{ "id": 4172009, "name": "KATHERINE HANNA EVERHART, Plaintiff v. O'CHARLEY'S INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Everhart v. O'Charley's Inc.", "decision_date": "2009-10-06", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1454", "first_page": "142", "last_page": "161", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 142" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "517 U.S. 559", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11745877 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court's order denying motion for new punitive damages trial contained sufficient findings, \"all supported by evidence adduced at trial, in support of its conclusion that the jury's punitive damages verdict was amply supported by the evidence\"" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639165 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635180, 12635181 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/626/0649-01", "/se2d/626/0649-02" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632990 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642407 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640275 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 582, 146 S.E. 395, 405 (1929)" }, { "page": "878-79", "parenthetical": "holding there was sufficient evidence of \"conscious and intentional disregard\" of employee's rights where employer failed to fully investigate incident before charging employee with embezzlement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9725312, 9726080, 9725538, 9725636, 9725125, 9726440, 9726185, 9725963, 9725742, 9726553, 9726323, 9725849, 9725435, 9725213 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1130-03", "/us/531/1130-10", "/us/531/1130-05", "/us/531/1130-06", "/us/531/1130-01", "/us/531/1130-13", "/us/531/1130-11", "/us/531/1130-09", "/us/531/1130-07", "/us/531/1130-14", "/us/531/1130-12", "/us/531/1130-08", "/us/531/1130-04", "/us/531/1130-02" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1006", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330529, 1330884, 1332356, 1335114, 1332012, 1330701, 1332079, 1330544, 1333073, 1335603, 1332603, 1334483, 1332790, 1332535, 1332666, 1335835 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1006-07", "/us/513/1006-05", "/us/513/1006-08", "/us/513/1006-06", "/us/513/1006-01", "/us/513/1006-15", "/us/513/1006-02", "/us/513/1006-10", "/us/513/1006-11", "/us/513/1006-13", "/us/513/1006-16", "/us/513/1006-14", "/us/513/1006-12", "/us/513/1006-09", "/us/513/1006-03", "/us/513/1006-04" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633348 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371895 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court's order denying motion for new punitive damages trial contained sufficient findings, \"all supported by evidence adduced at trial, in support of its conclusion that the jury's punitive damages verdict was amply supported by the evidence\"" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209846 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11317824 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "1046" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-124", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-124.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-129", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355557 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "concluding that punitive damages award 526 times amount of actual damages was \"certainly large\" but not \"so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of the State to allow\"" }, { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "concluding that punitive damages award 526 times amount of actual damages was \"certainly large\" but not \"so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of the State to allow\"" }, { "page": "2723", "parenthetical": "concluding that punitive damages award 526 times amount of actual damages was \"certainly large\" but not \"so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of the State to allow\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131361 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "688-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9301404 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.\"" }, { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.\"" }, { "page": "1682-83", "parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12133609 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[p]roof of 'severe emotional distress' does not necessarily require medical evidence or testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187124 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[p]roof of 'severe emotional distress' does not necessarily require medical evidence or testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569848 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798368, 3793536, 3790594, 3793379, 3793907, 3796086, 3788826, 3791163 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0177-01", "/nc/360/0177-03", "/nc/360/0177-04", "/nc/360/0177-02", "/nc/360/0177-05", "/nc/360/0177-08", "/nc/360/0177-06", "/nc/360/0177-07" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006084 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560-61", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "holding that unambiguous statutes \"must be construed as written\" and courts are \"without power to interpolate or to superimpose provisions not contained therein\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525781 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "holding that unambiguous statutes \"must be construed as written\" and courts are \"without power to interpolate or to superimpose provisions not contained therein\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50", "parenthetical": "using dictionary definition to determine ordinary meaning of word in statute where statute did not define term" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "using dictionary definition to determine ordinary meaning of word in statute where statute did not define term" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162961 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 827", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9000289 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0827-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1372 (1968)" }, { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "holding employee was manager where employee had supervisory powers, including power to hire and fire employees, and worked \"directly under\" and \"hand-in-hand\" with owner of restaurant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250786 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539-40", "parenthetical": "quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1372 (1968)" }, { "page": "539-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 So.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7467115 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1159-61", "parenthetical": "differentiating between punitive damages based on vicarious liability and direct liability of corporation for punitive damages" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/654/1158-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "\"In the case at bar, plaintiffs submitted affidavits which stated that defendants' employees were extremely careless and that they exercised poor judgment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522331 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360-61", "parenthetical": "holding there was insufficient evidence of willful or wanton conduct where physical therapist repaired weight machine without training and with improper parts, and plaintiff was injured when machine broke" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439699 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006 WL 3690632", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*1" }, { "page": "*2" }, { "page": "*7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89918", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. Dist. LEXIS", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "968 F. Supp. 1469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 494696 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1475", "parenthetical": "concluding evidence was sufficient to send punitive damages issue to jury under \u00a7 1983 where evidence showed that hospital \"failed to provide even the most basic pre-termination\" investigation and hearing prior to terminating doctor's medical privileges" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/968/1469-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E. 