{ "id": 4171579, "name": "PARKDALE AMERICA, LLC, Plaintiff v. REGINALD S. HINTON, in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Revenue, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Parkdale America, LLC v. Hinton", "decision_date": "2009-10-06", "docket_number": "No. COA09-10", "first_page": "275", "last_page": "281", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 275" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637517 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634820 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639168 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634918 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498604, 2494254, 2500149, 2495486, 2493599 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0635-04", "/nc/327/0635-05", "/nc/327/0635-02", "/nc/327/0635-01", "/nc/327/0635-03" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523766 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135857 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564966 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650", "parenthetical": "\"declin[ing]\" to consider as indicative of legislative intent committee's version of bill omitting certain provision" }, { "page": "650", "parenthetical": "concluding agency's \"interpretation of the statute at issue is irrelevant\" where legislative intent can be \"derived from the plain language of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "\"declin[ing]\" to consider as indicative of legislative intent committee's version of bill omitting certain provision" }, { "page": "202-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567865 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597493 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491616, 491810, 491436, 491885, 491438, 491569, 491772, 491391 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0166-06", "/nc/357/0166-05", "/nc/357/0166-02", "/nc/357/0166-01", "/nc/357/0166-04", "/nc/357/0166-08", "/nc/357/0166-07", "/nc/357/0166-03" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 430 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251989 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155898 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493270 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740457 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794819 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 S.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "\"The legislative intent is the essence of the law and the guiding star in the interpretation thereof.\"" }, { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622519 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211", "parenthetical": "\"The legislative intent is the essence of the law and the guiding star in the interpretation thereof.\"" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks' omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks' omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571604 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(23)" }, { "page": "(23)(b)", "parenthetical": "\"section (23)(b)\"" }, { "page": "(23)(b)" }, { "page": "(23)(b)" }, { "page": "(23)" }, { "page": "(23)(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739573 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790975 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0280-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 864, "char_count": 16153, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3783174231393413 }, "sha256": "26070b365f1709a0d12a7c808f3c9552ac1a4ee1093ab19bf4de1acd93948794", "simhash": "1:9c0ed4025432b636", "word_count": 2712 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "PARKDALE AMERICA, LLC, Plaintiff v. REGINALD S. HINTON, in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Revenue, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant Reginald S. Hinton, the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Revenue (\u201cDOR\u201d), appeals from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Parkdale America, LLC. DOR primarily argues that Parkdale failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that the packaging materials it uses to ship goods to its customers qualifies for an exemption under North Carolina\u2019s sales and use tax, and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Parkdale. Because we conclude that Parkdale\u2019s packaging material is encompassed by the tax exemption, we affirm.\nFacts\nParkdale manufactures and sells industrial yarn. As the yarn is spun, it is wound onto cones. To ship its cones of yam to customers, Parkdale uses the \u201cYarn Pak,\u201d which is manufactured by Shuert Industries, Inc. Parkdale\u2019s sales contracts with its customers require the return of the Yarn Paks for recycling and reuse, and Parkdale retains ownership of the Yam Paks.\nThe Yam Pak consists of several interlocking components \u2014 a bottom pallet, a top pallet, and up to six dividers \u2014 that allow it to hold up to 100 individual cones of yarn. The bottom pallet of the Yarn Pak is approximately 55 inches long and 45 inches wide and made of high-density polyethylene. The bottom pallet is roughly 1/4 of an inch thick and weighs approximately 22 pounds. The plastic bottom is molded into a \u201cgrid pattern ... to cradle dozens of different configurations of tubes and cones of yarn.