{ "id": 4171791, "name": "CHRISTOPHER A. MUSI and PAMELA SABALOS, Plaintiffs v. THE TOWN OF SHALLOTTE and THE TOWN OF SHALLOTTE BOARD OF ALDERMEN, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Musi v. Town of Shallotte", "decision_date": "2009-10-20", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1522", "first_page": "379", "last_page": "387", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 379" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638766 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407", "parenthetical": "quoting Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 271, 302 S.E.2d 204, 214 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639350 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639196 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710415 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8186045 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "quoting Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 271, 302 S.E.2d 204, 214 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999846 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "citing Barham v. Hawk, 165 N.C. App. 708, 721, 600 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2004). (2009)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 U.S. 183", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3902736 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-88", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "844", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/277/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2563061 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523290 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "quoting Nelson v. City of Burlington, 80 N.C. App. 285, 288, 341 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436804 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "quoting Nelson v. City of Burlington, 80 N.C. App. 285, 288, 341 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E. 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628580, 8633574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0051-01", "/nc/214/0850-02" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154414 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724761 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 183 (1965), and Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529622 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 183 (1965), and Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313678 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522879 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549555 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524247 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523581 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771", "parenthetical": "quoting Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219914 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "quoting Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523215 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562814 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795-96", "parenthetical": "quoting Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 620, 227 S.E.2d 576, 583 (1976), and Heery v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 61 N.C. App. 612, 614, 300 S.E.2d 869, 870 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241604 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485-86", "parenthetical": "quoting Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 620, 227 S.E.2d 576, 583 (1976), and Heery v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 61 N.C. App. 612, 614, 300 S.E.2d 869, 870 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190224 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8211509 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9127650 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249087 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507", "parenthetical": "internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365903 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359", "parenthetical": "internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (other citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151090 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (other citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0334-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 972, "char_count": 19778, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.461680913764093e-08, "percentile": 0.4851701778752352 }, "sha256": "a1428e5bd0bb8cdf52629cdf4f579f74bac79781d3172817dc0fa7775af10c2b", "simhash": "1:0b41fc8a383f2446", "word_count": 3248 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "CHRISTOPHER A. MUSI and PAMELA SABALOS, Plaintiffs v. THE TOWN OF SHALLOTTE and THE TOWN OF SHALLOTTE BOARD OF ALDERMEN, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nPlaintiffs (Christopher Musi and Pamela Sabalos) appeal the denial of their summary judgment motion and entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Town of Shallotte. We affirm.\nThis appeal arises from a zoning decision of the Board of Alderman of the Town of Shallotte, in Brunswick County, North Carolina. The property that was rezoned (the subject property) consists of fifteen separate tracts with six different owners. The subject property is located on the west side of the Shallotte River, between the Town of Shallotte and the Atlantic Ocean, each a little over a mile away. In 2006 the subject property was subject to the zoning authority of Brunswick County, and had an R-7500 zoning designation.\nIn June 2006 owners of the subject property applied to the Town of Shallotte for satellite annexation and rezoning under several town zoning categories. The Town of Shallotte Planning Board voted to recommend to the Board of Aldermen that the application be denied. In September 2006 the applicants withdrew their request and filed a second application, which was also withdrawn before it was presented to the Board of Aldermen for consideration.