{ "id": 4172507, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS E. WRIGHT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wright", "decision_date": "2009-11-03", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1392", "first_page": "578", "last_page": "586", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 578" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635825 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11711714 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155599 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411017 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138413 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511282 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302134 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4772976 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 620" }, { "page": "804" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708015 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 620" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045236 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917", "parenthetical": "quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 620 (1966)" }, { "page": "917-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557891 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 620 (1966)" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567546 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139503 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0095-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 869, "char_count": 19817, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.547323632535678e-07, "percentile": 0.674041227886259 }, "sha256": "7a6885595db1871bba913788e6fd5e98bf63acd34118ba289f313b11dc922a47", "simhash": "1:9ff8b56a5314017f", "word_count": 3191 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS E. WRIGHT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nThomas E. Wright (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. We find no error.\nI. Background\nDefendant was a member of the North Carolina House of Representatives and the president of The Community\u2019s Health Foundation, Inc. (\u201cthe Foundation\u201d). In the spring of 2002, defendant approached Ronnie Burbank (\u201cBurbank\u201d), a commercial lender with Coastal Federal Bank, and requested a loan to purchase property at 926 North 4th Street in Wilmington, North Carolina for the Foundation. Defendant represented to Burbank that the loan would be repaid through government grant funds.\nFive-and-a-half years later, on 10 December 2007, defendant was indicted for six separate offenses, including, inter alia, four counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant\u2019s cases were scheduled for trial on 3 March 2008. On 7 February 2008, defendant filed a Motion to Continue Trial Date and Extend the Discovery Period. The trial court granted the motion and defendant\u2019s cases were rescheduled for trial on 31 March 2008.\nOn 20 March 2008, defendant was removed from the North Carolina House of Representatives. Defendant\u2019s counsel stated the removal was the lead news story on all local television stations and \u201ca number of top legislators pronounced defendant guilty of the criminal charges against him.\u201d\nOn 28 March 2008, defendant made another Motion to Continue that was denied by the trial court. Beginning on 31 March 2008, defendant was tried in Wake County Superior Court on four counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. The State presented evidence that defendant contacted Torlen Wade (\u201cWade\u201d), former acting director of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services\u2019 Office of Research, Demonstrations' and Rural Health Development, regarding funds needed to secure a building for an African-American history museum that would also house the Foundation. Wade testified he told defendant he could not fund the history project, but could support the health project if defendant went through the appropriate grant process. Defendant told Wade he did not really need the money, he just needed a letter to give to the bank. Subsequently, Wade provided the letter.\nBurbank internally approved a loan in the amount of $150,000 to the Foundation on 5 March 2002, relying on defendant\u2019s representations that the source of repayment would primarily be the funds obtained from state and federal grants. Wade did not write his letter until 15 March 2002, and Burbank received the letter shortly thereafter. The loan closed on 5 April 2002. Burbank testified he initially relied on the defendant\u2019s representations and Wade\u2019s letter to approve and later to renew and extend the time for repayment of the loan.\nOn 14 November 2003, defendant contacted AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals (\u201cAstraZeneca\u201d) and requested a donation of $1,500 to the Foundation for educational initiatives and projects. Brian Shank (\u201cShank\u201d), a lobbyist for AstraZeneca, recommended a $2,400 contribution from AstraZeneca to the Foundation. Agent Kanawa Perry (\u201cAgent Perry\u201d) with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation testified that defendant told him he deposited the Foundation\u2019s check into his personal bank account. Shank testified he would not have recommended the contribution to the Foundation if he had known the funds would not have gone to the Foundation.\nOn 6 February 2004, defendant requested a contribution from Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. (\u201cAnheuser-Busch\u201d) for the Foundation. Lewis McKinney (\u201cMcKinney\u201d), regional director for government affairs with Anheuser-Busch, testified he recommended a $5000 contribution from Anheuser-Busch to the Foundation. Anheuser-Busch sent defendant a $5000 check on 5 March 2004. Defendant told Agent Perry he deposited the funds in his personal bank account. McKinney testified it was his intent in recommending the contribution that it be used for the Foundation and not deposited into defendant\u2019s private account.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge of obtaining $150,000 by false pretenses from Coastal Federal Bank. The trial court denied this motion. Defendant then renewed his motion to dismiss the same charge at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court again denied the motion.\nThe jury returned verdicts of guilty to three charges of obtaining property by false pretenses: (1) obtaining $150,000 from Coastal Federal Bank; (2) obtaining $2400 from AstraZeneca; and (3) obtaining $5000 from Anheuser-Busch. Defendant was found not guilty on the remaining charge of obtaining $1500 from AT&T Corporation. The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive active sentences of a minimum term of six months to a maximum term of eight months. Defendant also received an active sentence of a minimum term of fifty-eight months to a maximum term of seventy-nine months that was to run at the expiration of the first two sentences. All sentences were to be served in the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appeals.