{ "id": 4171509, "name": "HOWARD BIGGERS III, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of HOWARD BIGGERS, IV, Deceased, and CINDY BIGGERS, Plaintiffs v. BALD HEAD ISLAND, a North Carolina Municipality; BALD HEAD ISLAND LIMITED, a Foreign Limited Partnership; BALD HEAD ISLAND MANAGEMENT, INC.; MITCHELL ISLAND INVESTMENTS, INC., a Foreign Corporation, as General Partner of Bald Head Island Limited; and, DOUGLAS \"BUD\" ODELL, Defendants BALD HEAD ISLAND LIMITED, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiffs v. TIMOTHY MATTHEWS, Third-Party Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Biggers v. Bald Head Island", "decision_date": "2009-09-15", "docket_number": "No. COA08-249", "first_page": "83", "last_page": "90", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 83" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573719 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 S.E. 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 5, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271887 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/160/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.C. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8684619 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1875, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "57" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/72/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9191852 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "citing Ivarsson v. Office of Indigent Def Servs., 156 N.C. App. 628, 631, 577 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8472406 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "citing Ivarsson v. Office of Indigent Def Servs., 156 N.C. App. 628, 631, 577 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497610 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524081 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795971, 795908, 796133, 796109, 795919 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0656-04", "/nc/342/0656-01", "/nc/342/0656-03", "/nc/342/0656-05", "/nc/342/0656-02" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E,2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708418 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "citing Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 425, 302 S.E,2d 868, 871 (1983)" }, { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918657 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "citing Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 425, 302 S.E,2d 868, 871 (1983)" }, { "page": "859-60" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403377 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 699, 314 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 699, 314 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567849 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citing Rone Int'l, Inc. v. Brooks, 304 N.C. 371, 374-75, 283 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569908 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "citing Rone Int'l, Inc. v. Brooks, 304 N.C. 371, 374-75, 283 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0366-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 917, "char_count": 17374, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13662167176541953 }, "sha256": "0c58552b3cc8b4b1f4284135c025af53c0683b11cc5d95ced80369915b143419", "simhash": "1:0bfa5260c567cc56", "word_count": 2844 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "HOWARD BIGGERS III, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of HOWARD BIGGERS, IV, Deceased, and CINDY BIGGERS, Plaintiffs v. BALD HEAD ISLAND, a North Carolina Municipality; BALD HEAD ISLAND LIMITED, a Foreign Limited Partnership; BALD HEAD ISLAND MANAGEMENT, INC.; MITCHELL ISLAND INVESTMENTS, INC., a Foreign Corporation, as General Partner of Bald Head Island Limited; and, DOUGLAS \u201cBUD\u201d ODELL, Defendants BALD HEAD ISLAND LIMITED, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiffs v. TIMOTHY MATTHEWS, Third-Party Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nHoward Biggers, III (\u201cMr. Biggers\u201d) and Cindy Biggers (\u201cMrs. Biggers\u201d) (collectively, \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) parents of Howard Biggers, IV (\u201cHoward\u201d) and Garrett Biggers (\u201cGarrett\u201d) appeal the trial court\u2019s orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Village of Bald Head Island (\u201cthe Village\u201d), Bald Head Island Limited (\u201cLimited\u201d), and Douglas \u201cBud\u201d Odell (\u201cOdell\u201d) (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d). For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court\u2019s orders.\nEarly in 2003, plaintiffs planned a family vacation to the Village for the upcoming summer. Plaintiffs previously had vacationed in the Village in 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. On 17 March 2003, plaintiffs entered into a Guest Rental Agreement with Limited to rent a cottage and electric vehicle owned by Odell for their vacation.\nOn 28 June 2003, plaintiffs traveled to the Village with their two children, Garrett, age four, and Howard, age six, for a week-long family vacation. On 30 June 2003, Mrs. Biggers left the cottage to pick up her sister and brother-in-law, Susan Matthews (\u201cMrs. Matthews\u201d) and Tim Matthews (\u201cMr. Matthews\u201d) (collectively, \u201cthe Matthewses\u201d) from the ferry landing. Mrs. Biggers drove the golf cart provided by Odell; Garrett and Howard rode in the front seat with her. After picking up the Matthewses, the family returned to the cottage where they picked up Mr. Biggers and prepared for a day at the beach. Mrs. Biggers drove along Keelson Row and through a \u201creverse \u2018S\u2019 \u201d turn both to and from the ferry landing.