{ "id": 4170045, "name": "MARY LUE JACKSON, Plaintiff v. PAUL CULBRETH, SHIRLEY CULBRETH and 406 PARTNERS, LLC, successor in interest to ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING, LLC, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. Culbreth", "decision_date": "2009-09-01", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1079", "first_page": "531", "last_page": "540", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 N.C. App. 531" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637617 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636652 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 S.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640823 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/659/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8236209 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8159086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8176550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914810 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" }, { "page": "650" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 U.S. 552", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3425971 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1872, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/82/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803444 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916131 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0186-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 801, "char_count": 21057, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1336344574553945e-07, "percentile": 0.5767660585617154 }, "sha256": "cb00a1a62e04bc94876a11f21e29ef09925323a3543458c03c456322a4bd54fe", "simhash": "1:874824de70f7ad7f", "word_count": 3461 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:19:28.879345+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "MARY LUE JACKSON, Plaintiff v. PAUL CULBRETH, SHIRLEY CULBRETH and 406 PARTNERS, LLC, successor in interest to ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING, LLC, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nI. Facts\nThis appeal arose from a title dispute between cotenants, Mary Lue Jackson (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) and Paul and Shirley Culbreth (the \u201cCulbreths\u201d) and the Culbreths\u2019 lender, 406 Partners, LLC. The property is known as 2519 Southwest Boulevard, Charlotte, North Carolina (the \u201cproperty\u201d). Plaintiff and Paul Culbreth initially obtained a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in the property from a deed from Lillie Propst dated 27 August 2002, and recorded on 5 September 2002 in Book 14031, at pages 141-43, in the Mecklenburg County Public Registry (the \u201cPropst Deed\u201d).\nSubsequently, a second deed dated 3 August 2005 and recorded 29 August 2005 in Deed Book 19251, at pages 927-29, in the Mecklenburg County Public Registry, purported to convey the interest of plaintiff and her husband, James Lawrence Jackson (the \u201cJacksons\u201d) to the Culbreths (the \u201cSecond Deed\u201d). Claiming the Second Deed to be a forgery, plaintiff, through counsel, demanded the Culbreths cancel or void the deed. This demand went unmet.\nAfter the recording of the Second Deed, the Culbreths signed a promissory note and Deed of Trust mortgaging the property for $52,000.00 to Ace Mortgage Funding, LLC (\u201cAce Mortgage\u201d), the predecessor in interest to defendant 406 Partners, LLC (the \u201cdefendant\u201d). The deed of trust was recorded on 7 August 2006.\nOn 23 January 2007, plaintiff commenced this action to quiet title to the property and served Ace Mortgage, its trustee Archer Land Title, and the Culbreths. Plaintiff complained, among other things, that the Second Deed was a forgery, and was never signed or authorized by plaintiff or her husband. Plaintiffs complaint further alleged that the Culbreths \u201cwere fully aware of the forged nature of the [Second Deed]\u201d and that the Jacksons \u201chad denied the authenticity of the [Second Deed] and had requested that [the Second Deed] be voided.\u201d Plaintiff also complained that Ace Mortgage \u201centered into a transaction\u201d with the Culbreths \u201cbased upon the forged deed and upon the obvious misrepresentations by the [Culbreths].\u201d Plaintiff sought the court\u2019s declaration: (1) of her \u201crights, status, and the legal validity of her claim to ownership of the Property\u201d; (2) that she was the \u201crightful owner of a one-half interest in the Property, as a joint tenant with Paul Culbreth\u201d based on the Propst Deed; and (3) that the Second Deed and Deed of Trust be declared null and void.\nBecause no answer or responsive pleading was filed on behalf of Ace Mortgage, plaintiff filed on 7 May 2007 a Motion for Entry of Default against Ace Mortgage. The Mecklenburg County Clerk of Court entered a default against Ace Mortgage on 29 June 2007. Likewise, because no responsive pleading or answer was filed on behalf of the Culbreths, plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Entry of Default against the Culbreths on 5 July 2007. The Mecklenburg County Clerk of Court then entered a default against the Culbreths on 24 July 2007.\nOn 3 August 2007, plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure against Ace Mortgage and the Culbreths. On 3 October 2007, the trial court entered an order setting aside the entry of default against Ace Mortgage, substituting defendant for Ace Mortgage as party-defendant, and granting defendant ten days to file a responsive pleading. Defendant\u2019s answer, filed the same day, denied that the Second Deed was forged or that defendant entered the transactions based on the forgery or on misrepresentations of the Culbreths. In addition, on 3 October 2007, the court entered a Default Judgment against the Culbreths pursuant to Rule 55 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. After reciting the history of procedural default against the Culbreths, discussed ante, the court made the following \u201cConclusions of Law\u201d:\n1. That Plaintiff, Mary Lue Jackson is the rightful owner of a one-half, undivided interest in the property... as a tenant-in-common with Paul Culbreth ....