdismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof[.]\u201d Thus, by virtue of its literal language, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37 \u201cauthorizes a trial judge to impose sanctions, including dismissal, upon a party for discovery violations.\u201d Badillo v. Cunningham, 177 N.C. App. 732, 734, 629 S.E.2d 909, 910 (2006), aff\u2019d, 361 N.C. 112, 637 S.E.2d 538 (2006).\nAccording to well-established North Carolina law, \u201ca broad discretion must be given to the trial judge with regard to sanctions.\u201d Rose v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 120 N.C. App. 235, 240, 461 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1995) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted), aff'd, 344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996). A trial court does not abuse its discretion by imposing a severe sanction so long as that sanction is \u201camong those expressly authorized by statute\u201d and there is no \u201cspecific evidence of injustice.\u201d Roane-Barker v. Southeastern Hospital Supply Corp., 99 N.C. App. 30, 37, 392 S.E.2d 663, 667 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 93, 402 S.E.2d 418 (1991). However, before imposing a severe sanction such as dismissal, a trial judge must consider the appropriateness of less severe sanctions. See Badillo, 177 N.C. App. at 734, 629 S.E.2d at 911 (citing Goss v. Battle, 111 N.C. App. 173, 176-77, 432 S.E.2d 156, 158-59 (1993)).\nPlaintiffs 5 October 2007 motion cited N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(7) and (9), as a basis for affording the requested relief. Compare Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 183 N.C. App. at 469, 645 S.E.2d at 108 (holding a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(e) to have been insufficient because it \u201cdid not make reference to any of the[] grounds of Rule 59(a);\u201d \u201cuse any of the language from the rule which would tend to give notice of [the movant\u2019s] reliance on any of the foregoing grounds;\u201d or \u201creveal[] the basis of the motion in terms of the 59(a) grounds\u201d) (quotation omitted). In her motion, Plaintiff essentially challenged the trial court\u2019s balancing of the equities, argued that Defendant was not prejudiced by her delay in providing discovery, and claimed that \u201ca lesser sanction would have been appropriate in this matter.\u201d At an absolute minimum, this argument would, if valid, provide a recognized basis for challenging the validity of an order dismissing a complaint as a sanction for failing to provide discovery, since trial judges are required to give consideration to lesser sanctions before acting in that fashion. Badillo, 177 N.C. App. at 734, 629 S.E.2d at 911. Thus, even if the remainder of Plaintiff\u2019s motion constituted nothing more than a mere rearguing of information that had been previously presented to the trial court, her challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court\u2019s consideration of lesser sanctions constitutes a valid basis for granting a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(e), under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(7) and (9).\nAs a result, we conclude that Plaintiff properly sought relief from the 21 September 2007 order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(e), in her 5 October 2007 motion. For that reason, the thirty day period for noting an appeal from the 21 September 2007 order was tolled until thirty days after service upon Plaintiff of any order deciding her motion. N.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(3). Since Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal from the 21 September 2007 order within thirty days after the entry and service of the 11 December 2007 order, this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs appellate challenges to both orders. Thus, Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the 21 September 2007 order is denied.\nII: Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 37\nThe next question we must address is whether the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s claims for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(d). After a careful review of the record in light of the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed.\nAs we have already noted, a trial judge has the authority to enter an order \u201cdismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party\u201d as a sanction for failing to provide discovery. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)c. Furthermore, as we have also noted, the imposition of particular sanctions under Rule 37(d) is subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Hammer v. Allison, 20 N.C. App. 623, 202 S.E.2d 307, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 233, 204 S.E.2d 23 (1974); Hursey v. Homes by Design, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 175, 177, 464 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1995) (stating that \u201c[sanctions under Rule 37 are within the sound discretion of the trial court\u201d). However, \u201c[i]mposition of sanctions that are directed to the outcome of the case, such as dismissals, default judgments, or preclusion orders, are reviewed on appeal from final judgment, and while the standard of review is often stated to be abuse of discretion, the most drastic penalties, dismissal or default, are examined in the light of the general purpose of the Rules to encourage trial on the merits.\u201d American Imports, Inc. v. G. E. Employees Western Region Federal Credit Union, 37 N.C. App. 121, 124, 245 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1978) (quotation omitted); but see Fayetteville Publ. Co. v. Advanced Internet Techs., Inc., 192 N.C. App. 419, 424, 665 S.E.2d 518, 522 (2008) (stating that \u201c[t]his Court reviews the trial court\u2019s action in granting sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, including dismissal of claims, for abuse of discretion) (citing Baker v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 180 N.C. App. 296, 299, 636 S.E.2d 829, 831 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 425, 648 S.E.2d 204 (2007)). As a result, we review Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to the 21 September 2007 order utilizing an abuse of discretion standard while remaining sensitive to the general preference for dispositions on the merits that lies at the base of our rules of civil procedure.