\nIn October 2006 the owners and agents for the subject property submitted a third application for satellite annexation and rezoning by the Town of Shallotte. The zoning designations requested by the applicants permit a higher density of housing units than the Brunswick County R-7500 zoning to which the applicants were then subject. After consideration of the request at its November 2006 meeting, the Planning Board voted to recommend that the Board of Aldermen approve this application. On 6 March the Town of Shallotte Board of Aldermen conducted a public hearing to consider the application and voted to annex the subject property and to rezone it as requested in the application.\nOn 2 May 2007 Plaintiffs filed a Declaratory Judgment action against the Town of Shallotte and Shallotte\u2019s Board of Aldermen. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the rezoning was invalid, but did not challenge the Board\u2019s annexation of the subject property. The parties each moved for summary judgment, and a hearing was conducted on 13 May 2008. On 9 June 2008 the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, from which order Plaintiffs appealed to this Court. Plaintiffs have dismissed their claims against the Town of Shallotte Board of Aldermen, which is not a party to this appeal.\nStandard of Review\nPlaintiffs appeal from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment. Summary judgment is properly entered \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). On appeal, \u201c[w]e review atrial court\u2019s order granting or denying summary judgment de novo. \u2018Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment\u2019 for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d Craig v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P\u2019ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (other citations omitted)).\nThe present case was appropriate for entry of a summary judgment order, because it presents issues of law rather than fact:\nEach party based its claim upon the same sequence of events[, and]... [n] either party has challenged the accuracy or authenticity of the documents establishing the occurrence of these events. Although the parties disagree on the legal significance of the established facts, the facts themselves are not in dispute. Consequently, we conclude that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact surrounding the trial court\u2019s summary judgment order.\nAdams v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 148 N.C. App. 356, 359, 558 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). We next determine whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants.\nPreliminarily, we address the issue of standing. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity of the Defendants\u2019 rezoning.\nStanding \u201crefers to whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy so as to properly seek adjudication of the matter.\u201d Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 114, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002) (citations omitted). \u201cStanding is a necessary prerequisite to a court\u2019s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 324, 560 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2002). \u201cStanding is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.\" Cook v. Union Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 185 N.C. App. 582, 588, 649 S.E.2d 458, 464 (2007) (citation omitted).\nDefendants argue that, for Plaintiffs to have standing to file a declaratory judgment action challenging the rezoning, they must allege and prove that the rezoning caused them special damages. \u201c[S]pecial damage[s] are defined as a reduction in the value of his [petitioner\u2019s] own property.\u201d Sarda v. City/Cty. of Durham Bd. of Adjust., 156 N.C. App. 213, 215, 575 S.E.2d 829, 831 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nThis Court previously has held:\nA party has standing to challenge a zoning ordinance in an action for declaratory judgment only when it \u201chas a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter affected by the zoning ordinance[.]\u201d The standing requirement for a declaratory judgment action is therefore similar to the requirement that a party seeking review of a municipal decision by writ of certiorari suffer damages \u201cdistinct from the rest of the community.\u201d When a party seeks review by writ of certiorari, however, our courts have imposed an additional requirement that the party allege special damages in its complaint. This requirement arises from [certain statutes] which allow only \u201caggrieved\u201d persons to seek review by writ of certiorari. In contrast, the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . does not require a party seeking relief be an \u201caggrieved\u201d person or to otherwise allege special damages[.] [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254 (2007), and] ... we hold it is not required.\nVillage Creek Prop. Owners\u2019 Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Town of Edenton, 135 N.C. App. 482, 485-86, 520 S.E.2d 793, 795-96 (1999) (quoting Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 620, 227 S.E.2d 576, 583 (1976), and Heery v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 61 N.C. App. 612, 614, 300 S.E.2d 869, 870 (1983)) (footnotes omitted and other citations omitted). We find Village Creek applicable to the facts of this case, and hold that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Defendants\u2019 rezoning of the subject property.\nPlaintiffs argue first that Defendants\u2019 rezoning \u201cis illegal spot zoning and is, therefore, void.\u201d Accordingly, we must determine whether the rezoning at issue constituted spot zoning:\nSpot zoning is defined, in pertinent part, as a zoning ordinance or amendment that \u201csingles out and reclassifies a relatively small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to . . . relieve the small tract from restrictions to which the rest of the area is subjected.\u201d\nGood Neighbors of S. Davidson v. Town of Denton, 355 N.C. 254, 257, 559 S.E.2d 768, 771 (2002) (quoting Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972)). \u201cAn essential element of spot zoning is a small tract of land owned by a single person and surrounded by a much larger area uniformly zoned.