{ "id": 4171888, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LUCIANO DIAZ TELLEZ", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Tellez", "decision_date": "2009-11-03", "docket_number": "No. COA09-338", "first_page": "517", "last_page": "529", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 517" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639123 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 S.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631750, 12631751 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "first and second alterations added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/601/0863-02", "/se2d/601/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631749, 12631750, 12631722, 12631724, 12631665, 12631666, 12631743 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "first and second alterations added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/601/0862-02", "/se2d/601/0863-02", "/se2d/601/0536-02", "/se2d/601/0537-02", "/se2d/601/0861-02", "/se2d/601/0861-01", "/se2d/601/0858-02" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636327 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635625 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641935 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hagans, 177 N.C. App. 17, 23, 628 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631157 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/593/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631209, 12631211, 12631212, 12631213, 12631158, 12631159, 12631102 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/593/0081-01", "/se2d/593/0083-02", "/se2d/593/0083-01", "/se2d/593/0084-01", "/se2d/593/0395-01", "/se2d/593/0396-01", "/se2d/592/0200-02" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "\"[A] party's failure to properly preserve an issue for appellate review ordinarily justifies the appellate court's refusal to consider the issue on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641642 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640279 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "noting the defendant's impermissible attempt at an \"equine swap\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-60", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that constitutional matters that are not raised and passed upon at trial will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal.\" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165972 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that constitutional matters that are not raised and passed upon at trial will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal.\" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 L. Ed. 2d 760", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 U.S. 1319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738089 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "632-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954525 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151736 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8379695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" }, { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "\"A trial court has 'wide latitude in deciding when a prior consistent statement can be admitted for corroborative, nonhearsay purposes.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138508 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "\"A trial court has 'wide latitude in deciding when a prior consistent statement can be admitted for corroborative, nonhearsay purposes.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300872 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161583 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hagans, 177 N.C. App. 17, 23, 628 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167249 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155839 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796541 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" }, { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957565 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" }, { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542671 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511311 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150522 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155599 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623030 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 344-45, 103 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5309817 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 344-45, 103 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519974 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "652-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511888 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96", "parenthetical": "\"[A] party's failure to properly preserve an issue for appellate review ordinarily justifies the appellate court's refusal to consider the issue on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160391 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684963 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344", "parenthetical": "noting that \"plain error review is limited to errors in a trial court's jury instructions or a trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150506 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that \"plain error review is limited to errors in a trial court's jury instructions or a trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155375 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "noting the defendant's impermissible attempt at an \"equine swap\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249125 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0120-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1271, "char_count": 29383, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.220620616966642e-08, "percentile": 0.476932052795356 }, "sha256": "6862ecb01b2304611ab41e129d27d63f503f9fb930d6a99d0461bbccc3d8dc28", "simhash": "1:b512546d673e2c76", "word_count": 4800 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LUCIANO DIAZ TELLEZ" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nLuciano Diaz Tellez (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a conviction of two counts of second-degree murder and one count of felonious hit- and-run. For the reasons set forth below, we hold no error.