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628339 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/196/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 582, 146 S.E. 395, 405 (1929)" }, { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198057 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511585, 1511553, 1511438, 1511279, 1511377 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0667-04", "/nc/356/0667-03", "/nc/356/0667-05", "/nc/356/0667-01", "/nc/356/0667-02" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080078 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "quoting Bulk v. Piedmont Music Ctr., 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079936 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249-50", "parenthetical": "quoting Bulk v. Piedmont Music Ctr., 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511168, 1511188, 1511382, 1511236 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0313-01", "/nc/356/0313-04", "/nc/356/0313-02", "/nc/356/0313-03" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079822 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "observing that when party \"opens the door\" to issue, opposing party may elicit evidence that would otherwise be incompetent or irrelevant to \"dispel favorable inferences arising\" from party's evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532283 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "observing that when party \"opens the door\" to issue, opposing party may elicit evidence that would otherwise be incompetent or irrelevant to \"dispel favorable inferences arising\" from party's evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the introduction of evidence to dispel favorable inferences arising from [the] cross-examination of a witness\" is permissible even if the evidence would otherwise constitute hearsay" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867674 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the introduction of evidence to dispel favorable inferences arising from [the] cross-examination of a witness\" is permissible even if the evidence would otherwise constitute hearsay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 890", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 797", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "concluding State could cross-examine defendant regarding specifics of prior offenses where defendant's testimony attempted to minimize seriousness of crimes" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "193-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 S. Ct. 525", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537586 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8438167 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "\"[Appellant] may not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "\"[Appellant] may not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 559", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11745877 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "1596" }, { "page": "574-75" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "1598-99" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "1603" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "1603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0559-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1784, "char_count": 48538, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.32051298465107e-08, "percentile": 0.5131969083911841 }, "sha256": "de1e4ff05dbf3225866ba8d56a6e4c3b6d6e8f8a31564f1ced4d30bc844970e7", "simhash": "1:894f35ffb2cc5c59", "word_count": 7796 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "KATHERINE HANNA EVERHART, Plaintiff v. O\u2019CHARLEY\u2019S INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant O\u2019Charley\u2019s Inc. appeals from a judgment entered following a bifurcated trial in which plaintiff Katherine Hanna Everhart was awarded $10,000.00 in compensatory damages in the first phase of the trial and $350,000.00 in punitive damages in the second phase. The trial court subsequently reduced the punitive damages award to $250,000.00. On appeal, O\u2019Charley\u2019s only challenges the punitive damages award, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (\u201cJNOV\u201d) and its motion for a new trial as to the punitive damages phase. The primary contention of O\u2019Charley\u2019s is that its JNOV motion should have been granted for insufficient evidence that Ms. Everhart\u2019s injuries were related to willful or wanton conduct attributable to O\u2019Charley\u2019s. Because our review of the record reveals ample evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict, and we find O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 remaining arguments unpersuasive, we uphold the punitive damages award.\nFacts\nOn 9 September 2006, Ms. Everhart went shopping with her husband and two sons at Hanes Mall in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. After finishing their shopping, the family went to an O\u2019Charley\u2019s restaurant near the mall for dinner. Ms. Everhart requested water, immediately drank the entire glass, and asked for a refill. The Everharts\u2019 server, Dathan Jones, went to get a water pitcher, but accidentally grabbed a pitcher that had been used to soak soda nozzles in a cleaning solution called Auto-Chlor System Solution-QA Sanitizer (\u201cAuto-Chlor\u201d). As a result, he refilled Ms. Everhart\u2019s glass with a mixture of water and Auto-Chlor.\nMs. Everhart took several sips through her straw and immediately noticed an unfamiliar taste and a chemical smell. Although she swallowed some of the liquid, she spit out the rest. Some drops landed on her shirt and immediately began discoloring it. Mr. Everhart asked his wife what was wrong, and she responded: \u201cI\u2019ve been poisoned.\u201d At this point, Mr. Jones came back to the table, grabbed the glass, and left. Ms. Everhart told her husband that she felt sick, \u201clike [she was] going to throw up,\u201d and went to the bathroom to try to make herself throw up.\nWhile Ms. Everhart was in the bathroom, Assistant Dining Room Manager Byron Witherspoon came to the table and introduced himself as the manager on duty at O\u2019Charley\u2019s. Mr. Everhart told Mr. Witherspoon that \u201chis wife had drunk an unknown substance and she had gotten sick and ran into the restroom.\u201d Mr. Witherspoon then left the table, got a \u201cCustomer Accident/Incident Report\u201d form from the restaurant office, and went back to the table to obtain information from Mr. Everhart about the incident. While Mr. Witherspoon was asking Mr. Everhart the questions on the incident report form, Mr. Everhart repeatedly asked him, \u201cWhat was in the pitcher?\u201d Mr. Everhart explained to Mr. Witherspoon that he was taking Ms. Everhart to the emergency room and needed to know what Ms. Everhart had swallowed. Mr. Witherspoon did not answer Mr. Everhart\u2019s questions, but instead responded by simply asking the next question on the incident report form.\nThe container of Auto-Chlor was kept above a sink in the restaurant\u2019s kitchen area. Its first aid label stated that if someone swallowed the solution, poison control or a doctor should be called immediately. It also warned that if the solution was ingested, the person should not try to induce vomiting unless directed to do so by poison control or a doctor. According to the label, the person should instead try to sip a glass of water if the person was able to swallow.\nAfter attempting to induce vomiting for roughly five minutes in the bathroom, Ms. Everhart returned to the table where Mr. Witherspoon was still attempting to complete the incident report form by questioning Mr. Everhart. Ms. Everhart was \u201cvisibly crying, shaking and extremely upset.