\u201d Covington v. Town of Apex, 108 N.C. App. 231, 237, 423 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1992). We conclude that the subject property meets neither of these criteria for spot zoning.\nThe subject property does not have a common owner, but is comprised of fifteen (15) parcels, with six (6) owners. Plaintiffs allege that \u201ca rezoning of property owned by more than one person can still constitute spot zoning.\u201d In support of this proposition, Plaintiffs cite three cases. Two of these, Alderman v. Chatham County, 89 N.C. App. 610, 366 S.E.2d 885 (1988); and Lathan v. Bd. of Commissioners, 47 N.C. App. 357, 267 S.E.2d 30 (1980), involve the rezoning of property with a common owner, and thus shed no light on this issue. The third case cited by Plaintiffs is Budd v. Davie County, 116 N.C. App. 168, 447 S.E.2d 449 (1994), which addressed rezoning of (1) a tract of land owned by one person and, (2) a \u201cstrip of land\u201d running from the tract, and owned'by that person\u2019s son. We do not find Budd persuasive, for several reasons.\nFirstly, Budd\u2019s holding is internally inconsistent. After quoting the same definition of spot zoning given above, and even noting that an \u201cessential element of spot zoning is a small tract of land owned by a single person\u201d, the Court then holds that the rezoning in question, involving property with two different owners, was spot zoning.\nAdditionally, in Good Neighbors, a Supreme Court of North Carolina case decided after Budd, the Court reiterates the definition in Blades and Chrismon, including the requirement that the rezoning be of a parcel with one owner. To the extent that Good Neighbors conflicts with Budd, we are bound to follow Good Neighbors.\nThe judicial policy of stare decisis is followed by the courts of this state. Under this doctrine, \u201c[t]he determination of a point of law by a court will generally be followed by a court of the same or lower rank[.]\u201d . . . Moreover, this Court has no authority to overrule decisions of our Supreme Court and we have the responsibility to follow those decisions \u201cuntil otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.\u201d\nDunn v. Pate, 106 N.C. App. 56, 60, 415 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1992), rev\u2019d on other grounds by Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 431 S.E.2d 178 (1993) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 183 (1965), and Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985)). Consequently, this Court is bound to adhere to the rule set out in Good Neighbors and other Supreme Court of North Carolina cases.\nPlaintiffs acknowledge that the subject property has multiple owners, but assert that the rezoning can properly be analyzed as spot zoning, because (1) the owners of most of the tracts are members of the same extended family, and (2) the owners of the tracts have a \u201ccommon interest.\u201d Plaintiffs cite no authority for these exceptions to the general definition and we find none.\nWe also conclude that the subject property is not \u201csurrounded by a much larger area uniformly zoned,\u201d as required by Blades, 280 N.C. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45, and subsequent cases citing Blades. There is no precise definition of the area to be analyzed to determine whether a rezoned property is surrounded by a \u201cmuch larger area\u201d of uniform zoning. In this case, Plaintiffs chose to focus on the area within a one-mile radius of the subject property, and submitted a map of the zoning designations in this area. The map reveals that the one mile area around the subject property includes several zoning categories, including Brunswick County R-6000 and R-7500, and Shallotte Town R-10, RA-15, and Commercial Waterfront.\nMoreover, Plaintiffs do not articulate the reason for their choice of a one mile radius around the subject property, and we note that a significant part of this area consists of the waters of the Shallotte River. Examination of either a larger area around the subject property, or of the nearest mile of dry land reveals additional zoning designations.\nIn sum, the subject property was not the property of a single owner, and was not surrounded by a uniformly zoned area. We conclude that the rezoning did not constitute \u201cspot zoning\u201d as this term has been defined, and we do not reach the question of whether it was illegal spot zoning. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPlaintiffs also argue that \u201cthe Board of Aldermen failed to consider the suitability of the subject property for the entire range of uses permitted in the MF-10, RM-10 and R-10 zoning districts, and the rezoning is, therefore, void.\u201d We disagree.\nRe-zoning is considered a legislative act. Accordingly, zoning decisions are typically afforded great deference by reviewing courts and \u201c[w]hen the most that can be said against such ordinances is that whether it was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere []\" and in most circumstances, \u201cwill not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body[.]\u201d\nChildress v. Yadkin Cty., 186 N.C. App. 30, 34, 650 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2007) (quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938)) (other citation omitted). \u201c \u2018A duly adopted rezoning ordinance is presumed to be valid and the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish its invalidity.\u2019 \u201d Kerik v. Davidson Cty., 145 N.C. App. 222, 231, 551 S.E.2d 186, 192 (2001) (quoting Nelson v. City of Burlington, 80 N.C. App. 285, 288, 341 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1986)). However, \u201cwhen rezoning property from one general use district with fixed permitted uses to another general use district with fixed permitted uses, a city council must determine that the property is suitable for all uses permitted in the new general use districts ]\u201d Hall v. City of Durham, 323 N.C. 293, 305, 372 S.E.2d 564, 572 (1988).