{ "id": 4172576, "name": "THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. WILSON and DORIS WILSON, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. WILSON, Petitioners v. DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES and DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE of THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Estate of Wilson v. Division of Social Services", "decision_date": "2009-11-03", "docket_number": "No. COA09-216", "first_page": "747", "last_page": "753", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 747" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633154 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635483 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 565, 614 S.E.2d 479, 486 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794414 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789468 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 565, 614 S.E.2d 479, 486 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that \"[a] contention not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526433 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159-60", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[a] contention not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568167, 8568205, 8568301, 8568272, 8568240 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0390-01", "/nc/304/0390-02", "/nc/304/0390-05", "/nc/304/0390-04", "/nc/304/0390-03" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520689 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 C.F.R. \u00a7 416.1201", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 917", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787616, 1787648, 1787650, 1787566 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0917-02", "/us/448/0917-01", "/us/448/0917-03", "/us/448/0917-04" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787609 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "794" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 34", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11721956 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784, 794, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1180 (1980)" }, { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784, 794, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1180 (1980)" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238269 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "citing Sutton v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387, 389, 511 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1999)" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511222 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "citing Sutton v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387, 389, 511 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 706, "char_count": 16243, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.2885592943835722 }, "sha256": "556094630a4a7fde20b0b88f677a0c2168e17bef665b3abbf6314e06b2595515", "simhash": "1:45d1f3b0f5ba0fc6", "word_count": 2584 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. WILSON and DORIS WILSON, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. WILSON, Petitioners v. DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES and DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE of THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nPetitioner Doris Wilson, in her capacity as the administratrix of the Estate of Kenneth L. Wilson, appeals from the superior court\u2019s decision which reversed respondent North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services\u2019 (\u201cDHHS\u201d) final decision, but nonetheless held that Kenneth L. Wilson\u2019s assets exceeded the $3,000.00 resource limit for Medicaid eligibility. We disagree, and accordingly reverse the superior court\u2019s decision and remand to the superior court for further remand to DHHS for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\nI. Factual Background\nKenneth L. Wilson (\u201cMr. Wilson\u201d) was hospitalized at Carolinas Medical Center on 7 January 2007 until his death on 22 February 2007. During Mr. Wilson\u2019s hospitalization, his wife, Doris Wilson, sold her 100% stock ownership in Brothers Delivery Service, Inc. (\u201cBrothers\u201d) to her son, Kenneth L. Wilson, Jr., via a purchase agreement dated 24 January 2007 (\u201cPurchase Agreement\u201d). Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Kenneth L. Wilson, Jr., agreed to purchase 100% of the stock and assets associated with Brothers for the price of $62,531.00, to be paid in sixty installments of $1,041.82 each, beginning on 1 March 2007. The Purchase Agreement was signed by Kenneth Wilson, Jr., but was not signed by Doris Wilson.\nOn 5 April 2007, Doris Wilson applied for Medicaid benefits seeking coverage for Mr. Wilson\u2019s hospitalization. The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) denied petitioner\u2019s application for Medicaid benefits on 5 July 2007. This decision was affirmed by DSS in a Local Hearing Decision dated 3 August 2007, which found that the Purchase Agreement was a promissory note, the value of which counted toward Mr. Wilson\u2019s assets for the purpose of determining his eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Mr. Wilson\u2019s countable assets totaled $8,375.98 after the minimum Community Spouse Resource Allowance of $20,328.00 was subtracted from his total assets of $28,703.93. The total assets were calculated based on Mr. Wilson\u2019s available resources, including two account balances in two Branch Banking and Trust Accounts, a First Citizens bank account, and the value of a promissory note. DSS found that the value of Mr. Wilson\u2019s assets exceeded Medicaid\u2019s allowable resource limit of $3,000.00 and disqualified Mr. Wilson for Medicaid benefits. DSS\u2019s decision was affirmed by DHHS in a State Hearing Decision issued 3 October 2007; DHHS upheld the classification of the Purchase Agreement as a saleable promissory note. Petitioner requested further review of DHHS\u2019s decision alleging the Purchase Agreement was a bill of sale and not an asset for purposes of qualification for Medicaid benefits. On 22 January 2008, the DHHS Chief Hearing Officer issued a final decision affirming the 3 October 2007 decision denying Mr. Wilson\u2019s Medicaid benefit application due to excess resources.