{ "id": 4169040, "name": "CAROLINE D'AQUISTO, Employee, Plaintiff v. MISSION ST. JOSEPH'S HEALTH SYSTEM, Employer, CAMBRIDGE INTEGRATED SERVICES, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "D'Aquisto v. Mission St. Joseph's Health System", "decision_date": "2009-08-04", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1238", "first_page": "674", "last_page": "681", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. App. 674" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633078 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636545 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "D'Aquisto II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "D'Aquisto I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-90", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135620, 135687, 135891, 135635, 135861 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0379-04", "/nc/353/0379-05", "/nc/353/0379-03", "/nc/353/0379-02", "/nc/353/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659767 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "quoting Hall, 263 N.C. at 576, 139 S.E.2d at 862 (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080920 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "quoting Hall, 263 N.C. at 576, 139 S.E.2d at 862 (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" }, { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "1965" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572007 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199-200" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607756 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91", "parenthetical": "quoting Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64, 105 S.E.2d 196, 199-200 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435466 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "quoting Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64, 105 S.E.2d 196, 199-200 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "\"Taylor II\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562490 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "\"Taylor II\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Taylor I\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525556 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Taylor I\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708772, 4705865, 4705394, 4709177, 4708703 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0543-05", "/nc/308/0543-03", "/nc/308/0543-04", "/nc/308/0543-01", "/nc/308/0543-02" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" }, { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918005 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187488 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798760, 798832, 798902, 798938, 798973 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0516-04", "/nc/343/0516-03", "/nc/343/0516-05", "/nc/343/0516-02", "/nc/343/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11094063 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "quoting Long v. Harris, 137 N.C. App. 461, 465, 528 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2000) (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8412866 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "quoting Long v. Harris, 137 N.C. App. 461, 465, 528 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2000) (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8435124 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788784 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "D'Aquisto II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8436186 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "D'Aquisto I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 27, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 665, "char_count": 16417, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13639598293182345 }, "sha256": "d80ab65e91e160c78f3f4051ea49c83a4f0b4a1eb2e6901d342ce6ee7d006124", "simhash": "1:0c0a0d622c3b7510", "word_count": 2634 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:23.100841+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "CAROLINE D\u2019AQUISTO, Employee, Plaintiff v. MISSION ST. JOSEPH\u2019S HEALTH SYSTEM, Employer, CAMBRIDGE INTEGRATED SERVICES, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nThis appeal contests an award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 by the Industrial Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d) for claimant-plaintiff, Caroline D\u2019Aquisto (\u201cclaimant\u201d), and her attorney\u2019s fees expended in the appeal subsequent to the initial award of compensation. Employer-defendant Mission St. Joseph\u2019s Health System (\u201cemployer\u201d) contends that this award is inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in D\u2019Aquisto II involving application of a companion statute N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1; that the Commission may not award fees for appeals outside of the Commission\u2019s proceedings; and that claimant was procedurally barred from making this request. We disagree and affirm the decision of the Commission.\nI. Procedural History\nThe procedural history of this case is set forth in D\u2019Aquisto v. Mission St. Joseph\u2019s Health Sys., 171 N.C. App. 216, 614 S.E.2d 583 (2005) (D\u2019Aquisto I) which was reversed in part by D\u2019Aquisto v. Mission St. Joseph\u2019s Health Sys., 360 N.C. 567, 633 S.E.2d 89 (2006) (D\u2019Aquisto II). Initially the Commission held and this Court affirmed that the award of attorney\u2019s fees for claimant under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 was not to be deducted from claimant\u2019s award but was to be taxed against employer because its defense of the claim was unreasonable. This sanction was reversed by the Supreme Court which held that \u201cdefendant\u2019s defense of the matter was not without reasonable grounds.