\nOn 4 March 2007, at approximately 1:00 p.m., defendant arrived at a party in Coats, North Carolina where LuJayne Childers (\u201cChilders\u201d) and Ramon Castro (\u201cCastro\u201d) were already present. Defendant consumed approximately four beers during the party. Childers, who consumed three beers during the party, observed defendant drinking but did not spend significant time with him and did not know how much alcohol defendant had consumed: Shortly before dark, Childers, Castro, and defendant left the party. Defendant drove Castro\u2019s car; Castro sat in the front passenger seat, and Childers sat in the rear passenger seat. At the time, Childers did not believe that defendant was intoxicated.\nAt approximately 5:00 p.m., Dwane Braswell (\u201cMr. Braswell\u201d) left his house in Clayton, North Carolina with his nine-year-old son Jerry Braswell (\u201cJerry\u201d) to pick up his weekly paycheck in Fuquay-Varina, North Carolina. Mr. Braswell hauled logs for a living with his eighteen-wheeler truck. At 6:18 p.m., Mr. Braswell called his wife Candy Braswell (\u201cMs. Braswell\u201d) on a two-way radio and offered to bring dinner home.\nThereafter, Staley Ogburn (\u201cOgburn\u201d) observed a large truck\u2014 a tractor without a trailer attached \u2014 approach the intersection of Plain View Church Road traveling eastbound on Highway 210 at approximately fifty-five miles per hour, which was the speed limit for that portion of the highway. Ogburn had stopped at the intersection to wait for the truck to pass so that he could turn right onto Highway 210.\nMeanwhile, defendant approached the intersection of Plain View Church Road and Highway 210. Defendant slowed down the car, but did not stop at the stop sign. Defendant drove around Ogburn\u2019s car and drove into the intersection at approximately twenty or twenty-five miles per hour. Childers yelled, \u201cthe truck,\u201d and Castro yelled, \u201cthe trucka,\u201d but defendant drove into the truck\u2019s path and collided with the truck. The truck rolled several times and caught on fire.\nChilders did not see defendant after the collision, but he noticed that the driver\u2019s side door of the car was open. Ogburn saw two people, who appeared to be unharmed, sitting in the back seat of the car that hit the truck; Ogburn saw no one in the driver\u2019s seat.\nEmergency Medical Services (\u201cEMS\u201d) was dispatched at 6:46 p.m. and arrived on the scene at 6:53 p.m. Paramedics were unable to help the truck\u2019s occupants due to the intensity of the flames and were forced to wait for the fire department to arrive. Paramedics discovered the bodies of an adult male driver and a young male child, both burned beyond recognition. At approximately 9:35 p.m., Trooper Derek L. Mobley (\u201cTrooper Mobley\u201d) informed Ms. Braswell that her husband and son had been killed in a car crash. Dr. Samuel Simmons (\u201cDr. Simmons\u201d), an expert in forensic pathology, later testified that Mr. Braswell died of smoke and soot inhalation and thermal injury while Jerry died from smoke and soot inhalation, thermal injury, and blunt force cerebral injuries.\nTrooper R. Brian Maynard (\u201cTrooper Maynard\u201d) was the first trooper on the scene. He observed that the driver\u2019s side door of the car was ajar and that there were three beer cans inside the car \u2014 one in the driver\u2019s side door and two on the driver\u2019s side floorboard. One of the beer cans was open. Trooper Maynard also noticed a strong smell of alcohol coming from the inside of the car. Trooper Maynard took a written statement from Childers. Childers advised Trooper Maynard that she did not know where defendant was after the collision and that defendant \u201cwas drunk and left.. He was drunk and ran, got scared.\u201d Officers were unable to locate defendant that night.\nOn the morning of 5 March 2007, Sergeant Joe A. Starling (\u201cSergeant Starling\u201d) observed a person matching defendant\u2019s description at a mobile home where officers believed defendant was residing. As Sergeant Starling pulled his car up to the home, defendant, who was drinking a beer at the time, \u201clooked directly at\u201d and \u201cmade eye contact\u201d with Sergeant Starling and \u201cturned and ran directly 180 degrees from [Sergeant Starling] towards the wood line.\u201d Sergeant Starling chased defendant and \u201chollered at him to stop.\u201d Defendant stopped after Sergeant Starling caught up to and placed his hands on defendant. Sergeant Starling then placed defendant under arrest. Trooper Mobley arrived minutes later and observed that defendant\u2019s clothes were damp, that he had a slight odor of alcohol about his person, and that he had scratches on his arms and face.\nOn the morning of 6 March 2007, police interviewed .defendant with the assistance of Lea Granados, a Spanish interpreter certified by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Defendant admitted that he was driving the car at the time of the collision. Defendant stated that he did not see the truck when he pulled onto Highway 210 and that he tried to speed up upon realizing the truck was about to hit him. Defendant said he ran away after the collision because he was on probation. He also stated that he spent the night in the woods near his house. Defendant explained that he was \u201cjust having a beer\u201d at the time Sergeant Starling encountered him at his residence.