\nAccording to Plaintiff, the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing her complaint with prejudice because: (1) Plaintiff did, in fact, respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by the late filing of Plaintiff\u2019s responses; and (3) the trial court failed to adequately consider lesser sanctions before dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint. We do not, after careful review of the record, believe that any of these contentions justifies an award of appellate relief.\nPlaintiff\u2019s first challenge to the 21 September 2007 order hinges on a contention that the trial court erred by failing to consider Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cbelated responses\u201d to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests in determining the \u201cappropriate sanction[.]\u201d According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 33(a), 34, and 36, Plaintiff had 30 days plus any additional period of time allowed by the court within which to respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests. Plaintiff served responses to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests on 4 September 2007, approximately ten months after Defendant first submitted his discovery requests to Plaintiff and eight months after the responses were required to be served. Plaintiff has cited no authority tending to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint after such a lengthy, eight month delay because Plaintiff ultimately served responses upon Defendant, and we are aware of none. Furthermore, given the length of Plaintiff\u2019s delay in \u2022responding to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests, a reasonable trial judge could well have concluded that the last minute provision of discovery on 4 September 2007 did not suffice to preclude dismissal. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff provided discovery at the last minute does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nFurthermore, contrary to Plaintiff\u2019s argument, the trial court did, in fact, consider the late filing of Plaintiff\u2019s discovery responses in deciding what sanction, if any, to impose on Plaintiff. In the 21 September 2007 order, the trial court found:\nDuring Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s argument in court on September 4, he served Defendant\u2019s counsel with a written response to discovery and attached documentation. Counsel for Defendant did not have an opportunity to review the untimely written responses or documentation during the hearing and the Court makes no findings with respect to the sufficiency of the responses or documentation.\nThe fact that the trial court did not examine the \u201csufficiency of the responses\u201d is not' tantamount to a failure to consider the late service of Plaintiff\u2019s responses at all; instead, taken in context, the quoted language from the 21 September 2007 order simply indicates that the trial court had not evaluated the extent to which Plaintiff\u2019s responses were complete prior to sanctioning Plaintiff. In addition, the trial court stated that it viewed \u201cthe totality of the circumstances of the case\u201d in determining the appropriate sanction to impose upon Plaintiff and noted Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cuntimely response on the day of the hearing\u201d in describing the reasons that a lesser sanction than dismissal would not be appropriate. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did, in fact, consider the fact that responses to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests had been submitted on 4 September 2007 in deciding that Plaintiff should be sanctioned for failing to respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests in a timely manner.\nSecondly, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice because Defendant was not prejudiced by her delay in responding to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests. Contrary to Plaintiff\u2019s argument, \u201cRule 37 does not require the [movant] to show that it was prejudiced by the [nonmovant\u2019s] actions in order to obtain sanctions.\u201d Cheek v. Poole, 121 N.C. App. 370, 375, 465 S.E.2d 561, 564, cert. denied, 343 N.C. 305, 471 S.E.2d 68 (1996); see also Roane-Barker, 99 N.C. App. at 37, 392 S.E.2d at 668 (stating that Rule 37 does not require the movant to show that it was prejudiced by the nonmovant\u2019s actions in order to obtain sanctions for abuse of discovery); Clark v. Penland, 146 N.C. App. 288, 291, 552 S.E.2d 243, 244 (2001) (stating that \u201cRule 37 does not require the [movant] to show that it was prejudiced by the [nonmovant\u2019s] actions in order to obtain sanctions for abuse of discovery\u201d). Although the trial court could have appropriately considered the issue of prejudice in making a sanctions-related decision and appears to have done so in that part of its order detailing the expense incurred by Defendant in attempting to obtain the provision of discovery, it was not required to find prejudice as a precondition for dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint. \u201c \u2018A ruling committed to a trial court\u2019s discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006), aff\u2019d in part on other grounds, 360 N.C. 518, 631 S.E.2d 114 (2006) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). After careful consideration of the record in light of the applicable legal standard, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adopt Plaintiff\u2019s position on the prejudice issue.\nFinally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by imposing severe sanctions without adequately considering the imposition of lesser sanctions. As we noted in discussing the issue of whether Plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the 21 September 2007 order should be dismissed, a trial judge must consider the imposition of less severe sanctions prior to dismissing an action with prejudice as a sanction for failing to provide discovery in a timely manner. See Goss, 111 N.C. App. at 176-77, 432 S.E.2d at 158-59. However, \u201cthe trial court is not required to list and specifically reject each possible lesser sanction prior to determining that dismissal is appropriate.