\u201d Around the circumference of the pallet is a lip extending upwards approximately three to four inches. The lip covers the bottom half of the yarn cones and, along with the molded indentations, holds the cones in place in the pallet.\nAfter the yarn cones are placed in the Yarn Pak\u2019s bottom pallet, a divider is placed on top of the cones. The divider is about 1/8 of an inch thick and weighs roughly seven pounds. Similar to the bottom pallet of the Yarn Pak, the divider is 55 inches long and 45 inches wide. Each divider also has a lip on all four sides that extends downward and covers 1 1/2 inches of the top of the yarn cones positioned in the bottom pallet. Up to seven layers of cones may be stacked in a Yarn Pak, using six dividers.\nThe Yam Pak top pallet is similar to the bottom, made of polyethylene with molded indentations to fit around the cones of yam. Like the bottom pallet and dividers, the top pallet is 55 inches long, 45 inches wide, and a 1/4 of an inch thick. It also weighs approximately 22 pounds. The top pallet also has a lip that extends roughly three inches downward on all four sides, holding the top layer of cones in place. Parkdale normally buys the Yam Pak by the set, including the top and bottom pallets and the dividers.\nAfter the cones of yam are packed into the Yarn Pak, Parkdale typically wraps it in \u201cshrink wrap,\u201d overlapping the edges of the bottom and top pallets as well as the dividers. The shrink wrap is not part of the Yam Pak and is not necessary to hold the Yarn Pak together. It is used as a protective barrier against dust and moisture during shipping.\nAlso, in some instances, Parkdale uses a single 1/2 inch plastic band, strapped vertically around the Yam Pak for additional security. Whether Parkdale uses the plastic band is up to the customer and it routinely ships Yam Paks without the band.\nOn 13 June 2006, DOR issued a Notice of Sales and Use Tax Assessment to Parkdale for the period of 1 January 2003 through 31 December 2005. DOR assessed Parkdale $223,492.06 based on Parkdale\u2019s purchase of the Yarn Packs. The total assessment included $164,359.67 in taxes, $41,089.92 in penalties, and $18,042.47 in interest. Under protest, Parkdale paid $186,875.06 in taxes and interest on 28 November 2006. In a 4 January 2007 letter, DOR waived the $41,089.92 in penalties. When DOR denied Parkdale\u2019s request to refund the taxes and interest paid, Parkdale filed suit to recover these amounts. After filing an answer generally denying Parkdale\u2019s claim, DOR moved for summary judgment. In an order entered 13 August 2008, the trial court denied DOR\u2019s motion and granted summary judgment to Parkdale, ordering DOR to refund Parkdale $186,875.06, plus interest. DOR timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nDOR argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Parkdale. On appeal, an order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 285, 624 S.E.2d 620, 625 (2006). \u201cSummary judgment is appropriate if \u2018the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any -material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007) (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).\nOn appeal, DOR contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Parkdale failed to establish that its Yarn Paks qualify for an exemption under the North Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.1 et seq. (2007). Both DOR and Parkdale focus on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13(23) (2007), which provides an exemption from the use tax for specified \u201cpackaging items.\u201d Pertinent here, the statute provides an exemption for: \u201cA container that is used as packaging by the owner of the container or another person to enclose tangible personal property for delivery to a purchaser of the property and is required to be returned to its owner for reuse.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13(23)(b) (\u201csection (23)(b)\u201d). Parkdale, as the party \u201cclaim[ing] an exemption or exception from tax coverage,\u201d bears the \u201cburden of bringing [itjself within the exemption or exception.\u201d Canteen Service v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 256 N.C. 155, 163, 123 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1962).\nAt oral argument, DOR conceded that, for purposes of section (23)(b), a Yarn Pak is a \u201ccontainer\u201d; that it is \u201cused as packaging\u201d; that it holds \u201ctangible personal property\u201d; and that it is \u201crequired to be returned to [Parkdale] for reuse.\u201d DOR claims, however, that Parkdale is not entitled to the exemption because \u201c[t]he plain language [of the statute] only exempts containers that enclose tangible personal property.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\n\u201cA question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law\u201d and the first principle of statutory interpretation is to \u201cascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.