\nDefendant admitted that he did not have and had never had a North Carolina driver\u2019s license, and that his privilege to obtain one had been revoked. He further admitted that he had been arrested twice for driving while impaired. Specifically, defendant had been convicted of driving while impaired on 28 August 2002 stemming from driving with a 0.12 blood-alcohol concentration (\u201cBAC\u201d) on 15 May 2002. On 4 November 2005, defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on supervised probation for driving while license revoked and driving while impaired stemming from an incident on 29 April 2005 when, with a 0.21 BAC, he drove into two parked cars, forcing one of them into a residential building.\nOn 9 April 2007, a- grand jury returned true bills of indictment against defendant for two counts of second degree murder and one count of felonious hit-and-run. At the 18 August 2008 Criminal Session of Johnston County Superior Court, defendant\u2019s case was called for trial. On 22 August 2008, a jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced defendant as a prior record level II offender to consecutive sentences of imprisonment of 189 to 236 months, 189 to 236 months, and seven to nine months, respectively, for the convictions. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury with respect to evidence of his prior impaired driving and driving while license revoked convictions and that the court effectively instructed the jury that the State had proven the element of malice for second-degree murder. Defendant, however, has failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.\nThe North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 10(b)(2) provides that\n[a] party may not assign as error any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly that to which he objects and the grounds of his objection ....\nN.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (2007). It is well-established that \u201cwhere a theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount in the appellate courts.\u201d State v. Holliman, 155 N.C. App. 120, 123, 573 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Lopez, 188 N.C. App. 553, 557, 655 S.E.2d 895, 898 (2008) (noting the defendant\u2019s impermissible attempt at an \u201cequine swap\u201d). But, the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure also provide that\n[i]n criminal cases, a question which was not preserved by objection noted at trial and which is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action, nevertheless may be made the basis of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\nN.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (2007). See also In re. W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 247 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009) (noting that \u201cplain error review is limited to errors in a trial court\u2019s jury instructions or a trial court\u2019s rulings on admissibility of evidence\u201d) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 460, 533 S.E.2d 168, 230-31 (2000)).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel engaged in the following colloquy with respect to giving pattern jury instruction, number 104.15 prior to the introduction of evidence of defendant\u2019s previous convictions:\n[THE COURT]: Well, here is what I proposed to tell the jury. Something along these lines: Members of the jury, you are about to hear evidence tending to show that on a previous occasion the defendant was charged with \u2014 I could say another crime. I could say the crimes of driving while impaired and driving while his driver\u2019s license was revoked. I simply say as I indicated was charged with some other crime. Perhaps that\u2019s the best way to deal with it right now. This evidence is being received solely for the purpose of showing malice as that term will be defined for you at a later time. If you believe this evidence, you may consider it, but only for the limited purpose for which it is being received.\n[THE COURT]: What says the defendant?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The defendant is satisfied with that instruction, Your Honor.\nDuring the trial, and without objection, the trial court instructed the jury:\n[A]t this time I expect that you are about to hear evidence tending to show that on some previous occasion the defendant was charged with some other crime. I charge that this evidence is being received solely for the purpose of showing malice as that term will be defined for you at some later time during this trial. If you believe this evidence, you may consider it, but only for the limited purpose for which it is being received.\nThus, the limiting instruction which defendant now contests on appeal was provided in substance and virtually verbatim to the jury, without objection, at trial.\nLater, at the close of all the evidence, the trial court again instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:\n[E]vidence has been received tending to show that on two occasions prior to the date of these alleged crimes, the defendant was convicted of driving while impaired and that on two other prior occasions he was convicted of driving with a revoked license. This evidence was received solely for the purpose of showing malice. If you believe this evidence, you may consider it, but only for this limited purpose for which it was received.\nDuring the charge conference, the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel discussed the wording of this instruction at length. The court indicated its intention to include instruction, number 104.15 after the element of malice in pattern jury instruction, number 206.32 for second-degree murder. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that\nalong the way the jury needs to know that they can\u2019t use those prior conviction[s] as evidence that he was driving while impaired. And by taking it away from where you were going to put it and putting it into number five [of pattern jury instruction, number 206.32], what you\u2019re saying is this is what it\u2019s for, don\u2019t use it for anything else. Whereas before, it draws more attention of don\u2019t use it for guilt for any other purpose. I think it takes away something. Although it does make it very clear that it\u2019s being used for malice, I think it takes away from the instruction that it can be used for something else.