{
  "id": 8549534,
  "name": "F. F. GOFORTH and wife, LILLIE GOFORTH v. JIM WALTER, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Goforth v. Jim Walter, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1973-12-12",
  "docket_number": "No. 7228SC706",
  "first_page": "79",
  "last_page": "84",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 N.C. App. 79"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "100 S.E. 2d 391",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "247 N.C. 150",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8625754
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/247/0150-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 453",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "274 N.C. 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559308
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/274/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "12 S.E. 2d 671",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "218 N.C. 740",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8624702
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/218/0740-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 545,
    "char_count": 14175,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.604,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.90313782376244e-08,
      "percentile": 0.41960496538601283
    },
    "sha256": "dfe7667558e4b4e6f6ace963ee82b0d43f7b482984d3df63941e39f68a4fa274",
    "simhash": "1:878b3468d6b391c6",
    "word_count": 2294
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:00.958655+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Campbell and Morris concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "F. F. GOFORTH and wife, LILLIE GOFORTH v. JIM WALTER, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nThere was no error in the trial court\u2019s granting defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict with respect to plaintiffs\u2019 claim for wrongful foreclosure. At the commencement of the trial the parties entered into certain stipulations, including the following:\n\u201cIt is further stipulated and agreed that for valuable consideration the defendant assigned the Note executed to the defendant by Plaintiffs to Mid-State Homes, Inc. and that upon default by the plaintiffs, Mid-State Homes, Inc. caused said deed of trust to be foreclosed under the terms of the power of sale contained therein, and said property was sold by public auction under such power of sale; and the same was conveyed by trustees deed copy of which is marked Exhibit 4 and may be admitted in evidence by either party without further identification.\u201d\nThis stipulation established that it was not the defendant, but Mid-State Homes, Inc., which caused the deed of trust to be foreclosed. Neither the trustee in the deed of trust nor Mid-State Homes, Inc., was made a party to this action, and there was no allegation in the complaint that either had acted improperly in connection with the foreclosure. Indeed, Mid-State Homes, Inc., was not even mentioned or referred to, directly or indirectly, in the complaint. Furthermore, there was simply no evidence to show that the deed of trust was not properly subject to foreclosure or that the power of sale contained therein was not properly invoked and fully complied with. Thus, plaintiffs\u2019 evidence not only failed to show that defendant acted in any way improperly in connection with the foreclosure, but it even failed to show that anyone else had. Plaintiffs had the burden of presenting evidence to support their claim for wrongful foreclosure, and in the absence of such evidence defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict as to that claim was properly-allowed.\nPrior to the trial plaintiffs served upon defendant written interrogatories under Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which they asked forty questions relating to various matters. The court sustained defendant\u2019s objections to certain of these, and defendant answered the remainder. On this appeal plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error in sustaining objections to their interrogatories regarding the internal organization of the corporate defendant and regarding defendant corporation\u2019s relationship to Mid-State Homes. Inc. Certain of the interrogatories as to which defendant\u2019s objections were sustained were clearly improper in that the information requested could in no view of the pleadings have been pertinent to this litigation, and the asking of these questions indicated no more than plaintiffs\u2019 desire to embark upon a wide-ranging fishing expedition throughout defendant\u2019s corporate structure. If it be assumed arguendo that defendant might properly have been required to answer certain of plaintiffs\u2019 other questions as to which objections were sustained, plaintiffs have failed to show that any error prejudicial to them resulted from the trial court\u2019s action in sustaining defendant\u2019s objections to such questions. The information sought in questions relating to the identity of certain of the local agents and employees of the defendant would have been relevant, if at all, only as it related to the first issue submitted to the jury, and that issue was in any event, answered in plaintiffs\u2019 favor. While information as to defendant\u2019s relationship, if any, with Mid-State Homes, Inc., might have been relevant had plaintiffs alleged that Mid-State Homes, Inc., acted in connection with the foreclosure as defendant\u2019s agent or alter ego, no such allegation was made. Moreover, as above noted, plaintiffs failed to present evidence that defendant or Mid-State Homes, Inc., or anyone else acted improperly in connection with the foreclosure. On this record plaintiffs have simply failed to show how they were prejudiced by the court\u2019s sustaining objections to certain of their interrogatories, and their assignments of error relating thereto are overruled.