\nPetitioner sought judicial review of DHHS\u2019s final decision in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. In an Order dated 14 November 2008, the trial court reversed DHHS\u2019s final decision, finding the Purchase Agreement was not a saleable promissory note, but was an agreement for the sale of stock, a \u201cchattel\u201d with a value of $62,531.00. The trial court concluded, however, that the Purchase Agreement was countable against Mr. Wilson\u2019s assets for determining his eligibility for Medicaid benefits. The trial court remanded the issue to the Chief Hearing Officer to enter a new decision consistent with the trial court\u2019s findings. From this order, petitioner appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\n\u25a0 The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act provides an aggrieved party with the right to judicial review of an agency\u2019s final decision in a contested case. N.C: Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 (2007). Where a petitioner asserts that an agency\u2019s decision was affected by legal error, this Court reviews the agency\u2019s decision de novo. See Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (citing Sutton v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387, 389, 511 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1999)).\n[W]hen an appellate court reviews\n\u201ca superior court order regarding an agency decision, \u2018the appellate court examines the trial court\u2019s order for error of law. The process has been described as a twofold task: (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly.\u2019 \u201d\nId. at 14, 565 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Services, 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997)). Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the superior court properly applied the correct standard of review to the undisputed facts of the case at bar.\nIII. Issues on Appeal\nOn appeal, petitioner contends that (1) the trial court erred in concluding that the Purchase Agreement is \u201cchattel,\u201d a countable resource for purposes of determining Mr. Wilson\u2019s eligibility for Medicaid, or (2) in the alternative, if the Purchase Agreement is a countable resource, Brothers is excluded as a countable resource for the time period prior to Doris Wilson\u2019s making and attempted execution of the agreement pursuant to the North Carolina Adult Medicaid Manual as property actively involved in trade or business. We agree with petitioner and conclude that the Purchase Agreement is not a countable resource.\nFirst, petitioner contends that the Purchase Agreement is a bill of sale, not a negotiable instrument, and as such, should not be counted as a resource for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility. While we do not agree with petitioner\u2019s characterization of the Purchase Agreement as a bill of sale, we do agree that the agreement is not a countable asset for Medicaid eligibility purposes.\nPursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid program \u201c \u2018provid[es] federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.\u2019 \u201d Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36, 69 L. Ed. 2d 460, 465 (1981) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784, 794, reh\u2019g denied, 448 U.S. 917, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1180 (1980)). Each state establishes its own criteria for assessing Medicaid eligibility; therefore, \u201c[a]n individual is entitl\u00e9d to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the [s]tate in which he lives.\u201d Id. at 36-37, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 465. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 108A-55(a) (2007) provides the following:\n[DHHS] may authorize, within appropriations made for this purpose, payments of all or part of the cost of medical and other remedial care for any eligible person when it is essential to the health and welfare of such person that such care be provided, and when the total resources of such person are not sufficient to provide the necessary care.\nDHHS developed the North Carolina Adult Medicaid Manual (\u201cNCAMM\u201d) to determine whether or not an applicant is eligible to receive Medicaid coverage.\nAccording to the NCAMM, DHHS considers three types of property when determining eligibility: (1) real property, (2) personal property, and (3) liquid assets. North Carolina Adult Medicaid Manual \u00a7 2230I.B.1-3 (2008); see also 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 416.1201 (2009). The manual defines real property as \u201cland and all buildings or dwellings which are permanently affixed to the land.\u201d Id. Personal property is defined as \u201call personal effects and household goods[.]\u201d Id. \u201cLiquid assets include cash, bank accounts, certificates of deposit as well as any item that can be converted to cash[.]\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, the resource at issue is the Purchase Agreement purporting to sell 100% of Doris Wilson\u2019s stock and other assets of Brothers to Kenneth Wilson, Jr. With regard to the characterization of the Purchase Agreement, the Court notes that the parties agree that the agreement cannot be classified as either real or personal property. Therefore, in order to be considered a countable resource for determining Medicaid eligibility, the Purchase Agreement must meet the aforementioned definition of a liquid asset.\nDHHS, in its final decision, concluded that the Purchase Agreement was a promissory note, a negotiable instrument and countable resource for determining Medicaid eligibility. In order to be classified as a negotiable instrument, a writing must meet the following criteria:\n[B]e signed by the maker or drawer, contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money, contain no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by G.S. Chapter 25, Article 3, be payable on demand or at a definite time, and be payable to order or to bearer.\nGillespie v. DeWitt, 53 N.C. App. 252, 256-57, 280 S.E.2d 736, 740 (1981), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 832 (1981). On appeal, petitioner contends, and DHHS agrees in its brief, that the Purchase Agreement is not a negotiable promissory note because the payment terms were too uncertain to constitute an unconditional promise to pay. The superior court agreed and reversed DHHS\u2019s determination that the Purchase Agreement was a promissory note, but held that the agreement is \u201cchattel,\u201d a countable resource for determining Medicaid eligibility, having avalu\u00e9 of $62,531.00 to Doris Wilson.\nWith regard to this issue, we agree that the Purchase Agreement is not a promissory note; however, we disagree with the superior court\u2019s determination that the Purchase Agreement is \u201cchattel.\u201d Chattel is defined as \u201cmovable or transferable property.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 95 (2d ed. 2001). Moreover, chattel paper is defined as \u201c[a] writing that shows both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods.\u201d Id. The Purchase Agreement is neither transferrable nor movable. In addition, in order to be characterized as chattel paper, the resource must show a monetary obligation and thus be capable of being monetarily valued. See id. Here, as agreed upon by the parties in their briefs, the payment terms of the Purchase Agreement were too uncertain to determine what value should be given and when payments of such value should begin. Accordingly, the superior court erred in characterizing the agreement as chattel or chattel paper.