\u201d Mr. Jones then returned to the table and apologized to Ms. Everhart. Mr. Witherspoon did not, however, ask Mr. Jones any questions about what the substance was that was in Ms. Everhart\u2019s glass. In addition, at no time while the Everharts were still at the restaurant did Mr. Witherspoon look for the Auto-Chlor\u2019s warning label to give the Everharts the first aid instructions.\nThe Everharts left O\u2019Charley\u2019s to go to Forsyth Medical Center\u2019s emergency room. Ms. Everhart testified that on the drive there, she was \u201cdistraught\u201d and \u201cpetrified\u201d by the fear of not knowing what she had ingested. When she arrived at the hospital, she was unable to tell the medical staff what she drank, but she said she thought it might have been bleach. The doctor treating Ms. Everhart had to call O\u2019Charley\u2019s to find out what was in the glass.\nMs. Everhart was discharged after being treated. Beginning the next day and continuing for roughly a week, Ms. Everhart had sores on her lips and in her mouth, had a sore throat, and felt nauseous. Ms. Everhart also experienced painful heartburn, indigestion, and reflux. Two months afterward, Ms. Everhart underwent an endoscopy, which indicated that Ms. Everhart\u2019s esophagus, stomach, and duodenum were normal.\nMs. Everhart filed suit against O\u2019Charley\u2019s on 12 March 2007, asserting claims for negligence and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. After the trial court denied O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 motion for summary judgment, O\u2019Charley\u2019s moved pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-30 (2007) for a bifurcated trial on the issues of compensatory and punitive damages.\nFollowing the compensatory damages phase of the trial, the jury awarded Ms. Everhart $10,000.00. During the punitive damages phase, the trial court denied O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. The jury subsequently awarded Ms. Everhart $350,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts on 15 April 2008, but reduced the amount of the punitive damages award to $250,000.00 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-25(b) (2007). On 17 April 2008, O\u2019Charley\u2019s moved for JNOV, or, alternatively, for a new trial, with both motions only addressing the punitive damages award. In an order entered 3 June 2008, the trial court denied the motions and upheld the punitive damages award. O\u2019Charley\u2019s timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s contends that the trial court erred during the punitive damages phase of the trial by admitting evidence about allegations in a 2004 Florida lawsuit that a customer had been served bleach in another O\u2019Charley\u2019s restaurant. Prior to trial, O\u2019Charley\u2019s filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence regarding the Florida lawsuit on the grounds of hearsay, relevance, improper purpose, and unfair prejudice. After considering arguments from counsel, the trial court granted the motion and excluded the evidence.\nDuring the cross-examination of Kevin Alexander, a regional operations director with O\u2019Charley\u2019s who was called as an adverse witness by Ms. Everhart, defense counsel asked about the incident report form completed in this case:\nQ. After this incident, was it reported to other stores?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Why was that?\nA. I reported it to all of my stores, the incident that had happened, reminded everyone that following the procedures on breaking down the stations, on how we store things. And I again spoke to my boss about it. The following Monday on his conference call he had me to relate what I knew at the time about it to the other operations directors so that it could be \u2014 you know, they could talk to their own restaurants about it.\nAt this point, Ms. Everhart\u2019s counsel asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury and argued:\n[Defense counsel] just opened the door wide open for me to inquire as to why they inquired with any other restaurants as to this previous incident and gave them any notice of it for future conduct. It\u2019s not fair that they get to say, \u201cAfter this happened I told every other store so this won\u2019t happen again,\u201d and I can\u2019t say, \u201cWell, the first time it happened, you didn\u2019t tell anyone.\u201d\nThe trial court ruled that \u201c[t]he jury gets to consider similar past conduct\u201d and allowed Ms. Everhart\u2019s counsel to ask Mr. Alexander on redirect, over O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 objection, \u201cMr. Alexander, are you aware of the existence of any similar past conduct of the nature of this lawsuit by O\u2019Charley\u2019s in 2002 in Florida?\u201d Mr. Alexander responded that he \u201cbecame aware of an allegation today'... I just found out today that there was an allegation of bleach.\u201d\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s first claims that the evidence is inadmissible because Mr. Alexander did not know about the allegations prior to being questioned, and, therefore, could not testify from personal knowledge as required by Rule 602 of the Rules of Evidence. O\u2019Charley\u2019s did not, however, assert Rule 602 as a basis for its objection to the question asked Mr. Alexander. Its objection on other bases \u2014 hearsay, relevance, and unfair prejudice \u2014 were not sufficient to preserve an appeal based on Rule 602. A party may not assert at trial one basis for objection to the admission of evidence, but then rely upon a different basis on appeal. See State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988) (\u201c[Appellant] may not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon appeal.\u201d).\nWhile O\u2019Charley\u2019s did rely in part upon Rule 602 in its motion in limine that was granted by the trial court, in order to preserve the issue for appeal, it was required to repeat its objections at trial when the evidence was actually offered. See State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 520, 615 S.E.2d 688, 690 (2005) (\u201cRulings on motions in limine are preliminary in nature and subject to change at trial, depending on the evidence offered, and thus an objection to an order granting or denying the motion is insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of the evidence.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). We, therefore, do not consider this argument on appeal.\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s next contends that the evidence of the Florida allegations was inadmissible hearsay. As Ms. Everhart\u2019s counsel argued, however, defense counsel \u201copened the door\u201d for Ms. Everhart\u2019s counsel to question Mr. Alexander about the Florida case.\nIt is well established that \u201cwhere one party introduces evidence of a particular fact, the opposing party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though the rebuttal evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.\u201d State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 360, 444 S.E.2d 879, 901, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429, 115 S. Ct. 525 (1994). Further, \u201cevidence which would otherwise be inadmissible may be permissible on cross-examination to correct inaccuracies or misleading omissions in the [party]\u2019s testimony or to dispel favorable inferences arising therefrom.\u201d State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 193, 531 S.E.2d 428, 448 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d 797, 121 S. Ct. 890 (2001). Accord State v. Johnston, 344 N.C. 596, 608, 476 S.E.2d 289, 296 (1996) (holding that \u201cthe introduction of evidence to dispel favorable inferences arising from [the] cross-examination of a witness\u201d is permissible even if the evidence would otherwise constitute hearsay); State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 412, 432 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1993) (observing that when party \u201copens the door\u201d to issue, opposing party may elicit evidence that would otherwise be incompetent or irrelevant to \u201cdispel favorable inferences arising\u201d from party\u2019s evidence).