\n2. That the Deed dated August 3, 2005 ... is null and void.\n3. That the Deed of Trust... in the original amount of fifty-two thousand and 00/100 ($52,000.00) ... is null and void[.]\n4. The Register of Deeds for Mecklenburg County is hereby Ordered to file a copy of this Court\u2019s Order in its records[.]\nSubsequently, on 12 October 2007, defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court denied the Motion to Reconsider on 3 June 2008, and on 19 June 2008, defendant appealed.\nII. Issues\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) entering a default judgment against the Culbreths after defendant filed its answer to the complaint; (2) extending the default judgment to defendant and ruling that it was bound by facts deemed admitted by the default judgment, and by finally adjudicating the rights between plaintiff and defendant; and (3) making findings of fact in the default judgment that were contradictory and not supported by the evidentiary record and making conclusions of law based on such findings of fact. Additionally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant\u2019s Motion to Reconsider, where the underlying default judgment was based on erroneous findings of fact and a misapplication of law.\nIII. Analysis\nDefault Judgment\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim, an action to quiet title, is a quasi in rem proceeding which seeks judgment affecting \u201cthe interests in the status, property or thing[s] of all persons served pursuant to Rule 4(k) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.3(c). \u201cTn rem\u2019 proceedings encompass any action brought against a person in which essential purpose of suit is to determine title to or affect interest in specific property located within territory over which court has jurisdiction.\u201d Green v. Wilson, 163 N.C. App. 186, 189, 592 S.E.2d 579, 581 (quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 793 (6th ed. 1990)), disc. review improvidently allowed, 359 N.C. 186, 606 S.E.2d 117 (2004).\nCentral to plaintiff\u2019s claim to quiet title is a judicial declaration of the status of the Second Deed purportedly conveying fee simple title from plaintiff to the Culbreths. Defendant succeeded to the Culbreths\u2019 interest in the property when it received a beneficial interest in the property by means of the Deed of Trust. Defendant contends that, because the Second Deed was properly acknowledged, it is entitled to rely on the presumption in favor of the legality of a written instrument by a certifying officer in forecasting evidence of a meritorious defense. Defendant contends that allowing the default judgment to stand \u201cwould have the unjust effect of preventing an answering defendant from raising a meritorious defense merely because another defendant failed to appear in a lawsuit.\u201d Defendant further contends that because it was properly served in the matter, has a recorded interest in the land, and has sufficiently forecasted a meritorious defense, its interest in an in rem action cannot be summarily adjudicated in a default proceeding between plaintiff and the Culbreths. We agree.\nThe United States Supreme Court enunciated in Frow v. De La Vega:\nThe true mode of proceeding where a bill makes a joint charge against several defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a default and a formal decree pro confesso against him, and proceed with the cause upon the answers of the other defendants. The defaulting defendant has merely lost his standing in court. He will not be entitled to service of notices in the cause, nor to appear in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the final hearing. But if the suit should be decided against the complainant on the'merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike \u2014 the defaulter as well as the others. If it be decided in the complainant\u2019s favor, he will then be entitled to a final decree against all.\nFrow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554, 21 L. Ed. 60, 61 (1872). This Court in Moore v. Sullivan applied the Frow principle stating that \u201cin the default judgment situation when a plaintiff has alleged joint liability, a default judgment should not be entered against the defaulting defendant if one or more of the defendants do not default.\u201d Moore v. Sullivan, 123 N.C. App. 647, 650, 473 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1996); see also Leonard v. Pugh, 86 N.C. App. 207, 356 S.E.2d 812 (1987); Harris v. Carter, 33 N.C. App. 179, 234 S.E.2d 472 (1977). An entry of default should instead be entered, which cuts off a defaulting defendant\u2019s right to participate on the merits. Moore, 123 N.C. App. at 650, 473 S.E.2d at 661.\nPlaintiff argued in her objection to defendant\u2019s Motion to Reconsider that she \u201cmade no claim of wrongdoing against the Defendant 406 Partners, LLC\u201d and thus would like to declare the claim \u201cseparate\u201d from those advanced against the Culbreths. The quasi in rem nature of plaintiff\u2019s claim undercuts this argument. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint to quiet title is an action in rem against the Culbreths and defendant\u2019s predecessor in interest, Ace Mortgage. In item number five of the complaint, plaintiff states that the Second Deed is a \u201cforgery\u201d that \u201cwas never signed or authorized by [the Jacksons].\u201d In item number six of the complaint, plaintiff complains that the Culbreths \u201cwere fully aware\u201d of the \u201cforged nature of the deed.\u201d In item number seven, plaintiff complains that Ace Mortgage, \u201cbased upon the forged deed and upon the obvious misrepresentations by the [Culbreths] . . . entered into a transaction with [the Culbreths].