{
  "id": 8554844,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN PRESTON HARRIS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harris",
  "decision_date": "1974-02-06",
  "docket_number": "No. 747SC138",
  "first_page": "643",
  "last_page": "644",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 N.C. App. 643"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 226,
    "char_count": 3478,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.585,
    "sha256": "f316dc9e94c0c6f58d5084445de7671d9ca60758c378636ddbd46642d73c2feb",
    "simhash": "1:13f8428d1326848c",
    "word_count": 569
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:00.958655+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Mor\u00e9is and Carson concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN PRESTON HARRIS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BROCK, Chief Judge.\nDefendant appeared in the trial court without counsel. He insisted that he was able to employ counsel but did not want one because he felt counsel could do him no good. He tendered a plea of guilty and was fully examined by the trial court touching upon his understanding and the voluntariness of his plea. Defendant stated in the written inquiry that he understood he was charged with assault with intent to commit rape; that the charge had been explained to him; that he was in fact guilty; that no one had made any promise or threat to influence him to plead guilty; and that he freely, understandingly, and voluntarily authorized entry of a plea of guilty. The trial judge who questioned and observed the defendant adjudicated that the plea of guilty was freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.\nDefendant now argues that the plea should be stricken because he was induced to plead guilty by promises. Obviously, defendant was hoping for a suspended sentence, and he now wants to strike his plea because he received an active sentence. The sheriff of Nash County testified that the prosecutrix and other members of defendant\u2019s family told the sheriff that they hoped defendant would receive a suspended sentence. However, this is far from evidence of a promise by anyone that defendant would in fact receive a suspended sentence.\nDefendant argues that his waiver of counsel was not executed voluntarily. The thorough examination of defendant by the trial court on this point and defendant\u2019s execution of a written waiver of counsel nullify this argument.\nDefendant moves to arrest judgment because the bill of indictment fails to allege all of the essential elements of the crime. The motion is denied. The indictment fully and sufficiently charged the crime in pertinent part as. follows: that the defendant on the 27th day of January 1973, \u201cdid unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously assault Rosie H. Harris, a female, with the intent to unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously ravish and carnally know the said Rosie H. Harris by force and against her will.\u201d\nNo error.\nJudges Mor\u00e9is and Carson concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BROCK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorney General Davis, for the State.",
      "W. O. Rosser, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN PRESTON HARRIS\nNo. 747SC138\n(Filed 6 February 1974)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 23\u2014 guilty plea \u2014 promise of leniency \u2014 insufficiency of evidence\nEvidence that defendant hoped he would receive a suspended rather than an active sentence was insufficient to support defendent\u2019s contention that his guilty plea should be stricken because it was induced by promise of leniency.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 32\u2014 waiver of counsel \u2014 voluntariness\nDefendant\u2019s waiver of counsel was voluntary where he was thoroughly examined by the trial court on that point and he executed a written waiver of counsel.\n3. Rape \u00a7 3\u2014 assault with intent to rape \u2014 sufficiency of indictment\nIndictment charging defendant with the felony of assault with intent to rape fully and sufficiently charged the crime.\nAppeal by defendant from James, Judge, 26 March 1973 Session of Superior Court held in Nash County. Argued in the Court of Appeals 23 January 1974.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment with the felony of assault with intent to rape. Upon his plea of guilty, defendant was sentenced to a term of four to six years imprisonment.\nDefendant appealed.\nAttorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorney General Davis, for the State.\nW. O. Rosser, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0643-01",
  "first_page_order": 671,
  "last_page_order": 672
}