\nIn other words, defendant objected to the limiting instruction on the grounds that it was not sufficiently limiting, not on the grounds \u2014 now advanced on appeal \u2014 that the \u201cinstruction effectively removed the State\u2019s burden of proving the critical element of malice.\u201d\nBecause defendant did not object to the instruction when given prior to the introduction of contested evidence, and because he did not object to the instruction given at the close of the evidence on the theory now presented, defendant was required to demonstrate that the alleged error amounts to plain error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (2007). However, defendant neither assigned nor argued plain error, and thus, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See State v. Rodriguez, 192 N.C. App. 178, 187, 664 S.E.2d 654, 660 (2008). Since defendant failed to preserve the issue of the limiting instruction on appeal, we need not address it. See Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 195-96, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008) (\u201c[A] party\u2019s failure to properly preserve an issue for appellate review ordinarily justifies the appellate court\u2019s refusal to consider the issue on appeal.\u201d).\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the second-degree murder charges on the grounds that there was no evidence that defendant was impaired. We disagree.\nIn order to survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present substantial evidence \u201c(1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense.\u201d State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). \u201cThe term \u2018substantial evidence\u2019 ... is interchangeable with \u2018more than a scintilla of evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Faison, 330 N.C. 347, 358, 411 S.E.2d 143, 149 (1991) (quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982)). \u201c \u2018If there is more than a scintilla of competent evidence to support allegations in the warrant or indictment, it is the court\u2019s duty to submit the case to the jury.\u2019 \u201d State v. Everhardt, 96 N.C. App. 1, 11, 384 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1989), aff\u2019d, 326 N.C. 777, 392 S.E.2d 391 (1990) (quoting State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 344-45, 103 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1958)). The court must consider all of the evidence admitted, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378-79, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000). But, \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration.\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1982); State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 98-99, 678 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009). \u201c[S]o long as the evidence supports a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s guilt, a motion to dismiss is properly denied even though the evidence also \u2018permits a reasonable inference of the defendant\u2019s innocence.\u2019 \u201d Miller, 363 N.C. at 99, 678 S.E.2d at 594 (quoting State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2002)). Ultimately, it is the jury\u2019s task to resolve contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence and make the final determination of defendant\u2019s guilt. Fritseh, 351 N.C. at 379, 526 S.E.2d at 455.\nDefendant was convicted of second-degree murder. Second-degree murder is defined as \u201can unlawful killing with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Brewer, 328 N.C. 515, 522, 402 S.E.2d 380, 385 (1991). \u201cIntent to kill is not a necessary element of second-degree murder, but there must be an intentional act sufficient to show malice.\u201d Id. To prove malice with respect to operating a motor vehicle, \u201c[i]t is necessary for the State to prove only that defendant had the intent to perform the act of driving in such a reckless manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely result, thus evidencing depravity of mind.\u201d State v. Locklear, 159 N.C. App. 588, 592, 583 S.E.2d 726, 729 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 157, 593 S.E.2d 394, aff'd, 359 N.C. 63, 602 S.E.2d 359 (2004) (per curiam).\nIn the case sub judice, defendant concedes that there was evidence that he was operating the vehicle and that he previously had been convicted of driving while impaired. Defendant\u2019s sole contention is that there was not sufficient evidence that he was impaired while driving on 4 March 2007. By focusing on evidence of impairment, defendant attempts to direct this Court\u2019s attention away from the paramount issue \u2014 whether defendant \u201cdr[ove] in such a reckless manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely result.\u201d Locklear, 159 N.C. App. at 592, 583 S.E.2d at 729. See also State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 395, 527 S.E.2d 299, 304 (2000) (holding that in order to prove second-degree murder the State only was required \u201cto prove [] that defendant had the intent to perform the act of driving in such a reckless manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely result\u201d and \u201cwas not required to show that defendant had a conscious, direct purpose to do specific harm or damage, or had a specific intent to kill\u201d).\nThe State\u2019s evidence clearly established that (1) defendant consumed three beers over three hours immediately prior to operating a motor vehicle; (2) defendant began consuming a fourth beer while operating a motor vehicle; (3) defendant failed to stop at a stop sign; (4) defendant drove around Ogburn\u2019s vehicle and pulled onto Highway 210 without noticing the truck; (5) defendant sped up upon realizing the truck was about to hit him; (6) defendant purportedly did not notice that the truck with which he had collided was engulfed in flames; (7) defendant fled the scene of the crash without checking on either the occupants of the track or his friends inside the severely damaged car; (8) Childers told investigators that defendant was drank or, at the very least, that defendant may have been drunk; and (9) defendant hid and slept in the woods and ran from police when apprehended. In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, evidence favoring the State is to be considered as a whole in determining its sufficiency. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 652-53. It is clear that the evidence of defendant\u2019s reckless operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the collision viewed in its totality is substantial. See State v. Davis, 197 N.C. App. 738, 743, 678 S.E.2d 385, 389 (2009) (holding that the State\u2019s evidence that defendant had a 0.13 BAC; defendant \u201cgot into his track and drove on a well-traveled highway\u201d; defendant \u201cran over a sign and continued driving\u201d; defendant \u201ccontinued weaving side to side\u201d; defendant \u201ceventually ran off the road and, without braking or otherwise attempting to avoid a collision, crashed into [a] pickup track\u201d was sufficient to support a finding of malice).\nAccordingly, we hold that the State\u2019s evidence of defendant\u2019s reckless driving, alcohol consumption both before and while operating a motor vehicle, prior impaired driving and driving while license revoked convictions, and flight and elusive behavior after the collision constitutes substantial evidence of malice based upon depravity of mind sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the introduction of Trooper Maynard\u2019s testimony con-' veying certain statements made by Childers to Trooper Maynard at the scene of the crash that defendant \u201cwas drunk and left.... He was drunk and ran, got scared.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201c \u2018The standard of review for this Court assessing evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. A trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d State v. Cook, 193 N.C. App. 179, 181, 666 S.E.2d 795, 797 (2008) (quoting State v. Hagans, 177 N.C. App. 17, 23, 628 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2006)). The abuse of discretion standard applies to decisions by a trial court that a statement is admissible for corroboration. See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 104, 552 S.E.2d 596, 617 (2001) (\u201cA trial court has \u2018wide latitude in deciding when a prior consistent statement can be admitted for corroborative, nonhearsay purposes.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 410, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998)).\nHearsay \u2014 which is \u201cgenerally inadmissible,\u201d State v. Glynn, 178 N.C. App. 689, 696, 632 S.E.2d 551, 556 (2006) \u2014 \u201cis a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2007). \u201cHowever, out-of-court statements offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay . . . .\u201d Glynn, 178 N.C. App. at 696, 632 S.E.2d at 556. Thus, evidence offered for corroboration and not as substantive evidence will not be excluded as hearsay. See State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 39, 678 S.E.2d 618, 636-37 (2009).\nAs this Court has explained,\n[corroborative testimony is testimony which tends to strengthen, confirm, or make more certain the testimony of another witness. In order to be admissible as corroborative evidence, a witness\u2019 [J prior consistent statements merely must tend to add weight or credibility to the witness\u2019s testimony. Further, it is well established that such corroborative evidence may contain new or additional facts when it tends to strengthen and add credibility to the testimony which it corroborates. If the previous statements are generally consistent with the witness\u2019 testimony, slight variations will not render the statements inadmissible, but such variations ... affect [only] the credibility of the statement. A trial court has wide latitude in deciding when a prior consistent statement can be admitted for corroborative, nonhearsay purposes.\nState v. Bell, 159 N.C. App. 151, 155, 584 S.E.2d 298, 301 (2003), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 733, 601 S.E.2d 863 (2004) (first and second alterations added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Burton, 322 N.C. 447, 450, 368 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1988). Ultimately, \u201c[t]he trial court is in the best position to determine whether the testimony of [one witness as to a prior statement of another witness] corroborate[s] the testimony of [the latter].\u201d Bell, 159 N.C. App. at 156, 584 S.E.2d at 302. Only if the prior statement contradicts the trial testimony should the prior statement be excluded. See, e.g., Burton, 322 N.C. at 450-51, 368 S.E.2d at 632-33 (holding that the trial court erred by overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the admissibility of a prior statement that the victim was \u201clying flat on his back when he was shot\u201d because the prior statement contradicted the witness\u2019s trial testimony that the victim was \u201con top of\u2019 another individual).\nIn the case sub judice, Childers acknowledged during cross-examination that she told the investigator hired by defense counsel \u201c[s]omething to th[e] effect\u201d that she was not \u201csure whether the defendant was drunk or just a bad driver,\u201d adding, \u201c[m]aybe he was an inexperienced driver. I didn\u2019t know if he was intoxicated. I didn\u2019t think he was.\u201d Later, during Trooper Maynard\u2019s testimony, the trial court gave the following limiting instruction to the jury:\n[Y]ou are about to hear testimony from this witness, Trooper' Maynard, which might tend to show that at an earlier time a previous witness in this case, Ms. LuJayne Childers, made a statement which may be consistent or may conflict with her testimony at this trial. I instruct you that you must not consider such earlier statement as evidence of the truth of what was said at that earlier time because it was not made, under oath at this trial. If you believe that such earlier statement was made and that it\u2019s consistent or does conflict with the testimony of Ms. Childers at this trial, then you may consider this, together with all other facts and circumstances, bearing upon her truthfulness, in deciding whether you will believe or disbelieve her testimony at this trial.