\nAppellants contend that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that if they answered the first issue in plaintiffs\u2019 favor, thereby finding defendant breached its contract, they might award no more than nominal damages. Under the evidence in this case, the instruction was proper. While evidence was presented as to the respects in which the house as constructed failed to meet the standards and specifications contracted for, there was a complete lack of any evidence either as to what it would have cost to bring the house up to contractual standards or as to the difference in value between the house as constructed and as contracted for. \u201cWhen plaintiff proves breach of contract he is entitled at least to nominal damages,\u201d Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E. 2d 671, but \u201c[i]n order to recover compensatory damages in a contract action, plaintiff must show that the damages were the natural and probable result of the acts complained of and must show loss with a reasonable certainty, and damages may not be based upon mere speculation or conjecture.\u201d Pike v. Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161 S.E. 2d 453. In the present case, the plaintiffs had the burden of presenting evidence from which the jury could determine with a reasonable certainty, and not by mere speculation or conjecture, the amount of damages which resulted from defendant\u2019s breach of contract. Absent such evidence, plaintiffs were entitled to no more than nominal damages.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 contention that the trial court erred in excluding evidence as to the fair market value of their land is without merit. Such evidence would have been relevant only in connection with plaintiffs\u2019 claim for wrongful foreclosure as to which defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict was properly allowed. Childress v. Trading Post, 247 N.C. 150, 100 S.E. 2d 391, cited and relied on by plaintiffs, is not here apposite. In that case there was evidence from which the jury might find that the foundation of the house which defendant in that case had built under contract with plaintiffs was so weakened by cracks as to endanger the house itself, so that the house had no substantial value; hence, rescission should be permitted. An issue was tendered for the purpose of having the jury pass upon the substantiality of the asserted breaches, but the trial court declined to submit the issue. On appeal, our Supreme Court held that under the evidence in that case the tendered issue should have been submitted so that the nature and extent of the defaults could be determined. The opinion of the court pointed out that if the defaults are of sufficient magnitude to justify cancellation, plaintiffs would be entitled to be restored to the condition they occupied on the day the contract was entered into. The opinion also pointed out, however, that \u201c [n] ot every breach of a contract justifies a cancellation and rescission. The breach must be so material as in effect to defeat the very terms of the contract.\u201d In the case now before us, there was no evidence that defendant\u2019s breaches were so material nor was any issue tendered for the purpose of having the jury pass upon the question of whether the alleged breaches by defendant were of such magnitude as to render the house without substantial value, thereby justifying a rescission of the contract. On the contrary, the record discloses that the house constructed by defendant in this case was in fact ultimately repaired and that following the foreclosure it has been occupied and used as a residence by other parties.\nFinally, appellants contend that the trial judge erred in refusing to accept the jury\u2019s verdict as originally returned on the damage issue. In this connection the verdict first brought back by the jury was \u201cYes, the reasonable market value of the land as of the date of the contract.\u201d The trial judge correctly rejected this verdict on the second issue and repeated his instructions to the jury that they could return a verdict on the second issue for no more than nominal damages. As above noted, nominal damages were all that were justified by the evidence presented.\nWhile unquestionably plaintiffs have suffered loss of their land by the events disclosed by the record in this case, this loss resulted not from such breaches of the contract by the defendant as the evidence disclosed, but from plaintiffs\u2019 own intransigence in insisting on their right to rescind the contract in the face of defendant\u2019s efforts to correct the defects in the house, and from plaintiffs\u2019 refusal to honor their own obligations under the deed of trust.\nIn the judgment appealed from we find\nNo error.\nJudges Campbell and Morris concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PARKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Brock & Howell by Ronald W. Howell for plaintiff appellants.",