\u201d The Supreme Court remanded the case \u201cto the Court of Appeals for remand to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\u201d\nRemand to the Full Commission\nOn 5 January 2007, claimant moved the Full Commission for entry of an Opinion and Award on remand in compliance with the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in D Aquisto II. In its motion, claimant requested that, instead of awarding attorney\u2019s fees as a penalty, the Full Commission amend the award so that attorney\u2019s fees could be paid out of the accrued and future benefits of claimant.\nOn 29 January 2007, Commissioner Thomas Bolch, on behalf of the Full Commission, entered a new Opinion and Award, which removed all references to employer\u2019s unreasonable defense of this matter, and made the following award of attorney\u2019s fees to claimant:\n4. Defendants shall pay to plaintiff\u2019s counsel a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of 25 percent (25%) of the compensation awarded herein, both past and future. Such fee shall be deducted from the accrued and future benefits and paid directly to the plaintiff\u2019s counsel.\n(Emphasis added.) On 14 February 2007, employer mailed checks to claimant and claimant\u2019s counsel in the respective amounts of $110,595.60 and $26,966.97.\nAward of Appellate Attorney\u2019s Fees\nOn 30 April 2007, claimant filed a motion with the Commission requesting that, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88, she be awarded attorney\u2019s fees incurred in defense of employer\u2019s appeals. On 4 October 2007, Commissioner Christopher Scott awarded attorney\u2019s fees to claimant\u2019s counsel in the amount of $36,273.30 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88, as the result of \u201cdefendants\u2019 multiple but unsuccessful appeals\u201d in the case.\nAppeal of Award of Appellate Attorney\u2019s Fees\nOn 18 June 2008, the Full Commission affirmed the award of appellate attorney\u2019s fees to claimant, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 and made the following relevant findings of fact and conclusion of law:\n12. Defendant\u2019s appeals have been unsuccessful in terminating plaintiff\u2019s award of TTD and medical benefits as awarded by the Opinion and Award of Deputy Commissioner Garner on August 7, 2003. Accordingly, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88, the Full Commission has discretion to award a reasonable attorney fee for the plaintiffs counsels, [sic]\n14. Based upon its sound discretion, the Full Commission finds the award of attorney\u2019s fees and costs of $36,276.30 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 to be reasonable. ...\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\n1.The appeals of this matter w;ere brought by defendant. Defendant has been ordered to make, or to continue to make payments of benefits to plaintiff. Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88, the Full Commission may award attorney\u2019s fees t\u00f3 plaintiff.\nDefendant appeals.\nII.Issues\nOn appeal, employer assigns error to the Full Commission\u2019s award of appellate attorney\u2019s fees to claimant under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88. Employer argues that (1) the award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 is inconsistent with the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in D\u2019Aquisto II, which reversed the award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1; (2) the Full Commission was not permitted to award claimant attorney\u2019s fees for appeals outside the Commission; and (3) claimant was procedurally barred from requesting attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.\nIII.Standard of Review\n\u201cThis Court reviews the Commission\u2019s ruling on a motion for attorney\u2019s fees for an abuse of discretion.\u201d Cox v. City of Winston-Salem, 171 N.C. App. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 746, 750 (2005). An abuse of discretion results only where a decision is \u201c \u2018 \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or ... so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Goforth v. K-Mart Corp., 167 N.C. App. 618, 624, 605 S.E.2d 709, 713 (2004) (quoting Long v. Harris, 137 N.C. App. 461, 465, 528 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2000) (citation omitted)).\nIV. Analysis\nA. Basis of Award of Fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-88 and 97-88.1\nEmployer argues that the Full Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 is inconsistent with the Supreme Court\u2019s reversal of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 in D Aquisto II. Employer\u2019s premise is that, because the defense of claimant\u2019s claim was adjudicated to be reasonable for purposes of avoiding sanctions under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1, this finding would foreclose an award of fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88. Because evaluation of the \u201cunreasonableness\u201d of a defense claim is not a statutory factor to be weighed in granting attorney\u2019s fees for a claimant defending an appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88, employer\u2019s argument has no merit.\nThe sanction imposing attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 against an employer involves an evaluation of whether the employer\u2019s defense of an initial claim is \u201cunreasonable.