{ "id": 8549786, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES HENRY PRIDGEN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pridgen", "decision_date": "1973-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 737SC755", "first_page": "116", "last_page": "120", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "20 N.C. App. 116" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551473 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0591-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 8431, "ocr_confidence": 0.609, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.3406511344869913 }, "sha256": "7f04c57ebab61bdcb7f0ea4e6fe71b2b926bdb4c0253413f12feffe5e1b8760d", "simhash": "1:677f30ec61e0d1fb", "word_count": 1413 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:00.958655+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Campbell and Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES HENRY PRIDGEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BROCK, Chief Judge.\nDefendant argues that the testimony of witness Favre on redirect examination is incompetent and highly prejudicial to the defendant because it allowed an officer of the law to explain his failure to enforce the law as to one individual, Randy Prid-gen. Favre had testified that he did not charge Randy Pridgen, a fifteen-year-old minor on 4 August 1971, with a violation of the law because Randy Pridgen was a juvenile and the witness \u201cnot figure anything would really be gained by charging a juvenile with this type of offense,\u201d when the witness did not believe it was the juvenile\u2019s whiskey.\n\u201cThe burden is on defendant not only to show error but also to show that the error complained of affected the result adversely to him. ...\u201d 3 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 167, p. 126. In the light of the other evidence we fail to see how defendant was prejudiced by this statement of the witness. The assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the defendant was entrapped by State\u2019s witness Gregory, and that the trial judge should have allowed defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit made at the close of State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all of the evidence. Only the motion made at the close of all of the evidence is before us for review.\n\u201cG.S. 15-173 provides in pertinent part: \u201cIf the defendant introduces evidence, he thereby waives any motion for dismissal or judgment as in case of nonsuit which he may have made prior to the introduction of his evidence and cannot urge such prior motion as ground for appeal.\u201d When the defendant offers evidence, he waives the motion lodged, either actually or by statute, at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and only the motion lodged at the close of all the evidence is considered. State v. Paschall, 14 N.C. App. 591, 188 S.E. 2d 521.\nDefendant contends that the series of events leading up to the arrest of defendant constituted entrapment. \u201cMere initiation, instigation, invitation, or exposure to temptation by enforcement officers is not sufficient to establish the defense of entrapment, it being necessary that the defendants would not have committed the offense except for misrepresentation, trickery, persuasion, or fraud.\u201d 2 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 7, p. 487.\nThe only trickery involved was that of the law enforcement agents secreting themselves inside the box on the bed of the pickup, and the failure of the witness Gregory to inform the defendant that he was working in conjunction with law enforcement agencies. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant argues that the court failed to give the jury sufficient instructions as to the defense of entrapment. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cNow, in this case the defendant has raised the defense of what is called \u2018entrapment,\u2019 and entrapment is a complete defense to the offense charged.\n\u201cNow, the burden of proving entrapment is upon the defendant. However, the defendant is not required to prove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to your satisfaction.\u201d\nThe trial court then instructed the jury as to the elements of entrapment. Before the jury retired to consider its verdict, both parties were asked if either desired anything else to be charged; both answered in the negative.\nWe find no error in the charge of the trial court to the jury. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends that the trial court should have granted defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, based upon conversations and events which occurred while the court was in recess.\nWhile the court was in recess, one of the jurors got into the box in which the officers had hidden while riding in the back of the pickup truck, the box having been introduced by defendant as an exhibit. While the juror was in the box, he stated that he could see the back of the Sheriff\u2019s chair, but his response to the Sheriff\u2019s question of whether he could see a picture on the wall in the back of the courtroom is uncertain. The juror testified that he could see the back of the courtroom through the hole in the box.\nDefendant contends that the actions and conversation of the jurors amounted to a discussion of the evidence for deliberation, and obtaining evidence improperly. Also, defendant contends that the actions of Sheriff Womble were improper communications with the jury concerning evidence of the case. We see no merit in these arguments.\nThe trial court heard defendant\u2019s motion, and, after conducting a hearing as to the events which had transpired during the recess, determined that no prejudice had been shown. The finding of the trial court on a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial is conclusive when supported by the evidence. See 3 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 175, p. 148. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe hold that the defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Campbell and Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BROCK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Robert Morgan and Associate Attorney Howard A. Kramer, for the State.", "Vernon F. Daughtridge for the defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES HENRY PRIDGEN\nNo. 737SC755\n(Filed 12 December 1973)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 33, 169 \u2014 reason for absence of charges against minor\nIn a prosecution for possession and sale of nontaxpaid whiskey, defendant was not prejudiced by an officer\u2019s testimony that he did not bring charges against a fifteen-year-old boy because he \u201cdid not figure anything would really be gained by charging a juvenile with this type of offense\u201d when the witness didn\u2019t believe it was the juvenile\u2019s whiskey.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 7 \u2014 sale of nontaxpaid whiskey \u2014 entrapment\nDefendant was not entrapped when a State\u2019s witness allowed law enforcement officers to hide inside a box on his truck while he bought nontaxpaid whiskey from defendant.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 7 \u2014 instructions on entrapment\nTrial court\u2019s instructions on the defense of entrapment were sufficient.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 101\u2014 conduct of juror during recess \u2014 absence of prejudice\nIn a prosecution for possession and sale of nontaxpaid whiskey, defendant was not prejudiced when, during a recess, a juror got into a box in which officers had hidden while whiskey was bought from defendant and stated that he could see the back of the sheriff\u2019s chair, and the sheriff asked the juror whether he could see a picture on the wall in the back of the courtroom.\nAppeal by defendant from Webb, Judge, June 1973 Session of Superior Court held in Nash County.\nDefendant was charged in a warrant with unlawfully and willfully having in his possession and selling forty-two (42) gallons of nontaxpaid alcoholic beverages. Defendant was found guilty in District Court and upon appeal was tried de novo in the Superior Court.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 4 August 1971, the defendant agreed to sell seven cases of whiskey to one Michael Gregory (Gregory), who was working under the supervision of one C. V. Favre (Favre) of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the U. S. Department of the Treasury. Gregory contacted Favre and one Alfred Joyner, who secreted themselves within a box in the bed of the pickup truck driven by Gregory. Gregory then drove to the defendant\u2019s trailer where he was met by defendant and a colored male. Defendant instructed Gregory that the whiskey was $30.00 per case, and that the colored male would assist in loading. Following directions given by the colored male accompanying Gregory, Gregory drove a short distance from defendant\u2019s trailer to a house where Randy Pridgen, nephew of defendant, instructed the two to drive to another house. The colored male and Randy then loaded the whiskey in the truck. Gregory paid Randy $210.00. Gregory then drove to Rocky Mount and turned over the whiskey to Investigator Favre and ABC Officer Joyner.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that Gregory had been on probation twice in Sampson County, having been charged with manufacturing nontaxpaid whiskey; that Gregory, according to his former probation officer, had a general character and reputation for untruthfulness; that Gregory had approached one Willie House, a prisonmate of Gregory\u2019s at Smithfield, North Carolina, and urged House to go into the \u201cbootlegging business\u201d with him; that Randy Pridgen, nephew of the defendant, did not sell liquor nor assist in the loading of the pickup truck on 4 August 1971.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan and Associate Attorney Howard A. Kramer, for the State.\nVernon F. Daughtridge for the defendant." }, "file_name": "0116-01", "first_page_order": 144, "last_page_order": 148 }