{ "id": 4170599, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: M.S.", "name_abbreviation": "In re M.S.", "decision_date": "2009-08-18", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1016", "first_page": "260", "last_page": "267", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 N.C. App. 260" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636994 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "quoting Griffin, 162 N.C. App. at 493, 592 S.E.2d at 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641600 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633601 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635041 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636697, 12636698 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0891-01", "/se2d/634/0891-02" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636378, 12636379, 12636380 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0768-01", "/se2d/632/0768-02", "/se2d/632/0768-03" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634744 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632798, 12632799 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0320-01", "/se2d/612/0320-02" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12632800, 12632801, 12632802, 3797732, 3793990, 3803693, 3804429, 3799921, 3793971, 3799381, 3800918, 3798330 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0321-01", "/se2d/612/0322-01", "/se2d/612/0322-02", "/nc/359/0411-06", "/nc/359/0411-08", "/nc/359/0411-01", "/nc/359/0411-02", "/nc/359/0411-05", "/nc/359/0411-09", "/nc/359/0411-07", "/nc/359/0411-04", "/nc/359/0411-03" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637106 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793", "parenthetical": "\"Because litigants cannot consent to jurisdiction not authorized by law, they may challenge 'jurisdiction over the subject matter ... at any stage of the proceedings, even after judgment.' \"" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566427 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8239959 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153", "parenthetical": "quoting Griffin, 162 N.C. App. at 493, 592 S.E.2d at 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160226 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Haddock, 191 N.C. App. 474, 476, 664 S.E.2d 339, 342 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166258 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Haddock, 191 N.C. App. 474, 476, 664 S.E.2d 339, 342 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918200 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564272 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321482 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1846, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613029 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524209 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569965 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 154444", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985088 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957680 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353353 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15444.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792064, 3789234, 3788598, 3797047, 3791800, 3791227, 3798558 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0542-06", "/nc/360/0542-03", "/nc/360/0542-02", "/nc/360/0542-01", "/nc/360/0542-07", "/nc/360/0542-05", "/nc/360/0542-04" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792225, 3788417, 3791334, 3790022, 3789906, 3789364, 3797885 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0489-03", "/nc/360/0489-05", "/nc/360/0489-02", "/nc/360/0489-06", "/nc/360/0489-07", "/nc/360/0489-04", "/nc/360/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352812 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468501 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 S. Ct. 120", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 L. Ed. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 22", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450473, 451287 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0022-02", "/us/371/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570063 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787934 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "\"Because litigants cannot consent to jurisdiction not authorized by law, they may challenge 'jurisdiction over the subject matter ... at any stage of the proceedings, even after judgment.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 754, "char_count": 16183, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.799831283997081e-08, "percentile": 0.4572627593346176 }, "sha256": "244df666784842a5c5bad5a6e50a00f022950e44d31be3846f0da5f2c3b344aa", "simhash": "1:4f79d448bdf74f36", "word_count": 2715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:19:28.879345+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: M.S." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nThe juvenile M.S. appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders adjudicating him delinquent and placing him on probation for 12 months. On appeal, the juvenile contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the juvenile petitions, which failed to name the alleged victims of the charged offenses, were fatally defective. We agree that the State was required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) (2007) to name the alleged victims in the juvenile petitions and, therefore, vacate the trial court\u2019s orders.