\nII. Motion to Continue\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Continue. Defendant contends that the extreme publicity in Wake County resulting from defendant\u2019s removal from the North Carolina House of Representatives, eleven days prior to the commencement of the trial, irreparably tainted the jury pool. We disagree.\nNormally, the review of a denial of a motion for continuance is restricted to whether the trial court abused its discretion and the denial will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Barnard, 346 N.C. 95, 104, 484 S.E.2d 382, 387 (1997). However, when the motion raises a constitutional issue, the trial court\u2019s action is a reviewable question of law. Id. \u201cThe denial of a motion to continue, even when the motion raises a constitutional issue, is grounds for a new trial only upon a showing by the defendant that the denial was erroneous and also that his case was prejudiced as a result of the error.\u201d Id. (quoting State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 104, 291 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1982)).\nDefendant filed a Motion to Continue on the grounds that pretrial publicity had the potential to prejudice the jury pool and deprive defendant of a fair trial, in violation of defendant\u2019s due process rights. \u201cDue process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.\u201d State v. Boykin, 291 N.C. 264, 269, 229 S.E.2d 914, 917 (1976) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 620 (1966)). \u201c[Wjhere there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity.\u201d State v. Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 478, 302 S.E.2d 799, 804 (1983) (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 620). The burden is on the defendant to Show \u201cso great a prejudice . . . that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.\u201d Richardson, 308 N.C. at 478, 302 S.E.2d at 804 (quoting Boykin, 291 N.C. \u00e1t 269, 229 S.E.2d at 917-18).\nIn the instant case, defendant did not present any evidence to the trial court in support of his Motion to Continue and did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of any pretrial publicity. The record before this Court is also bereft of any evidence by which defendant\u2019s claims regarding pretrial publicity could be evaluated. Without any evidence of the nature of the pretrial publicity complained about by defendant, it is impossible to determine whether defendant was prejudiced or whether the trial court erred by denying the Motion to Continue.\nEven assuming, arguendo, that there was sufficient evidence of pretrial publicity in the record, the transcript of the voir dire proceedings makes it clear that this publicity did not improperly influence the jury. All of the jurors on defendant\u2019s jury explicitly stated they either bad not heard about defendant\u2019s case or that they could put aside what they heard on television or read in newspapers and could determine defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence based on the evidence they heard at trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court cannot be said to have erred by denying defendant\u2019s Motion to Continue. See Richardson, 308 N.C. at 481, 302 S.E.2d at 805; State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 369-72, 346 S.E.2d 596, 610-12 (1986).\nIII. Testimony of Kim Strach\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony by Kim Strach (\u201cMs. Strach\u201d), Deputy Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (\u201cthe SBE\u201d). Ms. Strach testified the SBE received a complaint in December 2006 alleging the \u201cCommittee to Elect Thomas Wright\u201d violated campaign finance regulations by failing to timely report receipt of some contributions that it had received. The SBE subpoenaed defendant\u2019s bank account records and compared them to campaign finance reports. The SBE discovered some campaign contributions that were deposited had not been disclosed. Based on this information, the SBE decided to audit the accounts. The SBE examined every check and discovered that between 2000 and 2006, 58% of defendant\u2019s campaign contributions were deposited into his personal account. During the audit, the SBE noticed checks from AstraZeneca and Anheuser-Busch deposited in defendant\u2019s personal account. Ms. Strach further testified about the amount of defendant\u2019s campaign expenditures and contributions that had not been disclosed.\nA. Rule 404(h)\nDefendant argues that Ms. Strach\u2019s testimony was inadmissible under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 403 and 404(b)(2007). \u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s determination to admit evidence under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403, for an abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Summers, 177 N.C. App. 691, 697, 629 S.E.2d 902, 907 (2006) (citations omitted). Rule 404(b) provides:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2007). Rule 404(b) \u201cstate[s] a clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). \u201cRule 404(b) evidence, however, should be carefully scrutinized in order to adequately safeguard against the improper introduction of character evidence against the accused.\u201d State v. al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2002).\nMs. Strach\u2019s testimony related directly to obstruction of justice charges against defendant that were not joined with the four counts of obtaining property by false pretenses for defendant\u2019s trial. However, Ms. Strach\u2019s testimony was necessary for the State to show how some of the charges in the instant case were initiated. Ms. Strach testified that the improper transfers of the contributions by AstraZeneca and Anheuser-Busch into defendant\u2019s personal accounts were first discovered after audits were performed. Because Ms. Strach\u2019s testimony was probative of a fact other than the character of the defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony.\nB. Due Process\nDefendant argues that allowing evidence about defendant\u2019s campaign expenditures was equivalent to trying defendant for the obstruction of justice charge which was severed before trial began, in violation of defendant\u2019s right to due process. Defendant contends he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not have adequate time to prepare to address the obstruction of justice charge.\nAt trial, defendant did not object to Ms. Strach\u2019s testimony on this basis, and he has therefore failed to preserve his constitutional arguments for appellate review. It is well settled that constitutional issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 389, 555 S.E.2d 557, 571 (2001). This assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Trial Court\u2019s Response to Jury Questions\nAfter the jury retired to deliberate, the jury presented a question to the trial court regarding the charges on Count Number 4, obtaining the $150,000 loan from Coastal Federal Bank by false pretenses (\u201cCount Four\u201d). The jury asked two questions: (1) whether renewal and extension of bank loans mean the same thing as \u201cobtained a loan\u201d and (2) does the representation to the bank only include a copy of the letter to the bank or does it include any oral and/or verbal representations? After hearing from counsel, the trial court instructed the jury that renewal and extension of bank loans mean the same thing as \u201cobtained a loan\u201d and that the representation to the bank \u201conly includes a copy of the letter.