\nThe testimony elicited by O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 counsel when questioning Mr. Alexander would have permitted the jury to draw the favorable inference that once O\u2019Charley\u2019s had notice of an incident, it would take corrective measures to ensure that such an incident would not happen again, thus negating the need to impose punitive damages to deter further misconduct. Ms. Everhart was entitled to attempt to rebut this inference by showing that O\u2019Charley\u2019s, when it received notice of similar allegations on a prior occasion, did not advise its regional operations directors of those allegations. See Braxton, 352 N.C. at 193-94, 531 S.E.2d at 449 (concluding State could cross-examine defendant regarding specifics of prior offenses where defendant\u2019s testimony attempted to minimize seriousness of crimes). The trial court, therefore, properly permitted the question.\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s also argues that the evidence should have been excluded under N.C.R. Evid. 403 as being unfairly prejudicial. Where, however, a party is responsible for \u201copening the door\u201d with respect to certain evidence, that party may not complain of unfair prejudice resulting from its admission. See State v. Wilson, 151 N.C. App. 219, 226, 565 S.E.2d 223, 228 (\u201cBecause defendant opened the door to the testimony at issue, we need not address defendant\u2019s argument that the testimony was inadmissible because it was irrelevant or overly prejudicial.\u201d), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 313, 571 S.E.2d 215 (2002). This argument is, therefore, also overruled.\nII\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s next argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for JNOV. \u201cThe standard of review of a ruling entered upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is \u2018whether, upon examination of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and that party being given the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn therefrom, the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\u2019 \u201d Branch v. High Rock Realty, Inc., 151 N.C. App. 244, 249-50, 565 S.E.2d 248, 252 (2002) (quoting Bulk v. Piedmont Music Ctr., 138 N.C. App. 425, 429, 531 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2000)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 667, 576 S.E.2d 330 (2003). A JNOV \u201cmotion should be denied if there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the non-movant\u2019s claim.\u201d Norman Owen Trucking, Inc. v. Morkoski, 131 N.C. App. 168, 172, 506 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1998). A \u201c \u2018scintilla of evidence\u2019 \u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018very slight evidence.\u2019 \u201d Scarborough v. Dillard\u2019s Inc., 188 N.C. App. 430, 434, 655 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2008) (quoting State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 582, 146 S.E. 395, 405 (1929)).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-15(a) (2007) establishes the standards for recovering punitive damages in North Carolina:\nPunitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and that one of the following aggravating factors was present and was related to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded:\n(1) Fraud.\n(2) Malice.\n(3) Willful or wanton conduct.\nThe existence of the aggravating factor must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(b).\nIn this case, the sole aggravating factor at issue at trial was willful or wanton conduct. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lD-5(7) (2007) defines \u201c[w]illful or wanton conduct\u201d as \u201cthe conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others, which the defendant knows or should know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or other harm. \u2018Willful or wanton conduct\u2019 means more than gross negligence.\u201d\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of willful or wanton conduct. In arguing that Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s conduct was not willful or wanton, however, O\u2019Charley\u2019s only points to the evidence favorable to its position. It ignores the evidence indicating that Mr. Witherspoon, consistent with O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 policy, willfully disregarded the possibility of injury to Ms. Everhart so that he could complete the incident report form.\nMs. Everhart presented evidence that after Ms. Everhart went into the restroom to try to induce vomiting and Mr. Witherspoon came to the Everharts\u2019 table to fill out the incident report form, Mr. Everhart repeatedly asked Mr. Witherspoon, \u201cWhat was in the pitcher?\u201d Mr. Witherspoon \u201cjust ignored his question and went on with his sheet of paper.\u201d Mr. Everhart testified that Mr. Witherspoon refused to look up from the form and continued to ask questions from the form despite Mr. Everhart\u2019s attempts to try to find out what was in Ms. Everhart\u2019s glass. Ms. Everhart\u2019s evidence showed that Mr. Witherspoon made no effort to identify what had been served Ms. Everhart even though he could have asked the server when he returned to the table.\nThe label on the Auto-Chlor, which was back in the restaurant\u2019s kitchen, contained a first aid warning stating: \u201cIF SWALLOWED: Call poison control center or doctor immediately for treatment advice. Have person sip a glass of water if able to swallow. Do not induce vomiting unless told to do so by a poison control center or doctor. . . . NOTE TO PHYSICIAN: Probable mucosal damage may contraindicate the use of gastric lavage. Measures against circulatory shock, respiratory depression and convulsion may be needed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that Mr. Witherspoon did not attempt to find the Auto-Chlor warning label to learn what its first aid instructions were.\nMr. Witherspoon testified that he did not answer Mr. Everhart\u2019s questions because he needed to collect \u201cvital information\u201d such as Ms. Everhart\u2019s age, marital status, and contact information for the incident report before investigating the nature of the substance Ms. Everhart had ingested. Mr. Witherspoon also acknowledged that although he knew Ms. Everhart was in the bathroom, he did not instruct anyone to go check on her because he needed to fill out the report form. Both Mr. Witherspoon and Kevin Alexander, one of O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 regional operations directors, testified that O\u2019Charley\u2019s has a policy that the manager must complete the incident report form before doing anything else unless the customer is \u201cconvulsing, passed out on the floor,\u201d or \u201cbleeding profusely.\u201d Mr. Witherspoon acted in accordance with the policy. Because, according to Mr. Witherspoon, Ms. Everhart did not look \u201coverly sick\u201d when she returned from the bathroom, Mr. Witherspoon continued to fill out the report form.\nAlthough the incident report form asks for biographical information, such as the name, address, telephone number, and employer of the injured person, the form does not include space for documenting the results of any investigation by O\u2019Charley\u2019s personnel. The form states that it is to be \u201ccompleted by O\u2019Charley\u2019s, Inc. personnel in anticipation of litigation[,]\u201d and asks, \u201cDo you think a claim will be made?\u201d It also asks for the contact information for potential \u201cwitnesses.\u201d\nThis evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Everhart, shows that, although Mr. Witherspoon knew Ms. Everhart had ingested some unknown substance that had made her sick, he refused to find out what she had actually been served or the first aid protocol for that substance before completing O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 incident report form. Moreover, that form is not designed to provide assistance to the customer, but is focused on \u201canticipat[ing]... litigation.