\u201d Badillo, 177 N.C. App. at 735, 629 S.E.2d at 911.\nThe trial court found in the 21 September 2007 order that:\nThe Court has considered lesser discovery sanctions, and dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit with prejudice is the only just and appropriate sanction in view of the totality of the circumstances of the case, which demonstrate the severity of Plaintiff\u2019s disobedience in failing to make discovery in a lawsuit she instituted and her unjustified noncompliance with the mandatory North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nBased upon this finding, the trial court concluded in the 21 September 2007 order that:\nThe Court has considered lesser sanctions than dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit with prejudice. Lesser sanctions would be unjust and inappropriate in view of the totality of the circumstances of the case, which demonstrate the severity of the disobedience of Plaintiff in refusing to make discovery in a lawsuit she instituted, her unjustified noncompliance with the mandatory North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and untimely response on the day of the hearing.\nIn In re Pedestrian Walkway Failure, the trial court used very similar language in dismissing a complaint based on a failure to provide discovery:\n[T]he Court has carefully considered each of [plaintiff\u2019s] acts [of misconduct], as well as their cumulative effect, and has also considered the available sanctions for such misconduct. After thorough consideration, the Court has determined that sanctions less severe than dismissal would not be adequate given the seriousness of the misconduct[.]\nIn re Pedestrian Walkway Failure, 173 N.C. App. 237, 251, 618 S.E.2d 819, 828-29 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 290, 628 S.E.2d 382 (2006). On appeal, we held that this language demonstrated an adequate consideration of less severe sanctions to withstand a challenge on appeal. See also Badillo, 177 N.C. App. at 734, 629 S.E.2d at 911. The relevant portions of the trial court\u2019s order are not materially different from the language deemed sufficient in Pedestrian Walkway Failure and Cunningham. Thus, we conclude that the trial court adequately considered the imposition of less severe sanctions prior to dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nAs a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint as a sanction for failing to make discovery in a timely fashion. Thus, the trial court\u2019s 21 September 2007 order should be affirmed.\nIll: Rule 59 and Rule 60\nThe next question we must address is whether the trial court properly denied Plaintiff\u2019s motion for relief from the 21 September 2007 order under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(e) on the basis of the grounds set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(7) and (9) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 60(b)(1) and (6). After a careful review of Plaintiffs challenge to the relevant portion of the 11 December 2007 order in light of the applicable law and the record, we find Plaintiff\u2019s arguments unpersuasive.\n\u201cIn the absence of an abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for a new trial due to the insufficiency of evidence is not reversible on appeal.\u201d Hines v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 191 N.C. App. 390, 393, 663 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2008), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 126, 673 S.E.2d 171 (2009) (citing In re Buck, 350 N.C. 621, 626, 516 S.E.2d 858, 860-61 (1999) (emphasizing that requests for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7), are reviewed under an abuse of discretion rather than a de novo standard). Generally speaking, requests for relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(9) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion as well. Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 484, 290 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1982) (stating that \u201cit is plain that a trial judge\u2019s discretionary order pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown\u201d). \u201cHowever, where the [Rule 59] motion involves a question of law or legal inference, our standard of review is de novo.\" Alliance for Transp. Reform, 183 N.C. App. at 469, 645 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Kinsey v. Spann, 139 N.C. App. 370, 372, 533 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2000). \u201cAs with Rule 59 motions, the standard of review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is abuse of discretion.\u201d Davis, 360 N.C. at 523, 631 S.E.2d at 118. Thus, the standard of review applicable to Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to the denial of her requests for relief from the 21 September 2007 order is whether the trial court\u2019s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion or involved an error of law or legal inference.\nOn appeal, Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her requests for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 and Rule 60, because (1) Plaintiff did, in fact, respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by Plaintiff\u2019s late responses; and (3) the trial court failed to consider lesser sanctions before dismissing Plaintiffs complaint. For the reasons set forth above, however, we are unable to conclude that the trial court\u2019s refusal to provide relief constituted an abuse of discretion. As we noted in discussing similar issues in connection with Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to the 21 September 2007 order, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the fact that Plaintiff served her discovery responses on the day of the hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions did not suffice to preclude dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint; the trial court was not required to find prejudice to Defendant as a precondition for imposing sanctions and appears to have actually considered the prejudice issue in deciding that a less severe sanction would not suffice; and the trial court adequately considered the imposition of lesser alternatives to the dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint before imposing severe sanctions. As a result, the trial court\u2019s 11 December 2007 order denying Plaintiff\u2019s requests for relief from the 21 September 2007 order is not affected by any error of the type alleged by Plaintiff and should be affirmed.