\nFacts\nOn 25 and 30 January 2008, the State filed four juvenile petitions alleging that the juvenile was delinquent for committing four counts of first degree sexual offense. On 4 February 2008, the juvenile filed a transcript of admission in which the juvenile admitted committing two counts of first degree sexual offense in exchange for the State\u2019s promise to dismiss the two remaining counts. The trial court accepted the admission on 4 February 2008.\nAt the adjudication hearing, the State provided the following factual basis for the juvenile\u2019s admission. On 12 November 2007, a mother contacted police officers to report that her five-year-old son, A.H. (\u201cAndrew\u201d), had been sexually assaulted. Andrew\u2019s mother reported that when she gave Andrew a bath, he indicated that his \u201cbehind\u201d was sore, and when she asked him what had happened, he said the juvenile\u2019s name. Upon being interviewed by police officers, Andrew said that the juvenile had \u201cput his weiner [sic] in [Andrew\u2019s] behind\u201d when Andrew spent the night at the juvenile\u2019s house. Andrew said that the juvenile had done the same thing to his cousin who was also five years old. In his statement to the police, the juvenile said that he and the two boys had been playing a game and that he \u201ctook his hand and put it on their private part, and that he tried to put his penis in their behind but did not. ...\u201d The juvenile was 14 years old at the time.\nThe trial court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent in an order filed 11 March 2008. Following a dispositional hearing on 31 March 2008, an order was entered on 15 April 2008 placing the juvenile on Level 2 probation for 12 months. The juvenile timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nThe juvenile\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile petitions were fatally defective because they failed to name the alleged victims of the charged offenses. As an initial matter, the State contends that any defect in the petitions was a. constitutional error, review of which the juvenile waived by failing to object below. Because the juvenile argues that the State\u2019s failure to name the victims in the juvenile petitions deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, the juvenile\u2019s challenge is jurisdictional and unable to be waived.\nChallenges to a court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 595, 636 S.E.2d 787, 793 (2006) (\u201cBecause litigants cannot consent to jurisdiction not authorized by law, they may challenge \u2018jurisdiction over the subject matter ... at any stage of the proceedings, even after judgment.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pulley v. Pulley, 255 N.C. 423, 429, 121 S.E.2d 876, 880 (1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 371 U.S. 22, 9 L. Ed. 2d 96, 83 S. Ct. 120 (1962)). \u201cArguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction may even be raised for the first time before [an appellate] [c]ourt.\u201d Id.\nFurther, our courts have repeatedly held that a defective petition \u201cis inoperative and fails to evoke the jurisdiction of the court.\u201d In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. 143, 150, 607 S.E.2d 304, 309, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 411, 612 S.E.2d 320 (2005). Therefore, a challenge to the facial validity of a juvenile petition \u201cmay be raised at any time.\u201d S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. at 153, 636 S.E.2d at 279. This rule applies even when a juvenile has filed a transcript of admission. See State v. McGee, 175 N.C. App. 586, 587-88, 623 S.E.2d 782, 784 (\u201cBy knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, an accused waives all defenses other than the sufficiency of the indictment. Nevertheless, when an indictment is alleged to be facially invalid, thereby depriving .the trial court of jurisdiction, the indictment may be challenged at any time.\u201d (internal citations omitted)), disc, review denied, 360 N.C. 489, 632 S.E.2d 768, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 542, 634 S.E.2d 891 (2006).\nThe juvenile contends on appeal that the petitions in this case were facially defective under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15444.2(b). Accordingly, the juvenile is challenging the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction, an issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal. We note that the State has cited no authority suggesting that arguments such as those made by the juvenile in this case do not implicate the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction and may be waived. We, therefore, conclude that the juvenile\u2019s challenge to the petitions is properly before us.\n\u201c \u2018Because juvenile petitions are generally held to the standards of a criminal indictment, we consider the requirements of the indictments of the offenses at issue.\u2019 \u201d S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. at 153, 636 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting In re B.D.W., 175 N.C. App. 760, 761, 625 S.E.2d 558, 560 (2006)). The petitions in this case charged the juvenile with first degree sexual offense. The General Assembly has authorized the State to use short-form indictments when charging first degree sexual offense. State v. Miller, 159 N.C. App. 608, 613, 583 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2003), aff'd per curiam, 358 N.C. 133, 591 S.E.2d 520 (2004). With respect to short-form indictments for sexual offense, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 154444(a) provides:\nIn indictments for sex offense it is not necessary to allege every matter required to be proved on the trial; but in the body of the indictment, after naming the person accused, the date of the offense, the county in which the sex offense was allegedly committed, and the averment \u201cwith force and arms,\u201d as is now usual, it is sufficient in describing a sex offense to allege that the accused person unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did engage in a sex offense with the victim, naming the victim, by force and against the will of such victim and concluding as is now required by law. Any bill of indictment containing the averments and allegations herein named shall be good and sufficient in law as an indictment for a first degree sex offense and will support a verdict of guilty of a sex offense in the first degree, a sex offense in the second degree, an attempt to commit a sex offense or an assault.