\u201d Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks' omitted); accord Watson Industries v. Shaw, Comr. of Revenue, 235 N.C. 203, 211, 69 S.E.2d 505, 511 (1952) (\u201cThe legislative intent is the essence of the law and the guiding star in the interpretation thereof.\u201d). The primary \u201cconsideration in determining legislative intent is the words chosen by the legislature.\u201d O & M Indus, v. Smith Eng\u2019r Co., 360 N.C. 263, 267-68, 624 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2006). In interpreting statutes, courts \u201cfirst determine whether the statute is clear and unambiguous, and if so, [the court] applies] the words in their plain and definite meaning.\u201d State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207, 211, 639 S.E.2d 437, 440 (2007). Only where the statutory language is ambiguous is \u201cjudicial construction [necessary] to ascertain the legislative will.\u201d Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990).\nNeither party contends that section (23)(b)\u2019s use of \u201cenclose\u201d is ambiguous, nor do we perceive the term to be ambiguous. Instead, as the term is not defined in the statute, the parties focus on the ordinary meaning of the word. \u201cWhere words of a statute are not defined, the courts presume that the legislature intended to give them their ordinary meaning determined according to the context in which those words are ordinarily used.\u201d Regional Acceptance Corp. v. Powers, 327 N.C. 274, 278, 394 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1990). Where, as here, there is no \u201ccontextual definition, courts may look to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words within a statute.\u201d Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Sens., Inc., 351 N.C. 634, 638, 528 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2000).\nThe word \u201cenclose\u201d is defined as: \u201cto close in\u201d; \u201cto fence off or in\u201d; or \u201cto seize or grasp securely: hold.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 746 (1968). In State v. Cockerham, 155 N.C. App. 729, 574 S.E.2d 694, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 166, 580 S.E.2d 702 (2003), this Court similarly relied on the dictionary definition of the word \u201cenclose\u201d in interpreting a criminal statute, noting that the term means \u201c \u2018[t]o surround on all sides; fence in; close in\u2019 \u201d; or \u201c \u2018[t]o contain, especially as to shelter of hide ....\u2019\u201d Id. at 734, 574 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 430 (1978)) (first and second alterations added).\nAs the trial court observed at the summary judgment hearing, the Yam Paks satisfy all the definitions of \u201cenclose\u201d set out in Cockerham except the definition that they \u201csurround on all sides.\u201d The color photographs in the record support this conclusion, showing the Yam Paks as comprising a bottom pallet and a top pallet, each with a lip of several inches that covers the cones of yarn. The pallets also have molded indentations in them so that when the cones and dividers are layered, the pallets, cones, and dividers lock into place. When properly stacked so that the components are interlocking, if the Yam Pak is placed on its side, the yam cones do not fall out. Thus the Yam Pak is a container that \u201cencloses\u201d tangible personal property, qualifying for the section (23) (b) tax exemption.\nFocusing on Cockerham\u2019s definition that to \u201cenclose\u201d means \u201c \u2018[t]o surround on all sides,\u2019 \u201d id., DOR appears to argue that in order for the Yarn Paks to \u201cenclose\u201d the yam cones, the Yarn Paks must completely or fully enclose them, without \u201cleav[ing] the yarn exposed between the pallets and separators.\u201d Adopting DOR\u2019s position that a container must \u201ccompletely\u201d or \u201cfully\u201d enclose property in order to qualify for the exemption would effectively add language to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13(23)(b) not adopted by the Legislature. This Court has \u201cno power to add to or subtract from the language of the statute.\u201d Ferguson v. Riddle, 233 N.C. 54, 57, 62 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1950).\nMoreover, the three to four inch lip that runs around the circumference of the bottom and top pallets of the Yam Pak do, in fact, surround the cones on all sides. That the lips do not completely or fully encapsulate the cones does not mean that they are not \u201cenclosed\u201d for purposes of section (23) (b). As the trial court remarked: \u201cIf you have got a horse and you want to fence him in or enclose him, then you fence him in but that doesn\u2019t mean you can\u2019t stick your hand through the fence.\u201d\nIn arguing that the General Assembly must have intended to exclude \u201cpackaging items\u201d like the Yarn Pak from the exemption in section (23)(b), DOR relies extensively on legislative committee reports and communications between DOR and the committee considering the proposed exemption. Our Supreme Court has stressed, however, that \u201c[i]n determining legislative intent, [courts] do[] not look to the record of the internal deliberations of committees of the legislature considering proposed legislation.