\nIV: Rule 11 Sanctions\nFinally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by sanctioning her for filing motions for relief from the 21 September 2007 order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60. After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sanctioning Plaintiff for filing this motion.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11:\nEvery pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose^] . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a). \u201c \u2018There are three parts to a Rule 11 analysis: (1) factual sufficiency, (2) legal sufficiency, and (3) improper purpose. A violation of any one of these requirements mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.\u2019 \u2019\u2019 Persis Nova Constr. v. Edwards, 195 N.C. App. 55, 61, 671 S.E.2d 23, 27 (2009) (quoting Dodd v. Steele, 114 N.C. App. 632, 635, 442 S.E.2d 363, 365, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 691, 448 S.E.2d 521 (1994)).\nIn reviewing an order imposing sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11:\nThe appellate court will determine (1) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law support its judgment or determination, (2) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate court makes these three determinations in the affirmative,- it must uphold the trial court\u2019s decision to impose or deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a).\nDunn v. Canoy, 180 N.C. App. 30, 41, 636 S.E.2d 243, 250 (2006), disc. review denied and appeal dis\u2019d, 361 N.C. 351, 645 S.E.2d 766 (2007) (quoting Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989)). \u201cA court\u2019s failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue is error which generally requires remand in order for the trial court to resolve any disputed factual issues.\u201d McClerin v. R-M Indus., 118 N.C. App. 640, 644, 456 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1995). \u201cThe appropriateness of a particular sanction,\u201d however, \u201cis reviewed for abuse of discretion.\u201d Bledsole v. Johnson, 357 N.C. 133, 138, 579 S.E.2d 379, 381 (2003).\nIn the 11 December 2007 order, the trial court found as fact that:\n13. ... At the hearing on November 26, 2007, Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence or present any authority warranting the Court\u2019s rehearing the arguments presented by counsel at the September 4, 2007 hearing.\n14. Plaintiff failed to present any grounds pursuant to Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to support setting aside the Court\u2019s previous ruling, there are no such circumstances warranting such relief and justice does not demand relief from the Order.\n15. The Order, filed September 21, 2007, was soundly based on the facts and law.\n16. Plaintiffs Rule 59/60 Motion is not well-grounded in law or in fact.\nBased on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that \u201cPlaintiffs Rule 59/60 Motion is not well-grounded in law or in fact\u201d and sanctioned Plaintiff.\nOn appeal, Plaintiff contends that \u201cthe trial court erred by sanctioning Plaintiff for filing the motion for relief without making the factual findings required by Rule 11[.]\u201d More particularly, Plaintiff argues that \u201c[t]he trial court did not cite Rule 11 in its order or explain how Plaintiffs Rule 59/60 motion failed Rule ll\u2019s requirements.\u201d At bottom, despite her references to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, Plaintiff is really challenging the adequacy of the trial court\u2019s legal conclusions. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to identify any factual issue relevant to the sanctions issue which the trial court failed to address. In the absence of any failure on the part of the trial court to resolve such a factual controversy, we are unable to identify any inadequacy in its findings. Furthermore, the trial court specifically concluded that \u201cPlaintiff failed to offer any evidence or present any authority warranting the Court\u2019s rehearing the arguments presented by counsel at the September 4, 2007, hearing\u201d and \u201cfailed to present any grounds pursuant to Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to support setting aside the Court\u2019s previous ruling.\u201d This portion of the trial court\u2019s order is sufficient to permit us to identify the basis for the trial court\u2019s decision and .to review the adequacy of its determination on appeal. Since the trial court\u2019s order is sufficient to permit appellate review and since Plaintiff has not challenged this portion of the 11 December 2007 order on any substantive ground, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court did not err by granting Defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions.\nV: Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs challenges to the 21 September 2007 and 11 December 2007 orders lack merit. As a result, both orders are affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge Martin and Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr. concur.\n. No party to this proceeding has contended that a litigant is not entitled to seek relief from an order imposing sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(d), under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59, and we do not, for that reason, express an opinion on that issue here. However, we note in passing that the decision of this Court in Smith v. Johnson, 125 N.C. App. 603, 606, 481 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1997), disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 283, 487 S.E.2d 584 (1997), appears to assume that relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59, is, at least in theory, available to individuals who have been sanctioned for discovery violations.\n. In her brief, Plaintiff essentially contends that her 5 October 2007 motion should be treated as a motion to alter or amend the 21 September 2007 order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(e). We agree with Plaintiff\u2019s characterization of her motion and will treat it as such in this opinion.