\u201d A jury could reasonably find from this evidence that Mr. Witherspoon chose to give preference to protecting O\u2019Charley\u2019s from possible litigation over providing assistance to Ms. Everhart who had been served a possibly toxic substance. The jury could then further conclude that Mr. Witherspoon acted with conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to Ms. Everhart\u2019s rights and safety, thus supporting a finding of willful or wanton conduct. See Scarborough, 188 N.C. App. at 435, 655 S.E.2d at 878-79 (holding there was sufficient evidence of \u201cconscious and intentional disregard\u201d of employee\u2019s rights where employer failed to fully investigate incident before charging employee with embezzlement). See also Medeiros v. Randolph County Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 968 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (concluding evidence was sufficient to send punitive damages issue to jury under \u00a7 1983 where evidence showed that hospital \u201cfailed to provide even the most basic pre-termination\u201d investigation and hearing prior to terminating doctor\u2019s medical privileges).\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s compares this case to Faris v. SFX Entm\u2019t, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89918, 2006 WL 3690632 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (unpublished), Collins v. St. George Physical Therapy, 141 N.C. App. 82, 539 S.E.2d 356 (2000), and Bull v. Goforth Props., Inc., 95 N.C. App. 615, 383 S.E.2d 387 (1989), and contends that these cases \u201cillustrate[] the type of conduct that fails to meet the willful or wanton threshold.\u201d In Faris, a concert attendee at an amphitheater was electrocuted in a stairwell when he accidentally came into contact with a broken light fixture while holding onto the handrail, thus completing the circuit with the stairwell. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89918 at *4, 2006 WL 3690632 at *1. One week earlier, two other people had reported being shocked at the same location from the same faulty light fixture. Id. at *4, 2006 WL 3690632 at *2. The district court concluded as a matter of law that the facility manager\u2019s conduct in failing to correct the condition was not willful and wanton, reasoning that: \u201ca reading of the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff does not produce evidence that Lynch intentionally turned a blind eye to the danger: he looked, he saw, and he acted. Unfortunately, and possibly negligently, he looked in the wrong place, saw the wrong thing, and took ineffective action.\u201d Id. at *23-24, 2006 WL 3690632 at *7.\nHere, the evidence would permit the jury to make the finding of an intentional blind eye to danger that was absent in Faris. Mr. Witherspoon did not \u201cineffective [ly] \u201d attempt to help Ms. Everhart, but rather willfully avoided assisting her in order to complete O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 litigation form.\nMr. Witherspoon\u2019s deliberate disregard of Ms. Everhart\u2019s safety in favor of preparing for litigation similarly distinguishes this case from Collins and Butt. The evidence in those two cases showed, at best, that the defendant was seriously negligent and the plaintiff was harmed. Neither case had the evidence of willfulness produced in this case. See Collins, 141 N.C. App. at 86-88, 539 S.E.2d at 360-61 (holding there was insufficient evidence of willful or wanton conduct where physical therapist repaired weight machine without training and with improper parts, and plaintiff was injured when machine broke); Butt, 95 N.C. App. at 619, 383 S.E.2d at 389 (\u201cIn the case at bar, plaintiffs submitted affidavits which stated that defendants\u2019 employees were extremely careless and that they exercised poor judgment.\u201d). We, therefore, hold that Ms. Everhart presented sufficient evidence of willful and wanton conduct to send the punitive damages issue to the jury.\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s next contends that it cannot be held liable for punitive damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(c). That statute provides that in order to award punitive damages against a corporation based on vicarious liability, \u201cthe officers, directors, or managers of the corporation [must have] participated in or condoned the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to punitive damages.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(c).\nThis is not, however, a case where O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 liability for punitive damages was based solely on vicarious liability. Mr. Witherspoon testified that in his interaction with the Everharts, he was simply following O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 corporate policy of completing the incident report form before investigating the nature of the incident. O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 regional operations director confirmed that this was O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 policy. A corporation may be subject to punitive damages based on a theory of direct liability where the corporation\u2019s acts or policies constitute the aggravating factor. See Schropp v. Crown Eurocars, Inc., 654 So.2d 1158, 1159-61 (Fla. 1995) (differentiating between punitive damages based on vicarious liability and direct liability of corporation for punitive damages).\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s argues that its policy does not amount to willful or wanton conduct. O\u2019Charley\u2019s, however, cites no authority supportive of its position. Instead, O\u2019Charley\u2019s claims that \u201cthere is nothing \u2018wicked\u2019 or \u2018needless\u2019 about preparing a report that memorializes the facts of an incident that may be the subject of litigation.\u201d This characterization of the O\u2019Charley\u2019s policy fails to apply N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lD-5(7)\u2019s definition of \u201cwillful or wanton conduct.\u201d\nAfter describing its policy in the light most favorable to it \u2014 contrary to the proper standard of review \u2014 O\u2019Charley\u2019s asserts that \u201c[it] puts the safety of its guests before the legitimate need to memorialize the facts surrounding the incident.\u201d Mr. Witherspoon, however, testified that it was O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 corporate policy to complete the incident report form before investigating an incident unless the customer is \u201cconvulsing, passed out on the floor,\u201d or \u201cbleeding profusely.\u201d A reasonable jury could disagree with O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 characterization of its policy and conclude to the contrary that this policy recklessly disregards customers\u2019 safety and well-being in order to begin the process of protecting O\u2019Charley\u2019s against potential litigation.\nIn any event, we disagree with O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 contention, as to Mr. Witherspoon, that even if he did act willfully or wantonly, he does not fall within the category of employees \u2014 officers, directors, and managers \u2014 whose conduct may be imputed to O\u2019Charley\u2019s for purposes of punitive damages. There is no suggestion that Mr. Witherspoon is an officer or director of O\u2019Charley\u2019s; the issue under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(c) is whether he is a manager. In the absence of a statutory definition, this Court has defined \u201c[a] \u2018manager\u2019 [as] one who \u2018conducts, directs, or supervises something.\u2019 \u201d Miller v. B.H.B. Enters., Inc., 152 N.C. App. 532, 539-40, 568 S.E.2d 219, 225 (2002) (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1372 (1968)).\nIn Wallace v. M, M & R, Inc., 165 N.C. App. 827, 833, 600 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2004), this Court addressed whether an employee of the defendants\u2019 nightclub was a manager within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(c). In concluding that the employee was in fact a manager, the Court found significant the fact that: (1) the employee was designated a manager; (2) the employee had supervisory powers; (3) the employee gave input on hiring and firing decisions and participated in personnel meetings; (4) the employee set work schedules for other employees; and (5) the employee handled money and controlled dispensing alcohol. Id.