\nPlaintiffs, Garrett, Howard, and the Matthewses packed the golf cart with chairs and towels, and they drove to the beach. The party again traveled along Keelson Row and through the reverse \u201cS\u201d turn. Shortly after arriving at the beach, Mrs. Matthews announced that Mr. Matthews\u2019s brother and sister-in-law also were coming to the Village that day. The Matthewses, along with Howard and Garrett, left the beach and drove Odell\u2019s golf cart to pick up the Matthewses\u2019 family members.\nMr. Matthews drove the golf cart; Garrett sat in the middle of the front seat; and Howard sat on the outside of the passenger-side of the front seat. Mrs. Matthews sat in the golf cart\u2019s right, rear seat. Mrs. Matthews and Howard sang children\u2019s songs as the party again approached the reverse \u201cS\u201d curve on Keelson Row. As they approached the curve, Mrs. Matthews extended her right arm in a protective manner. Howard turned in his seat so that his back was facing out of the cart with his right hip pointing toward the dashboard. Howard then fell out of the cart. Mrs. Matthews yelled for Mr. Matthews to stop the cart because he did not notice that Howard had fallen out of the cart.\nThe Matthewses took Howard back to the cottage. Howard complained that his head hurt. Mrs. Matthews stayed with Howard at the cottage while Mr. Matthews, his brother and sister-in-law, and Garrett returned to join plaintiffs at the beach. Mr. Matthews told plaintiffs that he believed Howard was all right.\nHoward\u2019s condition worsened, and Emergency Medical Services were called approximately two hours after Howard\u2019s fall. Fourteen months later, on 14 August 2004, Howard died from complications resulting from a traumatic brain injury caused by his fall from the golf cart.\nOn 16 September 2005, plaintiffs brought this negligence action alleging that (1) the Village negligently failed to require seatbelts for electric vehicles operating within its jurisdiction; (2) Limited negligently failed to require seatbelts in the electric vehicles owned by the property owners; and (3) Odell negligently failed to install seatbelts in his golf cart. On 8 August 2007, Limited moved for summary judgment. On 15 August 2007, both the Village and Odell moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders granting summary judgment in defendants\u2019 favor.\nSummary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). \u201cAn issue is \u2018genuine\u2019 if it can be proven by substantial evidence^] and a fact is \u2018material\u2019 if it would constitute or irrevocably establish any material element of a claim or a defense.\u201d Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982) (citing Rone Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Brooks, 304 N.C. 371, 374-75, 283 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1981)).\nIn deciding a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003). If there is any evidence of a genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 471, 597 S.E.2d 674, 694 (2004). We review an order allowing summary judgment de novo. Summey, 357 N.C. at 496, 586 S.E.2d at 249.\nThe moving party bears the burden of showing that no triable issue of fact exists. Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 699, 314 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1984)). \u201cEven though summary judgment is seldom appropriate in a negligence case, summary judgment may be granted in a negligence action where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the plaintiff fails to show one of the elements of negligence.\u201d Lavelle v. Shultz, 120 N.C. App. 857, 859, 463 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1995) (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 425, 302 S.E,2d 868, 871 (1983)), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 656, 467 S.E.2d 715 (1996). Furthermore,\n[i]n order to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of negligence by showing: (1) that defendant failed to exercise proper care in the performance of a duty owed plaintiff; (2) the negligent breach of that duty was a proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injury; and (3) a person of ordinary prudence should have foreseen that plaintiff\u2019s injury was probable under the circumstances.\nLavelle, 120 N.C. App. at 859-60, 463 S.E.2d at 569 (citing Talian v. City of Charlotte, 98 N.C. App. 281, 283, 390 S.E.2d 737, 739 (1990), aff\u2019d, 327 N.C. 629, 398 S.E.2d 330 (1990) (per curiam)) (emphasis added).\nIn plaintiffs\u2019 first argument on appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Village because there is a genuine isshe of material fact as to whether the Village waived its governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. However, plaintiffs\u2019 underlying argument is that the Village was negligent because it failed to enact an ordinance requiring the installation of seatbelts in golf carts traveling within its municipal boundaries. We disagree.\n\u201cThe legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.\u201d N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 6. \u201cA violation of the separation of powers doctrine occurs when one branch of state government exercises powers that are reserved for another branch of state government.