\nTrooper Maynard then testified that when he asked Childers at the scene of the crash where the driver had gone, Childers told him, \u201cI don\u2019t know. He was drunk and left. He was drunk and ran, got scared.\u201d\nThe two statements relate to Childers\u2019s opinion of defendant\u2019s level of impairment at different times. Contrary to defendant\u2019s contentions, the prosecutor was not offering Trooper Maynard\u2019s statement to corroborate Childers\u2019s statement concerning her opinion prior to the crash. Instead, the prosecutor offered Trooper Maynard\u2019s statement to corroborate Childers\u2019s testimony that she made \u201cstatements to investigators saying that she did not know whether the defendant was drunk or just a bad driver.\u201d Childers initially stated that she thought defendant may have been drunk, while Childers\u2019s statement to Trooper Maynard that defendant \u201cwas drunk\u201d provided new information and \u201cstrengthen[ed] or add[ed] credibility to her previous statement that she admitted during testimony.\u201d See Bell, 159 N.C. App. at 155, 584 S.E.2d at 301.\nAs noted, supra, \u201c[a] trial court has wide latitude in deciding when a prior consistent statement can be admitted for corroborative, nonhearsay purposes.\u201d Bell, 159 N.C. App. at 155, 584 S.E.2d at 301. Here, it cannot be said that the trial court\u2019s decision was \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason and ... so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 447, 648 S.E.2d 788, 794 (2007) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1319, 170 L. Ed. 2d 760 (2008). Further, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice, particularly in light of the abundance of caution exercised by the trial court in giving an appropriate limiting instruction.\nAccordingly, we hold that Trooper Maynard\u2019s testimony strengthened Childers\u2019s testimony, and thus, the trial court properly admitted Trooper Maynard\u2019s testimony regarding Childers\u2019s statement to him that defendant \u201cwas drunk and left ... He was drunk and ran, got scared\u201d for corroboration.\nFinally, defendant argues that he was denied due process of law when the trial court permitted the State to make purportedly improper statements to the jury during its closing argument. We disagree.\nDefendant made only a general objection to the State\u2019s closing arguments, which the trial court overruled:\n[PROSECUTOR]: . . . But if you think back to the defendant\u2019s statement that he gave to the officers, I think that is a critical piece of evidence, how much time the defendant stayed at the party because he\u2019s drinking the entire time.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.\n[THE COURT]: Overruled,\nOn appeal, defendant attempts to extrapolate from that general objection an argument of constitutional magnitude. Accordingly, to the extent that the instant issue involves due process or other constitutional considerations, defendant has failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. See State v. Dean, 196 N.C. App. 180, 188, 674 S.E.2d 453, 459-60 (2009) (\u201cIt is well settled that constitutional matters that are not raised and passed upon at trial will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal.\u201d (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); N.C. R. App. P. 10(b) (2007).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold no error.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Attorney General Hal Askins and Assistant Attorney General Jess D. MeKeel, for the State.", "Sofie W. Hosford, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LUCIANO DIAZ TELLEZ\nNo. COA09-338\n(Filed 3 November 2009)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 limiting instruction \u2014 no objection\nAn appeal from a limiting instruction was not considered where defendant failed to object to the instruction when given prior to the introduction of the contested evidence, did not object to the instruction at the close of the evidence on the theory now presented, and neither assigned nor argued plain error.\n2. Homicide\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 drunken driving \u2014 malice \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe State\u2019s evidence of defendant\u2019s convictions for reckless driving, alcohol consumption both before and while operating a motor vehicle, prior impaired driving, and driving while license revoked, as well as flight and elusive behavior after the collision, constituted substantial evidence of malice based upon depravity of mind sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss a second-degree murder prosecution.\n3. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 trooper\u2019s account of witness\u2019s statements \u2014 admissible\u2014corroboration\nIn a second-degree murder prosecution arising from an auto collision, a Highway Patrol Trooper\u2019s testimony relating a passenger\u2019s statements about defendant (the driver) being drunk was properly admitted for corroboration because it strengthened the passenger\u2019s testimony. Furthermore, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 closing argument \u2014 general objection\nDefendant\u2019s general objection to the State\u2019s closing argument in a second-degree murder prosecution did not preserve for appellate review an issue involving due process or other constitutional considerations.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 22 August 20\u201808 by Judge Thomas H. Lock in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 September 2009.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Attorney General Hal Askins and Assistant Attorney General Jess D. MeKeel, for the State.\nSofie W. Hosford, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0517-01", "first_page_order": 543, "last_page_order": 555 }