\u201d The award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 involves an evaluation as to whether the employer lost an appeal. The failure to award attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 does not bar an award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88. The two statutes serve different purposes and provide different remedies. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 only provides attorney\u2019s fees for the initial hearing before the Commission, while \u00a7 97-88 governs attorney\u2019s fees accrued in defending an insurer\u2019s unsuccessful appeal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-88 and 97-88.1 (2007).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 provides that:\nIf the Industrial Commission shall determine that any hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings including reasonable fees for defendant\u2019s attorney or plaintiff\u2019s attorney upon the party who has brought or defended them.\nId. (emphasis added). The purpose of this section is to prevent stubborn, unfounded litigiousness which is inharmonious with the primary purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to provide compensation to injured employees. Troutman v. White & Simpson, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 48, 54, 464 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1995), disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 516, 472 S.E.2d 26 (1996).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 provides:\nIf the Industrial Commission . . . shall find that such hearing or proceedings were brought by the insurer and the Commission or court by its decision orders the insurer to make, or to continue payments of benefits, including compensation for medical expenses, to the injured employee, the Commission or court may further order that the cost to the injured employee of such hearing or proceedings including therein reasonable attorney\u2019s fee to be determined by the Commission shall be paid by the insurer as a part of the bill of costs.\nId. This statute allows an injured employee to move that his appellate attorney\u2019s fees be paid when (1) an insurer appeals the Commission\u2019s order directing that the employer pay benefits to claimant, and (2) the order to pay benefits is affirmed. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88; Troutman, 121 N.C. App. at 53, 464 S.E.2d at 485.\nThe determination of whether claimant should be awarded attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 is not controlled by the decision whether to award attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. Whitfield v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 158 N.C. App. 341, 359, 581 S.E.2d 778, 789 (2003). Contrary to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1, an award of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 concerns only appellate attorney\u2019s fees and is permitted even if the insurer who institutes the proceeding has reasonable grounds for bringing the appeal. See Brown v. Public Works Comm\u2019n, 122 N.C. App. 473, 470 S.E.2d 352 (1996).\nSubsequently, claimant moved for an award of appellate attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 to compensate her counsel for time spent in defending multiple appeals brought by employer, and the Commission granted claimant\u2019s motion. Here, the Full Commission was within its discretion to award claimant appellate attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 because employer, who is self-insured, appealed the award of benefits to claimant and the award was affirmed on appeal. Accordingly, our Supreme Court\u2019s reversal of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 is not inconsistent with the Commission\u2019s subsequent award of attorney\u2019s fees to claimant under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88. This assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Discretion of the Full Commission\nSecond, employer asserts that pursuant to Buck v. Procter & Gamble, 58 N.C. App. 804, 806, 295 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1982), cert. denied, 308 N.C. 543, 304 S.E.2d 236 (1983), the Full Commission was not permitted to award attorney\u2019s fees for claimant because there was no longer an appeal before the Industrial Commission. Employer\u2019s reliance on Buck is misplaced because the reasoning that employer cites is no longer good law.\nIn Buck, our Court held that, pursuant to Taylor v. J. P. Stevens, 57 N.C. App. 643, 292 S.E.2d 277 (1982) (\"Taylor I\u201d), the Commission was only permitted to award attorney\u2019s fees \u201cwhen an appeal is before it to review a hearing commissioner\u2019s decision\u201d and did not have discretion to award attorney\u2019s fees for services rendered before an appellate court. Buck, 58 N.C. App. at 806, 295 S.E.2d at 245. However, in Taylor v. J. P. Stevens Co., 307 N.C. 392, 398, 298 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1983) (\u201cTaylor II\"), our Supreme Court concluded that the Court in Taylor I erred in holding that the Commission does not have the authority to award attorney\u2019s fees for work done in furtherance of an appeal. Id. As far as its reliance on Taylor I, the proposition that employer cites in Buck is no longer valid. This assignment of error is overruled.\nC. Final Judgment\nEmployer contends that claimant was procedurally barred from requesting additional attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 because the Commission entered \u201cfinal judgment\u201d on the issue in its 29 January 2007 order. We disagree.