\nWith regard to Mr. Wilson\u2019s Medicaid eligibility, this Court recognizes that the purpose of the Purchase Agreement was to sell Doris Wilson\u2019s family business, Brothers, to her son, Kenneth Wilson, Jr. DHHS argues that the ultimate issue in this matter rests on a determination of the present ownership status of Brothers. More specifically, DHHS contends that the Purchase Agreement did not transfer Doris Wilson\u2019s interest in Brothers to Kenneth Wilson, Jr., because the agreement was not signed by both parties. Therefore, DHHS contends that Doris Wilson currently maintains her ownership interest in Brothers.\nIn response, petitioner avers that DHHS did not raise the issue of Brothers\u2019 ownership status or the validity of the Purchase Agreement at the administrative agency level or the trial court level. Although the Court notes that the Purchase Agreement was not signed by Doris Wilson, after a careful review of the record on appeal, it appears that DHHS did not preserve the issues of Brothers\u2019 ownership status or the validity of the Purchase Agreement for appeal; therefore, pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the issues are not properly before this Court. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); see also Town of Chapel Hill v. Burchette, 100 N.C. App. 157, 159-60, 394 S.E.2d 698; 700 (1990) (holding that \u201c[a] contention not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal\u201d). Even if DHHS had preserved the issues for appeal, DHHS\u2019s argument is self-defeating. For instance, if the Court accepts DHHS\u2019s argument as true, Doris Wilson\u2019s interest in Brothers\u2019 stock and assets would be excluded as a countable asset for Medicaid eligibility purposes pursuant to DHHS\u2019s NCAMM. In pertinent part, the NCAMM provides that property actively used in a business or trade is excluded as a resource in determining Medicaid eligibility. North Carolina Adult Medicaid Manual \u00a7 2230VIIA.5 (2008). Prior to Doris\u2019s and Kenneth Wilson Jr.\u2019s drafting and execution of the Purchase Agreement, Doris Wilson\u2019s stock and assets of Brothers would have been characterized as property actively involved in a trade or business, Brothers. Further, during DHHS\u2019s administrative agency hearing, the Mecklenburg County income caseworker noted that Brothers was being classified as a non-countable asset prior to Doris Wilson\u2019s transfer of, the stock and assets of the business via the Purchase Agreement. Therefore, prior to the Purchase Agreement, Doris Wilson\u2019s ownership interest in .the stock as Mr. Wilson\u2019s spouse would have been excluded by DHHS pursuant to the definitions in the Medicaid Manual.\nThe stock and asset transfer via the Purchase Agreement should not affect Mr. Wilson\u2019s Medicaid eligibility because his eligibility would not have been adversely affected by Doris Wilson\u2019s maintaining her ownership of the stock and all assets in Brothers. The purpose of Medicaid, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as stated above, is \u201c \u2018to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.\u2019 \u201d Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 36, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 465 (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 301, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 794). If Doris Wilson had not executed the Purchase Agreement to sell her interest in Brothers to her son, Mr. Wilson may be considered a \u201cneedy person\u201d pursuant to Title XIX and the DHHS guidelines, and he would be eligible for Medicaid coverage.\nIV. Conclusion\nIn accordance with the purpose of Title XIX of the Social Security Act and the NCAMM, we conclude that this Purchase Agreement is not a liquid asset for the' purpose of determining Mr. Wilson\u2019s Medicaid eligibility. The agreement does not fit squarely within any of the three aforementioned categories of countable assets; therefore, it should be excluded from the calculation. Our Supreme Court has provided that \u201c \u2018[t]he role of the Court is not to sit as a super legislature and second-guess the balance struck by elected officials\u2019 \u201d; therefore, this Court should defer in this matter to the policy adopted by the United States Congress. Diaz v. Division of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 389, 628 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2006) (quoting State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 565, 614 S.E.2d 479, 486 (2005)). We hold that the trial court, in determining that the Purchase Agreement is chattel, acted under a misapprehension of law and thereby applied an incorrect standard of review to the undisputed facts. The decision of the superior court is reversed, and we remand to the superior court for further remand to DHHS for further proceedings to determine whether petitioner is entitled to Medicaid assistance if the Purchase Agreement is not included in the calculation.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ott Cone & Redpath, RA., by Laurie S. Truesdell, for petitioner appellants.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brenda Baddy, for North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services respondent appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. WILSON and DORIS WILSON, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH L. WILSON, Petitioners v. DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES and DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE of THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondents\nNo. COA09-216\n(Filed 3 November 2009)\nPublic Assistance\u2014 Medicaid \u2014 eligibility\u2014purchase agreement \u2014 chattel\u2014countable resource\nThe trial court erred by concluding that a purchase agreement was \u201cchattel\u201d and a countable resource for purposes of determining decedent\u2019s eligibility for Medicaid. The case is remanded to the superior court for further remand to the Department of Health and Human Services for further proceedings to determine whether petitioner is entitled to Medicaid assistance without the purchase agreement included in the calculation.\nAppeal by petitioners from judgment and order entered 14 November 2008 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 September 2009.\nOtt Cone & Redpath, RA., by Laurie S. Truesdell, for petitioner appellants.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brenda Baddy, for North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services respondent appellee." }, "file_name": "0747-01", "first_page_order": 773, "last_page_order": 779 }