\nIn this case, Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s title at the time of the incident was Assistant Dining Room Manager, and he introduced himself as the \u201cmanager in charge\u201d when he first came over to the Everharts\u2019 table. Renaldo Famble, the restaurant\u2019s Service Manager and Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s boss, testified that \u201cevery assistant manager is responsible for the restaurant.\u201d O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 regional operations director further testified that in Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s position, he \u201cdirected] what is going on on the shift,\u201d including authorizing customer refunds, comping meals, and coordinating other employees\u2019 breaks. Mr. Witherspoon also gave input on \u201cdeciding] who is hired and who is fired[.]\u201d Based on Wallace, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Witherspoon was a \u201cmanager\u201d of O\u2019Charley\u2019s for punitive damages purposes. See also Miller, 152 N.C. App. at 539-40, 568 S.E.2d at 225 (holding employee was manager where employee had supervisory powers, including power to hire and fire employees, and worked \u201cdirectly under\u201d and \u201chand-in-hand\u201d with owner of restaurant).\nFinally, O\u2019Charley\u2019s argues that Ms. Everhart failed to produce sufficient evidence that the willful and wanton conduct, if any, was related to Ms. Everhart\u2019s injuries. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(a) requires that the fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct be \u201crelated to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded[.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) Citing to medical causation cases, O\u2019Charley\u2019s asserts that Ms. Everhart was required to present evidence of a causal connection between Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s conduct and Ms. Everhart\u2019s injuries.\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 argument, however, overlooks the fact that the statute is not phrased in terms of causation, but instead uses the phrase \u201crelated to.\u201d Id. Where, as here, \u201ca statute does not define a term, we must rely on the common and ordinary meaning of the words used.\u201d Martin v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 194 N.C. App. 716, 722, 670 S.E.2d 629, 634 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 374, 678 S.E.2d 665 (2009). The term \u201crelated\u201d is defined as \u201chaving a relationship\u201d or \u201cconnected by reason of an established or discoverable relation.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1916 (1968). See State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 329, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449-50 (2009) (using dictionary definition to determine ordinary meaning of word in statute where statute did not define term). This definition does not denote a causal connection, and, therefore, we cannot import a causation requirement into the statute. See State v. Hardy, 67 N.C. App. 122, 125, 312 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1984) (holding that unambiguous statutes \u201cmust be construed as written\u201d and courts are \u201cwithout power to interpolate or to superimpose provisions not contained therein\u201d).\nIndeed, this Court, in addressing the necessary relationship between the defendant\u2019s aggravating conduct and the plaintiff\u2019s injuries, has previously held that the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(c) requires only that a plaintiff demonstrate a \u201cconnection between the [aggravating conduct] and plaintiff[\u2018s] alleged harm.\u201d Schenk v. HNA Holdings, Inc., 170 N.C. App. 555, 560-61, 613 S.E.2d 503, 508, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 177, 626 S.E.2d 649 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 argument, Ms. Everhart was not required to prove that the willful and wanton conduct caused Ms. Everhart\u2019s injuries, but rather was required to prove a connection between that conduct and her injuries.\nWe hold Ms. Everhart presented sufficient evidence of the necessary \u201cconnection.\u201d The Auto-Chlor warning label stated that if someone ingested the solution, poison control or a doctor should be contacted immediately and the person should not attempt to induce vomiting unless directed to do so by poison control or the doctor. The label also indicated that the person should try to sip water if possible. Because Mr. Witherspoon was following the O\u2019Charley\u2019s policy, he never attempted to find out if Ms. Everhart had ingested Auto-Chlor and'never read the label to learn what first aid steps were necessary to treat ingestion of Auto-Chlor. Despite the fact that the solution\u2019s warning label explicitly instructed not to induce vomiting and to try to drink water if possible, Ms. Everhart testified that she was in the bathroom for approximately five minutes trying to make herself throw up. Ms. Everhart was never told to try to sip water and she testified that she had blisters and sores on her lips and in her mouth, had a sore throat, and experienced nausea, heartburn, indigestion, and reflux for a week afterward. This evidence was sufficient to show a connection between the failure to investigate what Ms. Everhart drank and her injuries.\nIn addition to her physical injuries, Ms. Everhart also testified about her emotional distress while driving to the hospital:\nWe had no information at all, just my having tasted it and what I had spat out had already bleached out my shirt \u2014 I mean, in that short a period of time. And I was scared because I felt like if this liquid had done this to my shirt that quickly, what is it doing to my insides[?] I mean, I was just petrified. I didn\u2019t know what was going on inside.\nA jury could also find a connection between this evidence of Ms. Everhart\u2019s emotional injuries and Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s deliberate disregard of the need to obtain information regarding what Ms. Everhart had swallowed.\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s also urges that expert evidence was required to prove the necessary relationship, but relies on authority addressing causation and not a \u201cconnection\u201d or \u201crelated[ness].\u201d The actual issue set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(c) does not, in this case, require expert evidence. See Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (recognizing that expert evidence is not necessary to prove causation in the \u201c \u2018many instances in which the facts in evidence are such that any layman of average intelligence and experience would know what caused the injuries complained of\u2019 \u201d (quoting Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 325, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965))).\nWith respect to Ms. Everhart\u2019s emotional distress, contrary to O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 contention, this Court has held that even in cases involving intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, expert medical evidence is not necessarily required. See Pacheco v. Rogers & Breece, Inc., 157 N.C. App. 445, 450, 579 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2003) (holding that \u201c[p]roof of \u2018severe emotional distress\u2019 does not necessarily require medical evidence or testimony\u201d); McKnight v. Simpson\u2019s Beauty Supply, Inc., 86 N.C. App. 451, 454, 358 S.E.2d 107, 109 (1987) (concluding trial court erred in dismissing claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for lack of expert evidence because \u201c[t]hough expert medical testimony may be necessary to establish that some types of emotional distress were suffered or that it was caused by a defendant\u2019s outrageous conduct, such testimony was not indispensable to a jury trial on plaintiff\u2019s claim\u201d). We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, Ms. Everhart\u2019s testimony was competent to address whether her emotional injuries were related to the willful and wanton conduct.