\nEmployer asserts that claimant waived her request for appellate attorney\u2019s fees by failing to raise the matter on remand. When claimant filed her motion for entry of an Opinion and Award on remand, she requested that her award be amended in compliance with D\u2019Aquisto II, so that attorney\u2019s fees were not assessed as a penalty, but instead were payable out of her benefits. Employer contends that all of claimant\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees were \u201cfixed and determined\u201d when the Commission granted her request in its 29 January 2007 order.\nIn support of its argument, employer refers to the Latin maxim interest rei publicae ut sit finis litum, which states that \u201c \u2018there should be an end of litigation for the repose of society.\u2019 \u201d Croom v. Department of Commerce, 143 N.C. App. 493, 498, 547 S.E.2d 87, 91 (2001) (quoting Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64, 105 S.E.2d 196, 199-200 (1958)). The public policy of interest rei publicae ut sit finis litum\n\u201crequires a lawsuit to be tried as a whole and not as fractions . .. [and] the entry of a single judgment which will completely and finally determine all the rights of the parties. A party should be required to present his whole cause of action at one time in the forum in which the litigation has been duly constituted.\u201d\nId. (citation omitted).\nHowever, \u201cthis principle [interest rei publicae ut sit finis litum] does not have the strict application in proceedings for workmen\u2019s compensation that it has as regards [to] proceedings in the courts.\u201d Hall v. Chevrolet Co., 263 N.C. 569, 577, 139 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1965). \u201c[I]t is well established that the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act \u2018 \u201cshould be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 597, 532 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2000) (quoting Hall, 263 N.C. at 576, 139 S.E.2d at 862 (1965)). Contrary to courts of general jurisdiction, the Commission is vested with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate all aspects of workers\u2019 compensation claims brought before it. Pearson v. C.P. Buchner Steel Erection Co., 348 N.C. 239, 241-42, 498 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1998), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 379, 547 S.E.2d 434 (2001).\nFurthennore, in the Commission\u2019s 29 January 2007 order, it did not address appellate attorney\u2019s fees, and therefore, the Commission was permitted to review the matter. The assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nAccordingly, we overrule employer\u2019s assignments of error and affirm the Full Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees to claimant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur.\n. Employer is currently known as \u201cMission Hospitals, Inc.\u201d\n. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-90, all attorney\u2019s fees are subject to the approval of the Commission.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ganley & Ramer, PLLC, by Thomas F. Ramer; and The Sumwalt Law Firm, by Vernon Sumwalt for claimant-appellee.", "Van Winkle Buck Wall Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Allan R. Tarletonfor employer-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROLINE D\u2019AQUISTO, Employee, Plaintiff v. MISSION ST. JOSEPH\u2019S HEALTH SYSTEM, Employer, CAMBRIDGE INTEGRATED SERVICES, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1238\n(Filed 4 August 2009)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 appellate attorney fees\u2014 reversed under one statute \u2014 granted under another\nThe Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion by awarding appellate attorney fees to claimant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88 where the Supreme Court had reversed attorney fees awarded as a sanction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88.1. Evaluation of the unreasonableness of a defense is not a statutory factor to be weighed in granting attorney fees for a claimant defending an appeal under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88, and the failure to award attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88.1 does not bar an award of attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 appellate attorney fees\u2014 awarded by Industrial Commission\nThe contention that the Industrial Commission was not permitted to award appellate attorney fees because a claimant was no longer before the Industrial Commission was misplaced. The reasoning cited for the contention is no longer good law.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 appellate attorney fees \u2014 continuing jurisdiction\nA workers\u2019 compensation claimant was not barred from requesting additional attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88 because the Commission entered \u201cfinal judgment\u201d on the issue in an order. Contrary to courts of general jurisdiction, the Industrial Commission is vested with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate all aspects of workers\u2019 compensation claims brought before it. Furthermore, the Commission did not address appellate attorney fees in its original order and was permitted to review the matter on remand.\nAppeal by defendant-employer from Opinion and Award entered 18 June 2008 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 March 2009.\nGanley & Ramer, PLLC, by Thomas F. Ramer; and The Sumwalt Law Firm, by Vernon Sumwalt for claimant-appellee.\nVan Winkle Buck Wall Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Allan R. Tarletonfor employer-appellant." }, "file_name": "0674-01", "first_page_order": 700, "last_page_order": 707 }