\u201d Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 657, 403 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1991). Nor is \u201c[testimony, even by members of the Legislature which adopted the statute, as to its purpose and the construction intended to be given by the Legislature to its terms, . . . competent evidence upon which the court can make its determination as to the meaning of the statutory provision.\u201d Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 332-33, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967). Thus the committee reports and memoranda are not proper considerations in interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13(23)(b). See N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 202, 675 S.E.2d 641, 650 (2009) (\u201cdeclin[ing]\u201d to consider as indicative of legislative intent committee\u2019s version of bill omitting certain provision).\nIn any event, the concern expressed in the communications between DOR and the legislative committee was whether the language in the proposed legislation was overly broad in that it might exempt \u201crailroad pallets\u201d from the use tax. Although the Yarn Pak is in part comprised of a bottom and top \u201cpallet,\u201d the Yarn Pak as a whole is distinct from railroad pallets, which are used as skid plates to transport heavy objects other than cones of yam. Our holding in this case relates only to Yam Paks \u2014 not railroad pallets.\nIn support of its argument that the Yam Paks do not \u201cenclose\u201d property as that term is used in section (23) (b), DOR cites to In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1974), where the Supreme Court held that \u201ca provision in a tax statute providing an exemption from the tax, otherwise imposed, is to be construed strictly against the taxpayer and in favor of the State.\u201d As the Court in Clayton-Marcus further explained, however, this \u201crule[] come[s] into play . . . only when there is ambiguity in the statute. When the meaning of the statute is clear, there is no need for construction and the clear intent of the Legislature must be given effect by the courts.\u201d Id. Thus, the \u201cspecial canons of statutory construction\u201d that apply \u201c[wjhen the [ambiguous] statute under consideration is one concerning taxation,\u201d do not apply in this case, where the tax statute is unambiguous. Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001).\nDOR also contends that \u201c[b]ecause [DOR] is charged with the duty to interpret the Revenue Laws of the State, its interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13(23)b is prima facie correct.\u201d \u201cWhile it is true one of the most significant aids to construction in determining the meaning of a revenue law is the interpretation given such act by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement, .... [i]t is only in cases of doubt or ambiguity that the courts may allow themselves to be guided or influenced by an executive construction of a statute.\u201d Watson Industries, 235 N.C. at 211, 69 S.E.2d at 511 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord In re Total Care, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 517, 520, 393 S.E.2d 338, 340 (\u201cAlthough where an issue of statutory construction arises the construction adopted by the agency charged with implementing the statute may be considered, such an issue only arises where an ambiguity exists.\u201d), disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 635, 399 S.E.2d 122 (1990). Where, as here, the statutory language at issue is not ambiguous, it is the statute\u2019s plain language, not an agency\u2019s interpretation of it, that controls. See N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 363 N.C. at 202-03, 675 S.E.2d at 650 (concluding agency\u2019s \u201cinterpretation of the statute at issue is irrelevant\u201d where legislative intent can be \u201cderived from the plain language of the statute\u201d). We, therefore, conclude that Parkdale\u2019s Yarn Paks qualify for the tax exemption under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-164.13(23)(b) and affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment to Parkdale.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, by Deborah L. Fletcher and Christopher A. Hicks, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tenisha S. Jacobs, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PARKDALE AMERICA, LLC, Plaintiff v. REGINALD S. HINTON, in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Revenue, Defendant\nNo. COA09-10\n(Filed 6 October 2009)\nTaxation\u2014 sales and use tax \u2014 exemption\u2014packaging materials\nThe trial court did not err in a sales and use tax case by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff because the packaging materials plaintiff used to ship goods to its customers qualified for the tax exemption under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-164.13(23)(b).\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 13 August 2008 by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 August 2009.\nKatten Muchin Rosenman LLP, by Deborah L. Fletcher and Christopher A. Hicks, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tenisha S. Jacobs, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0275-01", "first_page_order": 301, "last_page_order": 307 }