\nPlaintiffs argue that the Board of Aldermen voted to rezone the subject property without considering the various uses permitted by the zoning designation. Their position is based primarily on the fact that the request for rezoning was associated with a proposal to build multifamily condominiums. Plaintiffs assert that the Aldermen who voted in favor of the rezoning \u201cbelieved that the Rezoning would result in high-density multi-family dwellings being built\u201d in the rezoned area. Plaintiffs stress that the prospective developers \u201cmade no attempt to disguise their plans,\u201d suggesting that it is improper for rezoning to be considered in the context of a specific request or development proposal. However, it seems probable that most rezoning matters arise from a specific request by a party who hopes to build a particular building or development. Plaintiffs articulate no reason that if the Aldermen anticipated that a certain development would likely follow rezoning, this expectation would be inconsistent with the Board\u2019s consideration of other uses, in addition to the proposed development. Nor do Plaintiffs explain the reason proponents of rezoning should keep their proposals a secret or would be expected to \u201cdisguise\u201d their plans.\nWe have examined the record and conclude that there is ample evidence that the Board of Aldermen gave adequate consideration to the possible uses under the rezoning. The subject property was Brunswick County land that was annexed by the Town of Shallotte. Accordingly, the town replaced the county zoning categories with Shallotte\u2019s zoning designations. Rezoning allowed a greater density of housing, and it is undisputed that the issue of housing density was thoroughly addressed. However, most of the uses permitted by rezoning were already allowed by the previous Brunswick County zoning. Further, when the Aldermen were deposed, each one testified that he had considered the full range of permitted uses.\nIn Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 197 S.E. 706, the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the courts\u2019 role in reviewing zoning ordinances, and stated, in part:\nThe courts will not invalidate zoning ordinances duly adopted by a municipality unless it clearly appears that in the adoption of such ordinances the action of the city officials \u201chas no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense.\u201d\nId. at 55, 197 S.E. 706 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88, 72 L. Ed. 842, 844 (1928) (internal citation omitted)). In the instant case, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to establish that the Board of Aldermen did not conduct the proper assessment of the range of permitted uses in the rezoned areas, and that the rezoning is not void on this basis. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by excluding Exhibits BB and CC from the evidence at the summary judgment hearing. We disagree.\n\u201cWe review the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.\u201d Media Network, Inc. v. Long Haymes Carr, Inc., - N.C. App. -, -, 678 S.E.2d 671, 687 (2009) (citing Barham v. Hawk, 165 N.C. App. 708, 721, 600 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2004). (2009)). \u201cA trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason. A ruling committed to a trial court\u2019s discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citations omitted).\n- The exhibits that Plaintiffs sought to include in the evidence consist of letters from citizens opposed to certain construction plans that had been proposed for the subject property. Plaintiffs appeal from the Board of Aldermen\u2019s rezoning at its March, 2007 meeting. It is undisputed that these letters were not made a part of the record at this meeting. Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to argue on appeal that exclusion of these letters affected the outcome of the summary judgment proceeding:\n[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was inadmissible, plaintiffs have not shown prejudice. \u201cThe burden is on the appellant not only to show error, but to show prejudicial error, i. e., that a different result would have likely ensued had the error not occurred. G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 61 [(2007)].\u201d\nO\u2019Mara v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 184 N.C. App. 428, 440, 646 S.E.2d 400, 407 (2007) (quoting Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 271, 302 S.E.2d 204, 214 (1983)). This assignment of error is overruled. We conclude that the court did not err by entering summary judgment for Defendants and that its order should be\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Brough Law Firm, by Thomas C. Morphis, Jr., for Plaintiffs.", "Jess, Isenberg & Thompson, by Laura E. Thompson, for Defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHRISTOPHER A. MUSI and PAMELA SABALOS, Plaintiffs v. THE TOWN OF SHALLOTTE and THE TOWN OF SHALLOTTE BOARD OF ALDERMEN, Defendants\nNo. COA08-1522\n(Filed 20 October 2009)\n1. Declaratory Judgments\u2014 standing \u2014 allegation of special damages not required\nPlaintiffs had standing to file a declaratory judgment action challenging defendants\u2019 rezoning of property because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not require a party seeking relief to be an \u201caggrieved\u201d person or to otherwise allege special damages.\n2. Zoning\u2014 rezoning \u2014 spot zoning\nA rezoning was not spot zoning where the property did not have a single owner and was not surrounded by a uniformly zoned area. The question of whether it was illegal spot zoning was not reached.\n3. Zoning\u2014 rezoning \u2014 range of permitted uses\nPlaintiffs failed to establish that the Board of Aldermen did not conduct the proper assessment of the range of permitted uses in the pertinent rezoned areas, and thus the rezoning was not void on this basis.\n4. Evidence\u2014 exclusion of exhibits \u2014 summary judgment hearing\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain exhibits from evidence at a summary judgment hearing in a declaratory judgment action challenging rezoning.\nAppeal by Plaintiffs from judgment entered 9 June 2008 by Judge Thomas H. Lock in Brunswick County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2009.\nThe Brough Law Firm, by Thomas C. Morphis, Jr., for Plaintiffs.\nJess, Isenberg & Thompson, by Laura E. Thompson, for Defendants." }, "file_name": "0379-01", "first_page_order": 405, "last_page_order": 413 }