\n. As should be obvious, Plaintiff could not have advanced this argument prior to the entry of the 21 September 2007 order, since she had no way to know the exact language that the trial court would employ in ruling on Defendant\u2019s request for sanctions prior to that time.\n. The fact that Plaintiff alleged a valid ground for relief from the 21 September 2007 order in her 5 October 2007 motion does not, of course, mean that her argument is substantively valid. At this stage, our inquiry is limited to the issue of whether Plaintiff has adequately stated a potentially valid basis for an award of relief. The extent to which Plaintiff is actually entitled to relief on the basis of this claim or is subject to sanctions for advancing it are entirely different issues that will be addressed in more detail below.\n. The court entered an order extending the time for Plaintiff to respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests. Instead of requiring Plaintiff to respond to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests by 30 November 2006, which was thirty days after Defendant\u2019s requests were served, the court \u201callowed [Plaintiff] through the 2 day of January, 200[7], within which to file her responses.\u201d\n. Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by striking Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit. Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit merely reiterated two of the three contentions that she brought forward on appeal, which are that (1) Plaintiff ultimately responded to Defendant\u2019s discovery requests and that (2)- Defendant was not prejudiced by the delayed service of these responses. In its 11 December 2007 order, the trial court found that \u201c[t]he \u2018verification\u2019 page attached to the Affidavit erroneously states that Plaintiff \u201chas read the foregoing Complaint for Breach of Contract\u201d and that \u201c[t]he date the document appears to have been sworn to is October 4, 2006.\u201d Based on this factual finding, the trial court concluded that \u201c[t]he \u2018Affidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Motions\u2019 submitted in connection with Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 59/60 Motion was not properly verified and is defective\u201d and ordered that the affidavit be stricken. Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by striking Plaintiff\u2019s'affidavit, that error had no conceivable effect upon the outcome at trial or on appeal given our conclusion that the trial court appropriately rejected Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to the 21 September 2007 order for reasons unrelated to the presence or absence of evidentiary support in denying the motion that Plaintiff filed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60.\n. Our conclusion that the trial court did not err by sanctioning Plaintiff for seeking relief from the 21 September 2007 order is not in any way inconsistent with our determination that Plaintiffs 5 October 2007 motion sufficed to toll the running of the time within which Plaintiff was entitled to note an appeal from the 21 September 2007 order. In essence, the 5 October 2007 motion sufficed to toll the time for noting an appeal because it was in proper form and alleged a potentially valid basis for altering or amending the 21 September 2007 order. On the other hand, when compared with the information in the record, it is clear that these grounds were not actually valid given the language of the 21 September 2007 order. Thus, our holdings on these issues are not in any way inconsistent with each other.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Vann Law Firm, PA., by Christopher M. Vann, for Plaintiff.", "James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by William K. Diehl, Jr., and Irene P. King, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAUREN B. BATLLE f/k/a LAUREN B. SABATES, Plaintiff v. ARTURO SABATES, Defendant\nNo. COA08-860\n(Filed 4 August 2009)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 timeliness \u2014 Rule 59 and 60 motions\u2014 tolling of time\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal as untimely was denied where plaintiff\u2019s complaint had been dismissed as a discovery sanction,'plaintiff had filed motions for relief under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60, that motion was denied and plaintiff appealed, and defendant argued that plaintiff\u2019s motions were not sufficient and that they did not toll the time for noting an appeal. Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 59 motion essentially challenged the trial court\u2019s balancing of the equities in choosing a dismissal as a discovery sanction, which was a potentially valid basis for grant-. ing a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59, so that her notice of appeal was timely.\n2. Discovery\u2014 sanctions for delay \u2014 dismissal\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint as a sanction for failing to make discovery in a timely fashion. A reasonable judge could conclude that the provision of discovery at a hearing, after an eight-month delay, did not suffice to preclude dismissal. The court was not required to find prejudice, and adequately considered lesser sanctions.\n3. Rules of Civil Procedure\u2014 Rules 59 and 60 \u2014 relief from discovery sanction\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for relief from dismissal as a discovery sanction pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 and 60 where the court had not abused its discretion initially by imposing the sanction.\n4. Pleadings\u2014 Rule 11 sanctions \u2014 findings sufficient for appeal\nThe trial court\u2019s findings in imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing motions for relief under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60 were sufficient for appeal.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from orders entered 21 September 2007 and 11 December 2007 by Judge Christy T. Mann in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 2009.\nVann Law Firm, PA., by Christopher M. Vann, for Plaintiff.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by William K. Diehl, Jr., and Irene P. King, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0407-01", "first_page_order": 433, "last_page_order": 453 }