\u201d Until all of the claims have been adjudicated against all defendants, title questions would remain in the lawsuit.\nPlaintiffs claims regarding funding based on the alleged forgery and the allegedly obvious misrepresentations are inextricably linked to plaintiff\u2019s claims against the Culbreths regarding the forgery and their knowledge of the same. The claims share a common set of facts and circumstances. As such, plaintiff made a \u201cjoint charge against several defendants.\u201d See Frow, 82 U.S. at 554 21 L. Ed. at 61. Because Ace Mortgage was predecessor in interest to defendant and the trial court set aside the default judgment against Ace Mortgage and substituted defendant as a party defendant, these claims for rights to the title are effectively made against defendant, where it stands in the stead of Ace Mortgage. We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in entering the Default Judgment quieting title in absence of defendant\u2019s default. See Moore, 123 N.C. App. at 650, 473 S.E.2d at 661.\nIn Little v. Barson Fin. Servs. Corp., the plaintiff sought to quiet title to a parcel of real estate. Little v. Barson Fin. Servs. Corp., 138 N.C. App. 700, 531 S.E.2d 889, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 675, 545 S.E.2d 440, disc. review dismissed, 352 N.C. 675, 545 S.E.2d 426 (2000). The trial court entered a default judgment against non-responding defendants, quieted title to the property, and ordered that the plaintiffs were the sole owners of the property. Id. This Court explained that \u201ca default judgment against the non-responding defendants did not make any admissions on behalf of defendant-appellants, bar any of their defenses or claims, or prejudice their rights.\u201d Id. at 703, 531 S.E.2d at 891. Accordingly, this Court ruled that the trial court erred in quieting title based on a default judgment, because the defendant-appellants should have had an opportunity to defend the claims. Id.\nIn the instant case, although the trial court\u2019s default judgment was against the Culbreths for their failure to answer or otherwise respond, the court\u2019s conclusions of law not only declare as null and void the Second Deed, but also declare as null and void the Deed of Trust naming Ace Mortgage Funding, LLC as the lender. Both conclusions of law extend the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the Culbreths to defendant and end any potential rights defendant may have had in the property.\nIn accordance with this Court\u2019s reasoning in Moore and Little, we hold that the court should not have entered a default judgment quieting title until all defendants\u2019 claims to the property had been adjudicated. See id.\nFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\nNext, defendant argues the trial court erred by making findings of fact in the default judgment that were contradictory and not supported by the evidentiary record and making conclusions of law based on such findings of fact. Defendant contends that \u201cParagraph I of the Order contained in the Default Judgment was erroneous since it purports to give Plaintiff-Appellee a one-half, undivided interest in the Property as a tenant-in-common with Defendant-Appellee, Paul Culbreth.\u201d We agree.\n\u201c\u2018[W]hen the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.\u2019 \u201d Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 699, 659 S.E.2d 742, 746 (2008) (citation omitted). \u2018\u201cEffective appellate review of an order entered by a trial court sitting without a jury is largely dependent upon the specificity by which the order\u2019s rationale is articulated.\u2019 \u201d In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733, 736, 643 S.E.2d 77, 79 (2007) (citation omitted). Evidence must support the findings, the findings must support the conclusions of law, and the conclusions of law must support the ensuing judgment. Lake Gaston Estates Prop. Owners Ass\u2019n v. County of Warren, 186 N.C. App. 606, 610, 652 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2007).\nHere, the trial court found as a fact that the Culbreths failed to timely respond to plaintiff\u2019s complaint and that an entry of default was entered against the Culbreths. Based on the findings of fact, the court concluded that the entry of default against the Culbreths was proper and that an entry of a default judgment granting plaintiff the relief sought was proper. The judgment entered erroneously declared plaintiff \u201cthe rightful owner of a one-half, undivided interest in the property described in the Complaint as a tenant-in-common with Paul Culbreth\u201d; declared the Second Deed \u201cnull and void\u201d; and declared the Deed of Trust \u201cnull and void.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nFirst] the evidence does not support the findings because the trial court\u2019s finding as to the ownership as tenants-in-common is erroneous; the Propst Deed conveyed the property to defendant Paul Culbreth and to plaintiff as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants-in-common. Second, the trial court did not articulate its rationale with any specificity in declaring the Second Deed or the Deed of Trust \u201cnull and void,\u201d and thus failed to provide sufficient details for effective appellate review. See In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. at 736, 643 S.E.2d at 79. Likewise, in its order on 406 Partners\u2019 Motion to Reconsider, the trial court did not articulate its reasons for denying the motion. Therefore, the evidence does not adequately support the findings, the findings do not adequately support the conclusions of law, and the conclusions of law do not adequately support the ensuing judgment. See Lake Gaston Estates Prop. Owners Ass\u2019n, 186 N.C. App. at 610, 652 S.E.2d at 673. It was, therefore, error for the trial court to make findings of fact in the default judgment that were contradictory and not supported by the evidentiary record and to make conclusions of law and order based on such findings of fact.