\u201d County of Cabarrus v. Tolson, 169 N.C. App. 636, 639, 610 S.E.2d 443, 446 (2005) (citing Ivarsson v. Office of Indigent Def Servs., 156 N.C. App. 628, 631, 577 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2003)). Thus, it long has been the rule that\nwhen a general authority is given to a municipal corporation, to be exercised through its proper legislative officers, to make ordinances for the good government, health and safety of the inhabitants and their property, it is thereby left entirely to the discretion of those authorities to determine what ordinances are proper for those purposes.\nHill v. The Bd. of Alderman of the City of Charlotte, 72 N.C. 55, 56 (1875) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover from the city for fire damage to his property caused by firecrackers because the decision of the municipal authorities to suspend temporarily an ordinance prohibiting firecrackers was within the authorities\u2019 discretion). Otherwise, a court \u201cwould arrogate to itself the legislative power of the city authorities, and it cannot be supposed possible that any court will be guilty of such an usurpation.\u201d Id. at 57. The Court explained that \u201cthe question, whether [the municipal authorities\u2019 decision is] wise or not, is not for a court to determine.\u201d Id. Therefore, \u201c[a] municipal corporation is not liable to an action for damages either for the non-exercise of, or for the manner in which, in good faith, it exercises discretionary powers of a public or legislative character.\u201d Id. (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nIn a case similar to the case sub judice, Goodwin v. Town of Reidsville, 160 N.C. 411, 76 S.E. 232 (1912), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s entry of nonsuit against the plaintiff\u2019s wrongful death claim against the town. Goodwin, 160 N.C. at 414, 76 S.E. at 234. The decedent was driving along the town\u2019s street when he was struck and killed by a baseball from a game being played by boys in the street. Goodwin, 160 N.C. at 412, 76 S.E. at 233. The town knew of the boys\u2019 custom of playing baseball in the street, but the town failed to adopt or enforce an ordinance prohibiting their activities. Id. Notwithstanding the plaintiff\u2019s tragic loss, the town\u2019s decision was inviolate. Goodwin, 160 N.C. at 414, 76 S.E. at 234.\nAccordingly, in view of our well-established precedent, the Village\u2019s failure to adopt an ordinance requiring the installation of seatbelts on golf carts is beyond the purview of our courts. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Village.\nNext, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Limited and Odell. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that Limited and Odell breached a duty of care by (1) renting a golf cart without a seatbelt to plaintiffs, and (2) failing to provide warning of the purportedly hidden danger of falling out of the golf cart. We disagree.\nIn Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Mem\u2019l Park, 281 N.C. 48, 53, 187 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1972), our Supreme Court instructed that a bailor for hire has a duty \u201cto see that the vehicle bailed is in good condition,\u201d and although the bailor is not an insurer, \u201che is liable for injury to the bailee or a third person proximately caused by a defect in the vehicle of which [the bailor] had knowledge or which he could have discovered [through] reasonable care and inspection.\u201d Id. In Roberts, the plaintiff was injured by a golf cart when the cart\u2019s brakes failed to perform properly. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the golf cart he had rented was equipped with defective brakes. Roberts, 281 N.C. at 54, 187 S.E.2d at 724. The plaintiff subsequently presented evidence that the golf cart was designed so that the cart\u2019s brakes should work regardless of whether the cart traveled backwards or forwards. Roberts, 281 N.C. at 52, 187 S.E.2d at 723. Upon those facts, the Court held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that the bailor was liable for the hidden, defective condition of the brakes such that the plaintiff could reach the jury. Roberts, 281 N.C. at 60, 187 S.E.2d at 728.\nIn the case sub judice, we initially note that although plaintiffs\u2019 arguments tend toward the contrary, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sounds in negligence, not products liability, and the undisputed fact remains that the golf cart was manufactured without seatbelts. With the exception of three superficial modifications, the cart was in the same or similar condition as it had been provided to Odell by the manufacturer.\nIn addition, the record contains an invoice for bi-monthly service to the golf cart. The invoice is dated 12 June 2003 \u2014 approximately two weeks prior to Howard\u2019s fall. No description of special repairs, maintenance, or other service appears on the invoice. Plaintiffs make no argument that Odell failed to meet his duty of exercising reasonable care and inspection. Nor do they argue that the golf cart was not in good operating condition. Here, any defect alleged by plaintiffs\u2014 the absence of a seatbelt \u2014 is an open and obvious condition, and the condition in which the golf cart originally was provided to Odell by the manufacturer.