\u201d\nA. Consistency of Trial Court\u2019s Answer with Indictment\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in its answer to the jury\u2019s first question. Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s answer was inconsistent with both the indictment and the trial court\u2019s original charge to the jury. An inquiry into whether a variance between a bill of indictment and a jury charge was prejudicial error and therefore fatal requires an examination of the purposes of an indictment, which are: \u201c(1) to identify the crime with which defendant is charged, (2) to protect defendant against being charged twice for the same offense, (3) to provide defendant with a basis on which to prepare a defense, and (4) to guide the court in sentencing.\u201d State v. Hines, 166 N.C. App. 202, 206-07, 600 S.E.2d 891, 895 (2004) (citation omitted).\nHere, the \u201cvariance\u201d did not result in failure to identify the crime charged and defendant was not charged twice for the same offense. For his actions procuring the loan, defendant was only charged on one count of obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant had a basis for defense and the indictment put defendant on notice it was considering defendant\u2019s use of the letter from Wade during the time frame of 13 March 2002 until June 2004. There was no inconsistency between the trial court\u2019s answer to the jury questions and the indictment.\nDefendant also argues the judge\u2019s answers violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(2), which reads: \u201c(a) A criminal pleading must contain: ... (2) A separate count addressed to each offense charged, but allegations in one count may be incorporated by reference in another count.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(2) (2007). Defendant was charged with only one offense in Count Four and convicted of one offense in Count Four. This assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Trial Court\u2019s Answer\nDefendant argues the trial court\u2019s answer was manifestly unsupported by reason because the loan was internally approved before the letter was written and the recipients had already received the money. The only case defendant cites in support of this argument, White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985), merely states the standard of review for abuse of discretion. This case does not support defendant\u2019s position. As such, we deem this assignment of error abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2008).\nV. Motion to Dismiss Count Four\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss Count Four. \u201cUpon defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.\u201d State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation omitted). To sustain a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses, the State must establish: \u201c(1)[A] false representation of a past or subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which the defendant obtains or attempts to obtain anything of value from another person.\u201d State v. Saunders, 126 N.C. App. 524, 528, 485 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (1997). In the instant case, the State presented substantial evidence of each element of the offense. The State\u2019s evidence established that defendant used Wade\u2019s letter to falsely represent that he had obtained grant funds in order to obtain a thing of value, the loan. Defendant\u2019s argument focuses on the fact that Wade\u2019s letter was written on 15 March 2002, ten days after the date Burbank internally approved the loan. However, the loan was not disbursed until April 2002, and Burbank testified he relied on the letter in closing the loan. There is substantial evidence for a jury to infer the bank relied on the letter in disbursing the funds for the loan. The trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nVI. Conclusion\nDefendant has failed to bring forth any argument regarding his remaining assignment of error. As such, we deem this assignment of error abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P 2.8(b)(6) (2008).\nDefendant received a fair trial, free from error.\nNo error.\nJudges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State.", "Douglas S. Harris, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS E. WRIGHT\nNo. COA08-1392\n(Filed 3 November 2009)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 pretrial publicity \u2014 continuance denied\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance due to pretrial publicity where defendant neither presented evidence to support the motion nor asked the trial court to take judicial notice of any publicity, and all of the jurors stated that they had not heard about the case or could put aside what they had heard or read.\n2. Evidence\u2014 character \u2014 obtaining property by false pretenses \u2014 campaign finance activities \u2014 probative of fact other than character\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a prosecution for obtaining property by false pretenses by admitting testimony about campaign finance activities that was necessary to show how some of the charges were initiated and was probative of a fact other than the character of defendant.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 constitutional issue \u2014 evidence not objected to\nA constitutional issue regarding testimony which was not objected to at trial was not preserved for appellate review.\n4. Indictment and Information\u2014 answer to jury question \u2014 no inconsistency with indictment\nThere was no inconsistency between the indictment and the trial court\u2019s answer to a jury question about a bank loan in a prosecution for obtaining property by false pretenses.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 lack of supporting authority \u2014 argument abandoned\nAn argument that was not supported by the case cited was deemed abandoned.\n6. False Pretense\u2014 bank loan \u2014 availability of grant funds\nThe trial court did not err by not dismissing one charge of obtaining property by false pretenses with a loan where there was substantial evidence for the jury to infer that the bank relied on a letter falsely representing that grant funds were available in disbursing funds for the loan.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 7 April 2008 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State.\nDouglas S. Harris, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0578-01", "first_page_order": 604, "last_page_order": 612 }