\nAbuse of Discretion\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to reconsider where the underlying default judgment was based on erroneous findings of fact and a misapplication of law. We agree.\n\u201cWe review the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion and reverse only upon \u2018a showing that [the] ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result;of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d James River Equip., Inc. v. Tharpe\u2019s Excavating, Inc., 179 N.C. App. 336, 344, 634 S.E.2d 548, 555 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 167, 639 S.E.2d 650 (2006).\nDefendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(b) provides as follows:\nAmendment \u2014 Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.\nThe motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(b) (2007). Pursuant to Rule 59(a), a new trial may be granted to a party when there is an \u201c[e]rror in the law occurring at the trial and objected to by the party making the motion,\u201d and for \u201c[a]ny other reason heretofore recognized as grounds for new trial.\u201d N.C. Gen.. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(8)-(9) (2007). Under prior case law, our Supreme Court has approved a new trial, for example, when equity and justice so require. Walston v. Greene, 246 N.C. 617, 617, 99 S.E.2d 805, 806 (1957).\nDefendant argued in its Motion to Reconsider that it denied the material allegations of plaintiffs complaint and that the entry of a default judgment against the Culbreths was \u201cpremature.\u201d As defendant explained, a decision on the merits in favor of plaintiff would entitle plaintiff to judgment against all defendants and would prevent defendant \u2014 an answering defendant \u2014 from raising a meritorious defense solely due to the Culbreths\u2019 failure to respond.\nIn denying defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court stated that it reconsidered the pleadings of record and defendant\u2019s brief. The court made no additional findings of fact or conclusions of law on which to base its denial of the Motion to Reconsider.\nReading Rules 52 and 59 together, we hold that the trial court, upon defendant\u2019s Motion to Reconsider, should have amended its findings, made additional findings, and amended its judgment because equity and justice required the court to allow defendant to defend its claim on the merits. See Walston, 246 N.C. at 617, 99 S.E.2d at 806. The result was exactly as defendant contended in its motion. Upon the default judgment entry against the Culbreths, defendant was prevented from arguing the claims on the merits. Defendant has succeeded in showing the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s Motion to Reconsider.\nIV. Conclusion\nIn Beard v. Pembaur, this Court stated that \u201c\u2018the law generally disfavors default judgments, [and] any doubt should be resolved in favor of setting aside an entry of default so the case may be decided on its merits.\u2019 \u201d Beard v. Pembaur, 68 N.C. App. 52, 56, 313 S.E.2d 853, 855 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 750, 321 S.E.2d 126 (1984); see also Acceptance Corp. v. Samuels, 11 N.C. App. 504, 181 S.E.2d 794 (1971). Because the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient to address the merits of plaintiffs claims, and because its order was based in part on erroneous conclusions of law, there remains doubt as to the merits of the claims. Pursuant to the principle in Beard, we reverse the trial court\u2019s entry of default judgment against the Culbreths and remand to the trial court for consideration of the merits of the claims. Based on this error, we further hold the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s Motion to Reconsider.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges WYNN and JACKSON concur.\n. The record is unclear as to the transfer of the lien from Ace Mortgage to defendant.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief filed for plaintiff-appellee.", "Patrick D. Sarsfield II, for 406 Partners, LLC defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARY LUE JACKSON, Plaintiff v. PAUL CULBRETH, SHIRLEY CULBRETH and 406 PARTNERS, LLC, successor in interest to ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING, LLC, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1079\n(Filed 1 September 2009)\n1. Judgments\u2014 default \u2014 quiet title\nThe trial court erred by entering a default judgment quieting title before all of defendant\u2019s claims to the property had been adjudicated.\n2. Judgments\u2014 default \u2014 findings\nThe trial court erred in an action to quiet title by making findings in a default judgment that were contradictory and not supported by the evidentiary record and then making conclusions based on those findings. The evidence does not support the findings and the court did not articulate its rationale with specificity.\n3. Judgment\u2014 default \u2014 motion to reconsider \u2014 equity and justice\nThe trial court abused its discretion in a quiet title action by denying defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider where the underlying default judgment was based on erroneous findings and a misapplication of law. Equity and justice required the court to allow defendant to defend the claim on the merits.\nAppeal by defendant 406 Partners, LLC, from default judgment entered 3 October 2007 and order entered 9 June 2008, by Judge Jesse B. Caldwell, III, in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 May 2009.\nNo brief filed for plaintiff-appellee.\nPatrick D. Sarsfield II, for 406 Partners, LLC defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0531-01", "first_page_order": 557, "last_page_order": 566 }