\nMr. Matthews testified that he (1) had played approximately fifteen rounds of golf per year, (2) had belonged to a country club several years prior to Howard\u2019s fall, (3) had used a golf cart whenever he had played golf, and (4) never had seen a golf cart with a seatbelt prior to his vacation with plaintiffs. We cannot find in our case law an affirmative duty for defendants such as Limited and Odell to undertake to alter a commonly manufactured product, such as a golf cart. Therefore, we hold that Limited and Odell met the duty of care owed by bailors of vehicles to bailees. See Roberts, 281 N.C. at 53, 187 S.E.2d at 724.\nIn addition to being properly maintained, the golf cart also was insured as required by the Village and by Limited\u2019s contract with Odell. Therefore, it appears that Odell and Limited were in compliance with any contractual duties or duties established by the Village. Plaintiff cites no other source from which a duty of care may arise.\nUpon review, we are convinced that plaintiff\u2019s negligence claims against Limited and Odell fail for want of duty, or where a duty does exist, for want of breach. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of Limited and Odell. See Lavelle, 120 N.C. App. at 859, 463 S.E.2d at 569.\nWhile we acknowledge the tragic circumstances presented, the law of negligence as regards defendants in the case sub judice does not provide a remedy for plaintiffs\u2019 loss. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEELMAN and STROUD concur.\n. The Village is a coastal community with a maximum speed limit of eighteen miles per hour within its municipal boundaries. Therefore, bicycles and electric vehicles, such as golf carts, are common means of transportation.\n. Limited previously had entered into an exclusive rental agency agreement with Odell for the use of his property asvacation rental property. Pursuant to the agreement, Odell was responsible for providing the cottage a \u201cfour-passenger electric vehicle with side curtains, charger and fire extinguisher, registered with the Village . . . .\u201d In exchange for a commission on the rental receipts, Limited agreed to rent the property and to perform various management and housekeeping services.\n. Pursuant to his agreement with Limited, Odell added (1) a sticker which instructed the user as to basic cart operation and alerted the cart\u2019s user to additional vacation and safety reference materials in the rental house, and (2) a fire extinguisher; and (3) Odell testified at his deposition that he also added a \u201cwind/rain screen\u201d as an \u201coptional extra\u201d after purchasing the cart, but that everything other than the screen and the fire extinguisher \u201cwas standard with the cart.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jones Martin Parris & Tessener Law Offices, P.L.L.C., by H. Forest Home, Jr. and Kristen L. Beightol, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Patterson Dilthey, LLP, by Ronald C. Dilthey, for Bald Head Island Limited, defendants-appellees.", "Crossley McIntosh Collier Hanley & Edes, P.L.L.C., by Brian E. Edes, for Village of Bald Head Island, defendants-appellees.", "Brown, Crump, Vanore & Tierney, L.L.P., by Derek M. Crump, for Douglas \u201cBud,\" Odell, defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HOWARD BIGGERS III, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of HOWARD BIGGERS, IV, Deceased, and CINDY BIGGERS, Plaintiffs v. BALD HEAD ISLAND, a North Carolina Municipality; BALD HEAD ISLAND LIMITED, a Foreign Limited Partnership; BALD HEAD ISLAND MANAGEMENT, INC.; MITCHELL ISLAND INVESTMENTS, INC., a Foreign Corporation, as General Partner of Bald Head Island Limited; and, DOUGLAS \u201cBUD\u201d ODELL, Defendants BALD HEAD ISLAND LIMITED, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiffs v. TIMOTHY MATTHEWS, Third-Party Defendant\nNo. COA08-249\n(Filed 15 September 2009)\n1. Immunity\u2014 governmental immunity \u2014 discretionary powers\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Village because: (1) a municipal corporation is not liable in an action for damages either for the non-exercise of, or for the manner in which, in good faith, it exercises discretionary powers of a public or legislative character; and (2) the Village\u2019s failure to adopt an ordinance requiring the installation of seatbelts on golf carts was beyond the purview of our courts.\n2. Negligence\u2014 duty of care \u2014 renting golf cart without seat-belt \u2014 hidden danger\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Limited and Odell because defendants did not breach a duty of care by renting a golf cart without a seatbelt to plaintiffs or by failing to provide warning of the purported hidden danger of falling out of a golf cart.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from orders entered 10 September 2007, 11 September 2007 and 17 September 2007 by Judge Ola M. Lewis in Brunswick County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 2008.\nJones Martin Parris & Tessener Law Offices, P.L.L.C., by H. Forest Home, Jr. and Kristen L. Beightol, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nPatterson Dilthey, LLP, by Ronald C. Dilthey, for Bald Head Island Limited, defendants-appellees.\nCrossley McIntosh Collier Hanley & Edes, P.L.L.C., by Brian E. Edes, for Village of Bald Head Island, defendants-appellees.\nBrown, Crump, Vanore & Tierney, L.L.P., by Derek M. Crump, for Douglas \u201cBud,\" Odell, defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0083-01", "first_page_order": 109, "last_page_order": 116 }