\n(Emphasis added.)\nSimilarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) provides that\n[i]f the victim is a person under the age of 13 years, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did engage in a sex offense with a child under the age of 13 years, naming the child, and concluding as aforesaid. Any bill of indictment containing the averments and allegations herein named shall be good and sufficient in law as an indictment for a sex offense against a child under the age of 13 years and all lesser included offenses.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThe juvenile argues on appeal that the petitions were fatally defective because they fail to allege the name of the child victims. The petitions filed in this case alleged:\nThe juvenile is a delinquent juvenile as defined by G.S. 7B-1501(7) in that on or about the date of the alleged offense shown above and in the county named above the juvenile did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, did [sic] . . . ENGAGE IN A SEXUAL ACT OTHER THAN VAGINAL INTERCOURSE WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 13 YEARS, WHO IS AT LEAST FOUR YEARS YOUNGER THAN THE DEFENDANT, AND THE DEFENDANT IS AT LEAST 12 YEARS OLD. G.S. 14-27.4(a)(l) FIRST DEGREE STATUTORY SEXUAL OFFENSE.\nThus, the petitions merely reference \u201ca child\u201d without alleging the victims\u2019 names.\nThe State argues that the name of the victim is simply an evidentiary detail that need not always be included in the indictment. In support of this argument, the State relies on State v. Edwards, 305 N.C. 378, 380, 289 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that while the State was required to prove a \u201csexual act\u201d was committed, the State was not required to specify which sexual act was committed in the indictment. In Edwards, however, the Court explicitly stated that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) \u201cprovides the approved \u2018short form\u2019 essentials of a bill for sex offense. . . .\u201d Edwards, 305 N.C. at 380, 289 S.E.2d at 362 (emphasis added). As naming the victim is included in the statute, it is one of those \u201c \u2018short form\u2019 essentials\u201d that must be contained in the indictment. Id.\nThis conclusion was also reached in State v. Dillard, 90 N.C. App. 318, 320, 368 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1988) (internal citations omitted), in which this Court explained that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15444.2(a)\nsets forth the requirements for sexual offense indictments. For an indictment to be legally valid under the statute, it must contain only the following: the name of the accused, the date of the offense, the county in which the offense was allegedly committed, the averment \u201cwith force and arms,\u201d the allegation that the accused unlawfully, willfully and feloniously engaged in a sex offense with the victim by force and against the victim\u2019s will, and the victim\u2019s name. An indictment including such information is sufficient to charge first-degree sexual offense, second-degree sexual offense, attempt to commit a sexual offense or assault.\n(Emphasis added.) Dillard thus holds that for a sexual offense indictment \u201cto be legally valid\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15444.2(a), \u201cit must contain,\u201d among other items, \u201cthe victim\u2019s name.\u201d Dillard, 90 N.C. App. at 320, 368 S.E.2d at 444.\nThis Court has recently addressed in further detail what is required when naming the victim in order to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15444.2(a). In McKoy, 196 N.C. App. at 652-53, 675 S.E.2d at 409, the defendant argued that indictments for second degree rape and second degree sexual offense were fatally defective because they did not include the full name of the victim, but rather referred to the victim by initials. The Court noted that the statutes permitting short-form indictments for both rape and sexual offense \u201cinclude the language \u2018naming her\u2019 or \u2018naming the victim\u2019 as part of the allegations to be set forth in the indictment.\u201d Id. at 655, 675 S.E.2d at 410-11. The Court pointed out that it had \u201cfound no decision by our North Carolina Courts directly interpreting whether \u2018naming\u2019 the victim can only be satisfied by using the victim\u2019s full name, or whether a nickname, initials or other identification method would be sufficient.\u201d Id. at 657, 675 S.E.2d at 411. Federal courts have, however, supported the use of initials in indictments. Id. at 657 n.1, 675 S.E.2d at 411 n.1. The Court then \u201cconclude [d] that the use of initials to identify a victim will require the trial court to employ the Coker and Lowe tests to determine if an indictment is sufficient to impart subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d Id. at 658, 675 S.E.2d at 412. McKoy, however, implicitly acknowledges that the indictment must name the victim in some fashion.