\nThus, we conclude that the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Everhart, was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably conclude that Mr. Witherspoon\u2019s refusal, pursuant to corporate policy, to find out what Ms. Everhart had ingested and learn what first aid was necessary is \u201crelated\u201d to Ms. Everhart\u2019s injuries. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 motion for JNOV as to the punitive damages verdict.\nIll\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s also argues that the trial court should have granted its motion for a new trial. It claims (1) that the punitive damages award was \u201cgrossly excessive\u201d and violated its due process rights and (2) the jury manifestly disregarded the trial court\u2019s instructions in calculating the amount of punitive damages to award.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lD-25(b) provides that \u201c[p]unitive damages awarded against a defendant shall not exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), whichever is greater.\u201d The statute further states that \u201c[i]f a trier of fact returns a verdict for punitive damages in excess of the maximum amount specified under this subsection, the trial court shall reduce the award and enter judgment for punitive damages in the maximum amount.\u201d Id. Here, as the jury awarded Ms. Everhart $10,000.00 in compensatory damages, the trial court reduced the jury\u2019s punitive damages award of $350,000.00 to $250,000.00 in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lD-25(b).\nWhether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674, 687, 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1682-83 (2001) (\u201c[Cjourts of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts\u2019 determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.\u201d). O\u2019Charley\u2019s contends that \u201cthe punitive damages award can only be described as grossly excessive and arbitrary[,]\u201d because \u201c[e]ven with the Court\u2019s statutory reduction of the award from $350,000 to $250,000, [O\u2019Charley\u2019s] faces an award that is 25 times the amount of the compensatory damages.\u201d\nWhen a punitive damages award is \u201cgrossly excessive,\u201d it violates the due process elapse of the Fourteenth Amendment. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809, 822, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1596 (1996). The BMW Court set out three \u201cguideposts\u201d for evaluating whether a punitive damages award is grossly excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant\u2019s conduct; (2) the disparity between the compensatory and punitive damages awards; and (3) available sanctions for comparable conduct. Id. at 574-75, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826, 116 S. Ct. at 1598-99.\nThis Court applied the BMW factors in Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 562 S.E.2d 82 (2002), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004). In Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 689, 562 S.E.2d at 94, the evidence showed that one of the defendant\u2019s employees attacked Mr. Rhyne, putting him in a chokehold for several minutes, while another employee pushed Mrs. Rhyne to the ground and prevented her from helping her husband. The defendant also took out assault charges against Mr. Rhyne in an attempt to prevent them from pressing charges against defendant\u2019s employees. Id. At trial, the jury awarded Mr. Rhyne $8,255.00 and Mrs. Rhyne $10,730.00 in compensatory damages. Id. at 676, 562 S.E.2d at 87. The jury further awarded the Rhynes $11.5 million each in punitive damages. Id. As in this case, the trial court reduced the punitive damages award to $250,000.00 each under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-25. Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 676, 562 S.E.2d at 87.\nIn holding that the punitive damage awards were not unconstitutionally excessive, this Court, considering the first BMW factor, emphasized the violent nature of the defendant\u2019s employees\u2019 conduct and that it went beyond mere negligence. Id. at 689, 562 S.E.2d at 94. With respect to the second factor, the Court considered the ratios of the punitive damages to the compensatory damages \u2014 \u201c30 to 1 for Mr. Rhyne and 23 to 1 for Mrs. Rhyne\u201d \u2014 to be \u201crelatively low.\u201d Id. As for the third BMW factor, the Court declined to consider the punitive damages award excessive in light of the General Assembly\u2019s judgment concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue. Id.\nAs in Rhyne, we conclude that application of the BMW factors to the facts of this case similarly establishes that the punitive damages award is not unconstitutionally excessive. As for the reprehensibility of O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 conduct, the first BMW factor, the evidence tends to show that Mr. Witherspoon knew that Ms. Everhart had drunk some unknown substance that had made her ill, but he consciously chose not to identify what had actually been served to her or to determine the recommended first aid protocol until after she had already gone to the hospital. Instead, Mr. Witherspoon, consistent with the O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 policy, focused on completing an incident report form used to anticipate litigation against O\u2019Charley\u2019s, ignoring Mr. Everhart\u2019s concerns about his wife\u2019s safety. O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 policy, as followed by Mr. Witherspoon \u2014 -which places priority on protecting O\u2019Charley\u2019s against civil liability over first aid for customers unless the customer is \u201cconvulsing, passed out on the floor,\u201d or \u201cbleeding profusely\u201d \u2014 rises to the level of reprehensible conduct.\nAs for the second BMW factor, the ratio of Ms. Everhart\u2019s punitive damages to compensatory damages \u2014 $250,000 to $10,000 = 25:1\u2014 falls within the same range as the plaintiffs\u2019 awards in Rhyne that this Court held was \u201crelatively low.\u201d Id. Accordingly, based on Rhyne, we hold that the ratio in this case is not unconstitutionally excessive under BMW. See also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462, 125 L. Ed. 2d 366, 382, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2723 (1993) (concluding that punitive damages award 526 times amount of actual damages was \u201ccertainly large\u201d but not \u201cso \u2018grossly excessive\u2019 as to be beyond the power of the State to allow\u201d).\nThe third BMW \u201cguidepost\u201d requires consideration of civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct, giving \u201c \u2018 \u201csubstantial deference\u201d to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.\u2019 \u201d Rhyne, 149 N.C. App. at 688-89, 562 S.E.2d at 94 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 584, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 832, 116 S. Ct. at 1603). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-129 (2007), the only statute cited by O\u2019Charley\u2019s, prohibits the adulteration of food. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-124.1(a) (2007) imposes a maximum civil penalty of $2,000.00 for violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-129. O\u2019Charley\u2019s views the \u201cgross disparity between the punitive damages award here and the only comparable civil penalty [as] yet another indicium of the award\u2019s excessiveness.\u201d\nIn addition to the civil penalty, however, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-124 makes the violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 106-129 a Class 2 misdemeanor. In turn, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.23(c) (2007) provides that the maximum sentence for a Class 2 misdemeanor is 60 days imprisonment. The Supreme Court in BMW noted that it had upheld punitive damage awards \u201c \u2018much in excess of the fine that could be imposed,\u2019 \u201d where \u201cimprisonment was also authorized in the criminal context.