      "W. Faison Barnes and Anne King for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "F. F. GOFORTH and wife, LILLIE GOFORTH v. JIM WALTER, INC.\nNo. 7228SC706\n(Filed 12 December 1973)\n1. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust \u00a7\u00a7 35, 39 \u2014 wrongful foreclosure \u2014 directed verdict proper\nThe trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict with respect to plaintiffs\u2019 claim for wrongful foreclosure on a deed of trust where a stipulation entered into by the parties established that it was not the defendant which caused the deed of trust to be foreclosed and where there was no evidence to show that the deed of trust was not properly subject to foreclosure or that the power of sale contained therein was not properly invoked and fully complied with.\n2. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 33 \u2014 unanswered interrogatories \u2014 information sought not pertinent\nThe trial court did not err in sustaining defendant\u2019s objections to certain of plaintiffs\u2019 interrogatories where the information requested could in no view of the pleadings have been pertinent to the litigation; furthermore, even if the court erred in sustaining defendant\u2019s objections to certain other interrogatories, plaintiffs failed to show that such error was prejudicial.\n3. Contracts \u00a7 29\u2014 breach of contract \u2014 award of no more than nominal damages proper\nIn an action for monetary damages resulting from defendant\u2019s alleged breach of contract in failing to construct a home on plaintiffs\u2019 land in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with contract specifications, the trial court properly instructed the jury that if they found that defendant breached its contract, they might award no more than nominal damages since plaintiffs failed to present any evidence as to what it would have cost to bring the house up to contractual standards or as to the difference in value between the house as constructed and as contracted for.\n4. Contracts \u00a7 26; Mortgages and Deeds of Trust \u00a7 39 \u2014 breach of contract \u2014 wrongful foreclosure \u2014 evidence of fair market value of land \u2014 relevancy\nEvidence with respect to the fair market value of plaintiffs\u2019 land was properly excluded in an action for breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure on a deed of trust where that evidence would have been relevant only in connection with plaintiffs\u2019 claim for wrongful foreclosure as to which defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict was properly allowed.\n5. Contracts \u00a7\u00a7 28, 29\u2014 breach of contract \u2014 instructions on nominal damages\nIn an action for breach of contract where nominal damages were all that were justified by the evidence, the trial court did not err in rejecting the jury\u2019s original verdict on the damage issue of \u201c . . . the reasonable market value of the land as of the date of the contract\u201d and repeating his instructions that they could return a verdict for no more than nominal damages.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Thornburg, Judge, 8 May 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Buncombe County.\nBy written contract dated 11 June 1969 defendant agreed to build a house according to certain plans and specifications upon a one-acre tract of land belonging to plaintiffs, and in return plaintiffs agreed to execute a promissory note to defendant in the amount of $13,824.00 payable in monthly installments and to secure the same by a deed of trust on the aforementioned property. Plaintiffs executed and delivered the note and deed of trust called for in the contract, and defendant, through subcontractors, caused a house to be built upon plaintiffs\u2019 land.\nOn 30 November 1970 plaintiffs filed complaint in this civil action alleging two claims for relief: (1) A claim for rescission of the contract or, in the alternative, for recovery of monetary damages resulting from defendant\u2019s alleged breach of the contract in failing to construct the house in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with contract specifications, and (2) a claim for monetary damages resulting from the alleged wrongful foreclosure of the deed of trust by the defendant. Defendant answered, denying it had breached the contract, and as a defense to plaintiffs\u2019 first claim alleged that it had proceeded through its subcontractors to perform its obligation under the contract, but that when the house was almost completed plaintiffs, without justification, placed \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d signs upon the property and prevented completion of the house. As a defense to plaintiffs\u2019 second claim, defendant alleged it had assigned the note executed to it by plaintiffs to Mid-State Homes, Inc., which corporation, upon default by plaintiffs, caused the deed of trust to be foreclosed under the terms of the power of sale contained therein, and that defendant was not \u00e1 party to the foreclosure proceeding and had never acquired title to the property.\nUpon the trial and at the close of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, the court allowed defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict dismissing the claim for wrongful foreclosure. At the close of all the evidence, plaintiffs\u2019 first claim was submitted to the jury on issues (1) as to defendant\u2019s breach of the contract and (2) as to damages. The jury answered the first issue in plaintiffs\u2019 favor. Under instructions from the court that, if they answered the first issue for plaintiffs they could award only nominal damages, the jury answered the second issue in the amount of $9.99. From judgment in accord with the verdict, plaintiffs appealed.\nBrock & Howell by Ronald W. Howell for plaintiff appellants.\nW. Faison Barnes and Anne King for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0079-01",
  "first_page_order": 107,
  "last_page_order": 112
}