{
  "id": 8554120,
  "name": "SUSIE T. PETTY v. WILLIAM ALLEN ALDRIDGE and ANN W. ALDRIDGE, By Her Guardian Ad Litem, WILLIAM A. ALDRIDGE",
  "name_abbreviation": "Petty v. Aldridge",
  "decision_date": "1974-01-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 7315SC37",
  "first_page": "514",
  "last_page": "518",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 N.C. App. 514"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.589,
    "sha256": "2393dfd2504214f7ab27a54a90d30c808cb421384e405a49b5868363303013a2",
    "simhash": "1:bae7bf9d8552c79c",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:00.958655+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Morris concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "SUSIE T. PETTY v. WILLIAM ALLEN ALDRIDGE and ANN W. ALDRIDGE, By Her Guardian Ad Litem, WILLIAM A. ALDRIDGE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nDefendants bring forward and argue in their brief some 15 assignments of error. Since, in our view of the case, the defendants are entitled to a new trial because of prejudicial errors in the charge, we do not discuss those assignments of error directed to the rulings of the court in admission or exclusion of evidence since these are not likely to occur at another trial.\nWe only discuss those errors in the charge which are sufficiently prejudicial singly or cumulatively to require a new trial.\nThe court charged the jury with respect to when violation of a statute is negligence per se and when it is not negligence per se. This instruction was not warranted, because the evidence did not disclose any violation of a motor vehicle statute, and the instruction served only to confuse the jury. To add further to the confusion, the court charged:\n\u201cIn this case, members of the jury, the plaintiff is invoking the alleged violation by the defendant of one or more of the following statutes. North Carolina General Statute 20-141, Section (c). This statute provides that the fact that a person is driving a vehicle within the speed limit does not relieve him of the duty to exercise due care, when the circumstances indicate that he or she should do so to avoid collision or injury, he or she is required to decrease speed when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic. A violation of this statute is negligence within itself.\u201d\nAfter a conference at the bench with the attorneys the court said: \u201cMembers of the jury, the court has just given you a charge relating to special hazards. The court instructs you to disregard that instruction and don\u2019t use it in your deliberations.\u201d The court did not retract its instruction with respect to situations where violation of a motor vehicle statute might be negligence per se. Indeed the error was compounded when the court proceeded to instruct that the plaintiff was \u201cinvoking the alleged violation\u201d by defendant of failing to keep control of her automobile and a further violation of failure to keep a proper lookout. Immediately following these instructions the court instructed that the plaintiff was invoking the \u201calleged violation of one or more of these statutes or laws\u201d by the defendant as \u201cbeing the direct immediate and proximate cause\u201d of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Again the court makes it possible for the jury to speculate that if defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to keep her automobile under control she was guilty of violation of a statute which would constitute negligence per se and no other facts could be considered.\nIn addition, in the court\u2019s mandate on the first issue, he instructed that if the plaintiff had fulfilled the responsibility cast upon her in presenting evidence which by its quality and convincing power had satisfied the jury, by its greater weight, that defendant was negligent in the particulars which he set out and that the negligence was one of the proximate causes of the \u201ccollision between the vehicles, then it would be your duty to answer the first issue in favor of the plaintiff, that is Yes.\u201d Of course, the issue was whether the plaintiff was injured by the defendant\u2019s negligence. There was no doubt but that the defendant\u2019s car ran into the rear of plaintiff\u2019s parked vehicle. The question was whether defendant\u2019s negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the injuries, if any, plaintiff received.\nFinally, the court instructed the jury that they were to consider what amount, if any, they found to be fair and reasonable compensation for suffering both of body and mind which you find \u201cproximately resulted from the negligent act of the defendant.\u201d Whether defendant was negligent was a question for the jury as well as whether his negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. This last instruction to the jury could well have allowed them to think that the court had said that defendant committed a negligent act and this determination, having been made by the court, was not for them to consider.\nThe cumulative effect of these errors in the charge, we think, is to leave the jury \u2014 the trier of fact \u2014 without the proper guidance necessary for a determination of the issues in the case.\nNew trial.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Morris concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PARKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Vernon & Vernon by John H. Vernon, Jr., and Wiley P. Wooten, for plaintiff appellee.",
      "Jordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey & Hill by Karl N. Hill, Jr., for defendant appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SUSIE T. PETTY v. WILLIAM ALLEN ALDRIDGE and ANN W. ALDRIDGE, By Her Guardian Ad Litem, WILLIAM A. ALDRIDGE\nNo. 7315SC37\n(Filed 16 January 1974)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 90\u2014 violation of statute as negligence per se \u2014 instruction improper\nIn plaintiff\u2019s action to recover for personal injuries sustained by her when defendant drove her vehicle into the rear of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle, the trial court\u2019s instruction with respect to when violation of a statute is negligence per se and when it is not negligence per se was error, since the evidence did not disclose any violation of a motor vehicle statute.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 90\u2014 negligence as proximate cause of collision \u2014 instruction improper\nWhere the question was whether defendant\u2019s negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the injuries, if any, plaintiff received, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they were to determine if defendant was negligent and if that negligence was one of the proximate causes of the collision between the vehicles.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 90\u2014 negligent act of defendant \u2014 jury question \u2014 erroneous instruction\nTrial court\u2019s instruction to the jury that they were to consider what amount, if any, they found to be fair and reasonable compensation for suffering both of body and mind which they found \u201cproximately resulted from the negligent act of the defendant\u201d was error, since that instruction could have allowed them to think that defendant committed a negligent act and this determination, having been made by the court, was not for them to consider.\nAppeal by defendants from Chess, Judge, 24 July 1972 Session, Superior Court, Alamance County.\nPlaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly received as the result of the negligent operation of an automobile by defendant Ann W. Aldridge. Plaintiff alleged, and her evidence tended to show, that at about 3:30 p.m. on 2 January 1968, she had parked her automobile at the east curb of Tarlton Avenue in Burlington, N. C., and was sitting in the car waiting for her son to be released from school and come get in the car.\nDefendant, Ann Aldridge, a 19-year-old girl driving a Ford automobile owned by her father, defendant William Allen Aldridge, drove the Ford automobile into the rear of plaintiff\u2019s car.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show that at the time she did not think she was hurt but that she began to have pain and muscle spasms, was treated by an orthopedic surgeon, and was given a 15% permanent disability by him, this being the minimum disability. The evidence was that prior to the accident, she was a crossing guard for a school in Burlington and received some $33.75 each two weeks for this work. She was also tying tail cords in her home for Burlington Industries, had been doing so since 1966, and was paid $9.00 per 1,000. She testified she could do 10,000 per week. The evidence was she was receiving more at the time of trial for her work for the City of Burlington as a crossing guard for a school than she was at the time of her injury, that she had done no more work at home for Burlington, did not know what their needs were during the years since the accident as to tail cords and had no agreement with them as to how many she would tie for them per year.\nThe defendant did not put on any evidence. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $22,000.00. From the judgment entered on the verdict, defendants appealed.\nVernon & Vernon by John H. Vernon, Jr., and Wiley P. Wooten, for plaintiff appellee.\nJordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey & Hill by Karl N. Hill, Jr., for defendant appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0514-01",
  "first_page_order": 542,
  "last_page_order": 546
}