\nIn this case the State did not name the victim at all \u2014 the petitions did not include the victim\u2019s initials or any other means of identifying the victim. As Dillard holds and McKoy acknowledges, there must be some attempt to name the victim. The State\u2019s bare reference to \u201ca child\u201d violates N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) and renders the petitions facially defective.\nFinally, we note that the State\u2019s argument that the victim\u2019s name is merely evidentiary is not only unsupported by the case law, but also is contrary to longstanding principles in North Carolina law regarding indictments. Our Supreme Court explained more than 50 years ago that \u201c[a]t common law it is of vital importance that the name of the person against whom the offense was directed be stated with exactitude.\u201d State v. Scott, 237 N.C. 432, 433, 75 S.E.2d 154, 155 (1.953). The Supreme Court explained:\n\u201cThe purpose of setting forth the name of the person who is the subject on which an offense is committed is to identify the particular fact or transaction on which the indictment is founded, so that the accused may have the benefit of one acquittal or conviction if accused a second time.\u201d\nId. at 433-34, 75 S.E.2d at 155 (quoting State v. Angel, 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 27, 29 (1846)).\nAlthough our courts have become more flexible regarding typographical errors as to names and misnomers in indictments, this Court\u2019s recent decision in McKoy confirms that the identity of the victim is still of critical importance in avoiding double jeopardy issues. See McKoy, 196 N.C. App. at 657, 675 S.E.2d at 412 (holding that the Court was required to determine \u201cwhether Defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to notice and freedom from double jeopardy were adequately protected by the use of the victim\u2019s initials\u201d (emphasis added)). The identity of the victim cannot, therefore, be merely an evidentiary matter.\n\u201c \u2018When the record shows a lack of jurisdiction in the lower court, the appropriate action on the part of the appellate court is to arrest judgment or vacate any order entered without authority.\u2019 \u201d In re R.P.M., 172 N.C. App. 782, 787, 616 S.E.2d 627, 631 (2005) (quoting State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981)). Because the petitions in this case were fatally defective in failing to name the alleged victims, we are compelled to vacate the trial court\u2019s orders.\nVacated.\nJudges McGEE and BEASLEY concur.\n. The minor victim\u2019s name has been changed to protect his privacy.\n. In criminal cases, a valid indictment gives the trial court its subject matter jurisdiction over the case. In re Griffin, 162 N.C. App. 487, 493, 592 S.E.2d 12, 16 (2004). Thus, \u201c \u2018[a] facially invalid indictment deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to enter judgment in a criminal case.\u2019 \u201d State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 654, 675 S.E.2d 406, 410 (2009) (quoting State v. Haddock, 191 N.C. App. 474, 476, 664 S.E.2d 339, 342 (2008)). Since \u201c[i]n a juvenile delinquency action, the juvenile petition \u2018serves essentially the same function as an indictment in a felony prosecution,\u2019 \u201d In re S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. 151, 153, 636 S.E.2d 277, 280 (2006) (quoting Griffin, 162 N.C. App. at 493, 592 S.E.2d at 16), this same principle applies in juvenile proceedings.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) requires the indictment to \u201cnam[e] the child\u201d as opposed to the victim and also requires the additional allegation that the victim was under the age of 13 to sufficiently charge first-degree sexual offense and all lesser included offenses. Given the phrasing of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.2, the reasoning of Dillard applies equally to \u00a7 15-144.2(a) and \u00a7 15-144.2(b).\n. See State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 435, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984); State v. Lowe, 295 N.C. 596, 603, 247 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1978).", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State.", "Ryan McKaig for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: M.S.\nNo. COA08-1016\n(Filed 18 August 2009)\nJuveniles\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 sexual offenses\u2014 fatally defective petition \u2014 failure to name victims\nThe trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in a first-degree sexual offense case based on fatally defective petitions, and the trial court\u2019s order is vacated because: (1) the State was required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) to name the alleged victims in the juvenile petitions; (2) the State did not name the victim at all, and the petitions did not include the victim\u2019s initials or any other means of identifying the victim; and (3) the State\u2019s bare reference to \u201ca child\u201d violates N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144.2(b) and renders the petitions facially defective. Further, a challenge to the facial validity of a juvenile petition may be raised at any time.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 11 March 2008 by Judge Margaret L. Sharpe and 15 April 2008 by Judge Susan E. Bray in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 March 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State.\nRyan McKaig for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0260-01", "first_page_order": 286, "last_page_order": 293 }