\u201d 517 U.S. at 583, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 831, 116 S. Ct. at 1603 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1, 23, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991)). Thus, in cases such as this one, exposure to criminal liability for comparable conduct justifies a larger punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio. Ultimately, in light of the reprehensibility of O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 conduct, the relatively low ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and the civil and criminal sanctions that might have been imposed for similar conduct, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the punitive damages award in this case does not violate O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 due process rights.\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s argues that, in any event, the trial court should have granted its motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(5) (\u201c[m]anifest disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court\u201d), Rule 59(a)(6) (\u201c[e]xcessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice\u201d), and Rule 59(a)(7) (\u201c [insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is contrary to law\u201d). Denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5) and (6) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict is reviewed under a de novo standard. N.C. Indus. Capital, LLC v. Clayton, 185 N.C. App. 356, 371, 649 S.E.2d 14, 25 (2007).\nTurning first to the sufficiency of the evidence, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-35 (2007) provides that in determining the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact \u201c[m]ay consider only that evidence that relates\u201d to: (1) \u201c[t]he reprehensibility of the defendant\u2019s motives and conduct\u201d; (2) \u201c[t]he likelihood, at the relevant time, of serious harm\u201d; (3) \u201c[t]he degree of the defendant\u2019s awareness of the probable consequences of its conduct\u201d; (4) \u201c[t]he duration of the defendant\u2019s conduct\u201d; (5) \u201c[t]he actual damages suffered by the claimant\u201d; (6) \u201c[a]ny concealment by the defendant of the facts or consequences of its conduct\u201d; (7) \u201c[t]he existence and frequency of any similar past conduct by the defendant\u201d; (8) \u201c[wjhether the defendant profited from the conduct\u201d; and (9) \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s ability to pay punitive damages, as evidenced by its revenues or net worth.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lD-35(2)(a)-(i). Without specifically citing to any factor, defendant argues that there is a \u201cpaucity of evidence supporting the jury\u2019s excessive award.\u201d\nIn concluding that the punitive damages award was \u201cjustified,\u201d the trial court found, based on the evidence presented, (1) that after drinking the Auto-Chlor mixture, Ms. Everhart believed she had ingested \u201cpoison\u201d and was in great emotional distress while trying to induce vomiting in the bathroom; (2) that in response to the incident Mr. Witherspoon interviewed Mr. Everhart to complete an incident report form, which is used to collect biographical data and other information in anticipation of litigation; (3) that it was O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 policy to complete the incident report form before investigating the nature of the chemical unless the customer was \u201cbleeding, passed out, or convulsing on the floor\u201d; (4) that Mr. Witherspoon \u201crefused to respond\u201d to Mr. Everhart\u2019s question about whether he knew what Ms. Everhart had been served, \u201cinstead only asking the next question on the incident report\u201d; (5) that when Ms. Everhart\u2019s server returned to the table, Mr. Witherspoon neither asked the server if he knew what was in the pitcher nor directed the server to find out; and (6) that at no time before Ms. Everhart left for the hospital did \u201cMr. Witherspoon look for the label of the sanitizing solution to provide to Mr. or Mrs. Everhart instructions on what to do or not to do for her injuries.\u201d We agree that the evidence would permit the jury to find these facts and that these facts support the jury\u2019s punitive damages award in light of the factors set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 lD-35(2). See Greene v. Royster, 187 N.C. App. 71, 80, 652 S.E.2d 277, 283 (2007) (holding that trial court\u2019s order denying motion for new punitive damages trial contained sufficient findings, \u201call supported by evidence adduced at trial, in support of its conclusion that the jury\u2019s punitive damages verdict was amply supported by the evidence\u201d).\nO\u2019Charley\u2019s next argues that \u201cby implication\u201d from the lack of evidence, \u201cthe jury disregarded the Court\u2019s instructions, and instead based its verdict on passion and prejudice against [O\u2019Charley\u2019s].\u201d In Greene, 187 N.C. App. at 81, 652 S.E.2d at 283, however, this Court upheld the denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) where the \u201cdefendants offered the trial court no facts which support their argument that the jury acted with passion and prejudice.\u201d Similarly, here, O\u2019Charley\u2019s points to nothing in the record \u2014 except the award itself \u2014 that might indicate that the jury disregarded the trial court\u2019s instructions or awarded punitive damages under the influence of passion or prejudice. O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 arguments instead repeat the contentions we found unpersuasive regarding its JNOV motion. As O\u2019Charley\u2019s fails to make any separate and distinct arguments in support of its motion for a new trial, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying O\u2019Charley\u2019s\u2019 motion for a new trial.\nNo Error.\nJudges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.\n. In affirming this Court\u2019s decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-25, but did not address whether the amount of punitive damages awarded in the case was unconstitutionally excessive.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Morrow Alexander Porter & Whitley, PLLC, by John Carl Vermitsky, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by D. Blaine Sanders and Andrew W. J. Tarr, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATHERINE HANNA EVERHART, Plaintiff v. O\u2019CHARLEY\u2019S INC., Defendant\nNo. COA08-1454\n(Filed 6 October 2009)\n1. Evidence\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 evidence of prior lawsuit\u2014 opened door\nThe trial court did not err during the punitive damages phase of a negligence trial by admitting evidence of prior allegations that a customer had been served bleach in another of defendant\u2019s restaurants. Defendant \u201copened the door\u201d to such evidence.\n2. Damages and Remedies\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict (JNOV)\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability case arising from a restaurant serving a customer cleaning solution by denying defendant\u2019s motion for (JNOV) on the issue of punitive damages. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably conclude that an employee\u2019s insistence on following company policy and completing a report before determining what plaintiff had ingested and the appropriate first aid was related to plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Plaintiff\u2019s testimony was competent to address whether her emotional injuries were related to the willful and wanton conduct.\n3. Damages and Remedies\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 motion for new trial\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial because the facts support the jury\u2019s punitive damages award in light of the factors set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 lD-35(2) and in BMW, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 April 2008 and order entered 3 June 2008 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2009.\nMorrow Alexander Porter & Whitley, PLLC, by John Carl Vermitsky, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by D. Blaine Sanders and Andrew W. J. Tarr, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0142-01", "first_page_order": 168, "last_page_order": 187 }